 I think we'll get started, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to Carnegie. My name is Chan Min Lee. I'm a senior fellow here at the Asia program. I am very delighted that many of you have made it in this inclement weather. We have a great panel today who knows probably more about South and North Korea combined in this city. What I wanted to do today was to give you a brief overview of our report, copies of which are outside. So Katie and I wrote this piece called the Korea Strategic Review, and we hope to do this on an annual basis. And just to give you a sense of where we are with the report, three key aspects were emphasized. The first was, I don't think there's ever been a Korean president, such as President Moon Jae-in, who has expended so much political capital on building South-North reconciliation and so-called a peace regime. And in some ways he has really succeeded, but if we compare this to like a half-time period in the football, that's where we are. And so the second half depends on a lot of factors and variables, which I think he may not be able to fully control. And that includes Kim Jong-un's responses, what President Trump will do in the next couple of years, Xi Jinping strategy, and of course domestic politics in South Korea. So that's the first take that Katie and I were focusing on. The second point is the fact that if you look at the history of South-North relations, seldom do you really focus on like what did the Chinese do because that's something that so-called sinologists in Korea focus on. And one, the big takeaways from our report, I hope, is the fact that we focused on critical issues that really shaped Korean foreign policy over the last year. And that includes that, for example, the huge controversy surrounding the deployment of that system and how the Korean government responded. And last but not least, and you can see this in the executive summary, we focused on, for example, what are the opportunity costs if things don't really go all that well. Currently, the Korean government, the South Korean government is at the height of its political power, as you all know. But in Korea, we have a single five-year presidency. He is really strong for two years. And from the third year, he begins to go into the so-called lame duck period. And then by the fourth or fifth year, their approval ratings become pretty low. Or in many cases, they end up going to jail. So we don't know whether that's going to repeat itself. I hope not. And so this is a very high-stakes poker game for President Moon. And I think it really depends not only on his ability to navigate these waters, but also to make sure that the Korean economy becomes really solid. And that is something that's going to be very difficult. So I believe that the ultimate legacy that Mr. Moon will leave behind not only will be on South Korean relations, but on the extent of whether he will be able to revive the Korean economy. KDIA basically says that next year it'll be about 2.6%. Moody's and others have said even lower. So unless he's able to jump out to Korean economy, he will face a lot of headwinds going into his third year in May 2019. So let me just stop there for my brief introduction remarks. I have today a very special panel and I'll just go down by the list. And on my left is Jean Lee. She's the director of the Hyundai Motor Korea Foundation Center for Korean History at the Wilson Center. She just hosted a major meeting yesterday with the Korean Minister of Unification and other dignitaries. Jean was the first, I think, American journalist to open a full-time office in Beijing when she worked for the associate in Pyongyang, sorry, when she worked for the AP, right? And so again, this is something that is really, really, really important because she has on-site experience working on a daily basis with her counterparts in North Korea. And so it's a real pleasure and an honor to meet you, Jean. And on a very, very personal level, her name is exactly the same as my daughter's. So, that's right, that's right. And then in the middle is James Schoff. Jim is an old Carnegie hand. We used to work at a small thing taken Boston many years back. He is one of the most knowledgeable experts on Japanese foreign policy, but I don't know why he calls himself a Japanese expert because if you see his work, 90% is on Korea. So Jim is very knowledgeable on Korean issues and I just could not be happier working within, shoulder to shoulder. And Jim has had experience working at the OSD in the private sector and he just received a very big award from the Nakasone Institute in Japan. So congratulations. On my very far left, that has nothing to do with his political leanings, Ambassador Joseph Ewan. And until recently he was a special representative for North Korea Policy in the State Department. He was acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Affairs at the tail end of the Obama administration. He served as ambassador to Malaysia at a crucial time. He is now a senior advisor to the USIP's Asia program and is also working for the Asia group as a consultant. So Ambassador Ewan, it's a real pleasure to welcome you to Carnegie. And I have two other people that I want to introduce. Katie Botto is my co-author. She's a terrific research analyst, a Hopkins graduate, full bright scholar at Yonsei. She worked at US Portals Korea and I'm very lucky to have her. So Katie can just stand up and get recognized, please. And then we have three junior fellows in this room. Where's Paul? Oh, downstairs, okay. And Eugene is there, okay. She's an Asan fellow from Korea. The student at POSTech, which is the Caltech of Korea. And the way in the bag whom you will not see, but he is here, is Alex Taylor, our senior program manager without him. None of this happens. So Alex, thank you very much. Anyway, so let me begin to ask my great panel and many great friends here. Chris, long time no see, welcome to Carnegie. And the first question is, will the midterms in the US impact North Korea policy? And so let me just begin with Eugene. So do you believe that the midterms, the so-called blue wave, is going to affect the Trump administration's North Korea policy in one way or the other? I think that it's possible that the momentum may shift and that there may have been some push on the part of President Trump to use the North Korea issue to perhaps galvanize support for his party or for his leadership before the midterms. But then we, so there was a lot of question, would he try to schedule that second summit with Kim Jong-un before those midterms to get that quick victory? And then we did hear in the weeks beforehand that no, he said, I don't have time for that. It's gonna be after the midterms and we see it being pushed back. Now he's saying, no, perhaps it will be sometime next year. And so I do think that it's possible that the momentum may shift and that's something that the North Koreans are going to take into account as well. That they may be patient. They may think that perhaps this North Korea as a foreign policy priority may fall down in terms of priorities. Because of the midterms. Just because he may have other priorities than post midterm elections. Okay, Joe, if I may ask you. I have very boring answer. It's gonna be no effect at all. Not at all. All right. Well, thank you for that. You can go now. Yeah. All right. And may I ask you why there is going to be zero? Because the foreign policy is very much per view of the executive branch. Right. And really midterm elections, I mean, let's face it, out of all the seats, all the House of Representatives and Senate, nobody voted based on. On foreign policy. All Korea issues in particular. You know? And so I think also Democrats even winning, they are friendly towards engagement. So it's not gonna change. Okay. So also I'll take a little. What's that? Part of me? Well, let me, I'll spice it up a little bit and say that, I think the honest answer is we don't know, you know, what the impact really is going to be. Because there are some other factors that I could point to. Certainly you're gonna have this House as a check on the Trump administration dynamic and what does that do to Trump's psyche and mood, et cetera. He also, on the plus side though, Trump has more loyalists within the GOP than he had before. He's not going to be doing battle within his own party. He, we will have a new Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, a new chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Armed Services in particular, Inhofe is pretty tough on China and there are some issues there. As Chris mentioned, Brad Sherman probably will be the House Asia Subcommittee chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and he's always been very tough. I think this host nation support issue, which is still coming down to the wire with Korea right now is potentially one of these wildcards and then Japan is up next. So budget battles, debt ceilings, trying to, the sense of crisis are all those factors. What I don't know is does that make things worse or better in the context of, he's got other priorities, so China trade, North Korea, other things become less of a, he wants to create a crisis there or is willing to tolerate a crisis or does that actually affect his mood and make things more unstable? No, Jeanne, if you put back your journalists back for a second, do you think that there is going to be, let's say a long drawn out, let's say domestic political process because of all the problems that the president faces and is that going to distract him on whether it's North Korea, whether it's Iran, whether it's Saudi Arabia, all of these Yemen, these really, really important foreign policy issues or do you think he will be able to still focus on his so-called his legacy issues? I am not going to predict how he is going to behave because I think one thing we've found is that he's very unpredictable and speaking as a journalist, I would say that we have spent, journalists have spent so much time trying to keep up with and cover the unpredictability of Trump's presidency and that has been such a distraction so it's very hard to gauge what the, how this is going to play out, how anything's going to play out because there's been one unexpected issue after another that has distracted us from the actual substantive issue so I think it's very hard to... Joe, recently there was a, you know, the Deputy National Secretary-Divisor, Mira Ricardelle, was shown out the door for a number of reasons and I think this is probably very unprecedented even for an American administration so, you know, you'll see a lot of staff changes within the executive branch and do you think that somehow will impact policy? Yeah, that will, I mean, everyone is right. At any given day anything can happen but to say that midterm election has triggered itself, has triggered an effect on North Korea policy is pretty far fetched and that's my point. I see, okay. Well, let me just stick with you because you've worked on North Korea policy for a very long time at the highest levels of government and President Trump appointed Steve Began as the new North Korea representative he's working very closely with Secretary Pompeo. What advice, if any, would you give him as he looks into 2019? Because we have potentially a second US North Korea summit, you have potentially a fourth inter-Korean summit, all of the military CVMs beginning to kick in next year. So what's your take, what would you tell him? Well, I think Steve Began is a negotiator, that's his job. He's supposed to negotiate and engage. So he's got to do his utmost to engage the North Koreans and at the moment he's finding that very, very hard and so I think therein lies his problem which is how does he get North Koreans to engage and that's obviously not a problem that Steve made himself but he has inherited it. So I would say to him that in fact he should have plenty of room to move. I mean, you know, it's someone's dream to have president to say that someone that decide you wanna engage that he's apparently in love, you know? So he really should have a huge room to move but I do believe there's been a lot of mixed messaging from the administration. You've seen President Trump say one thing which has been contradicted by Bolton and Pompeo. So therein lies the difficulty but I do think Steve Began should use the room created by President Trump to engage and that's his job. Jim, what would you tell him if you were in the same room with him? I mean, I can't add too much more than what Joe said but obviously this problem we face is the willingness of North Korea to engage or not at his level. So and Began is being undermined by these mixed messages because even though Trump is giving him this room his direct boss is Pompeo. And I think Pompeo and Bolton have different ideas than Trump in terms of what they're trying to kind of keep things disciplined, keep things focused on getting North Korea to be very explicit about what it's willing to give in exchange for benefits and that tension is very, makes it very difficult for Began to even explore what's possible. So. Oh, I was just going to pose a question to all of you witches. Do you see that as being friction or a difference in approach between Pompeo and Bolton and President Trump or is it a good, bad cop situation where President Trump is the guy at the top saying we have a bromance here, we're in love but asking Pompeo to be the tough guy. Well, I don't see a great grand strategy unfortunately although maybe by accident they have this opportunity. So you could envision if I'm Pompeo and Bolton and Began we get together and say okay, we have this room to move, we can be a little bit of the tough cop but I think they're still trying to put the onus on North Korea. Their view is the ball is in North Korea's court to come to us with a willingness to talk about denuclearization in a more detailed way. And I think the South Korean government instead, the Moon government is saying we understand that and yes, North Korea needs to do more but couldn't you do a few things first to make this more possible? And then so we're a little bit stuck there. Now maybe Began has room to be, maybe they could deploy him to be more flexible than Pompeo and Bolton. Maybe portray him to be a guy that the North Koreans can work with. Could have to work with. That could be a strategy that maybe show pictures of Trump and Began getting together, playing golf or something like that so that Began is the conduit to Trump. You know, Gene, having spent actual time in Pyongyang and you've also worked in South Korea for a long time, could you tell us exactly and insofar as you can, what does Kim Jong-un think about Moon Jae-in? What does he think about the entire peace process that they both tried so hard to achieve and they've had three summits since April of this year, you've had the Panmunjom Declaration, the Pyongyang Declaration, Moon Jae-in said that Trump, excuse me, Kim Jong-un is likely to come to Seoul by the end of the year, although he never promised that. But give us a read to the audience on what the mood is in Pyongyang now and in particular what Kim Jong-un thinks about his counterpart in Seoul. Okay, I will not dare to read his mind. We should have probably invited a Moodang, a Korean shaman to, however, just to show you how I read all of this. You know, I think that it's so interesting because North Korea does such a good job with its propaganda and portraying North Korean leader in a position of strength, that's what they have to do, that's their job and they do it very well. So for most of the world, what you saw in Singapore was really your first chance to see him interacting as a person outside of that sort of bubble of North Korean propaganda and he was very confident. He showed that he can circulate in foreign soil, interact with foreign leaders fairly comfortably, but I have been watching him since the moment he made his debut and so I've been, and I just wanna just provide a little bit of context, which is remember that this is a very young man under extreme pressure. When he first made that appearance, his name first appeared in state media in 2010, nobody knew who he was, they had heard rumors, but they didn't quite know who he was and he was so young and I remember thinking, how is he gonna survive this transition? Remember that this is, they may show us in their state media and to foreign journalists the showcase projects of Pyongyang, but we have to remember that this is an incredibly poor country with an estimated per capita GDP of $1,700 according to the CIA per person per year, $1,700 compared to 39,000 in South Korea. It's Pyongyang is relatively built up, but the rest of the countryside is lacks infrastructure, it's a very poor country. He was inheriting power, he has inherited power over people who didn't know who he was and so that's a lot of pressure that for a young man like him and I just mentioned that because although we see him now looking so confident we have to remember that it's taking him some time to get to this point and he's still under a lot of pressure. He knows that unless he improves his economy that he's not gonna be able to sustain that hold on power, that Kim family hold on power for decades to come and so I do think that we just need to think about that larger context. He has been and I've been writing about this for a couple years, he and his strategists are very good at looking at what the lay of the land is in terms of who's in the White House, who's in the Blue House. Blue House precisely. So he knew that when Trump was campaigning that there was the potential for something with this presidential campaign who said he would sit down with Kim Jong-un. So built that into the strategy and also when you had President Moon I'm sure, it was very clear from state media that they were looking forward to having a liberal back in the Blue House, somebody that they knew that they could work with, working all of that into the strategy. I think there's something really interesting going on here between President Moon and President, sorry Kim Jong-un. I do think North Korea has a strategy where they're saying let's make this into an inter-Korean, a joint unified stance. At the expense perhaps of the US ROK Alliance or Korea's ties with Japan or even Chinese North Korean ties. But Jim, if I may ask you, imagine that you're having a conversation with President Moon Jae-in as difficult as that may be. And... He speaks English. Right, so what advice would you give the president because we're in a kind of a lull. You had this raptome momentum from the Pyeongchang Olympic Games all the way to the April, May and September summits and then the June summit in Singapore with President Trump and Kim Jong-un. And so the Korean government wants some type of sanctions relief, right? They want to move the ball forward. But the Trump administration says, unless you declare your nuclear sites, then we really can't meet you halfway. What advice would you give your Korean friends and in particular to the Moon administration? Well, it's interesting when Gene makes the comment about forging an inter-Korean position or stance. And of course you can interpret that as being something that the United States should be wary of and is worried about. But on the other hand, I tend to think that that can be a very positive development. So how do you leverage what he really wants to do and what he's trying to accomplish into something that's positive also from an American point of view? Because I think Moon is pragmatic and has been, they're saying the right things in the context of supporting sanctions enforcement and denuclearization going hand in hand with inter-Korean relations. In the Pentagon, I was a little bit in the minority in the context of transfer of operational, wartime operational control to Korea. I actually thought that was a good idea. We were trying for 2012, we were trying for 2015. We kept moving it back, but it's very possible that we're getting closer to maybe something in the early 2020s where that's feasible if South Korea makes the right defense investments and the situation is common up. I think that's good to put Korea in that position of being the main interlocutor for North Korea in terms of if you want to negotiate peace and economic vitality, et cetera, you do it with South Korea and the US backs you up in that regard. Trump should like that, generally speaking, and I think you can do it in a way that preserves deterrence and security. So I would be looking for not necessarily end of war declarations prematurely. I would not be looking for trying to give up on the deterrence piece either. I mean, I'm a little worried right now that the way this summit is shaking out into early next year is, I mean, we're supposed to make a decision, the United States and South Korea on the spring training cycle by December 1st or so, so I can easily see for the sake of diplomacy, we're gonna postpone that too. And I think we need to set some clear standards and demands for reciprocity with North Korea that look, you can exercise some exercises, conventional exercises are legitimate and fine and we need to do them and you can do them, but let's keep going on the comprehensive military agreement. Let's keep going on confidence building measures but not give up totally on that. And the same with sanctions too. I think sanctions enforcement makes sanctions exemptions more valuable. If you're sufficiently enforcing sanctions, then you can offer, hey, we could develop a joint special economic zone inter-Korean together and get Trump on your side to do that if you hold up your end of the bargain on sanctions enforcement elsewhere. So I think there's some room to leverage the inter-Korean relationship and the alliance together to try to get what he wants. You know, Joe, when you're in government and working on North Korea policy or East Asia policy more broadly, it really entails a whole of government effort. It's not just the state you've got that have the NSE on board, the IC on board, DOD, and so forth. Do you believe that we are seeing that type of effort today in the Trump administration? Is there a whole of government effort? Or is it more like ad hoc or piecemeal? And by the same token, since you're frequent travel to Seoul, do you see a whole of government effort in Seoul working on North Korea policy? Yeah, I think that's a tough question to answer because in general, bureaucrats are very hierarchical. So you're going to agree with your boss and he may be an idiot, but you end up agreeing with your boss, you know? That's not an implying you had idiots as a boss before. No, not at all. And so at what level of detail they know and so on. So it is true that there will always be tension within an administration between those who advocate policy and those who implement it. So a good example is actually what Jim said. I completely agree with him on sanctions, which is that in order for sanctions to be effective, they have to be implemented and that's why exemptions are very, very valuable. But once you are wedded into those sanctions, there will always be resistance from those who are implementing sanctions to give exemptions. And so that's a difficult issue. Similarly, say for non-proliferation issues, obviously you want verification of agreement, say, denuclearization agreement. But verification, nobody wants to give verification, so you try to get to it, get to it, but those who are working on verification side is just beginning and the end of everything. So that becomes difficult. So I would say within the community, which is why you do appeal to your boss to resolve that issue. In this administration, of course, we have, when I worked there suddenly, we had a group that came together and there was same amount of tensions. I think in those cases, it's really up to those policy side to get the green light from their bosses and to pursue that direction. And that, I would imagine, happens everywhere, whether you are in Washington or Seoul. So that's the responsibility of the principles, I would call it, to set that direction so that the objections of those on implementation side becomes less of a barrier to get to the next level of engagement. I mean, let me turn the focus a little bit to South Korean politics. One thing that I found, I joined Carnegie in early July this year, is that there's a lot of expertise in this town on North Korean issues, on China obviously, on the US-Japan alliance. And people talk about South Korea but only not as a main driver on critical issues. And I think the absence of analysis on South Korean domestic politics is something that really needs to be, I guess, ramped up. So Jean, let me just go to you. In April, 2020, we have in South Korea national assembly elections, which are really important for President Moon and the Democratic Party if they want to retain the presidency, assuming that the current five-year presidency holds. So in your view, how do you read the domestic political terrain in South Korea today? Oh, and I'm so glad you're bringing this up because I don't think we talk about that, but it's so important to understanding what's happening with policy, not only with North Korea, but right now, politically, it is so divided. The politics is so partisan. I have never in my 25 years of covering Korea and traveling to Korea seen it so divided. And you worked in Seoul for how many years? I did for 10 years. For 10 years, okay. And I was there also as a journalist in the early 2000s. Early 2000s, okay. And in the 90s. So I've been going back and forth. My family lives in Korea, so I've been going back and forth and I've never seen it so divided. And I think that's important to remember. We have a different group of progressives in the Blue House in power after nine years of a conservative government and who have been waiting in the wings, ready to, and that is shaping and coloring everything. I've never seen it so divided. I think so that for President Moon and his party, as you mentioned earlier, he's put, and as you mentioned in your paper, he's put so much of his energy and capital into the North Korea policy that I think that that will shape and affect what happens in 2020. But I think whether his economic policies will actually turn up is going to be a critical indicator. And that's what I mean. I think he's spent so much on North Korea, perhaps not enough on the economy. And South Korea is the world's 11th largest economy and no president left or right or center can tell the market do this and then suddenly you have job creation. It just doesn't happen. And that's something that I think the Moon government is finding out now how difficult it is to implement your favorite economic policies, right? I would just want to say that in some ways, for us, we look at this in terms of North Korea, but for South Koreans, economy is number one. Well, sure. And especially for that younger generation who are having such a hard time getting jobs. And that will determine what happens, I think, in elections too. Because Koreans, like other democracies, vote with their wallets. So Jim, on that point, let me ask you a question. Japan under Prime Minister Abe, and he's been one of the strongest Prime Ministers in the post-war era, right? And his economic policies have actually worked so far. And it's surprising to see that people in their 20s are very supportive of the LDP and its cabinet. And so if you read that and what's happening in South Korea, how would you compare and contrast what Abe has done politically in Japan and how President Moon has done politically in South Korea? Since you know both capitals so well. Well, there's always apples and oranges in this kind of situation. And Abe doesn't face the same kind of central existential issue like North Korea that Moon does face. And he had the benefit of sorts, of kind of coming after the experiment with the DPJ party in Japan that stumbled. So he was given this second chance and I think smartly did go all in on the economy. First, he was not ideological in terms of, at least in the beginning on various social policies or foreign policies. And benefited from some global economic tides rising as well. So things have worked out from a South Korean point of view. Yeah, would it be better for Moon politically to have a more balanced kind of North Korea economy policy probably? But it's hard to escape that. What I think they see is this opportunity. It is so dramatic when you think of what has happened since the Olympic Charm offensive and my senses and I'm curious what you all think, because I don't go to Korea often enough, is that Moon and his crew really think that Kim represents a once in a lifetime opportunity that we gotta put all our chips on the table on this now. And if it works, we're gonna be remembered forever in the annals of Korean history. So that's a tough thing to ignore. The hard part is there's some signs that that may be true. There's plenty of signs that might not be true or is Kim just held back by peers that are more skeptical. And so all we have to do is help Kim navigate this opposition and then we can lead him to the promised land or it's Kim kind of in the back of his mind kind of playing us all to get out of the situation. Based on your discussions with Korean officials or former officials experts, since you know them all very, very well, what's your read? I mean, how seriously do they believe that Kim Jong-un is the real item, as Jim said? I mean, is he the holy grail of South North reconciliation? Are they gonna get the Nobel Peace Prize and like we're gonna sign this peace treaty and there will be an irreversible peace regime on the peninsula? Yeah, I think there is tremendous amount of belief among the Blue House folks. Right. I don't know whether that has spread beyond Blue House but certainly within the Blue House there are those who I call true believers, you know? And I think that is for me that's also a weakness in what they're trying to achieve which is trying to assert not just in Korea but also in Washington and elsewhere that this is the real McCoy, essentially. This is the real thing because I don't, so the biggest question always becomes on their part, yes, Kim Jong-un has made a strategic decision to denuclearize while in fact most everyone else are very doubtful that he's made that decision, that he may thought about that decision but he has not quite made it yet. And my own personal view is even Kim Jong-un doesn't know whether he's made a decision or not, you know? And why would he? I mean, unlike President Moon who has what, three and a half years to go. And unlike President Trump who has two years to go, I think Kim Jong-un can probably count on 40 years. And so, I mean, there are many good signs. I mean, don't get me wrong, many, many good signs but to imagine that North Korea would give up their nuclear program which they've been pursuing since the 60s, since the 1960s and tremendous sacrifice, tremendous cost, that's not an easy decision for them. And my belief is that we need to put off answering that question but rather say what is the next step and so I think that, you know, to me, I mean yesterday in fact, I think it was State Putin Roy who talked about the idea that they have decided to denuclearize is a fig leaf that allows discussions but we sometimes confuse fig for fig leaf. We think there is a fig there, there's no fig, only a leaf, you know, yeah. Can I just ask a quick question before we move too far from the domestic piece because I kind of wanted to follow up on Jean's comment that if you do have this backsliding of North Korean momentum by February, March or so next year and the economy's not doing well, what do you think, what is the impact of that on South Korean politics on that election and then what does that mean for Moon's power? I'm sure Jean has her own takes but my personal view is that, you know, all members of the National Assembly like all congressmen here or senators, their primary objective is getting reelected and so in Korea there is no primary for the National Assembly. There is a kind of a primary but not really so what really happens is you apply at the Central Party and there's a committee within the party that decides whether Chris Nelson will get reelected in district A. Thank you, Mr. So these guys are already thinking in the post-Moon era already, that's my view because they're asking themselves, number one, who will help me get nominated in my party? Is that President Moon and the folks in the Blue House or Ye Chan and others in the Democratic Party? And I guarantee you that even the ruling party members are really divided on where their loyalties basically lie. By the spring of next year, Jim, I think we will begin to see people say they're gonna start to line up and that means that President Moon's power within the Blue House, as much as he wants to look over the political process, will be balanced by the party's growing role going into the April 2020 elections because they've got to decide by the end of next year who the nominees will be. And I guarantee you there will be tremendous infighting within the party as to who gets the nomination. Any thoughts, Jean? Aside from the sort of political landscape and the National Assembly, I would just, going back to the sort of the timeframe, I do think that we're starting to see President Moon's approval ratings drop a bit. You know, they were exceptionally high, they're still pretty high. And some of that has, as we discussed, has to do with some of the domestic issues related to the economy. But of course if we go back to provocations or if the process gets dragged out, it's possible that he will lose some of that popular support that he's had so much of over the past year. And so that's something he has to consider. He began his administration with about high 70s. He maintained in the 60s. And he had gotten some bumps from the three summits. But I think the latest poll indicates his approval rating is in the mid 50s. And so, which is still very high, considering what he's facing. But if the five-year trajectory stands historically, then by the end of next year, his approval ratings are likely to go down rather than go up. But if I move on, I want to ask all my panelists, this is a very difficult question. What indicators are there in your minds that tells you that Kim Jong-un is serious about moving forward? Well, one, the best one in my opinion would be to really empower a working level dialogue to try to explore what's possible with a big and chai. He's reluctant to do that for whatever reason. Either he wants to appeal to Trump directly or he's afraid of his buddies, his peers undermining that process or he doesn't trust the process. But that would be the best. But I actually think if he goes to Seoul, I'm still interested in this possibility. That's one of the few irreversible steps that you can take in this whole process. You can't un-go to Seoul and see that and experience that. And that would be meaningful in my opinion and I don't know whether that's a done deal. He always definitely gonna do that anyway or that's actually hanging in the balance. Joe, what do you think? I think he needs to deliver on what he has said he could do. The biggest example being Young Bien. If he opens up Young Bien for inspection and dismantlement, I think that indicates that he's serious. And he said he would do that. And he said it even in June. So to me, that's a very clear signal. But I think what is important is for us, for US, for South Korea and for others to get him there. So really I do think the next step, the owners is on Washington. He said he would do it. Now let's try to make it happen. So what would you give to Kim Jong-un that would enable him to meet the Americans halfway? So he's saying, I mean, my rule of thumb is listen to what they say. Don't try to psychoanalyze them. Listen to what they say. What they say is they want sanctions relief. So talk about sanctions relief. I mean sanctions is not red or green. There's yellow in the middle, you know? And then so exactly at the gym's point is you can lift, you can give some relief, still maintain others. So this opens a whole avenue of discussion. Do you think if Secretary Pompeo just changed the wording of his statements to say instead of no sanctions relief until fully verified de-nuclearization to say we're willing to discuss certain exemptions under significant progress toward de-nuclearization that that would be enough to open the Bagan channel because you can't negotiate a young beyond access unless you have working level talks. Well, I mean, they all happen similarly. You know, it's not as though, you know, I agree with you, you need working level talks and this is what the working level talks should be about. You tell the North Koreans, yeah. You know, and you don't have to broadcast it. You tell them, let's have a discussion on sanctions on our side and young beyond on your side. Ian, do you think giving North Korean sanctions relief by the United States, by South Korea, by Japan is a good idea? To get Kim Jong-un into the negotiating fold? So I'll go back first to your question about what we're looking for. Right, the core indicators. And honestly, if you spend as much time as I do in North Korea, in the countryside, you have, there's, you will know that there's, he has no option but to be serious about changing the course, his policy. And like I said, we only see the pretty stuff but you only need to spend a night in the cold like I have where, you know, didn't know if you'd survive to know that that is not sustainable. So he has to make a change. He is just trying to do it as strategically as possible and we can't blame him. He, the nuclear weapon is the core of what has given him both legitimacy in terms of defending his people and it's a tool that he can use internationally. We, it is, there's no doubt in my mind that he wants to hold onto those as long as he can but he also needs sanctions relief. So we just need to keep that in mind. Now in terms of your question, I would say that the two sides and hopefully they've been doing this behind closed doors need to sit down and discuss exactly what it is that Washington needs to see North Korea do, a concrete commitment, to show concrete commitment to this process in order for the US to offer some sort of sanctions relief. But at the end of the day, do you think that Kim Jong-un for his economic policies more than anything else would be willing to give up his nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles? I personally don't think he will give them up and I think that what he is hoping for is for us to move towards some sort of acknowledgement of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state similar to other countries in that club. And that, but meanwhile saying that he supports denuclearization and nuclear weapons for the Korean Peninsula, but from a position of power. Now you bring out a really important question. I remember back when I was in grad school Mikhail Gorbachev became the secretary general in March 1985. And there was a lot of skepticism when this guy was really gonna change the Soviet Union. And when he came to Washington in 87 or so, there was this huge Gory mania. I mean, everybody remember Chris? He got out and walked around. Right? And he was in fact more popular in Washington than he was in Moscow. And from then on people took what he said quite seriously and within two years the Soviet Union collapsed. So my question to the panel is, can Kim Jong-un become the next Deng Xiaoping? Jim? Well, or your comment there about collapsing two years afterwards or the next Gorbachev to me is, here's a fundamental question I have, which is what is Kim's vision for how this plays out? Stronger inter-Korean relations, lifted sanctions, more international activity, people coming and going. Is that really his vision for the future of his country? Because I've heard it explained two ways. Well, Kim knows that in order to keep power he has to improve the lives of his people, et cetera, et cetera. But also people, the same people will say, but of course once he does that he will eventually lose power because of all the access to information and the exchange of people. So he probably, if he has a vision it is something closer to obviously the Deng model as opposed to the Gorbachev model because that was really successful and the other one wasn't. One party control, political control, economic engagement gets walled off into little special economic zones. They take a cut, certain oligarchs are rewarded along the way for benefit. And especially, I used to think that once you break down the barriers of information, et cetera, the Kim regime is, the days are numbered. Start the clock counting down. In today's day and age of fake news and state sponsored disinformation campaigns, et cetera, and looking at the vastly different views of America that we have even within America, I've come to the conclusion that if you're really savvy you can probably maintain a Kim dynasty and mystique even if you increase the amount of interaction. So he may be banking on his skill at propaganda and the ability to limit and control the interaction with the rest of the world as long as he can take increasing cuts and modernize and invest in his country. You know, Joe, one of the overriding assumptions by the progressives in South Korea is once the North Koreans taste money they're going to change. Because money really is the driver of the economy, the Jangmadang, the Donju's who actually now have a lot of influence on how the semi-market is run in North Korea. Do you believe in that assumption? Do you believe that the more that North Korea engages with the outside world that South Korean projects go in, maybe Japanese companies or American infrastructure projects? I do believe in it in the long run. In the long run. In the long run, that could happen. But I think that's going to take really long time. I really do believe that North Korea has developed a different culture, different system, and so I just don't imagine that all these scenarios have collapsed, you know? Once it opens up a little bit, there is more information, it's going to collapse. I don't buy that, you know? I think they will resist change for a long time and change they will allow will be very controlled. And the other thing that I think also in a little bit differently we forget is that China could do that because it did not have a giant successful another China next to it like North Korea, South Korea. So I do think that the foremost concern on the long-term trajectory of North Korea is how they deal with South Korea. It's not the United States. It's how do they relate to South Korea, which in terms of GDP is what, 60 times higher in terms of per capita GDP, 30 times higher, you know? So that's a challenge that I don't think any country has faced. It was same people, same history, same culture, except you are 30 times wealthier, you know? But you know, Jean, just on Joe's point, that is very, very true, Joe. But I think we also forget the fact that North Korea as a political system is highly resilient so that although they know they're much poorer than South Korea, they're backwards and whatever, they also know that they're able to forge political messages that are very, very focused. They're able to seep into the Korean mainstream whether by media or by other sources. So I agree with you that South Korea is much richer but it doesn't mean that South Korea will always win politically. And Jean, you know, based on your experience and of course even after, there are what, some five, seven million cell phones in North Korea today. And you cannot make international phone calls but they have smartphones. And the super elites have access to the internet but not the masses. Almost every single North Korean has watched a Korean drama or some type of Korean movie and they have some understanding of what's happening in the outside world. If Kim Jong-un begins to open that crack a little bit more and more information seeps in as a journalist and as an analyst, what are the social implications in North Korea? So that's a very good point. And I agree with Joe in terms of this being a, the future being sort of a North Korea-South Korea issue once the relationship with the U.S. is perhaps, I should say the Korean War is resolved in a certain sense because of course, even though the Koreans want it to be an inter-Korean issue, the U.S. is inextricably involved. But going to your point, I should also, when you talk about giving them a taste of money, the elites have had a taste of money. Remember that in North Korea. In North Korea, yeah. And even not just the Kims but the, I wouldn't call it the middle class but the elites, the court economy, the people who make up that court economy in Pyongyang do have access to money or I should say they have had access to money and they've also traveled overseas quite a bit. So it's not uncommon for me, for example, to see well-to-do North Koreans living in Beijing making money overseas with multiple cell phones and smartphones and like me, we had to check them at the airport in Pyongyang but they are very accustomed to all the creatures, all those, all that technology that they were used to living overseas, eating out all of that in a sense because of that, Kim Jong-un has also had to give them that in Pyongyang to maintain their loyalty. So they have had some, so the sanctions are partly designed to put a little bit of a crimp on their lifestyles and to try to encourage them to voice their opposition. And so that's something that Kim Jong-un is also having to take into account. Now I just wanted to go back to the point of North and South Korea and how this economic engagement is going to happen. I absolutely agree with Jim that North Korea is gonna, the regime of the government is gonna try to control exposure as much as possible. The delineation between the locals and the foreigners are so extreme in North Korea even today. And the best way for them in the North Korean mindset, the best way to expand their economy is to deal with North, I'm sorry, to deal with South Korea. Because only South Koreans have the emotional attachment and only South Koreans or ethnic Koreans are willing to give millions without expecting much in return. And so they're going to use these special economic zones. Those are zones, as we've mentioned, where they can control the interaction and influence of the outside world. Let me take that point a little bit further, Jun, because in the last September summit, you had E.J. Young from Samsung, from Hyundai Motors, SK, Chate One, and others. And so these chaebol chairman or vice chairman visited Pyongyang, and of course, as they were having dangmyeon apparently, some things were said, you know, but if you are a Korean conglomerate and looking into investments in North Korea, although there is a national reason for doing so, your bottom line is, is this going to be profitable? Right? Is this sustainable? And although I've never worked at Samsung or Hyundai Motors, I don't think these guys are going to invest the amount of money that the Moon government wants them to invest. Because they know that the bottom line is, first of all, there's no protection on foreign investments. They have no guarantees that whatever profits they make, they will be able to repatriate back to South Korea. So there are lots of issues regulatory, legal, and political, and so that's why I think there's going to be pushback from the chaebols if there is pressure from the Moon government. So if that's the case, Jim, where do you get the money from? Well, and I would go back to, you know, you asked me the question of what advice would you give President Moon. Part of my advice would be to emphasize, it's in your interest too to insist on international standards with North Korea on interaction, not to give special treatment to say that if we're gonna do this, we're gonna do this above board, these are the things, we'll work with you on developing these kinds of protections and legal provisions. And maybe there's a few little things early on you can do that help smooth the way, but I think very quickly you wanna insist on that. So in terms of where the money is going to come from, I think that's the argument is if you do this, and okay, it can be in a special economic zone, you don't have to have people running all over the country necessarily, I think it's okay to take our time and play the long game here. Right. But the money's gotta come from the private sector, I think it's gonna take far longer for North Korea to qualify for, you know, World Bank loans or IMF loans and what, you know, so they can begin that process, but they're not gonna clear those hurdles. But there should be, I mean you have, South Korea's been an island, in a sense, separated from the rest of Asia, and you could really improve the productivity of Northeast China, of Far East Russia, and there's a lot of potential once you can really connect all of that together, and there'll be some big infrastructure projects on LNG and some other things that require government backing and certain international loans, but I think there should be plenty of attractive projects at a basic level, and everybody's searching for cheaper labor in Asia right now anyway. So there's a balance somewhere to be found. We just don't know if the Kim regime is actually willing to adhere to international standards. You know, you've worked in the private sector before in Japan, and so let me just ask you, Jim, if you were a Japanese company, whether in construction or infrastructure projects, electricity, whatever that North Koreans need, and there is an opening, even before the normalization of Japanese-North Korea relations, if you were from an intrinsically business point of view, would you be willing to invest a lot of your yen into the North Koreans right now? Well, there are a couple of problems. Obviously you have the lack of dialogue between Japan and North Korea, noticable Prime Minister Abe just yesterday again mentioned that he was willing and interested in trying to develop a dialogue with North Korea, but the abductee issue is politically very, very high on the list and needs to be addressed in some way. That's a huge hurdle, and I wouldn't be committing money to North Korea until that's sufficiently addressed or there's a process to address that. And these other issues about international standards or investment protections, I think are also, I would not be rushing in there. But yeah, I could see, especially certain elements of, Japan has a labor shortage. Japan always is looking for new markets, is looking for new access to resources, et cetera. There's a scenario I could see, and we remember the old days when Kanemaru-san and others took cement investors and coal and other folks over on delegations off to the North Korea. But I think Japanese money in the North Korean issue is not going to be flowing into the commercial side anytime soon, but it's gonna cost money to verify and dismantle the nuclear weapons and chemical weapons, et cetera. So I could see Japanese funding going to the process of improving security and supporting that side of things, that wouldn't be private sector money, but Joe, if you look at South North relations, let's just take the economic relationship. And the Moon government really wants to ramp up North Korea's infrastructure. They're willing to spend between 40 to $100 billion initially. And so the National Assembly wanted to pass that bill, but because the opposition party was against it, they just passed it in the cabinet. So the Moon government wants to create a number of these huge mega pilot projects. Is that going to happen even without U.S. approval, quote, unquote, or lifting up sanctions? No, I don't think so. How do you go beneath the radar? You cannot. You cannot, right? You cannot, yeah. I mean, you cannot break, these are not just U.S. sanctions, these are also UN Security Council resolutions. And South Korean sanctions. Yeah, and it's clear. And also remember that anything that goes back and forth through DMZ is controlled by UNC, UN Command, which is effectively the U.S. four-star general. Well, so this is why the Moon government argues to the U.S. that you've got to give to North Korean sanctions relief, not only to entice them back to the table, but so that South North economic relations can really jumpstart. Although there are, of course, pros and cons. When you were in Pyongyang and in your interactions with average North Koreans in the countryside, how much did they know, Jean, about what's happening really in North, in South Korea if you could talk to them relatively freely? I think they are much more aware of South Korea than we think. However, remember that they are fairly, it depends on who you're talking to. Yeah, did you always have a binder when you went to the countryside or were you able to go on your own? So I was not able to go to the countryside on my own. I went with my staff. And to explain how these, it's very hard to travel within North Korea, as many of you know, even for foreigners. So that's why you so rarely see when foreign media go, you rarely see them leave the capital because they don't know how to apply for permission to leave the capital. And of course, going to the countryside, I had a car, but I wasn't allowed to drive it as an American, so I had to go to the driver. You have a North Korean driver. And my driver was not allowed to be in the car with me alone. So there are all these rules. Not only, it's designed, they say, to protect us and I think to protect them from too much foreign influence. And so I understood that the driver needed to defend himself against too much influence if he's alone with me. That's dangerous for him. And so, you know, a dangerous person. Got dangerous ideas as an American. But I was able to speak to people. So often, even if I was accompanied by my driver, there were many times where I would go to these small villages and have conversations. I did learn to speak their dialect and have conversations without anybody with me. And what did you get out of those so-called free-weaving discussions? Well, I was always very careful not to talk about politics because what I didn't want was to endanger them. But I was able to talk about what their lives were like and that's very helpful as well. What it is they want. Okay, all right. Well, I think we have about, I think we are gonna end this at three o'clock. And I wanted to give our panelists a chance to have a Q&A with the audience. So if you are gonna ask a question, can you please raise your hand, identify yourself, and over here at Paul, please. By the way, this is Paul Lee and Amy Shea in the back. They're junior fellows and it is extremely competitive to become junior fellows here at Carnegie and we're very lucky to have them both. Sir. Thanks. Are we on? I think you're on. I am, oh. Thanks, Chris Nelson, Nelson Report. This is a really helpful discussion because it's boiling down the really terrific but six hour discussion. Yesterday that Gene and Joe participated in at the Wilson Center, that was great, but you came out of it absolutely drained because it was like a grad school education and every possible question we could have. So this is really boiling it down. Thank you so much, Charlie. I wanted to shift slightly to what seems to have happened yesterday. Vice President Pence seems to have in a sense taken the advice of the consensus at Wilson, as I heard it, and Joe reminded us of Stave Roy's wonderful metaphor the fig give versus the fig leaf, which was the one thing I managed to get into my report last night. Too tired to think about it. But Stave's point was, Trump thinks he's gotten a fig when he hasn't, he's gotten a fig leaf and the South Korean government wants us to give some concessions to empower Kim to keep going and so there's a lot of optimism and hope there. So yesterday as we got back to the office, here's Pence apparently announcing that we are not gonna require a denuclearization list, a full declaration up front. But I wanted to ask the panel, what did you hear Pence actually say and has US policy approach changed and is it getting closer to what the Moon government wants us to do to help sustain hope and faith and movement? Okay, quickly, Joel. Yeah, I think the US administration is inching step by step getting closer to what North Koreans want. And then I think we should say this is what North Koreans want, not necessarily what South Koreans want. And I think you see that from very early statement after the June summit in Singapore, folks like Pompeo and Bolton saying nothing's gonna happen until there is complete verified denuclearization and then moving along the language that they need to take significant steps towards denuclearization and then thinking about the measures and so on. So I do think the gap is narrowing. That is not to say gap is still wide and I think you see that again, number of statements and signals from North Korea just today, Jean reminded me, she reads the No Dong Shin Won every day, page two. They are saying they test Kim Jong-un visited some new weapons site and I can't figure out what that is, but apparently that's clearly another signal that they're not happy that Washington's taking so long over this. Yes, the gentleman in the back. Yes, Stanley Kober. I was a student in the Soviet Union when the Helsinki Final Act was signed. A lot of people here were saying, oh my gosh, what a disaster, we're reforming, we're giving away the store. But my student conversations, there's one guy in particular who asked me what I thought and then he replied, I hope it means I don't have to serve in the Army. It had started a bottom up movement. Why do we need all this stuff? Why do I have to do this? Why do I have to be repressed if we're reaching these sorts of agreements? Could a similar reaction occur in North Korea and you're nodding? Because I haven't heard that explored. Let me think a couple more questions. Yes, ma'am, over here. In the front. I wanna go back to what you're talking about the South Korean economy and how important that is for President Moon. I was over there last year and I sort of follow this stuff. I have the impression that you can't just do a Keynesian juice job on the South Korean economy. That it's gonna require a total change in the culture to an entrepreneurial culture when Korean kids aren't supposed to do that. I mean, they don't have garages to monkey around in, much less monkey around in a garage. And so I just think it's gonna be a long, long time before the kind of changes that are required really give real oomph to the Korea that they're gonna be mired in this sort of two-point something for the rest of his term and whatever the political implications are of that. Okay, I think there's a young woman back here. Yeah, right there, yeah. Yeah. Thank you. Ruta, a fellow at the International Bar Association. I would like to focus more on human rights issues and I would like to ask your opinion. Is it a smart strategy of President Moon to kind of be silent about these issues? And is it realistic to expect that President Trump is gonna raise human rights issues without the leadership of President Moon? Thank you. Okay. All right, so why don't we, Jean, you wanna take those questions first? So, and I'm gonna refer, I'm gonna weave in what Joe was saying earlier. I think if you know the North Koreans, you also know that to bring up human rights and to bring up requiring a full inventory at the first meeting or the second meeting or the third meeting, it's a non-starter. And so you have to, if you have a sophisticated understanding of what really ticks them off, then you know that that's something that won't get you, get them to the table. But I do think that I do hope that as this relationship progresses that those are issues that they will bring up because we should, while we are in the midst of kind of the normalization of Kim Jong-un, we should remember that he does oversee a very repressive society and that there are many, many North Koreans who remain disenfranchised and that we do have a, this is a country with a vast political system, an enormously dense penal code. Now, as the other question, I think you're referring to the military in North Korea or military in South Korea? I mean, in terms of serving in the military. Was your question about serving the military in South Korea? Yeah, I don't know where. Well, no, in the context, I think in the context of bottom-up, kind of conventional confidence-building measures reducing the need for service on both sides, like why are average people getting dragged into this kind of arms race? And I just wanted to make one point. Well, we were watching with the first inter-Korean summit. I was actually watching it on, I think it was YouTube and so I was able to see what the South Koreans were commenting on as that summit was unfolding and so many of the comments were from young South Korean men who were saying, great, does this mean I don't have to go to the military service? It's very interesting with my, so I was teaching at Yonsei, like you and so many of my students remember that they are a very different, they have a very different relationship to North Korea than perhaps we do because they're so young. They grew up in that, they were born in the democratic era. They've been cut off from North Korea for so long. They don't understand why they have to deal with North Korea. So sometimes I have to remind my students that your future is inextricably linked to North Korea, whether you like it or not. So it's not just about whether you serve the military or not, it's about what happens in the future in the long term with that relationship. No, just quickly on human rights, my personal view is this. If you're for human rights in South Korea, it behooves you to be for human rights in North Korea. And one problem that I have with the progressive government is that I understand the rationale that you don't want to push human rights into their face. But at the same time, there are 32,000 North Korean refugees in South Korea and their activities are being stymied by the progressive, which I think is very, very unhealthy. It just sends the wrong message. And so there are ways to talk about human rights in North Korea and I sincerely hope that the international community, together with South Korea, will continue to push the DPRK regime on that path. Michael's question. I was just gonna respond quickly on the Helsinki question. I think that's an important point. And I think the North-South comprehensive military agreement in this effort to create no fly zones and knock down guard posts, et cetera, is come under some criticism because well, was it fully coordinated within the alliance or did South give up kind of too much and not getting enough? There are little quibbles and issues related to training and deterrence that maybe need to be addressed. But I think overall that was a very substantive, positive development that has room to continue to progress. And I would actually kind of decouple that to some extent from the denuclearization discussion because if things roll back on the denuclearization side, in other words, you have a regression of the talks break down, et cetera, I would wanna hold on to some of these conventional confidence-building measures and because that's precisely the time when you don't want a flare-up to happen. So I think building a better armistice or improving that whole situation, and we still have the advantage in satellite coverage and other things so that no fly zones doesn't bother me as much. And then on human rights, I was just gonna add quickly, that and other issues related to missiles or chemical weapons and other things, I think it's important, I've been convinced by those who would say, well, we need to talk about everything, put everything on the table. And initially, I was kinda like, ah, that's too much too soon. But I do agree with the view that you at least have it on the agenda or it's on the table because if you add it later, then the North Koreans will say, ah, you're moving the goalposts or this or that. So at least, even if you don't press it too much now, they need to know that this is coming down the line of other things if you want a really normal relationship. I agree with that and on human rights, I think we are, US is typically concentrated on what I call personal freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of speech, freedom of association and so on. You need to broaden that to include what they wanna talk about, which is things like freedom from hunger, shelter and so on. Better medical care. Exactly, and that's the way to have a broader dialogue. No? Before I guess a couple more questions, I want to ask my co-author, Katie Botto. Having lived in Korea, Katie, and we've worked on this project for a long time, as a young or younger American than Jim, what are your views having lived there and co-authoring this report with me on how South Koreans see their role in a future that could be possibly better? That's a big question. I definitely can't claim to speak for South Koreans, but I think that there's a lot of frustration. We talked a lot about the economic issues and I do think young people in Korea are far more concerned with that than with North Korean engagement. I mean, the youth unemployment rate is still over 9% as it was when Puck and Hay left office and that was one of Moon's big priorities and he has yet to solve it and has exacerbated that at various points. So I really think unless, as everyone has said many times, unless he's going to be able to fix that issue, I don't think young people, they're just concerned about when they're going to get a job and they're near future. So I'm not sure that they're thinking too far past that. Well, of course they are, they're thinking about many things. And I would say Katie and I were there at the same time and as you know, every year the threats, it's very cyclical and young South Koreans are fairly oblivious to it. And that's, we have it, it's in our news quite a bit, but for them they've lived with this threat for so long that they're almost... In year or two it, that's right, yeah. Absolutely, but I think this segues Michael, we didn't answer your question about the economy. Did we want to get back to this question? We'll get back, we have time for like two more questions. Yes, gentleman over there in the back, Paul. Yeah, yeah, Mark, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, thank you. Mark Tokola from KEI. If nuclearization just remains hard to do, what are the odds the next Trump-Kim summit will be about a peace declaration or end of the Korean War? That seems to be something South Korea wants very much. Sir, yes. Hi, Richard Johnson with the Nuclear Threat Initiative. I just wanted to, first of all, fully endorse what Joe Yun said about the need for working level talks and the only way you get there is to talk about sanctions relief. I think a lot of people forget that in the Iran deal we started with an interim deal with limited sanctions relief and we figured out through negotiations what types of sanctions were the ones to be lifted and that's how you got into the tack of talking about things like a declaration even if it's not complete. So I guess my question is, if it were up to the panel and you were actually getting to talk about sanctions relief, what are the kinds of sanctions that you would like to see relieved are those things to empower the inter-Korean dialogue and those projects, like some of my colleagues in Seoul are saying, or is it something else? What would be your wish list? Amy, I think we have one more person in the back and then I think that will be it for the questions. Even the... Yes, Junghwa Lu, South China Morning Post. I just have a follow-up for Ambassador Yun that there a concerted effort from North Korea that they ought to take the steps to engage with the US because we have two events happened overnight. One is, you mentioned, the new so-called high-tech weapon testing and the other is that KCNA said North Korea will release an American detainee but without specified date or time or location. So for the first part, is the new weapon testing to put pressure on Washington to push Trump elimination to talk about sanction relief? And the other side, the potential release of a new American detainee is it a good gesture from Pyongyang? Thanks. So let's all just as Joe and Jim and Jeant answer one question each. Okay. Can I choose which one? You can choose whatever you want. Okay. The easier the better. Yeah, yeah. I will choose Richard. Okay. Yeah, yeah. You know, I think Richard is 100% right. I mean, he actually did a lot of sanctions and other negotiations with Iran. And I think we really have to make progress in that. And the only way we can make progress is to get some working group meeting going. And let me just briefly touch on the South China Morning Post thing. It's always a good sign when they want to release a prisoner. I mean, quite honestly, I didn't even know we had a prisoner there, you know? It's always a good sign. And they're trying to send that good sign. And you're also right, I believe, that when they say Kim Jong-un has visited this high-tech weapons facility, they also want to send signal, hey, you know, we can go either way, you know? And so he's up to you to choose. And? I guess I'll take Mark's question, which is in the next summit, I, in addition to Pence announcing that they weren't necessarily going to insist on a declaration for the summit to happen, he then laid out a very high bar for all the things that he thought needed to come out of that summit, which was a very detailed plan of exactly what's gonna happen and how it's gonna happen. And I don't see how you get to that point without very detailed working-level negotiations. The experience before, when they were getting ready for Singapore, was Sung Kim, Ambassador Sung Kim was going and having this dialogue and kept running into a brick wall. So I'm skeptical that much is going to come out of that meeting of substance and it may not even happen if the US side doesn't feel like they're going to get something. In other words, I think the stalemate could continue actually for quite some time and maybe part of the whole purpose was to postpone the exercises anyway. I'm not, that's a skeptical way to look at it. And then just quickly on the hostage release or a detainee release issue. You know, I do think that we need to focus on things that are negotiated. North Korea loves to, well, we dismantled this missile test facility for you. We dismantled our nuclear test facility. Look at all these things we're doing for you that should be taken as signs and now what are you going to do for us? These things should be negotiated in terms of what's really a denuclearization process and verifiable. And so I think it all comes down to that. If we get working-level talks for the summit and if Kim goes to Seoul, those are two things I think that really take us in a much better direction. Negotiations with the North Koreans are always tough and I think we need to give both, we need to give this process some space. I just think that what we're seeing, these absolute positions are not what's actually going to be happening. And so I am a little bit, I think we need to be a bit more patient. And I do think, I do look at signs like I was saying that a report in No Dong Shim was on page two, it was not on the front page. So that's important to me. You know, it just says that it's not meant to throw it in our faces, but it's meant as a reminder, right? We will start, if they get impatient, we will start to see some threats in KCNA, et cetera. As for Mark, your question, absolutely. I think that obviously the Korean leaders want this end of war peace declaration. It's not gonna happen by the end of the year, clearly. It's something that has to happen. They may say they want to, but it has to happen with the US. And that summit we know is not gonna happen until next year if it happens. And I do think it will happen. I do think the North Koreans want it to happen. So we shouldn't be reading their rhetoric so literally. We need to have a more sophisticated nuance of understanding and understanding around the negotiations. And we never got to Michael's question, but I do think that if South Korea's gonna change, they're going through so many growing pains right now. It's a young democracy. And I think that it was so many years of Chebol controlled economy if they need to nurture that entrepreneurial culture so that South Koreans have an option other than just going to work for a Chebol. That's gonna take some time. We're gonna go through some growing pains. All right, I think I'll draw this panel to a close, but before I say my sincere thanks to the panelists and to the great audience, President Moon has embarked on a really important mission. I wish him success as a Korean. I hope that he's able to convince the Americans and North Koreans, Japanese, Chinese and Russians and Europeans in the midst of their Brexit talks, that this is the real deal. But he has his hands full on the North Korean played. And I think it's very important to remember historically that you don't want to put everything into one basket because there are issues that are beyond President Moon's control. And I think the most important factor in that sense is domestic economic growth and real job opportunities because Korean voters at the end of the day are not going to vote because of a fourth or fifth summit. They're going to vote because I have a job or my kid gets a good job or I have safety as Korea becomes older in population. So with that, let me thank my junior fellow. And I have to say one thing, which is he's not promoting his study enough, okay? I read it, believe it or not, from cover to cover. And it's quite a long report. And this is the best thing I've seen written coming out of United States in long, long time. It has very good segments on US, South Korean relations, especially the kind of really involved issues in alliance issues. How do we maintain troops there? And how does North Korea complicate all those? So it's really, really worthwhile. Thank you, Joe. I didn't ask him to do, to say that, but as you know, once you're a diplomat, you're always a diplomat. And so, let me thank my panelists, Ambassador Joseph Yoon. It's great to see you back here in Washington. My dear friend, Jim Shove, as I said, who is really not a Japan specialist, but is a Korean specialist. And Jean for- Your second daughter. My second daughter who is here in Washington. And so, please join me in a big applause for our great panelists. Thank you very much.