 It's time now to turn to Professor Wang Jizi who participated in the session yesterday. So Professor, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, Thomas. I'm happy to join others. Although I'm not able to join you physically, I hope I will be with you in person in the future. You asked great questions. But I cannot be very precise. As some people have said, China is rising strong materially. But in public acceptance of China around the world, the picture is mixed. Many media reports indicate that public opinion polls in the western countries, Japan, South Korea, and India are increasingly favourable to China. Recently, I heard that Mr. Kishida may be elected Prime Minister in Japan soon. It is related to what he and other Japanese see today's China. He was elected, he was educated in America. He is pragmatic, but probably unsympathetic to China's political values. And I would like to know my South Korean colleague, how he will assess the upcoming election of South Korea. And the next president of South Korea may have another approach to China. Last week, the leaders of the four nations that make up the informal grouping, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, known as Quad, met for the first time in person at the White House. His unstated goal is to stop China from becoming Asia's undisputed hegemo. There have been other events and developments in recent months, not in the picture of China. But they are hardly reported in China itself and hardly known to the general public in China. China's media is full of triumphalism, meaning we are winning, we are winning, and we are winning. We are friends all over the world, freezing our achievements. This self-image makes it difficult for Beijing to show any conciliatory attitude to what whoever viewed this hostile to China. I don't see any prospects that Beijing would back down on major foreign policy issues and become less assertive, but at least in rhetoric. Our French participant asked China to be humble, but I don't see the likelihood of being humble for China in the near future. China and the United States have been engaged in the projected strategic competition that may last for decades. However, at this moment, both Beijing and Washington are preoccupied with their respective domestic imperatives. On the Chinese side, we have electric outage in many provinces, especially in the northeast. The debt crisis regarding Evergrande is another example of China's weakness. The most damaging problem is the slowing down of economic growth. There are issues related to the increasing fertility rate and the aging population. It is difficult to achieve the goal of common prosperity when economic growth is slower, private enterprises are depressed and not doing well, and social safety net has not been markedly improved. In the US, we see continued political policies fighting back for the democratization of the Republic or in the Congress. Infrastructure, construction, pandemic control, legal immigration, gun control, corporate, to name just a few. So are you visage, temporary state in the bilateral relations between China and the United States? All this in the months ahead. I don't see this as an achievement. There can be an assumption of consulates in Houston and Chengdu. There could also be economic dialogue at high levels between the two countries. However, three possible problems are lying ahead for China in the next few months. First, the continued US effort to trace the origins of COVID-19 that worries China. Second, the winter Olympic Games. Western countries are not going to boycott the Games, but their public opinion polls show that these countries are not sympathetic, and they may not be wholeheartedly supporting the Games. That could be embarrassed time. Third, there is a talk about the Democratic summit toward the end of the year, and that is of course not very favorably received in China, especially China's concern about Taiwan's participation in the summit. Maybe not President Tsai Ing-wen or some top leaders, but even a lower level participation will annoy time. We have seen the intensification of China's propaganda war both at home and internationally against the United States. We see reports on racial tensions, gun control issues, bad management pandemic, human rights violations in the United States, and international failures like in Afghanistan. But the propaganda campaign is directed more at domestic audiences to enhance their confidence in the Communist Party rather than at international audiences for them to have a better understanding or positive understanding of China. So I see China's international behavior as mostly defensive in nature. I don't buy the theory that China desires to buy to be the hegemon of the world or even of Asia. As I say in my recent articles, I think the Chinese US competition is basically a game between the domestic order maintained by the Communist Party of China and the international order maintained and advocated by the United States. So in the United States, you see America first as a slogan, but in China, or this slogan I always hear comes partly first. So I see a US-China trade volume increased last year and climate change, the effort of China in China is serious. I'm more worried about technological decoupling. Thomas mentioned the chips, that is a real issue in US-China relationship. And also there is a possible cyber war. I'm not much worried about confrontation despite the increased militant uproars among some Chinese netizens and some commentators. We know that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last year made a phone call to his Chinese counterpart to prevent a war between the two sides and there will be improved crisis management arrangements between the two sides. I think the Taiwan policy of China is consistent. Xi Jinping made a telegram to his counterpart, the chairman of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, and he said Taiwan should engage each other for a peaceful solution. Constant will upgrade its military preparedness. There could be air fighters and bombers and flying over Taiwan or near Taiwan, things like that. But I don't see a real war between the two sides. When we talk about... Professor, I'm afraid I have to interrupt you. I will be back to you. Just to respect the time constraint. But as Marcus Noland insisted on the domestic factors, I think also what you have said about the Chinese opinion is very useful to fuel our debates.