 I'm going to spend a few minutes outlining the law regulating one type of humanitarian action, humanitarian relief operations. And the rules regulating humanitarian relief operations, humanitarian assistance, are simple and essentially the same in international and non-international armed conflict. So primary responsibility for meeting the needs of civilians lies with the party to the conflict that has control over them. I am grossly simplifying. We could have a week's seminar just on this, so I'm going to grossly simplify. If that party with responsibility to meet the needs of the civilian populations fails to do so, states and international and humanitarian organizations may offer to carry out relief operations. I think this sequencing is important. There's always a tendency by humanitarian organizations to want to rush in. It's like, hold on, let the party to the conflict see whether it can meet the needs, yes or no. In the majority of cases, the consent of affected states is required but may not be arbitrarily withheld. There are two situations in which states have no latitude to withhold consent. The first is situations of occupation. And the second are situations where the Security Council has taken a binding decision imposing relief operations. And I say imposing rather than authorizing because I don't want to have an unfortunate precedent where if the Security Council has not imposed them, a party that can somehow say I have no obligation to allow them. Relief operations have been agreed to. All parties must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of release consignments. But they may impose technical arrangements under which such passage is allowed. Now normally operationally it is at this stage of the game that most of the problems arise. A party to the conflict has said, yes, of course you can come in and carry out relief operations, but in practice it makes it extremely difficult for the relief operations to be carried out. That said, in the few minutes that remain today, I'm going to focus on two central legal questions that arise at an earlier stage of the process and that have received considerable attention in recent years. The first question is, I say consent is required, but who's consent? And the second question I've said is consent is required, not to be arbitrarily withheld, what amounts to an arbitrary withholding of consent to offers to carry out relief operations? Another key legal question which has arisen with immediate operational consequences are what are the consequences when a party arbitrarily withholds consent? Can unauthorized operations be carried out? That is a question that's not addressed by IHL but rather by other bodies of international law and maybe something we can turn in to discuss later. So first and foremost, who's consent is required? And here I'm talking about the initial green light to operate in a particular context. It's clear this is required, but it's less clear at least in relation to non-international armed conflict, who's consent is required? So if we look at international armed conflict, article 70 of additional protocol one requires the consent of the party's concerned in the relief actions. This is in the plural, this provision refers to most notably the state party to the conflict in whose territory you want to carry out the relief operation. Their consent is required, pretty simple. The position in non-international armed conflict is more complex and in fact there are two different provisions that are of direct relevance to this. The first is common article 32 of the Geneva conventions that I mentioned earlier and this provides that an impartial humanitarian body linked back to our principles may offer its services to the parties to the conflict. It is entitled to offer them to either side. The state and the organized armed group. However, it's silent as to whose consent is required in order to carry out the relief operations. Some have interpreted article 32 as implicitly allowing relief operations to be carried out if the party to whom you have made your offer accepts it. The consent of the other side is not required. Of course, that your relief operations don't have to carry a transit through territory controlled by your enemy. If you can get there directly, some say all that is required is the consent of the party to whom you've made the offer. I have to say I find it difficult to interpret the silence of article 32 in this particular way. I think it really leads to a significant infringement of state sovereignty to say I've made an offer to the organized armed group. I can reach the territory controlled by the organized armed group directly, therefore, your consent is not required. At best, this approach would only apply to the organizations the actors specifically referred to in comment article 3, so impartial humanitarian organizations. All other actors wishing to carry out relief operations would have to comply with the more stringent requirements in article 18.2. An article 18.2 of additional protocol 2 is more explicit on this point. It requires the consent of the high contracting party concerned. End of quote. This appears to be a clear reference to the state party, to the non-international armed conflict, the high contracting party concerned. However, it has been suggested by some that a high contracting party that a state is concerned by relief operations, only if they have to transit through territory under its control. If somehow the territory controlled by the opposition, by the rebel group, can be reached directly from neighboring states, the state is not concerned by the relief operations and therefore its consent is not required. Again, I have to say, I'm a bit of a positive dinosaur, I have to say I find this interpretation of article 18.2 a bit problematic. I have to say the suggestion that a state is only concerned by activities being carried out in its territory is not concerned by activities being carried out in its territory, they can be carried out by neighboring states, just is contrary to basic considerations of territorial sovereignty, it just doesn't make sense to me. Also more literally, this means that although we have a reference to the high contracting party concerned, there may be instances in which in fact there is no high contracting party concerned, which I think is a counterintuitive reading of the express language of article 18.2. So where does this leave us? I have to say, in light of the silence of article 3 on this specific issue of whose consent is required and the specific reference to the high contracting party in article 18.2 to the state, I think a view that gives due weight to general principles of international law relating to state sovereignty and also to a state's obligations towards the civilian population would be to say that the consent of the state is always required, even in relation to relief operations that can be carried out from neighboring states, but that in those circumstances, the state would have a narrower range of grounds for withholding consent. They need to be much more closely and directly linked to the territory in question, the territory under control of the opposition. For example, withholding consent out of concerns that the relief operations could somehow legitimize the opposition would be arbitrary or cement its control of territory that would also be an arbitrary ground for withholding consent in those circumstances. So my conclusion would be the consent of the state is always required, but it's got a narrow range of grounds for withholding consent. This is the law, and I'm looking at our colleague from Columbia, who's always very useful bringing us to the operational realities. What are the operational realities in practice? Whatever the law says, you would not go and carry out relief operations without the agreement of all the parties to the conflict through whose territory you go, because doing so would put you, your operations, and the very people you're trying to assist at risk. So there's a very clear difference between the legal position and what you would do operationally. The second question that I wanted to go through with you today is what amounts to arbitrary withholding of consent? Now, even though we have very clear language in Article 70, AP1, and Article 18, AP2, that consent is required, it was already understood at the time of the negotiations that parties didn't have an absolute and unlimited freedom to refuse to agree to relief operations. A party refusing consent had to do so for valid reasons, and I'm quoting here from the other commentaries, not for arbitrary or capricious ones, which makes sense, but the problem is that we don't actually find any definition of or even guidance in treaty law of what amounts to an arbitrary withholding of consent, and this is a point that has not been addressed by any national or international tribunal or human rights mechanism. So let's try and unpack it, and perhaps I'll share my thinking at the moment and then see if you can add other grounds. I think it's very useful to look at international law more broadly, not just IHL, to see what is understood by arbitrary, and human rights law in particular and also general principles of public international law provide some guidance on the type of conduct that would be arbitrary, and circumstances in which withholding consent would be arbitrary. Essentially, it is in three situations. First, if it's withheld in circumstances that would violate a party's other obligations under international law towards the civilian population in question. Secondly, if withholding consent violates the principles of necessity and proportionality. And thirdly, if consent is withheld in a manner that is unreasonable and just lacking in predictability or otherwise inappropriate. Now if we quickly look at the three different possible headings in turn, when do you think that withholding consent could violate a party's other obligations towards the civilian population? When it would violate human rights law and in particular? Right to life, right to health, right to normal circumstances of life, like infrastructure and things like that. Any other provisions under IHL? Sorry? That would be a circumstance exactly on absolutely the prohibition of starvation of the civilian population. So that's exactly the kind of thinking. I intuitively started off from IHL and I said, OK, sorry, go ahead. And we also see a connect with the grave bridge because sometimes the judicial guarantees are arbitrarily not provided. But in case of humanitarian law, it is the most. And same as also in NAIC in Common Article 3. Yeah, and I'm kind of focusing, I think you're looking more broadly at humanitarian action, I'm kind of focusing very much on relief operations assistance. So in what circumstances would saying no to an offer of assistance violate a party's other obligations under international law? And yes, under IHL it would be when the population is facing starvation and a party says no, relief goods cannot come in. That's one example. Another example that comes to mind is withholding consent to medical operations, including on the ground that medical goods could be used to treat wounded enemy combatants. As you know, the wounded and sick, including enemy combatants, must receive to the fullest extent practical and with the least possible delay the medical care required by their condition. And no distinction may be made on the provision of healthcare other than on medical grounds. So withholding consent to medical relief operations on the ground that they could assist enemy combatants would violate this rule. The same medical goods are also likely to be needed for the civilian population. And withholding consent in those circumstances would also violate civilians entitlement to medical care. Another possible ground is selective withholding of consent with the intent of discriminating against a particular group. So for example, systematically rejecting offers of assistance for regions populated by ethnic groups perceived as favoring the enemy. This would be a violation of the principle of the prohibition on non-discrimination. So these have kind of plucked from IHL. And then as you correctly said, there's also international humanitarian law that is relevant. So withholding consent in situations that violates fundamental human rights, most notably the right to physical integrity. And also we mentioned economic, social and cultural rights, situations where it prevents the satisfaction of the minimum core of these rights, the rights to an adequate standard of living, including food and water and health and medical services. That would be another instance in which withholding consent would violate, I've got one minute, I'm going to get to the end and then you've got the first question. Would violate a state's other obligations? Would be arbitrary, because it violates their other obligations. The second heading was withholding of consent in the violation of the principles of necessity and proportionality. And here I'm thinking of the principles of necessity and proportionality as expressed in international human rights law. So even where consent is withheld for a legitimate ground, it'll nonetheless be arbitrary if it exceeds what's necessary in the circumstances. So limitations in terms of time, duration, location and defected goods and services must not go beyond what is absolutely necessary to achieve the legitimate aim. So while it might be acceptable, perhaps at the outset of hostilities to say, hold on, no relief operations coming in, it would no longer be acceptable after one week. Or while it might be acceptable to say there is hot fighting in this particular area, therefore no relief operations, it wouldn't be acceptable to say and therefore no activities in the rest of the country. It's an ongoing assessment that needs to be carried out. And thirdly, my third heading focuses on the manner in which consent is withheld. And it would be arbitrary if it is done in a manner that's unreasonable or inappropriate or could lead to injustice or lack of predictability. And I suppose one very clear example of this would be circumstances where consent is withheld without providing any reasons for this. So it's not clear the process for providing reasons is not clear. Do you have to provide them to each individual actor that makes an offer, yes or no? It's honestly not clear in the law. However, what is clear is if there's a blanket refusal of accepting relief operations without the provision of any reasons, this would be arbitrary. Why essentially it wouldn't allow us to even assess whether the grounds are legitimate, yes or no. You just don't know why you are prevented from carrying out relief operations. So withholding consent without providing any reasons would give rise to a rebuttable presumption of arbitrariness. There's a question over there. I was interested in your opinion about the definition of the relief itself. Because if you look it from the IHL perspective and Geneva Conventions, we have the commentaries and there is more or less for the ICRC, let's say at least. But if you include in the interpretation and definition of the relief supplies for the perspective of state granting the consent from human rights perspective, I think through ICPR it's still okay because you will be talking about right to life and in human treatment. But as soon as you go to social economic cultural sphere because of my country, Georgia, where I've seen this struggle in 2008, there was discussion how far we should interpret relief supplies after first months. Supply of food, medicine, moving hospital is okay. But when we talk about capacity building for welfare or broadly defining right to life and medicine, then it goes far beyond moving hospital. And there was a tension between the international organizations as well as parties to the conflict. Should we consider this as a relief operation? Because as far as I remember, actually some of the international organizations tried to push this idea and there was a battle. Not within the IHL realm, but from the human rights interpretation perspective and it's interesting because there is no much written on that. That's a very good question. And as you say, the threshold of IHL is actually quite low in essentially it's essential, goods essential for the survival of the civilian population. It's really not a very high threshold. And obviously it's just a bottom line. Though there's nothing that precludes an actor who wants to try to carry out relief operations and beyond to try and persuade the relevant parties, can I also carry out these activities? But they're not specifically addressed by the law. So the state would be entitled to not consent to them, not agree to them even arbitrarily. They're not covered by the law. I think you raise an important point in relation to human rights law because I've always felt there was a bit of a disconnect between IHL that sets a pretty high threshold of suffering. You've got to be starving before it would be unlawful or arbitrary to withhold consent. And human rights law where fine, we've managed to narrow it down to rights to physical integrity fine, also pretty severe suffering. But once you start looking at economic, social and cultural rights, you're talking about an adequate standard of living, including food and water, health and medical services. It opens it out quite dramatically. I've tried to narrow it down by focusing on the core, I'm looking for the word, the minimum core of these rights. But it's still pretty broad. So that's just a question that sits uncomfortably I think between the potential range of rights and situations in which it would be arbitrary to withhold consent under human rights law and those where it would be equally unlawful under IHL.