 Today we're still working through those first few paragraphs of on-sense and reference and on Monday we'll move on to John Settle's article, Proper Names. So please keep trying to do this thing of do the reading, come to the lecture, do the reading, go to the section, do the reading. It will all come, I mean partly because in lecture I'm not going to cover absolutely everything in the reading and also you may think I'm getting it not quite right about the reading. There's room for perfectly reasonable disagreement here. So try to keep keying everything back to doing the reading. So our basic problem in these first few weeks is how do things get hooked up to objects? How do terms get hooked up to the concrete objects that we're talking about? And I want to begin by looking by remarking that there seem to be lots of different kinds of terms that get hooked up to objects, different kinds of singular term, a singular term in a term that gets hooked up to an object. And Frager says that it's sense that connects the name to the object defined for the object. And he makes a number of remarks about what sense is. It's really a difficult notion this. And one thing he does is he contrasts sense with ideal, so spend a little while looking at that contrast. And then go on to look at what he does positively say about what's done. The question I said was how does a singular term get tied up to an object? But on the face of it, there are lots of different kinds of singular terms, terms of simple objects. And it's not obvious you're going to get the same answer for all singular terms. I won't ask singular terms for all the terms of simple objects. This is kind of more of a left-back random. You get Sally, California, the moon. These are what you'd normally call proper names. Yeah? These are like names of things. You get demonstrative terms, which are kind of general purpose, like this and that. Excuse me a moment. Excuse me a moment. Okay. So demonstrators like this and that, they can be used to refer to practically anything. And they seem quite different to the names where each name has a fixed designation. And then there are descriptions like the tall man who called earlier, the point, for example, a point of intersection of A and B, the person sitting to the extreme right of the class. Also the king of the west Saxons, the candy-coloured, tangerine, flake, streamlined baby. So there are lots and lots of definite descriptions. And again, these seem to work in a different way to terms like demonstrators, like this and that, or names, like Sally. And on the face of it, Frigate is saying they all work the same way. They all get hooped up to the object by way of a sense. And it's natural to wonder, is that right? Is that really a uniform category here? One basic contrast we have to keep in mind is a contrast that if you don't, logic will be very familiar to you. But it's very simple, but it's very hard to keep in place. It's the distinction between a singular term and a general term. So if you say Sally is tall, how many pieces are there in that sentence? I say you get two pieces. You get the Sally piece and you got the is tall piece. And the Sally stands for, let us say, Sally, right, stands for an object. But does the is tall bit stand for an object? No, the is tall bit does not stand for an object. Which object could it be? The whole point about the is tall bit is that it's a general term. It can apply to many, many different things. Yeah? It can be applied to you or to me. It might be true in one case, false in the other. But the whole thing about a general term is that as you can see, it has this convenient slot in it so that it can take in that slot the names of endlessly many different particular things. Sally, Bob, whatever. Yeah? That all right? We will come back to this many times. It's really an important point. The distinction between a singular term and a general term. So when we're talking about how terms get hooked up to objects, we are only talking about the singular terms at this point. Just to see how it's hard to keep in place. Look at that definite description. I said, that's a singular term, right? The tall man who called earlier. That's all right? That was a singular term, right? That specifies a particular object. Yes? But let me put it to you. That tall? Didn't we just say tall was general? How come a general term's in there? What's going on? Uh-huh? People are usually... Yeah, that's what that means. This is a man who is taller than men usually are. Something like that. Yeah? People call it a usual man in the classroom. Yeah, but okay. But how come there's a general term in there? I agree the upshot is a single term. Yeah. Yeah. Statistics, right? Yeah. Yeah. No, I see. Yeah. You nodder it down. Yeah, there must be something. There must be something in both of these. Yeah, there was one other person. Was it you? Yeah, that's a singular term. What's a general term doing in there? Yeah. So just one, two. Yeah. Yeah, that tall man. Yeah. You might say that tall man, but someone might say, yeah, but he's not really tall. Yeah? So you're referred despite the general term not applying. Is that right? Is that what you mean? You say that tall man? And you say he wasn't really tall. He just seemed tall. You were scared. It is almost like a name, I agree. Yeah. But the thing is these names seem to manage fine without a general term in them. Sally in California. Yeah. I just want to raise this question at this point. Yeah. But okay, say one more thing. Sum it up. They say that some of the main points say the same thing again. Can you say the same, the same thing again? Take your point one more time. You are using this like a name. That's right. In that it stands for a particular object. Yeah. But the thing I'm saying in response is very often names don't manage without general terms in them. Yeah. So just a name like Sally. It's kind of surprising. There's a general term in there. Last one. Yeah. So there isn't really a general term in here. Yeah. That's kind of a radical view, but yeah, that's a reasonable response. Yeah. Okay. We will spend a lot of time on this. But at the moment, I just want you guys to think about this. Yeah. What is the contrast here? Okay. So here's Freg is general take a proper name, a word, a sign, a sign combination or expression expresses its sense and stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign, we express its sense and designate its reference. So anyone who understands speech at all knows that sometimes the signs stand for something. The existence of sense is something you only spot when you start thinking about informative versus uninformative identities like we did last time. And then when you think through what sense must be doing for sameness of sense to make an identity uninformative, then you realize the sense must be determining the reference. Yeah. So sense is kind of elusive. But it really seems to be doing a lot of work. It's not obvious that you can refer to sense at all. I mean, could we actually have sense as an object of study? Could you refer to senses and think about them? John Searle had an old example designed to say, well, you can't really. I mean, remember I was showing these pictures of a shed from different angles and saying, you got this take on it. You get that take on it. Well, it's a question. How could you refer to the take itself? The take seems, how should I say, somehow insubstantial is only there in your relation to the object. So if I have my take on the computer from over here and my take on the computer from over there, well, I can refer to the computer and thereby express the take both times. But referring to the take itself, could you do that? Searle had this example of I couldn't get a picture that exactly matches his description. But here in the description of a construction with lots of glass tubes in it. And these glass tubes have got targets at the bottom of them. And sometimes you get a pair of glass tubes that lead to the same object at the base. So when you drop a ball in to one of the glass tubes, that is like using a sign to refer to an object. And sometimes you get two glass tubes hooking up to the same object. Yeah. So the glass tube is like the way your ball gets to the target. The glass tube is like the sense. Yeah, that makes sense. If you see what I mean. Yeah. Yeah. So if you're thinking of sense like that, is the way that your sign gets to the object, then how could you refer to the glass tube itself? I mean, there's no such thing as a glass tube suddenly landing on a glass tube. Every time you drop a ball in, the thing goes all the way down to the concrete object. You can't really refer to the sense. You see what I mean? There's a way I've got of talking about the computer right now. I can express that by saying that computer. And you can kind of get on, you can imagine how I'm getting the computer. But referring to the take itself, does that really make sense? And it's an elusive idea, this notion of sense. So anyway, there is a path from sign to sense to reference. And as our old friend Rumpelstiltskin makes clear, there is no path backwards. Yeah. I don't think it's where we got to. Yeah. Anything about that? The regular connection between a sign, its sense and its reference, is of such a kind that to the sign that corresponds a definite sense, and to that in turn, a definite reference, well, to a given reference, to a given object, there does not belong only a single sign. That's the thing about no path backwards. Yeah. Now, there's a couple of obvious qualifications you have to make this about this. Sometimes a sign can be ambiguous. There might be, there are many different people called Sally. So a sign can express many different senses and refer to many different objects in different contexts. And there's also a puzzle about, aren't there singular terms that don't refer? Don't you sometimes get a sign by the sense, but no reference? You know, as you might say to me, there's no such person as Sally, she is just a figment of your imagination. One of your many imaginary friends. Yeah, that can happen. I hope it's the other people, right? You have singular terms that don't refer, they make sense, but they don't refer. Yeah. How come we can talk about unicorns and dragons? Yeah. Version. Yeah. We don't need the same thing as a sense. And if you said a term like unicorn has a sense, but no reference, does that catch it? Yeah, no, I'm agreeing. I'm assuming, unless you know something I don't, that there are no such things as unicorns, right? Yeah. So I'm assuming there's no reference. Yeah, so there's nothing concrete for it to refer to. So there is no such, there are no unicorns, I mean, nobody's too shuffled by this, there are no unicorns, right? Yeah. But still the sign means something. I'm going to put this, you know what it would be for there to be a unicorn. If one came up, you would know what that was all right. Yeah. So it's got some kind of meaning, you might say it's got a sense, but no reference. Yeah. Is that, that's kind of, I think that's a natural interpretation of what's going on here. Again, we'll come back to that. That's an important question. Yeah. Could an idea be a reference? Yeah. Yeah. We're going to talk a bit in a minute about what an idea is when Frege talks about it. But if you take something like a pain, a pain could be a reference, right? If I talk about a headache, yeah, you know, I described to you in great detail. I say it's a kind of dull, throbbing, heavy kind of headache. It's not really a sharp pain. It seems like I'm really identifying a particular thing there, the headache. Yeah. If I'm a connoisseur of pain, I might tell you quite a lot about this particular pain or that particular pain. Yeah. And I guess it's the same with, if I get a sensation of redness, I could tell you it's a pulsating, creamy red. Yeah. It seems like I'm talking about a particular sensation. And is that right? I don't know. I know a thing about war in relation to what Tchu was saying, that perhaps instead of saying it's a sense of unicorn, to which we're talking about unicorn is possible, that there is, as you say, each person has an internal representation of something that is a unicorn, and it's that which they refer to when they speak back. I see. I didn't get that. That's what you were after, right? So you could be referring to your unicorn sensations? Sensations, well, sensations as they come from the outside world. I feel like when we say sensations, we might be seeing them, which may not be a property of imagination that you actually see the things that you're talking about. But you might, it might lead that if you can refer to ideas that you don't need, like, an experience that is in particular that is in the outside world in order to refer to something. Yeah. Again, that's an important suggestion. The idea would be when you take a term like unicorn, it does refer to something all right, namely it refers to your inner sensations the sensations you have when you imagine a unicorn or something like that. Yeah, that's the idea. Yeah. That's an important idea, but straight off, it doesn't sound right, because straight off, if the reference of unicorn was a sensation, you would have to say unicorns do exist. You see what I mean? It's just that all we are is sensations. Everything exists. It's just that like, have like a physical makeup or just things that you can have an idea of. Not everybody can have an idea of exists, right? Right. I mean, I can have an idea of a spider dancing in my hand, right? Right, yeah. But we wouldn't say a spider doesn't exist, we wouldn't say a dancing doesn't exist. No, but this one doesn't exist. I hope. It doesn't exist. Yeah, that's the price you'd pay for that way of talking. You'd have to say unicorns do exist after all. Yeah. And that's what seems better about saying it's got a sentiment or a reference. Yeah. Straight off, these are complex questions. Oh hey, so there's varieties of singular term. Yeah, just a forced run through will spend a lot more time on this. Okay, ideas, anything else in this first? Okay. Ideas. Frager says, well, when Frager's talking about an idea, he means something that's in your stream of consciousness, something that's going through your mind, something like the sensation. And one striking thing he says is, we did this thing about informative and uninformative identities, where he said that shows us such a thing as sense, sense must be what fixes reference. But then let's go back and say, well, what is sense? Then it is fixing reference. And he says, well, we have to distinguish the sense from anything that's in your stream of consciousness. As you're talking, as you understand what I say, as I understand what you say, you're grasping the senses, all right. But the sense itself is not something running through your stream of consciousness. The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. So this is a strong rejection of that last suggestion that the sense or reference of the word unicorn might be a sensation. He's denying that. It says if the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, if it's something like that computer or that light, then my idea of it, the thing that runs through my stream of consciousness, is an internal image arising from my memories of sense impressions, which I've had, and acts both external and external, which I performed. So I've got my whole track history with the dear old computer, which has served me so well. And I have all my memories. But none of that is the sense. This is a painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name Busephalus. As we all know, Busephalus was the horse of Alexander the Great. This is a 13 year old Alexander the Great taming the Great Beast. I just thought you'd like to know that. So this is a very famous horse, allegedly buried in failure in Pakistan, which is named after it. But all these people, the painter, the horseman, the zoologist, all will have different sensations, different internal impressions associated with the name. Nonetheless, they all interpret it in the same way, despite all these differences in associations. A science sense can be the common property of many, and therefore is not a part or mode of the individual mind. People have talked about Busephalus literally for centuries, actually literally for millennia. So they've all been talking about the same thing and talking about it in the same way. That's how civilization is possible, right? That you have a common store of thoughts being communicated from generation to generation. So sense can't be something that's individual to a particular mind. Sense must be something objective. One can highly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts, which is transmitted from generation to generation. So we have to understand sense as having to do with that common store, that objective way, that way of thinking about the world that is objectively available, the same for you and me. If meaning was all about internal sensation, then communication would presumably be impossible. Your internal sensation has been quite different from mine. Since communication does seem to be possible, sense must be something objective. So we have to distinguish it from the individual's idea. It says someone who observes the moon through a telescope. Well, consider here we have someone observing the moon. Here we have the moon itself. And here we have the telescope. You thought you're following me here? Okay, so as Prega says, I compare the moon itself to the reference. So the moon itself is what you're thinking about. The moon is the object of the observation mediated by the real image projected by the object glass somewhere in the interior of the telescope, right? So there's a real image of the moon somewhere in the middle of the telescope. And then there's the retinal image that the particular observer is having the particular image of one observer rather than another. And he says, Well, the image on the object glass is like the sense the image in the middle of the telescope is like the sense that the moon is a reference. The image in here is like the sense. And the idea or experience is like the retinal image. The retinal image is idiosyncratic, it varies from person to person. The image in the object glass, the optical image in the telescope is one sided and dependent on the standpoint of observation. So it's only a particular take on the object. It's only a particular perspective on the object. But it's still objective in as much as it can be used by many observers. Yeah. So that's the picture of what's going on in communication. There's this thing that we can all use that thing like this, like the optical image. And it is only a perspective dependent take on the object, but it's perfectly objective. Everyone can use it and have the same one. So he's saying the sense of a term can be one sided and dependent on the standpoint of observation, but it still has to be objective. So what is it? And can you say what it is? The sense of a term. That's the puzzle. If all this has made perfect sense, you should know pretty well now if you should have it triangulated what the sense is. But can you say anything more? And what is the sense of a name like Bill Clinton? It is like the image in a telescope. Well, all right. With Busephalus, the idea is, I think the idea is everyone's using it in the same sense. So when the painter and the horsemen and the zoologist are all using the name, they all understand each other perfectly well. Communication is entirely possible. Yeah. So the painter might be saying to the horsemen, would Busephalus have had a saddle? What kind of saddle? You see what I mean? Would that be a horse with broad shoulders or a horse with narrow shoulders? So they're talking about the same thing. They communicate just fine. So the sense is exactly the same. The horsemen, however, thinking about Busephalus, may have all kinds of images of riding over rough ground, of charging into the enemy or ahead of a troop or whatever. The painter having presumably a more placid take on it might have a lot of images of cadmium red or different kinds of brown or whatever. Yeah. So they may be quite different things going on in the streams of consciousness as they talk about Busephalus. Does that help? Is that addressing the question? That's right. They are talking about the same reference. That's right. It's harder to get a fix on. Yeah, I agree with that. But the point is you only get a fix in the reference by way of the sense. That was the point about informative and uninformative identities. Since some identities involving Busephalus are informative and some are not, there must be the sense that is what is letting you access the reference. Yeah. And let me give just one other example. Suppose that Bill is a friend of yours and a friend of mine. But we have quite different relations. You really like Bill. Bill's name fills me with rage and resentment. So that whenever you mention the name Bill, I get this complex reaction of fear and hatred. Now you don't get any of that. You just quite like Bill, right? So when you and I talk about Bill, you are getting this pleasurable glow. And I am getting this complex of rage and fear. And our experiences are quite different on hearing something to do with an M. But just intuitively, that difference doesn't mean there's any problem about communication or who we're talking about. Yeah. There can be lots of variation there in your sensations on hearing an M. But the communication is just not affected. Yeah. Yeah. What's wrong with that? Yeah, yeah. I guess I get your point. But where does the sense come in there? Like how does the notion of trying to help us here? Because it's kind of like you were saying, you know, it seems like you're referring to the same reference and then you have your own private idea of it, but you have signed the reference, you seem okay. How does that help us here? Okay. This is why I spent so long on the informative, uninformative thing, right? Because that's really basic. You've got to have that distinction between informative and uninformative. And that doesn't have to do with what sensations you're having. Yeah. I mean, I could get over it about Bill. But it's not like I've got an informative identity. Yeah, Bill was actually Fred. That's not what happened. You see what I mean? Others gone away. Okay. Okay. Um, so how are we going to say what sense is? Well, what happens in frigate is go back to this contrast between kinds of singular term names, demonstrators, descriptions. Whenever push comes to shove, and Frigate has to say what the sense of a name is, what he does is he gives you a definite description. That's to say, what he's asked, well, what is the sense of Aristotle? How do you specify the sense of the name Aristotle? He says, well, the sense of the name Aristotle is something like this. The teacher of Alexander the great, who was born in Stegira. I call it a definite description because, um, we're kind of intuitively it's talking about somebody definite of a particular person, and it's giving you kind of characterisation of them, describing them, the teacher of Alexander great, who was born in Stegira. Yeah. So when it comes down to it, when Frig has got to say what the sense of a name is, he always specifies a description. He talks about this example as in those few paragraphs. He says the point, if you take A to be this line, B to be this line, C to be this line from the midpoint to the vertex, or if you see what I mean of each opposing side, and he says, well, here's an informative identity. The point of intersection of A and B is the same as the point of intersection of B and C. And that's an informative identity. You get the same point being presented in two different ways, and it takes it for granted that since you get different descriptions here, you get different senses, different ways of being given the same point. So the general picture is a name is getting tied up to an object by being associated with a sense. And when it comes down to it, and you say, well, what's a sense, what you always get is a description. So it looks like in this picture, a name is always being hooked up to the object by being associated with a description. So there's going to be some description associated with Buciphilus, that's been the same through the generations, something like that. And that description that fixes the reference can be the same even though all our associated sensations are different. So in the case of Aristotle, you got that name and it's getting hooked up to the object by the description, the teacher of Alexander the Great, who was born Staghira. So that way of doing it, that has many merits because you can see how there could be different descriptions picking out the same object. As in this case, you get different descriptions picking out the same thing. And it does seem to be objective. But what's going on here is that we're explaining how names refer by having them associated with definite descriptions. But then the next question is, how do descriptions refer? The descriptions are picking out an object alright. How do they work? Descriptions are being taken to be more basic than names. You get names like Bill Clinton, Sally, California and so on. And it's being assumed that you could have a language without any names in it and just descriptions. And then you bring in names, this kind of shorthand for descriptions, something like that. So it's being assumed that descriptions are more fundamental than names in this picture. Now there is a puzzle too about this that, after all, with names like of controversial people like Bill Clinton or Mitt Romney or whatever, your descriptions, the descriptions you associate with the name, might be quite different to the descriptions I associate with the name. There's room for a lot of variation there. This is Fregge, he says, in the case of an actual proper man, such as Aristotle, opinions as to the sense might differ. I mean, you might, after all, take it not to be whatever it was, the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Staghira, but the pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great. That's a different description. Anybody who does this, anybody who associates that description with a name, will attach another sense to the sentence, Aristotle was born in Staghira, then will a man who takes the sense of the name, the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Staghira. You see what he means? Yeah, there's room for variation in what description you associate with a name. And Fregge says sternly, so long as a reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science, and ought not to occur in a perfect language. So the idea is that, you know, this happens alright, but it's kind of regrettable and it's just a sign of how slack we are in our use of names, that we have these same names with different descriptions associated with them. Right, because it's kind of obvious that can be, that happens the whole time, right? I mean, you have a friend who you know as the organiser of some society, I know them in some other capacity, we have quite different descriptions associated with them, but the name still stands for the object alright, it just happens the whole time. Anybody who you have friends in common with, you and your friends might have quite different descriptions associated with them, yeah, with our name. Okay, one, two, three, oh four. Okay, infinite's a lot, I mean, you mean something like, there could be, there's only two descriptions here picking out Aristotle, but there really could be lots more than that. Yeah, I think that's completely fair. Infinite's really a lot, right, but there could be hundreds anyway. Well, if you identify sense with the description you associate with the name, yeah, yeah, then the variation in that is one thing, and variation in the sensations or images or emotional reactions you have is quite different, yeah. I'm sorry, I forget what I said, were you two, yeah, yeah, yes, right. That's very good, yeah, so doesn't that variation, if you can I put it like this, doesn't that variation in associated description threaten the objectivity of sense, threaten the possibility of communication? I think that's right, I think that's a real concern for this picture. I think what Frege has in mind is that if what really mattered for the meaning and fixing the reference of the sign was the individual sensations, then you could never know whether you were talking about the same thing as I was, yeah, it would be just impossible because you couldn't really peek into my mind and see which particular sensations I associated, yeah. But with descriptions you at any rate can get things out in the open, it is in principle possible that you could say, oh that's who you mean by John, you know, that's the description you associated, that could be completely public and out there to be discussed, yeah. What is the sensations being hidden in the recesses of the mind? You couldn't really ever make that public, I think that's what he has in mind, but I don't, I actually don't think that detracts from the force of what you're saying, that's a real problem, yeah. Were you next? I can't remember who it was. And it was you, who was Frege? Right, okay, right, yeah, each different description indicates a different sense, that's right. So long as the identity of the thing referred to by this description, with the thing referred to by that description, so long as that identity is informative, you're going to have a different sense. No, if you get different descriptions and they're really different in that the identities are informative, then that's just the same thing as saying the sense is different, yeah. However minor the differences, yeah. How are we going to get everybody tuned to the same description? There are cases, I mean, suppose you're having a discussion about the person who invented the wheel, yeah, and we say okay, let's call a person who invented the wheel Bright, yeah. Bright must have been brighter than the average caveman, you might say, I bet Bright was a person of high intelligence, yeah. And you see, I bet Bright was female, yeah, and you could have a discussion about Bright, yeah. You could say Bright must have existed about four million years ago, Bright was probably of colors and average height, or maybe Bright was rather short and had a lot to do to prove, or, you see what I mean? Yeah, I hope I can get away with that. You can have a lot of conjecture about Bright, yeah. But just the way the sign got onto the tracks there is always going to be the same description, whoever invented the wheel, yeah. Yeah, that would be a case, it's kind of an artificial case but it could happen, but it's quite clear that we're all keeping the same description, you know, I'll say, yeah. Right, the same extent of different expressions, that's right. And remember what's going on is that the name Aristotle is expressing the sense, yeah. And that's to say, you could introduce, you could have, I mean, presumably in medieval France, they didn't pronounce the name Aristotle the way you and I do right now, yeah. So that, that sign, there could have been a different sign connected up to the very same description and the very same reference, you see what I mean? So as to say the same sense could have had different terms expressing it, and that is what happens in different languages. If you take in French, Londra and the English, London, yeah, you get the same name there, but it could be perfectly well expressing just the same sense, London, London, yeah. That's what he means anyhow. I think. Okay, so there's a question how realistic this is. Oh, sorry, you were in line and you didn't get a question. It's not a bad way to describe it. It's kind of abstract and it's hard to get detail and just what it is and how it's meant to work. The reason we spend so long on the uninformative and informative identities is that that seems to make it compelling that there must be such a thing of sense and then we just have to try and get what it is, but we've got a kind of description so far of its role, what kind of work this thing must be doing, but giving a direct characterization of it is turning out to be not that easy. So framework in the sense of you've got an abstract description of what work it does, and now we say, but what is it this thing that is doing that work? Yeah. Okay, that's taking you for granted the descriptions are expressing the sense, but I think the problems people have been raising about can you really all have the same description associated with the name? Is that likely to happen? That's really what I mean here when I say how realistic is this that we should all have the same description associated with the name? As in the case of Bright you can do that, but it's not obvious that's very general. We don't have very much time left so let me just get to some further problems with an ocean of sense. One puzzle is, when I said that about Bright, whoever invented the wheel then they explained the name by using a description, so you can do that, but usually you don't explain names in that way. Usually you just say look here's the person, this is Sally. You don't usually give someone a description defining the name. You do it in a different way. These kind of introductions that you know encompasses happens the whole time that you're saying to people, this is Bill, this is Sally. You usually explain names using the monsters, not using the description. There's a basic puzzle about if you explain sense in terms of some associated representation. So if you take an informative identity like the one we had last time, so Calci-Blipi is the scarlet chimpermel, then you explain the difference in sense here by saying, well the representations associated with this name are different to the representations associated with that term, then the trouble is, you're going to get problems about sense arising for the associated representations. Whatever's going on with the description, you're going to get puzzles of sense arising there. So you're just pushing the problem down one. What's the sense of a definite description? How do you explain what it comes to with a definite description has a particular sense? You only really postpone the problem, you shoved it off from one bit of language on to another, the problems is going to keep going. We need this to bottom out somewhere. And it's natural to wonder through about demonstatives like this and that. I mean they are, Frege kind of ignores them like they're really peripheral to language, but it's possible to think the terms like this and that, that's really the heart of the functioning of language, when you can say this and that and point to something, that they really, in their humble way, the things that do all the work in generating the significance of language. I mean here we have our old friend, the tiger, hunting through the undergrowth. You see the tiger? I don't know if that's a good picture. Look at that. There's a tiger and you say that tiger. Now if you say that tiger looks hungry, well what's the sense of the demonstrative? Is there some description you can give? Seems to be a very clear case in which there's some tape you have on the tiger, there's some way you're getting on to the thing as you spot it in the undergrowth but is that a description? What kind of description would it be? I mean really what letting you get on to that thing is the fact that you're perceiving it, it's the fact that you see it, that's what's characterising the way of getting on to it and if you take, you know, you see it again and you say that's that same tiger, this tiger is that tiger. Yeah, you can say that, well you get an informative identity, this tiger is that tiger and you want to say well my take on the tiger here is different to my take on the tiger there but all we've got from Frigate is well maybe it's a description but that doesn't sound right in this case because what would the description be? And the other thing he says is it has nothing to do with your idea or sensation but really it seems to be your experience of the tiger that is letting you refer to it. It's the way you're experiencing the thing here is different to the way you're experiencing the thing there, that's why it's informative. So at the end of the day it's really hard to see how we can keep stuff about the psychology of the individual out of an account of the way in which the thing is being given to you because it's the way you experience the thing that seems to fix what way you're thinking of it. Okay that's the end of the message for today. Settle on Monday.