 Our visitors could not come at a more interesting time in US-Japan alliance relations and developments in Asia. What we'll do for the next two hours is start with Professor Shinichi Kitaoka, with whom I'll have a dialogue, and then we'll open it up to the audience for questions to talk about the Abe administration's security agenda, how it fits in the history and development of Japanese strategic thinking and the significance for our alliance. And then we'll move right at 4 o'clock into a panel discussion, which will be moderated by Tsuyoshi Sunohara, a friend to many people in this room, who is the secretary general for the US-Japan project at Nikkei Shimbun. And that panel will include General Nobori Yamaguchi, Admiral Yoji Kota, Robin Saksekota, and Sheila Smith. Then we'll adjourn promptly at 5. So let me begin by introducing Professor Kitaoka and opening our first discussion. Shinichi Kitaoka is the president of the International University of Japan, IUJ, George Packard's former home, and a professor of modern Japanese politics and diplomacy at GRIPS, the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, executive director of research at IPS, the International Institute of Policy Studies, and an emeritus professor at Todai. There is barely an influential advisory commission on foreign policy or defense in the past two decades that he has not either led or been a member of. Most recently, the advisory panel on national security and defense capabilities, which shaped the strategic framework for Japan's defense documents this last year. And his most recent job as acting chair of the advisory panel on reconstruction of the legal basis for national security, which focused on a number of issues, but most prominently, how to determine and guide Japan's right of collective self-defense. And so Kitaoka sensei is a historian and a foreign policy practitioner. He's been an ambassador to the United Nations. And I wanted to open up by welcoming you first and saying what a great honor and pleasure it is to have you all here today. But let me ask first if you could give an overview for the audience of the key elements of Prime Minister Abe's security strategy and how they fit for Japan historically and what they mean to the US. And then we'll dive into some of the specifics. Thank you very much, Mike, for inviting us. And then this is my first visit to this new building. And then I'm very happy to be here. Since the establishment of a second Abe administration in December 2012, there has been remarkable changes in the security policies. First of all, he re-established the advisory panel on restructuring the legal basis to national security. And then he also established an advisory panel on national security and defense capability in September last year. And then based on the discussion in the data, there was a panel on national security and defense capability. The Japanese government adopted the national defense guideline for 2014 and beyond. And then also, at the same time, again, based on the discussion in this panel, national security strategy was adopted for the first time because Japan was notorious for its sectionalism. It's very hard to integrate the policies across the foreign policy, defense policy, and so forth. So this is very important to establish a leading, to adopt a leading concept which is characterized one by more international cooperation and second, a more active contribution to peace. And then the national defense guideline was which is usually adopted every several years in which the key concept was the joint and dynamic defense process. And then along with these developments, the other cabinet established the National Security Council, which was also very necessary to overcome the sectionalism. And then at the same time, Secret Information Protection Act was enacted in December. These are all the homeworks for the realists for years. And then these kind of things were achieved, which was remarkable. But as a whole, if everything was achieved, still Japan will remain as a very normal, moderate, peace-loving country. I'm very sure about that. And then the final homework is the agenda for the advisory panel on legal restructuring. So we have just presented our report to the Prime Minister in May 15. And then the focus of the media is now directed to the negotiation between LDP and Kometo. Let me ask you, putting on your historian's hat, how new is all this? In some ways, a lot of this was Prime Minister Noda's agenda. And arguably, since John Foster Dulles, the US at various points, has asked for Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, for example, or asked for greater flexibility in arms export rules to enhance defense industrial cooperation. So is what Abesan's doing, in the media, it's new or scary or dramatic. But from your perspective, how new is all this? Or is this a natural evolution? Actually, many foreign policy and defense policy experts have been arguing about this since 1990. 1990 is a year in which the Sun and the Sun invaded into Kuwait, and then there was a heated discussion in Japan, what Japan could do over there. And then we found that the interpretation of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, that the exercise of collective right of defense is prohibited under our constitution. This has become an obstacle for Japan to go beyond. Because of this, we are unable to join in any part of the multinational process in 1990. So since then, the experts have been discussing this very much, but the solution of this issue is was made possible by two things, or three things. One is the deteriorating security environment around Japan, which made people aware of the importance of this issue. And secondly, the opposition party, the D.P.J. government has experienced that it's a, they just had in power for three years, and then they experienced the necessity. They came to understand the necessity of this policy. Not all of them, but some of them. And then thirdly, of course, Prime Minister Abes' leadership. And then that's why we come to almost sort of this issue. Reading your report, which came out a month ago, and listening to the deliberations in the diet, it seems that the major focus, or a major purpose of revising the interpretation of the constitution to allow the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is to strengthen the U.S. Japan Alliance. And reading your report, it seemed in effect to create a virtual joint and combined relationship, like we've had with NATO, like we've had with Korea, like in some respects we've had with Australia, though we don't have a formal joint and combined command structure. And for most of the post-war period, the Japanese side, at least the diet, has done everything it could to prevent that, to put in place obstacles to being makikomaru, entrapped in the American's strategy, particularly vis-a-vis China. So this seems like a complete role reversal. Is the American and U.S. Japan Alliance to mention of this really the heart of it, or is that just an easier way to sell it in the diet, if I could ask a rather cynical question? Before responding to your question, let me say that the reinterpretation of the collective right of self-defense is not only target of our discussion in the panel. We had three targets, one is, as a whole, our mission was to find out the weak points of Japan's legal basis for national security, and then how to improve, to make advices how to improve them. And then we have the three targets, one is constitutionally individual, exercise of individual rights of self-defense is okay, but there are some weak legal basis where we have to make another division of the law, self-defense force law, something like that. One example is that if Japan is attacked, if there's an armed attack on Japan, then the prime minister can order self-defense forces to go to fight. But actually, only in the case of armed attack, which means planned and organized attack from one country. Therefore, the attack or invasion or anything beyond this, below this, we self-defense forces do not have, not provided any legal basis. So our recommendation is one of the important recommendation is that how to make up for this loopholes. And secondly, of course, the collective right of self-defense is our target, and I will speak about this later. And third target is a collective security. You know, Japan has been participating in peacekeeping operations since 1992, but still the activities is very much confined. The Japan self-defense forces are not allowed to go to help the military of other countries or to go to help the civilians. They are only allowed to fight when they are attacked. This is very strange. And in order to make self-defense forces to be able to work more flexibly and effectively, we have to change this system. This was our second target. The third target is collective right of self-defense. When Japan is attacked, the US has come to help us. But if the US is attacked out of Japan's territory, then that's a problem. And then whenever there's a crisis in case of emergency, then we should be united together. And then even beyond our border. That's our basic target of our reinterpretation of collective right of self-defense. At the same time, also, for example, our aim is that to make Japan possible to exercise the collective right of self-defense, which I mean that if there's a case by which Japan is threatened very much, then Japan can exercise our collective right of self-defense. For example, the case of if the Persian Gulf was, there were some mines in the area, in our sea lane, then Japan, this is very dangerous to our security. So it's important to remove, to go to remove those mines. But if this is in the period of during the fighting, then this is to benefit one side or another. Therefore, it is considered to be joining in the fighting. Therefore, we should make it possible for Japan to be able to remove those mines. So, but mainly if we are able to work together with the United States in patrolling the Indian Ocean, for example, that will have a very stronger deterrence effect over there. So these are the main targets. But the core is of course how to make our relationship deeper and closer in the vicinity of Japan. It makes sense whether you call it virtual jointness, actual joint combined, whatever you call it, the less doubt there is about the ability of the US and Japan to operate together a contingency. The less doubt there is about that, the more deterrence there is, the more dissuasion there is, the more of a stabilizing factor there is in Asia. Can you say something to us about the process? So the newspapers are reporting yesterday and today that the Liberal Democratic Party, LDP's coalition partner, Kometo, which has sensitivities to these issues in its political base, that the LDP and Kometo have sort of started to reach a common ground, which makes it sound like a cabinet decision is possible as planned by the government this month. But then there's legislation, there are other things. Can you talk through for us how you see the politics and the process unfolding? The goal which we are envisioning were the enactment of new laws or revisions of the self-defense force law or peacekeeping operation law and other laws. And but before, in order to revise the law, the cabinet has to present a bill to the parliament. And in order for the cabinet to present a law, there has to be a separate cabinet decisions. And in order to make the cabinet decision, you have to, LDP has to present the Kometo. That's the reason why they are now focusing on how to present a Kometo. Even with a cabinet decision, it's not in effect, right? There has to be a legislative process or some other things have to happen. I've heard there are over a dozen bills that would have to be amended. But in the past, people have talked about a sort of one big comprehensive national security actor. How do you see the legislative process? Well, there are some people, and actually I myself thought about the wisdom of the establishment of a comprehensive security law. But it takes time. And now the situation does not allow us to give us too much time. Therefore, even if we can establish a comprehensive law, still each bill will require a lot of discussion and a lot of time. Therefore, now I think that we should go into the individual lawmaking. And then, if the LDP could proceed the Komet Party, then they can have a comfortable majority in both houses. And also, there are some other opposition parties like the Yishin Party and the Minnano Party and others to support these bills. Therefore, this is the key, how to proceed Komet Party. On the politics, there's very strong support in the LDP. There's a pretty strong support among Yishin and some smaller conservative parties. And I guess the Democratic Party of Japan's sort of split. And then Socialist, Democratic, Social Democrats and Communist Party are both small but opposed. But the public opinions very hard to understand from here. Some polls show when the public's asked you support, revised changing the interpretation of the constitution, it's sort of 50-50, some of them a little more in favor, some of them a little more opposed. But then others, other polls ask you support joint operations with the United States to keep the streets of Hormuz open. And then there's a very large majority that says yes. So the public opinion's really quite hard to read. What's your sense of the public's view of all this? Certainly, this is very, first of all, essentially this is very difficult and very abstract in nature. It's quite understandable that people cannot understand this very well. Therefore, if we ask a question whether or not you support the change of interpretation of constitution or whether you support the reinterpretation of the correct right of self-defense, then the answered majority tends to say no, negative. But actually, when we ask them if we should go to help US vessels out of Japan if they are attacked illegally, then the majority of the people say yes. Therefore, if we, the negotiation between LDP and Komeito goes on and then if they can present some views to the people and to the parliament, then the opposition will decline, I think. I'm sure you've seen commentary here and in Japan and elsewhere about how important it is to do this in a way that wins understanding in the region. I think that the Shangri-La meeting a week ago where Prime Minister Abe spoke, suggests that for the most part, the region is either fine with this development or desires it in order to maintain a healthy US-Japan alliance in a stable Asia. China's opposed for sure, and Korea's complicated. There are obvious and clear concerns. On the other hand, an effective US-Japan alliance is important to Korean security as many experts in Seoul know. So it puts a heavy burden on the government in Tokyo to do this process. But overall diplomacy with particular care, what do you recommend? What do you think is the best way to make sure that there's a robust and positive or at least not robustly negative reaction in the neighborhood? As you said, some of the Southeast Asian countries are supporting our efforts strongly, and other countries in Southeast Asia are quietly supportive. And then China is opposing. But if you look at the negotiation between the Japanese position and the Chinese leaders, it was pointed out from the Chinese side that there are two conditions for the two leaders to meet together. One is for the prime minister not to go to Yasukuni. The other was to recognize the Senkaku issue as a territorial issue. There are no hint, no point was made on this issue, security issue. Therefore, this is not as important as other two from, even from Chinese viewpoint. And also to the Korean people, I think if we can try to persuade them quietly and patiently, I think at least half of them or a majority of them can be persuaded. Because, you know, when it comes to the specialists, many of them are in agreement with us. Because, you know, many of the Korean people believe that they can be assisted by the US military in case of emergency. But the assistance by US assistance to Korea is for the important part of it is through the basis in Japan. So without the cooperation from Japan, it is important for the United States to give effective assistance to Korea in case of emergency. And also we have made it very clear that unless we are invited, we will not join to go to any country. Now if South Korea asked us to come to help them, we may consider. We may say yes, we may say no. And even if, for example, if there is a case in which some American vessel is in danger along the coast of Korean Peninsula and if we are asked to go and we decided to go, still we may get permission or consent from the Korean government if we are going to go across their territorial water. So in any case, without their consent or without their invitation, we will never go to a Korean territory or territorial sea or land at all. Therefore, there's no reason for them to be concerned about this. So I think we can proceed them. But other effective way might be as you may have in your mind. We may have a more flexible approach to on history and other issues. That may be helpful. When Groucho Marx had his TV show, every once in a while, he would have the sign drop down from the ceiling that said context. So that context does matter. I'd like to open it up now. If folks could raise your hand and we'll bring a microphone to you and briefly identify yourself and ask a question. And the floor's open. It's a pretty expert audience as I look around. I'm usually shy. Andrew, right? I think we have microphones, yeah. Hi, I'm Andrew Oros from Washington College and the East-West Center. So far the discussion's been fairly technical. I said there's an expert audience. So I also wanna ask a fairly technical question. On the issue of collective self-defense, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, the Josei Kyoku, has stated before that it was not permissible under the Constitution. And I'm just a little bit unclear about how that works vis-a-vis a Cabinet statement. So if the Abe Cabinet makes a statement that allows for collective self-defense, that overrides the Josei Kyoku's view or will the Josei Kyoku previously issue some statement that says they've reconsidered? Could you talk about the politics of that a little bit? You already, Josei Kyoku is the Cabinet legal bureau that renders these judgments sort of like the Office of Legal Counsel and the White House. So by the way, we don't just have to have technical questions. Kitaka Sensei is an expert on many things and Japanese foreign policy broadly. Well, in my perspective, I think this is a conflict between the bureaucrat-led politics or politics-leading bureaucracy. Cabinet Legislation Bureau is, in a sense, a lawyer for the prime minister. So he has to work for him. But actually, they insist on the autonomy or independence of a bureaucrat. That's very strange. So the Asahishinbu and other liberal papers are crystallizing. The Abe's appointment of Mr. Komatsu, Ambassador Komatsu, which is a rather irregular appointment, because usually the chief of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau is to be promoted from deputy. But he changed that. There's no law about this one, but he just wanted to pick up other legal experts who was an authority in international law, and which was criticized by the media. And also this was similar to the appointment of Mr. Kuroda, to the governor of the Bank of Japan. It was criticized as an irregular kind of appointment. What's wrong about that? Why the prime minister is not allowed to pick up a man who he likes and who he respects? And then also the, let me add also, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau recognizes that there has been the changes of interpretation of constitution only once in the past, but there are many in the past. The biggest change of interpretation was took place in 1954, in which the Cabinet recognized that despite of the Article IX, second half, Japan is allowed to have the minimum necessary defense power and use it. And then which is a big jump from zero to a minimum necessity, which is a big jump. And then, but it was again changed in 1972. The minimum necessity means only the exercise of individual right of self defense, excluding correct right of self defense. This was another change. And then this is, now we are trying to change to go back to the 1954 and to make it clear that minimum necessity includes both individual and correct right of self defense, which is perfectly within the constitution. In the front here. Hello. I'm Dr. Donna Wells. I'm an expert in the Russian language internet. Can you talk about the benefits to American interests regarding a closer US-Japan security alliance? The, now the support for the US-Japan alliance is higher than ever, very strong. And then, but there's a tendency among Japanese people to rely on the United States. There's some concern after the US withdrawal from the East and the US doing nothing into Ukraine. But still the Japanese people rely on the United States and they have a confidence in the US-Japan alliance very much. What you sometimes hear is the criticism of the defense guidelines review and of President Obama's robust statement of support for the alliance in Tokyo and April is that this is just encouraging free writing in Japan. So it's great that the Japanese people rely on us so much but we're tired and we're not as rich as we used to be and that's also been a theme for Americans since, I don't know when, since we've had alliances, how do we get, so is this, my own view is no, but could you explain whether this development represents free writing? What's, to get back to the original question, what's in it for us? I know the answer for my part, but I'd like to, but nobody here will agree with me, so. Free, free, free write is, you know, exaggeration, but as you know, since 1951 or since 1960, it was the exchange of a base and then other service. And then we are not expected to help in the United States out of Japan, but instead we are providing the basis. But this balance should be changed because of the change of our national powers. The relationship between Japan and the United States is very different in 1951 compared to today, so Japan should shoulder more of the responsibility, not only vis-a-vis the United States, but also to the world. That is one of the element of the so-called more proactive contribution to peace, which was the essence of the national security strategy which we adopted last December. You know, Japanese people tend to think that peace can be available or don't touch with any weapons or don't do anything out of Japan. That is the shortest way to peace, which is completely wrong. You know, peace can be achieved by many things. Peace cannot be achieved only by staying at home. And Japan as a big power should do more beyond the border. And then that's the more contribution, more cooperation with the United States is essential and also part of our bigger responsibility. In the back here. Kitaka-sensei, thank you. Alexander Sullivan from CNAS. In the press reporting of the past week or so, it appears that a deal was made between the LDP and Kometo, swapping on the one hand the inclusion of the possibility of the SDF operating in contested or combat zones for a deal on sort of adjustments to the coordination in gray zone scenarios between the National Command Authority and Constabulary Forces and the MSDF. So, you know, Kometo gave ground on the latter in exchange for holding firm on no combat zones on the former. Can you speak to both of those from your perspective having led the discussion on these issues and what that might result in in the future? You know, Kometo's idea is that we can do many things by extending our individual right of self defense. But actually, we think the panel's opinion is that it's a very dangerous idea to extend, to expand the zone of the corrective right of self defense. For example, one case is that if a missile was shot from North Korea to Guam or Hawaii and if Japan is able to shoot them down technically, then will Japan be able to do that? Yes, I think we should do that. But Kometo and other people believe that it can be done by extending our police right. But that means the kind of declaration that the space is our territory. It's a very dangerous expansion of the right. And then if we do that, then there are some neighbors which will follow the same kind of thing with pleasure. You know, various press commentary or expert commentaries said, this is all about missile defense or this is all about gray zone. You know, Senkaku, Yajiro, sort of US-Japan coordination or this is all about anti-submarine warfare or it's all about, it's a Gulf of Hormuz. Is it all about one thing or do you see it more comprehensively? What concerns me a little bit is if we decide it's all about one thing that defeats the purpose of strengthening the alliance, the alliance should be ready for many things, not just sort of building a barrier so that we're just getting ready for one problem. Yes, it did. You know, whenever we show the examples, we reiterate that these are just examples. This is not to exclude other cases because ambiguity is the essence of our national security. If we define, draw the very clear line, the enemy can come to this point. Then the ambiguity is a must, we have to prepare. Therefore, we cannot show the clear line. This is the essence of the national security, I think. Rust, is that Rusty? Thank you, Rust Deming at CICE. Nice to see you, Professor Kadoka. Thank you very much for coming. My question involves, you've been very involved in trying to improve both Japan, China and Japan ROK relations, particularly on Japan ROK relations which are very important to the U.S.-Japan alliance. What can be done? What are the next steps in trying to improve the atmosphere of Japan ROK relations? So that does not become an obstacle to further U.S.-Japan cooperation. Mainly on China? Well, I have been sometimes called as an advisor or brain trust for Mr. Abe, which is not the case. I'm just asked to work on this issue. So I'm not supporting all of Mr. Abe's policy. On some of the history issues, I have some disagreements beforehand. I have some disagreements on this policy also. I have to say that, as I said, we had three targets, the individual right of self-defense and the collective right of self-defense and also the collective security. And then, particularly, one of our focus was how to improve our participation in peacekeeping operations. We have, despite the self-defense force in South Sudan, the situation is very fragile over there. And then we have to make them work more effectively. But the discussion about peacekeeping operation is somewhat postponed by Mr. Abe. So I'm not very happy with that. Also, on history issue, I know that there's a criticism against Mr. Abe as a nationalist or hawkish or right-wing or whatever. To some extent, that kind of criticism might not be wrong. And then in order to wipe out this kind of criticism, he should take up some other policy measures. I hope that there should be some change on his policy on Yasukuni, for example. Then I myself is not a supporter of Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine. In Yasukuni Shrine, many of them are the soldiers who fought for the nation and who had to fall on the ground during the fighting since Meiji Restoration or even before that. So there are some people included in it whose wrong decisions led Japan into the wrong and desperate war. Because of that, those decisions, many soldiers had to die unnecessarily. Therefore, the kind of victims and victimizers are enshrined together. I'm not very happy with this. So I hope this should be changed by one of those two ways. One is to remove the so-called criminals and others from Yasukuni Shrine or to establish a new memorial, which was once discussed under Koizumi administration. I hope the new council to discuss this issue should be established in the near future. And then also, I was once a leader of a Japanese team in Japan-China Joint Study of History with China. And also, I was a member of the Japan-Korea Joint Study of History. I think this kind of activity should be restarted, possibly with the participation of third-country scholars. Good suggestions. Steve Winters. You commented on the claim of autonomy that had traditionally been associated with the Cabinet Legislative Bureau. And you also noted the appointment of Kamatsu to be the head outside of the traditional way of doing that. And the question is this. I have read in Japanese sources that the position of autonomy of this Cabinet Bureau arose because of, for one reason, the hesitancy of the Supreme Court in Japan to rule on the interpretation of the Constitution in regard to self-defense forces. So with the apparent weakening of the autonomy of the Cabinet Bureau in this regard, do you expect that the Supreme Court might be more inclined to issue opinions in these matters? And certainly we expect, so I read from Japanese sources, cases to be brought before the Supreme Court by the parties that disagree with the abby policy, perhaps social Democrats. My opinion is that we should go back to the basics of the Constitution. Okay, the Cabinet or the lawmakers should present their views to the Parliament. And the Parliament makes a decision on this. And then if this is considered to be unconstitutional, then there should be an appeal to the court. And then the final decision should be made by the Supreme Court. And then this is the effective and orthodox way of decision making. And then now the practice of Japan's constitution and politics is a little bit different from the original the Constitution. I'll get Larry in one sec. But in your view, Prime Minister Abe is doing a lot. In your paper, by the way, I hope everyone picked up a copy of an outline that Professor Kitoka did of the overall developments in Japan's defense and national security policy. But it's a pretty big to-do list. And of course that doesn't include the third arrow on the economy, nuclear power, taxes, and a whole host of other big economic assignments. Do you think that this security agenda you've outlined is Abe's security agenda? Or do you think this is likely to be the security agenda of his successor, whoever that may be, whenever that may be, it could be, you know, Easton's like you, I mean one step ahead is darkness and politics. It could be three years, it could be six years. But do you think that this, as we say, has legs? Do you think this has enough bipartisan support to hang on Prime Minister Abe's political position alone? One thing I just forgot to tell when I just read through the changes of policies. One thing was the transfer of the defense equipment was a little bit changed recently. Up until then, we had in 1967, many of our Sato cabinet established three principles on arms export, which was tightened by Miki Cabinet in 1976 and blah, blah, blah. The export of weapons was substantially prohibited in Japan, which was relaxed to allow the export of weapons which can be used for the defense of the country, which are threatened by other countries. In other words, the export of the weapons for peaceful purpose should be allowed. This was started by Noda Kan administration and Noda administration under the EPG government. And also, there was the national defense guideline. The one we adopted last year was national guideline for 2014 and beyond. But beforehand, there was a national defense guideline for 2011 and beyond, which was adopted in 2010, in which there was a remarkable shift from the focus was until then in Hokkaido, still. The major forces were deployed against Russia, which was ridiculous, even to the point of 2010, which was finally made a shift to Southwest and then the major shift was done under the EPG government and then the LDP just accepted and continued that one, but they didn't like to follow the same line. So they are saying that we have adopted a completely new one, but actually they are the same. And then, for example, I was involved in both changes. And in the end of 2010, there was a reduction of 1,000 soldiers in the ground forces. But because the LDP didn't like it, so they, whenever, as soon as they came to the power, they just increased the number. Is it really necessary in today's situation? That's a big question anyhow. And last year, there was an increase of 5,000 soldiers in ground forces decided, which is it was decided in the panel where I was a chair. Despite my opposition, it was adopted. Therefore, there is a strong bureaucratic autonomy still going on. So the changes are very incremental. So the basic line has support from both parties, I guess. General Yamaguchi can explain the military logic of that in a minute. Continuity and bipartisanship, in other words. Perhaps the direction doesn't hit John Prime Minister Abe, but the political capital he has explains why things are moving forward. Larry? Larry Nicks from CSIS, Dr. Kitaoka. Do the proponents of Japan adopting collective self-defense, do they believe that the self-defense forces, in order to carry out the objectives that you have laid out, the three objectives, do they believe that the self-defense forces will require in the future different kinds of weapons systems, different kinds of equipment in order to enhance capabilities, or do they believe that basically what Japan has now with the self-defense forces have now will be adequate to carry out these new missions if Japan does adopt collective self-defense? I think that Japan can expand their activities with today's weapons. We still have, we already have. Rather, if Japan decline to expand our activities beyond the border, and still if Japan wanted to defend ourselves by individual right of self-defense only, then the logical conclusion might be we should have bigger weapons. Is that as specific as you want to get? That is as specific as you want to get. Something bigger. Well, the next panel can dive into that one in specifics. We're talking a lot today about military capabilities, military, defense industrial cooperation, and military strategy, but in Japan's inventory of national power, the military is just one, with all respect to the uniformed people in the front row, not even necessarily the most important part of Japan's national power, how would you rank the, you mentioned at the very beginning that Prime Minister Abe did Japan's first national security strategy? What grade would you give it? Overall, not these specific defense related areas, but more public diplomacy and so forth. I've worked on two national security strategies at the White House. I would never ask someone what grade they would give them, because these are always committee efforts and public and political efforts, but it gives you a good sense of strategic direction. So how would you grade the national security strategy as an overall comprehensive strategy? Especially including foreign policy, ODA, and not just the military aspects we've been talking about. Considering the today's economic situation, I would give A to Abe, security policy. I want to take your class at Kokusari Angaku. Do you think it gave sufficient attention to development assistance, trade, and other aspects? It's very important. Let me touch on the issue I just forgot to mention. When the concept of more proactive contribution piece was adopted, was discussed in the panel in which I was a chair, I thought this is a good case in which we can show that Mr. Abe is not trying to deny the Japan's foreign policy after the war. This is a continuation of Japan's foreign policy after the war. Japan started its official development aid in the 1950s even before becoming a member of OECD, and then Japan started participation in peacekeeping operation in 1992, and then Japan started to promote the concept of human security at the United Nations to help the poorest countries in the world. So based on these achievements, Japan is trying to go ahead more, and then that is the evidence that Mr. Abe is not thinking of bringing Japan back to a period. And then as a whole, but as I said, considering today's financial situation, I would give A, so we wish we could spend more on ODA, and then the rise of our military budget is only 2.8%, excluding the personnel, then it's only less than 1%. So this is very modest. Therefore, I'd like to stress that the Abe's focus is not on the hard power. The focus is the soft power. The essence of soft power is a rule of law. Then that's why we cannot be indifferent with the situation in South China Sea. The peaceful solution of international conflicts, the commitment to peaceful solution of international conflicts is the most important achievement of human beings after two great wars in the 20th century. Therefore, this is something we cannot be indifferent. Therefore, how to strengthen this framework? But rule of law should be accompanied by some power balance. Therefore, it is also very necessary. That's why I gave A in today's financial situation. Because they can't spend much more in the Japanese government right now on the aid, and because that document emphasized rule of law quite a bit. I think we have time for one more question. Yes, sir, back over there. My name is Tio Scanlon Kimura. I'm with SAIS. Thank you very much. I have heard the terminology containment policy regarding China in many scholarly articles and whatnot, and I was talking to a CSIS expert last week after another panel, and he was talking about the need to engage with China. What do you think about those specific vocabularies and how can U.S., Japan collectively and individually continue to engage with China and not give a perceived sense of roping China in? Thank you. That's the most difficult question in the world. Actually, containment is... I don't like to use the word containment. Containment is a specific word which you used to vis-à-vis Soviet Russia in the Cold War time, in which we had a very limited economic transaction with the Soviet bloc. We have very much an interdependent relationship with China, so we cannot contain them or we should not contain them. We just want to invite them to be an active and responsible member of the international community, and we know that there are many respectable people in China and also in order to encourage them, in order not to disappoint them, we should not make any big compromise on this issue. So we should be firm on the issue of rural law, which is to be achieved also in the domestic area. In China, when, as I said, I was chairman of Japan-China Joint Study of History, during that exercise, one of the Chinese scholars was arrested and put into the jail for 20 years. Now it was reduced to 14 years, but still that could happen sometimes in China in order to help those people. We should be firm on human rights and democracy, not aggressively, but patiently. We have to be firm on this issue. And then we should wait. China is a country, they are usually very prudent, cautious in going into the military exercise. The words can be very strong, but in reality they are very cautious in going into the decision making, I think, I hope. The question reminds me of press conference about 20 years ago when the new head of Asia, the Pentagon, who everyone knows, Kurt Campbell, was trying to say in the context of our upgrading of the alliance with Japan that we also had to engage China. People didn't use the word engage as much in those days, and so Gigi Press translated it as tsutsumi komu, which means basically to embrace, which was then interpreted across Asia as contain. So these are tricky, tricky words, but in the Pentagon, if you've been there, you know in the policy area they on the walls, they have the words deter, dissuade, reassure, dissuade, deter, defeat, sort of the spectrum of strategy. And a lot of what is concretely being done right now in the U.S. Japan alliance is, in my view, a necessary step to integrate more and strengthen dissuasion and deterrence and reassure Japan and other allies or partners that are worried. It's a good question. This panel on probably the next stage in strategic thinking together with U.S. and Japan as allies is that reassurance part. What can we do without undercutting the steps we're taking to necessary steps to shore up dissuasion and deterrence to reassure other parts of Asia and Japan itself? What steps can we take together to try to reassure? Understanding that for many commentators in Beijing the word containment is very, very useful to drive an agenda they have and that we shouldn't perhaps worry too much about the frequent use of the word containment to describe our policy. We did a survey some of you may have seen. We rolled it out a week ago here at CSIS where we asked a large number of experts across Asia about the future of power order norms in the region. And one of the questions we asked is how would you characterize the U.S. rebalance to Asia? And outside of China it had overwhelming support. And when respondents characterized it in China over 80% said it's designed to contain China or it's too confrontational with China. Nowhere else in the region did that answer get more than 10% of the response. The main response was great idea needs more resources. So we have I think a lot of homework to do. Kitaka sensei thank you for joining us. Thank you for your work and all these commissions and for enlightening us. Please join me in showing our appreciation before we turn to the next panel.