 Ladies and gentlemen, Dave Packard is not here with us today because we haven't developed the AFM, that's the anti-flu missile, and he didn't appear with us today. Stan Racer presented his statement as a statement, however, from the Deputy Secretary Defense Dave Packard. I'd like to make a few comments about the presentation we made this morning and then we'll go into your questions. With our strong desire to further the era of negotiations and we have decided to develop and deploy the safeguard program this year on the same three basic reasons that were given by President Nixon last year. First, it responds to the evolving and increasing Soviet offensive weapons threat without requiring an immediate alternative decision by the United States to go forward with additional actions on offensive weapons. Two, it responds to a continuing Chinese progress that has been made in nuclear weapons. And third, it preserves our positive position in strategic arms limitation talks while giving the President the flexibility to respond to a Soviet or to this developing Chinese threat. Now let me turn to the specific program we are recommending this year and that I outlined to both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee this morning. For fiscal year 1971, we propose the authorization to deploy one, one additional safeguard site at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. This is in a Minuteman Field. At an expenditure in fiscal year 1971 of less than a hundred million dollars, this is a hundred million dollars more than would be needed for the phase one work already approved by the Congress. We also recommend that in fiscal 1971, we be authorized to undertake the long lead time advanced preparation work on five additional sites. This would include the site survey work, the engineering, the land acquisition purchase of some long team lead time items, but does not commit us to the deployment of radars or missiles at any of these five sites. The five sites are the Northeast, the Northwest, the National Capital Area, the Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, and the Michigan Ohio site. The proposed fiscal year 1971 program maintains the President's option to move further toward a 12 site full phase two safeguard system if necessary, order to curtail the deployment if threat developments permit. The deployment continues orderly control progress towards the objective set forth by President Nixon, but does not commit us to full phase two deployment without further review and further decisions. The deployment can be modified as required by changes in the threat, arms limitation negotiations, or unilateral actions on the part of the Chinese, Communist, or the Soviet Union. Given President Nixon's determination to postpone additional actions on U.S. offensive systems this year in order to advance the prospects of success at salt, further progress on safeguard deployment becomes the only viable course available in fiscal year 1971. As the President noted, each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to ensure that we are doing as much as necessary, but not more than required by the threat existing at the time. I believe the modified phase two deployment that we have recommended for fiscal year 1971 is the minimum we can and must do, both in costs and in system development to fulfill the President's national security objectives. And I believe that while these discussions are going on, as far as salt is concerned, that $100 million, less than $100 million investment and expenditure in fiscal year 1971 is needed and necessary. And I hope that the Congress will approve this modified phase two safeguard program for fiscal 71. The various gentlemen that are with me, Chairman, Chairman Wheeler, Dr. Foster, and the Secretary of the Army, Stan Reiser, myself will be glad to answer your questions. Secretary, was this decision to modify the phase two economic or military? Well, I would like to comment on that, and General Wheeler should comment on it, too. There were both considerations involved as far as the decision. The fiscal guidance that was given in regard to this program was to keep the program below a total authorized increase in the authorization as far as safeguard, keep it below a billion five, and keep the expenditures below $100 million in fiscal year 1971. That's the total add-on as far as the safeguard program was concerned. It's true that there were larger programs recommended, but in keeping in mind the military requirements as well as the fiscal requirements, also keeping in mind the practical situation that we face not only in the Congress but also the considerations of salt all had a bearing on this particular decision. As you know, last year we outlined a program to go forward with 10 additional sites as far as acquisition and testing was concerned. And I agreed at that time at the request of the Congressional Committees and at the request of the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee not to proceed on any of the additional sites except the two that were approved. And so we did not go back for the site acquisition on all 10 sites for approval this year but are only going back for five of the sites this year and construction on only one of the sites which is in a Minuteman field. But I'd like General Wheeler to comment on that overall question. I think you all will recall that last year the President said that there would be an annual review of the safeguard program taking into consideration the progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, technical progress and the threat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff participated in this government-wide review that took place this year. This program is in consonance with the overall program and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported. Mr. Secretary, can you pinpoint the actual location of those sites which are only under map described in general terms? No, I could not pinpoint the actual location. That's what we'd like to go forward with was the engineering and the site survey work on five. Just on five of the sites. I'd like to go forward with the site survey work at Southern New England, the National Capital, Michigan, Ohio, War and Air Force Base in the upper northwest. Until we have the authority to go forward with that site survey work, I have a commitment with my former colleagues in the Congress that we will not proceed on the site survey work until they approve. This is one of the important authorities that we are asking for. We are not asking for the full authority on the nine sites that you see on that particular map, but site survey work only on five and construction at only one. Mr. Secretary, there's no yet on what in the Air Force Base in Missouri. What's the significance of that and how does that tie in with the Chinese threat? Well, I would like to say in order to deal with the Chinese threat or an accidental launch and to give full protection to the United States, it would still require all 12 sites to give complete area protection as far as the United States is concerned. The area protection that you receive from the wipe and site goes up something like this with your Spartans. And you have area protection in that area. But the main type of protection there is from the Sprint missiles and we are increasing the Sprint missiles at both Maelstrom and Grand Forks. The area protection is given, of course, by the Spartan missiles that are deployed at these particular sites. But in order to get complete nationwide coverage, of course, all 12 sites would have to be in operation with your Spartan missiles. Mr. Secretary, you said in your posture report that it's quite possible, and it was a very startling statement, that it's quite possible that the threat may be larger than safeguarded design designed to handle. Yet you're putting forward a minimum program. As one projects the total Russian threat, and if the Soviet Union continues to go forward on the deployment basis that they did last year, and this was increased as far as SS-11, SS-9 deployment in 69 was up from 68, if this threat continues to materially increase, this does have a very decided effect upon the ABM system and upon the defense of the Minuteman system. Now, last year, those of us that were testifying in support of the safeguard system used certain estimates, which really were the bottom of the estimate and were near the lower scale of the estimate. The Soviet Union went far beyond that, as far as their deployment. As a matter of fact, there was some criticism when I was using the 225-230 figure last year as in Figure 4, 1969, that perhaps I had overestimated the threat as far as the SS-9 was concerned. That perhaps I had overestimated the threat as far as the SS-11 is concerned. Perhaps I had overestimated the threat as far as the submarine launch missiles were concerned. I would just like to make it very clear that the threat was underestimated last year. As a matter of fact, as far as the submarine launch missiles of the Soviet Union are concerned, they are now currently deploying at a rate that they will equal our Polaris fleet or go ahead of it 12 months before the estimate that I gave last year. They will be in that position in the 74-75 time period. And I think that this is most significant, that this be realized by all of us. Dr. Foster, could you tell us about the reason for adding another Spartan type missile? Why do you add another missile of that sort? Certainly. The reason for adding the additional development, that is the development of an improved Spartan, is simply to provide an increased capability against the depressed trajectories of an ICBM or SLBM missile. When we consider the sites near the coastal areas and attempt to take on an attack launched from the sea from the Soviet Y-class submarines, there is the possibility that these missiles will come in in the so-called low depressed trajectory. In order to be able to catch these in time, we need a missile with additional velocity. And so we are modifying the Spartan missile to be able to get additional velocity and provide the coverage of the B-52 forces against that kind of attack. Could you use that to improve Spartan also for your long range interceptor? Yes, we can, but the standard Spartan has some additional characteristics which make it especially useful against the normalized CBM attack or an accidental attack. Can you, Secretary, as you experience how do you read the feeling of the attack, the rerun of that beautiful attack? Well, first, I understand the difficulties that face the Congress, face the executive branch of the government in meeting the high priority needs that this country must meet both at home and abroad. I believe that that is one of the reasons that the Department of Defense has taken the leadership in showing ways to reduce overall defense expenditures. As you know, we have gone from 8.6 percent of the gross national product of this country down to 7 percent of the gross national product that's being expended on defense in this budget. Within the next 30 days, we're going forward with massive base reductions and force reductions at some 100 or so bases, well over 100 bases in the United States. We are doing this on the basis of meeting the priorities that exist within government. Now, I understand full well the problems that the Congress has in this field with the same problems that the executive branch has, but I do believe that in view of the fact that we're in a bargaining position and going forward with the salt talks this year, that the Congress will take the position of supporting the decisions of the President of the United States in this very difficult national security area. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is moving forward so rapidly is also in view of the statements that are being made by my counterpart in the Soviet Union and I hope that you will take advantage of reading some of those statements about their ABM program about their strategic missile offensive system and the manner in which they're pushing forward. As a defense planner, I can't go entirely by what we might like to have happen. We have to face the hard tough realities that exist as far as the overall security of this country is concerned and I believe that Congress will face up to those same responsibilities and will go forward with this modified program to expend less than $100 million, less than $100 million in this fiscal year 1971 on this program is recommended by the President. I don't quite understand how you see an increase in the threat when you today admit that the SS-11 missile is too inaccurate to be used as a missile killer against our Minutemen that there is no evidence that they're independently targeting the multiple warheads on the SS-9s. Doesn't this suggest over the past year a decrease in their threat vis-a-vis first strike capability? No. You mentioned in your testimony that the Chinese are tearing down their ICBM launch facility rebuilding it and for the last two or three years our estimates of when they could launch an ICBM has slipped. What problems are they having and what were you referring to in that passage? There I was referring to the fact that during the last year the Chinese communists have been tearing up their ICBM launch facility and rebuilding it and have now reached the point where they appear ready to conduct ICBM launches. So on that basis we would expect that it would be possible for the Chinese communists to launch their first ICBM as early as within the next few months. Did they move that facility, sir? Did it have anything to do with the border troubles with Russia? No, it did not to my knowledge. That fosters another question. What types of equipment that is the missiles and radars you expect to put into this third site and approximately how large a geographic area the site itself should come? Stan, why don't you? The Whiteman site, it will have both Sprint and Spartan and MSR radar. It will not be a par. And about how large will the site itself be? Will it be spread all over the state or will it be confined largely to the Whiteman subfield? Confined largely to the Minuteman field. It will be confined to the missile field that's involved there and it'll be comparable to the same type of construction that's going that will be going on at the other two sites in phase one. As you know we were held up and going forward with those two sites because I had agreed in testimony before the Congress even though we had authorization to go forward under the Sentinel program I had testified in the Congress that we would not go forward until approval had been granted by the Congress on phase one and that approval did not come through until December because of the construction cycle in the northern part of the United States we're not going into military construction contracting until April. So we do have a slippage there of six to seven months based upon the commitment that I made to the Congress that we would not go forward with the phase one construction until they had actually approved it and it declared both houses. Mr. Secretary, I think address this in his statement but I'm a little bit confused. Is what he's saying here that the full 12 site system deployed would cost about $12 million in 1969 dollars? That is if you go forward with the full 12 site deployment that's DOD acquisition costs and it is based upon 1969 dollars. This is important to understand too because in the there's heavy construction costs in the ABM program and you'll remember that back in 1957 58 time period the Department of Defense when I was on the other side of the table was directed not to put any increases based upon projected increases in cost and construction in any military construction program. The reason we directed them to do it at that time was that we felt the Department of Defense was adding too much of a question to their military construction costs so we made them use a current dollar figure and will not let them in military construction programs project added increases that you have to use a constant dollar factor and I'm sure all of you that cover the department understand that but there are people that don't understand the directions under which we operate in the military construction area. Secretary can I clarify your original answer on the five additional sites the advanced sites you mean that you know you don't at this moment know exactly where they are going to go and you're going to make site studies to we would like to go forward with the site survey and selection process and that has not been done. Secretary can we talk about the lack of the eye on the SS9. Last year you were indicating that you thought it might be a mirrored warhead but also President Nixon has mentioned the Soviet apparent interest in developing more accurate ICBM for their offensive message. Is there a development in the Soviet Union that you have detected? I want to make it very clear and Steve asked a question along that same line indicating some new intelligence about the accuracy of the SS11 and the SS9. I just want to make that very clear that I haven't given out any new intelligence information along that line where that comes from I don't know because as far as the information that I am basing this assessment of the threat on as far as accuracy is concerned we're using about the same information that was available to us last year now there is it is true that the Soviet Union has increased their testing program and they're testing in the ICBM area twice as many missiles as we are and they did during the last 12 months but I have not alluded to the accuracy figures and we have not gone out with any public comments regarding the accuracy last year I indicated that the multiple re-entry vehicle that was used by the Soviet Union could have different targeting projections I never indicated that I had evidence that it was independently guided either on the bus or after it left the bus and I have never made such a statement we of course do not have independently guided weapons after they leave the bus in any of our advanced stage missiles I'm sure you gentlemen realize that Johnny do you want to Dr. Foster certainly the purpose of adding the additional sprints to Malmstrom and Grand Forks was simply to bring them up to the defensive level associated with the phase two program that was described last year so we will be adding to the total number of sprints at Malmstrom and Grand Forks and putting in the total number of sprints required at Whiteman Secretary what what is the total not going to be the total expenditure year this year the congress approved as you say be a hundred million more well I made the grand total of 1.1 billion or 1 billion no it'll be less than a billion dollars I gave that figure to the committee today and the the total amount will be around nine hundred million dollars as far as the expenditure rate is concerned and less than one hundred million of that will be made up of the phase two program that the president is recommended today secretary could you we uh we always have around here and that is that Heather gets a question and she's had her hand up for some time and now Heather has a question for Dr. Foster Do you suspect that Western Electric would choose a new contractor for this modified MSR radar and how much do you expect that to cost compared to the original MSR? We have not released the costs for the improved Spartan interceptor but with regard to the contractor no I don't believe we would make a change in the contractor oh the MSR I'm sorry I missed your point uh we have not yet made a final decisions on the procedure for getting the advanced smaller radar and uh so I just can't give you the details I think they will not be available until around June. Mr. Secretary? Yes. If the so we have to keep the volume of SS9 because we need a rebase on that mask well there are many options available to us and I don't want to limit this country to just one option that is one that should be considered if the Soviet continue their strategic offensive missile buildup at that rate but I would not want to limit it just to the Minuteman option that we have available whether it be mobile or rebasing there are other options that are available and those tough hard decisions will have to be made in 1972 and as we prepare our new five-year program but this year I believe we have the time to follow through on the salt talks and to go with a very minimum program and still protect the security of the United States now those tough hard decisions the Soviet Union that is establishing this timetable and they're the ones that are establishing the timetable and you all know in this building how long it takes for us to project as a weapon system from four to eight years in the future before it actually comes into our inventory we for planning purposes we have to consider those things but I wouldn't want to limit our option to just the one that you point out we have information that the Soviet Union has carried on successful intercepts as far as ABM is concerned Secretary I was basing my question on two statements in Dr. Foster's testimony today one the tests of three reentry vehicles per SS9 have continued but they have not demonstrated to us the flexibility necessary to target each word against a different silo and to the SS11s could be used against Minutemen but to date the required accuracy improvement has not been demonstrated well this is no change though from last year and that's why when you ask if there's been a change the answer is no the answer is no and the there has been no indication as far as I'm concerned in the information that we have publicly released at any time during this year claiming a greater accuracy than was outlined to the committee in the testimony last year as far as the SS11 was concerned we indicated last year the very good accuracy of the SS9 which is very good it's an excellent accuracy and of course with when they have gone into the multiple reentry vehicle as they have on the SS9 and with the kind of accuracy they have it's difficult for me sometimes to understand why they need five megatons in each of those reentry vehicles with the kind of accuracy they have this is a certainly a counter force type weapon with the kind of accuracy they already have in that weapon system and what concerns me is that instead of the 225 to 230 that we thought they would have under construction they're well over 275 as far as the construction program and in being on the SS9 as of today sir secretary the point the president made last year in a press conference and Dr. Foster I'm sure made was that the footprint of the SS9 triple warhead was such that it was a very worrisome thing now in this statement Dr. Foster is saying they haven't demonstrated that they're all that good I think that's what Steve is trying to well I'll have I'm afraid that there's more being read into that statement than we tried to be cautious in that statement because there are people that have attributed to the Department of Defense the fact that they're independent independently targeted and we have never made that claim as far as the SS9 but I'd like Dr. Foster to comment on that well secretary is quite right there was at no time a prediction that the Soviet Union would have merves by last year or by this year no excuse me I think since I sense you some some concern here let me simply say the secretary has made it very clear and I believe the rest of us have that the concern is not for 1970 or 1971 the concern is for the period 1975 and beyond and at that time there is no doubt in anyone's mind but what the Soviet Union could well have those multiple vehicles merged from an SS9 and that's the threat he's talking about Charlie I think to in order to understand it when we talk about footprint as far as targeting is concerned we're talking about the targeting that is done before a missile is launched and we have evidence that the footprint the targeting can be changed prior to the time the minute the SS9 is launched and so that you can get a different characteristic in the impact of the warheads and that characteristic is such that it is adaptable in some areas to the minute man pattern that has not changed but we have not any evidence that they can independently target these particular weapons except as they are projected in the bus itself prior to the time of launch now we have