 Thank you very much for these very interesting presentations and thank you for all the presenters as well as you said that you are not so sure how these presentations link with each other and I must say me either, I'm much less because I just saw and read your presentation the first time myself as well. So this is very much trying to put something together here at this moment. Interestingly, these four presentations, what's in common in them is that they differ in everything. There's one from Africa, one from Africa, there's South America, Asia and then Middle East. Also, time-wise, it's from the 70s to 2022, the latest data. So there is a lot and also conceptually many things. So what I decided to do while I was taking my notes was to have some questions for each of you and we'll see if there's something then that can be brought together. In the first presentation on civilian agency and resistance on Myanmar, my question was on the civilian monitoring missions is when civilians are monitoring other civilians. So my question here was that are these civilians outsiders or insiders? So it's civilian monitoring civilians, but are they from the same countries, from the same community? Do they already understand the dynamics when they go to the region and you show two different regions and two different conflicts with two different armed actors or substates or how they are called in Myanmar. And how does that play if it's outside or civilian or inside civilian monitoring? And then my second question was that as ceasefires usually are quite volatile contexts. So because a ceasefire is supposed to lead at some point to a political agreement and this is still only the military agreement. So and it's not the permanent state. So how does time play there? Can you have a civilian civilian monitoring mission monitoring a ceasefire for years when the peace doesn't come and there is no intention even for a political solution. So what is the time factor here? These were my two main questions or reflections here from the first presentation. And then on the rebel governance and political engagement it was very interesting because you clearly brought the case of these rebel governance to, you said, you measured their position relative to the state and you looked at the governance ideology. So you clearly make an argument that these are political actors. They're not grievance actors. They are political actors. So my main question was that these political actors, it was the argument that they create new political agency or they transform earlier political agency. This was not very clear although I see that this is the main argument. And then another question was that when I looked at the data, there was something interesting that 50% of the peddits think that nobody, or 48%, think that nobody ruled them. So is it possible that they lived 60 years or 40 years of Colombian conflict and were not that even concerned about who ruled them or why they thought that nobody ruled them? Is it because you do show, which is very interesting that formal and informal political participation were not mutually exclusive in these cases? That it's not that you can either participate in politics through a party or something or then demonstrate that you can do both. But still then if people think that there's 50% or almost a half saying that nobody ruled them, so is that then perhaps part of the answer saying that people participated in politics in the context of the conflict they had had for 40 years. So that creates like a particular, you wouldn't say democracy, but you would call it a particular political universe where people participate politically and these actors change. So this was perhaps that you say the actors create and transform political agencies, so there's clearly something going on, but how much it then actually changes? This is what these were the main questions. And on the presentation on the armed civilian protection in the Mozambique Civil War, this was quite interesting to me because the data, when you say when, where and how, and the Civil War starts from the 70s and goes to the 90s, so it's a really long, long time to do the analysis and have this data. And yet when you speak about the protection of civilians, so you say that it's temporary, it's a temporary element. And then it's a temporary element in a 40 years conflict. So how does this temporality work there? It was my one question. And then the second also you said there's an elite collaboration in the adoption of the militias or the adoption of militia through an elite collaboration. So I was wondering is this elite support here, is it local elites very much or is it national elites or is it both that then has an impact on this protection of civilians? And then a political participation in this case, I was wondering because I was still writing a little bit my notes from the previous presentation. Is there a possibility for formal participation there or informal participation or is this a civil war context where you have nothing or at least it would need to be researched very ethnographically to see it or can you make a claim that there is in this case if there's elite support for these militias. So does that leave space for formal or informal political participation? And then the questions on the uprisings in Lebanon and Iraq. It's very interesting 2019 when those uprisings started, you would think there's now something going on that this was, this is some type of a post Arab spring eight years, seven, eight years past now something is happening and then COVID came and then the attention was shifted elsewhere or you showed that the protest changed or maybe there was a stronger repression because of that. I don't know, but it's interesting that there is this peak just before the pandemic. And I thought it was interesting, you call these broken democracies and there's this definition which I think is quite workable at corruption and neoliberalism and all that. And I was wondering whether how much do you see these as not transitional regimes, but transitional states still coming from either from civil war or from the Arab spring or states transitioning to something where the state structures and the power has perhaps drastically changed. So how this links to these protests. And then my second question was that it's, I think you show with these the negative coalition and the generating outrage and the elite defections that something is changing. Perhaps the space for civil society or the society to protest is changing and regime repression is changing as well. So how difficult it is to study this in a transitional case because you perhaps don't know who is controlling and repressing. That it's not very clear, at least in the case of Iraq, it's very hard to say whether it's a, what's happening inside of the government and inside of the particular states in Iraq that who is powerful inside of the army and who is powerful within the political elite. And I think in the case of Lebanon, there's a little bit more written about that, at least in the very general international media, but especially in the case of Iraq. How do you study that? The conditions of these revolutions when everything is changing in terms of the army and the political power. This is what I could do. And I hope you can answer my question. Thank you so much for these excellent comments and this very careful engagement with our presentations in just such a short amount of time. So these are excellent questions. So for the first question was whether the civilians who monitor to protect other civilians in Myanmar's conflict zones are insiders or outsiders to the conflict zones. So these civilians are insiders. They are part of the local populations. They are part of the main population groups, so the Kachin and Kachin state and the Karen state. They have local knowledge. They have a lot of buy-in from local civil society organizations. Their perception also was that they were very much threatened by the Myanmar army but not so much by the rebel group. So the Kachin, both the Kachin Independence Army and the Korean National Union are known for being relatively benign to the civilian population. So the monitors were acting as local monitors, protecting the local population with support from the local population, but also with some contestation. So there were parts in the civilian population who were very skeptical about the peace process and who saw that civilians monitoring ceasefires or monitoring, protection monitoring, were basically playing into the Myanmar government's strategy of playing out rebel groups against each other in ceasefire negotiations. And because of that skepticism towards the Myanmar army and the Myanmar government in the local population, these monitors also had a difficult standing in their own population groups. The second question was how does civilian monitoring play out over time in ceasefire contexts if the peace process starts? And again, that's an excellent question. There's also some research not just on Myanmar but also on Sri Lanka and on the Philippines on such civilian monitoring. And Sri Lanka is another case where there was a lot of support for civilians supporting the ceasefire monitoring, but we know that the Sri Lankan Civil War re-escalated basically and we know who won that civil war. So that ceasefire monitoring also collapsed. But generally the research also shows that civilians become monitors in ceasefire contexts precisely because these are fragile arrangements, precisely because there's very limited buy-in from the government side in support of a long-term peace process. And civilian monitors cannot replace that kind of buy-in in political from the side of the armed groups and especially when the political will is lacking on the government side. And so over time, if momentum stores, civilian monitors, they are unarmed, they don't have political power. They cannot replace that level of political power and buy-in from government and rebel forces. Okay, so thanks. My name's Abby, everyone. I'm earning my position up here by answering our questions, the very good questions raised by the discussant. Thank you for your questions. So the first question that you had, which is a great one, is so what is new and what is transformed? Or what actually is going on when rebels govern? And one way, or the way that I can think of to answer that is that we think, at least in the paper, what we develop is that there are different channels through which rebel governance can influence individuals' relationship with the state and with political engagement more broadly. One is by shifting preferences about how things should be done to come to a new political agreement or to challenge power or to get some other kind of outcome that people want. And so people's preferences may shift. Their beliefs may shift about what is most effective. So if you've lived for a very long time where there are new institutions built around shared governance, and we know also often sort of obligations by people in the community to collectively participate in public good provision, for example, and they see that working, then they may have new beliefs about what is the most effective way to participate in politics. And so then finally there could also be real incentives, right, to participate or not in a certain way, including punishment. So we know that there's lots of evidence for if an armed group imposed a boycott on elections like the FARC has done multiple times, people would not have access to formal participation because the FARC would say, no, you can't do that now. So all of these three possible channels could lead to the outcomes that we are expecting. And we can't really identify that very clearly with the data that we have, but those are sort of theoretical channels. Another way to think about this is that armed groups unevenly or more intensively govern in some places than in others. And this is related to some work by our colleague on Arjona who's now, who's on the rebel governance panel simultaneously, right, where in some cases they really do seem to, how do you say, outsource governance to the existing communities and then they kind of oversee it. That's her category of aliocracy or more directly govern. And what we are saying here is that in either case, they can do that in different ways and emphasize different ways to govern given this kind of level intensity. We also cannot measure that with our survey data. So that's something to keep in mind. That's related also to your question about why do 48% say we don't know, no, when we ask them, did the FARC rule here, did the paramilitaries rule here, so we don't know why people would have said that. We do know that those responses are clustered in certain rural communities where it's plausible that there was a much more distant relationship with a particular armed group or anything like that and in urban communities which may have been less exposed to such more obvious forms of, of rebel governance. This raises an uncomfortable challenge with our results or the logic of what we are trying to show with our evidence which is that maybe more politically attuned individuals also seem to notice better and be able to identify which group is ruling them in any given moment, right? And then what we are actually seeing is just that politically informed people are also more politically engaged. That's also something that we cannot really disentangle here, but it's something that we need to raise, I think. And then how can we know how much change is under armed groups a rule? Yeah, we, it's really difficult and fascinating. That's why we are writing this paper, but it is such a long war and we don't have good ways to really know what's going on in a particular community and for that I think qualitative methods would be much better suited for that, right? To really have an ethnographic understanding of how communities shifted over time under, under a different armed group rule. Would you like to correct anything? Yes, thank you so much for your questions. Why was civilian protection so late and so short? Well, it's kind of due to the history of the war, how the war spread, it started in the middle and then kind of subsequently spread to these central and northern provinces, so it came into Zambesia and Nampula in the mid-1980s and then the war kind of increased in lethality and intensity and this is what I describe as local military stalemates that gave then rise to these forms of civilian protection. And I should probably say that I'm only studying one group. There were other initiatives that were, that are not very well studied and it's not really well known how many they were, how sustained they were, how long they were active across different parts of this area that I'm also studying, but they weren't so durable and they were much smaller and they were also nonviolent forms of resistance, I should say, in the south and also in the same area. So there's more than I had time to talk about. Elite collaboration was important at the local level, so at the national level for Lima the government never wanted to acknowledge any official collaboration with kind of a traditional armed force because of kind of the socialist ideology and so at the national level there was some kind of tolerance of alliance with these groups, but it was never officially acknowledged or supported and so the local elite collaboration was much more important. And finally, what kind of forms of informal participation were existing during the war? Well, not much. People were on the run. They were hiding outside their villages. It was a very, especially during that time, they were displaced, so there were not many other ways to participate politically. Great, thanks. I'm going to be super quick because I would love to leave some time for Q&A, so I won't do all of your great comments justice, but I'll just answer two of them quickly. Why 2019? Great question. So there were four big revolutions in the Middle East in 2019, 2018, 2019, 2020, sort of Sudan, Algeria, Iraq and Lebanon. Not a lot of evidence of diffusion, unlike the Arab spring, a little bit maybe, but not a lot of evidence that activists were collaborating or actively sort of, so I don't know, maybe something in the water that year, but it is an interesting coincidence and of course people are calling it sort of an Arab spring 2.0. COVID was important, but as you could see from the protest charts, the revolutions were already on the down swing before COVID really set in. The COVID really was the nail in the coffin, but they were already decelerating before COVID really kicked in. By January, February the protests were declining. And then in terms of conceptualizing, I mean, yes, we're going with broken democracy, we've debated this a lot. Some of these are post-conflict societies, post-conflict regimes, not all of them. If we think about the larger universe, so Central America, the Balkans, Middle East are kind of post-conflict, but then there's some Eastern European and Latin American cases that really are not, they're not really post-conflict. I also don't love the term transitional because it sort of implies that they're going somewhere. And a lot of these regimes, I mean, Lebanon has been, has had this dynamic basically since independence, right? Certainly, I mean, since the Civil War, but that was, you know, 25 years ago, right? So, I mean, they're not transition, because they're not really transitioning to anything. They're actually quite stable in this kind of collusive governing dynamics, and I think a lot of the regimes could be described this way. So we don't love the term transitional because it sort of implies a teleology that we, you know, I don't think is really true. So anyway, we're still trying to figure out how to case these regimes and what, but we're going with broken democracy for now just because we think it encapsulates the kind of problems that these democratic regimes have. I think we need to have at least two questions, otherwise it's not democratic. So I saw this gentleman raising his hand like this already five minutes ago. So I think that the floor is now yours, you with glasses? Yeah, that's you. Yeah. Yes, André Rougieri, University of Oxford. And this is a question for Kilian, actually, because you actually trigger a lot of ideas and it's a fantastic project. So the first thing is just pedantic in the sense that you talk about revolution, uprising and protest. And so I was wondering whether, you know, I know your work, I know Mark Reisinger, I'm sure there is coherence and an analytical thinking there, but to me, actually, what you're talking are mostly extra institutional collective practices of incumbent removal. So basically you have these collective movements that they try to remove the incumbent. So my comments question is that you talk about broken democracy, but it seems to me the mechanism is that they're broken democracy, but resilient polar keys. So the crucial point is that they can give highly symbolic concession because power being polyarchic, you can basically give concession on symbolic and therefore they absorb this. I wonder if you can give us maybe a less, I don't know if it's positive or negative story, but if actually the case it can be that after the focal point disappear because also you don't mention focal point. But it is that once you have the highly symbolic concession, the focal point disappear and therefore there is the end of the collective action. But it can be that small but highly organized group can hijack the mobilization after the first focal point. And the second point is that you didn't tell us anything about when actually the incumbent decide to go non-constitution or basically become even a more broken democracy. And now I think we had the gentleman in the back that was really number two asking for the floor. And then I think we have, you know, like this other gentleman right there. And then we need to finalize this round. Thank you. Great for these presentations. I learned a lot. I just would like to ask about the, in the case of Myanmar, the organizational dimension of the civilian agency of this monetary. If there is any, what is the relationship of those organizations with authorities? Because, yeah, talking about civilian agency without any kind of organization or structure or whatever, so it seems a little rare. Are they related to trade unions, to human rights networks? And what is the relationship with the authorities? And this question is for Abby. Where and how do you locate or conceptualize in your argument the permanent killing of social leaders and the role that play in these forms of governance? I think we had already our questions. And then the gentleman right there. Thank you. Okay. Thank you to all. Two questions or comments. One to Michael and Abby and the other one to the presentation on Myanmar. So the first one to Michael and Abby. I was wondering whether you have some more aspects on your treatment or explanatory variable that you could exploit. So not just only whether they were under the rule or under a certain ethnic armed group, but whether for instance there was some competition between armed groups. How long they were under rule among different groups and whether for instance competition between armed groups could give one option would be the civilians more bargaining power towards the relationship towards the armed groups or vice versa, also remove bargaining power. So I don't know if there is more actually that you could exploit actually and to get a handle on the mechanisms. To Jana on Myanmar I think it's so I was I found that very interesting but I was wondering on several fronts where what the what the essence is actually of what you were telling us. So you're saying that civilian agency was strengthened actually through a kind of adaption of this external intervention. So I would really like to know a little bit more about what you mean with that protection has been strengthened because I think we need to boil it down to how does it manifest on the ground. How can you make that claim based on two states that the adoption of these monitoring technologies if you will contributed to the protection of civilians or strengthening of civilian agency. I think these terms need really an empirical grounding and I would have loved to see a little bit more evidence on that. Similarly I was wondering okay what do you mean actually with this monitoring technology right and the networks and institutions and what is behind all these terms. Is it that the people who are part of that program received I don't know a mobile phone, airtime for their mobile phones, contact numbers and is it could you not imagine to have having observed the same impact for other people who haven't been part of that program. So is there like at least theoretically what is the counterfactual that you're comparing or making that claim to that there has been this adoption and the effect of this program. Thank you. I think we start with Kilian, we go to Appian, Mike and all the remaining then of course will be directed to you in the middle because there I think that you know like some of the questions were just so large that you know like you can also contribute. It's nice to see that there are competing universities from saying countries in the you know like taking taking the floor so very interesting for a civil servant to see that but yeah I think Kilian please go first. Thank you. Okay, yeah so thanks Andrea great great questions I won't address all of them but these are really good food for thought on definitions yeah so what is a revolution 30 years of scholarship we still don't know so basically we're going with the sort of political revolution definition so regime change through popular mobilization so the question is are these efforts at regime change right that's and we don't normally think about regime change in democracies right we're making the sort of provocative statement that actually the claims in these revolutionary movements do amount to claims or demands for regime change because they're calling for something fundamentally different that these democracies are so broken and so problematic and the things that these these these protesters want are so profoundly different that this ultimately does entail a call for regime change and therefore we ought to categorize them as revolutions just as we normally you know think about revolutions in autocratic contexts and so yes they are also extra institutional practices of incumbent removal but because that the claims are so severe because they're demanding more than just the removal of the prime minister because they remain in the streets after the prime minister goes these are really these are really revolutionary movements and they should be thought of as such and theorized as such right and then we're thinking about the variation across so that's sort of to answer your first question and we can maybe talk more about the other ones just very briefly the civilian monitors in Myanmar where recruited through local civil society organization that means they were local people recruited oftentimes people who were previously active as community leaders pastors religious leaders and so on so they had some previous experience they were not from one particular organization and so on but the very fact that they were local though recruited locally through CSOs meant that they were not neutral in any term they weren't outsiders and so there was a lot of government on the grounds that these civilian monitors were not neutral observers of what was going on and that was a problem for these monitors the second question in terms of empirical evidence basically I can't give you the long story now the work that I presented is available online it does come with a lot of limitations it's based on interviews with civilian monitors and their own perceptions and some interviews with civil society organizations in an ideal world we would have done a lot more interviews and maybe a survey with the local populations to get a more broader view of how the local population at CC civilian monitors and what effect they had we can't do that or we couldn't do that because the conflict zones in Myanmar are extremely restricted in terms of access as simply not possible so these are findings that are based on the perceptions of the monitors and their narratives and that's very clearly stated in the published work questions especially thank you for coming so your question about how to integrate the killing of social leaders I think is a really great one because it helps me think or it helps us maybe interpret the finding that paramilitary rule is associated with informal and increased informal participation because it may be the case that precisely where paramilitary is governed in the past they had already eliminated social leaders that they found to be leftist and activist and so in those places it's now safe enough for people to participate in these informal ways without fearing retaliation it could be an interpretation of what we are finding there so thank you I think to understand that empirically we would need to do something where we are looking really geographically at the spread of the killing of social leaders for those of you who don't know who have been killed since the peace agreement was signed so we also I also don't like the post-conflict term but it's hard not to use it we do have additional measures in the survey but maybe that's something we can talk about with you at the coffee I don't want to keep everyone too much longer I think that's all thank you so much super interesting panel I'm sure that all of you who are more cognizant are also got very much out of this but I certainly enjoyed it a lot I mean like a director general seldom gets to have such wisdom in one floor I'm sorry to say there are some of my people sitting in the room but it's no I mean like this elevated debate and argumentation is always a pleasure so thank you all of you for very well presented papers and active conversation and I'm really sorry about the fact that we were not able to have more questions I don't think it reflects the state of democracy in Finland very well but there is always a coffee break so thank you very much