 For those of you who are required to view this film for whatever reason, I would like to clear the air first. I would like to ask you to put aside the emotions that you feel about me, about the situation, about espionage in general. It's important to let you know, and foremost important, is that espionage is a very real thing. A lot of people tend to just put it off as something that happens in another sphere, another world, another plane. But it's very real, and it happens every day. It's happening right now. This is about places and people, and particularly this place. This is the scene of a crime. A crime that was committed over and over again for 17 years. A crime as twisted and spreading as the branches of this old oak tree. A crime whose global consequences are still being probed. Other places. Here too, this crime was carried out. And here, and here. A crime that at one time seriously jeopardized U.S. naval plans and operations that still puts at risk some of the missions the United States Navy has called upon to perform. The people who committed this crime, today they're someplace else. In the United States penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, and other prisons throughout the country. But the massive damage they did during the 17 years of espionage still impacts the Navy's ability to operate and fight. When disaster strikes, the Navy picks up the pieces and carries on. But the Navy insists on knowing why and how it happened. There are always lessons to be learned so that what happened once will not happen again. Lessons learned. It hit the news like an international spy thriller transposed somehow strangely into country roads and backyards from Norfolk to California. It was all there. The neatly lettered instructions from the KGB pointing to a rendezvous on a country road, the coated symbols, the spy camera. The facts that emerged from the flurry of reports were clear enough. A retired Navy warrant officer, John Walker, had been caught delivering Navy secret materials to the Soviets here on this spot, near the intersection of Partnership Road and White's Ferry Road, about 25 miles from downtown Washington, D.C. On the evening of May 19, 1985, John Walker came here and placed a package containing classified Navy information at the base of this utility pole. A spot chosen by his KGB handlers. John Walker had visited this spot many times over the years to leave off bundles of Navy secrets. But this time, the package was retrieved and John Walker was under arrest. Soon in early June 1985, another retired Navy man, Jerry Whitworth, was also implicated. Then John Walker's brother, Arthur, and finally John's son, Michael, a seaman aboard USS Nimitz, was arrested. To make it even more puzzling, these were volunteer spies, not recruited or coerced by the KGB. They were Americans. John Walker and Jerry Whitworth, senior enlisted with excellent records. Arthur Walker, a former naval officer. Shortly before his arrest, Michael had received a Superior Performance Award from his ship. They were our people. But there it was. As far as anyone's expecting me of committing this crime, that was completely out of the question. Nobody ever suspected me of stealing documents from any of the commands that I was assigned to. Mostly because of the way I carried myself. I didn't look like a spy. A year later, it seemed like it was all over. The Walkers and Whitworth had their trials, got long prison sentences, and disappeared from public view. The reporters and the investigators are long gone from this bit of Maryland countryside chosen by the KGB for John Walker's drop point. But just as the media spotlight began to shift away from here and other locations associated with the Walker Ring, the full implication of their betrayal was beginning to dawn on the Naval Investigative Service, the FBI, and other agencies probing the case. The devastating impact of the Ring's betrayal was primarily due to the duties John Walker and Jerry Whitworth performed for the Navy. They were, both of them, communications men. Communications. The coded message channels through which fleet talks to fleet, flag to flag. Multiple networks that tell what the Navy is doing, thinking, planning, what we know and don't know, what we worry about. All classified information. Secrets. The Walker Ring, sitting on top of these crowded channels of communication, had, over a period of 17 years, sold the Soviets cryptologic keys and design logic, allowing them to decipher and read literally a million classified messages. Messages containing vitally important information. Our knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Soviet submarines. The capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations of our frontline weapons systems. Tactics. Warplans. Fleet readiness were compromised, along with details on development of new weapons and sensors still in use in the fleet today. How could they do this? I mean, granted, complete lack of ethics or shame or fear of being caught, how is it possible for anyone to steal so many secrets month after month for 17 years? The communications center is a highly secure environment. The people in charge have demonstrated trustworthiness and reliability over years of service. The CMS material has already been coordinated with the CMS custodian, and both of you will need to go down- Senior enlisted, as Walker and Whitworth were, enjoy respect. What time should I coordinate with nav cams? I would begin at least by at 10.45. The responsibility for day-to-day security rests on their shoulders. John Walker held positions of trust. At one time or another, he was the top secret control officer, department head of security, communications watch officer, and crypto material custodian. His duty stations included comm sub-lant, comm fib-lant, and comm nav surf-lant in Norfolk. Naval training center in San Diego, and USS Niagara Falls. A US Navy commendation he received read, warrant officer Walker is intensely loyal, taking great pride in himself and the naval service, fiercely supporting its principles and traditions. He was also, as we now know, the number one KGB agent in the world in terms of the duration of his operation, the quality and quantity of information passed, and the severity of damage to the United States. The communication system itself is based on cryptographic machines and keying material, developed with great ingenuity to be literally immune from being penetrated. Briefly, if you succeed in intercepting an enciphered message, you still need two other elements to decipher it. The cryptographic hardware and key, the additional mathematical function. Key is the changeable factor for additional security. Keying material is what Walker and Whitworth stole and sold in great quantity to the Soviets, along with machine logic diagrams published in crypto systems maintenance manuals. Over many years, the Soviets had built up a global communications intercept system at listening posts employing thousands of people. They daily copied Navy communications, vast amounts of traffic, but this was of relatively little value. Now, voluminous keying material provided by Walker and Whitworth at times opened a large volume of secret communications traffic to deciphering, and the massive hemorrhaging of Navy secrets began. How did it begin? Where did he start? To the best of our knowledge, based on evidence and Walker's at times unreliable word, there was one day during the winter of 1968, when John Walker, communications watch officer at Comsub-Lant Norfolk, long on ego and short on cash, decided to commit treason. With a stolen KL-47 key list in his pocket, John Walker drove up to Washington. He then found the Soviet Embassy and presented himself at its gates. They listened to what he had to say. When he came out, he had reached an agreement with the KGB to commit espionage against the United States Navy. This was to be the first of many, many sales. The pipeline was open. From this day forward, normally twice a year, crypto key lists and other secrets were Xeroxed and photographed. The film deposited at dead drops for pickup by Soviet agents. Nobody in Walker's work centers seemed to question his frequent use of the photocopier or why he consistently took work home with him. John Walker went 20 years without a security clearance update. He was a Navy veteran. He was one of us. In 1975, he recruited Jerry Whitworth, a radio man like himself whom he first met in San Diego five years earlier. Whitworth's duty stations were many. USS Constellation, USS Enterprise, USS Niagara Falls, communications facilities at Diego Garcia, Stockton and Alameda. They all afforded numerous opportunities to steal key lists. Whitworth too carried out wholesale theft of material without once incurring suspicion or censure. John Walker recruited family members, his brother Arthur, his son Michael. Both participated willingly. During his short career in the Navy, Michael Walker was able to inflict serious damage. First assigned to VF 102 at NAS Oceana, then to Nimitz, Michael was granted an interim secret clearance without even having a national agency check. Michael was viewed as highly competent, a 4-0 sailor, yet he stole more than 1,300 messages and other documents during his stay on Nimitz, intending to pass them on to his father. At the time of his arrest, some of these were hidden away at the head of his bunk. While Michael did not have access to cryptologic materials, he provided to his father 37 documents which included information on Navy weapons and sensor systems, tactics, war plans, and our knowledge of certain Soviet air defense and satellite capabilities. I didn't do anything out of the ordinary in relationship to my job, which handled, which was basically handling classified information. So it wasn't difficult to take something off a computer, make a copy of it right under their noses, and carry on my normal duties. Immediately following Walker's arrest, investigators began probing losses inflicted by the ring. It would require some time before the full picture emerged of how much and how long Navy communications had been compromised. But as the painstaking process of tracing and analysis continued, as more and more key lists were added, more and more communications networks incriminated, it became clear that this nation had suffered losses that could only be described as appalling. From here to Norfolk, to Diego Garcia, to San Diego, to Nimitz, Niagara Falls, Constellation, we began to see, spreading out from here, a web of frightening proportions. We gradually came face to face with the reality. A large volume of Navy communications was exposed to Soviet scrutiny for long periods of time. Confirmation of this came from an unexpected source. Before Vitaliy Uchenko, the KGB defector who redefected went back to the USSR, he was extensively debriefed. The Walker case was, he said, the greatest case in KGB history. We deciphered more than a million of your messages. If there had been a war, we would have won it. Still another source reports rapid expansion of KGB office space and facilities in Moscow during 1972 through 1982. We believe the expansion was directly connected to the need to handle large amounts of intercept intelligence made readable by the Walker Ring. Today, what the Soviets reaped from their bonanza is still impacting naval operations and planning. What did they learn? They learned operational and technical characteristics of frontline weapons systems and sensors. The Soviets gained significant insights into U.S. intelligence sources and methods. They gained significant insight into U.S. naval tactics, operational procedures, and contingency war plans. At major Navy test ranges, evaluations were reported over communications links that were open to compromise by the Espionage Ring. Messages containing significant detailed information about the capabilities, limitations, and technical characteristics of our systems. Information sufficient for the Soviets to develop countermeasures. Exposed through this compromise is the Navy's arsenal of air-to-air missiles, AIM-7, AIM-9, AIM-54, and ship-launched surface-to-air missiles, as well as technical and operational characteristics of the Navy's primary torpedoes. As far as we can determine, data on operational characteristics and limitations of Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles were also transmitted through compromised communication lines, along with significant data on the Navy's sensor systems. The highly sensitive area of intelligence sources and methods was compromised by the Spy Ring. They gave away crypto keys that exposed our capacities and techniques for tracking Soviet submarines. We believe that some of the recent Soviet advances in sound-quieting their submarines are a direct result of being able to read Navy communications channels. Through the same sources, extensive information on U.S. intercept facilities was given away, as well as data on the satellites that provide U.S. photographic and electronic intelligence. Communication channels made readable through the Spy Ring's treason have given Soviet commanders an advantage they are sure to exploit to the utmost. The Navy shall live for a long time in the shadow of the tragedy in which this deserted roadside is only one of the scenes. Lessons have been learned. The Navy has tightened security controls. Two-person handling of crypto key material is enforced. It's now considerably more difficult for a walker or a Whitworth to rummage through communications vaults alone. Some key lists are being issued in canister form, which prevents ready-copying. In addition, packaging has been improved to prevent tampering. All right, Scott, let's get you logged into the LCP. Do you always use the same password you told me this morning? Yes, use the same one I issued this morning. Log-on and password procedures are being used to control access to shipboard data terminals. The overall number of persons having access to classified material is being reduced. A new op-nav notice requires all commands to report to NIS, any incident where classified material has been lost or subjected to compromise. Persons in sensitive positions are administered random polygraph tests. These safeguards deter people like Walker by making espionage too dangerous and too difficult. If Walker had been scared off just once by having someone question his right to remove material from his building, the course of history might have been changed. In this whole equation of spy versus security systems, there is one more important component, people. What makes security systems work is the sense of responsibility people bring to their job or assignment. We've all been here before. The standard NIS security briefing. Everyone in the Department of the Navy, Marine, Officer, Enlisted, Civilian is supposed to be briefed every year on the basic requirements of security. But today, what the NIS lecturer says has a sharper edge thanks to the Walker spy ring. You are required to report to the Naval Investigative Service any contact you may have with any citizen of a hostile country. The nation's named on this list. This may be the most casual, innocent type of contact. A Polish national, you may meet at a party. A group of Soviet tourists you run into in a restaurant downtown. We at NIS need to know this to determine if indeed this was a chance encounter. The second basic requirement. Any time, any person, an associate, a superior, a friend, anyone regardless of nationality, rank or status, attempts to obtain sensitive or classified information without proper clearance or need to know, that attempt must be reported. Remember, John Walker and his fellow spies were volunteers. They were not blackmailed or coerced by the KGB. They sold their services. The person in question doesn't have to look like or act like a spy. Remember, to all outward appearances, John Walker, Jerry Whitworth and the others were typical Americans. People like you and me. Shipmates, neighbors, fellow watchstanders, friends and also traders. What about the people who knew Michael, John, Arthur and Jerry? Here at Naval Operating Base Norfolk, at San Diego and other places where the sad drama of the Walker spy rings played out are the other characters in the story. The shipmates and fellow workers, the people the spies worked with day after day. These are the people the spies betrayed as fully as they betrayed their country. Who were these people? How well did they know the chief, the sailor, the warrant, who turned out to be a spy? I think all the warrant officers that I served with, we had like a, it was five of us and we were a close knit group and we all went out together and, you know, we went on the beach together and it would have been the same thing if I found out that one of them had gotten killed in an automobile accident and I would have felt the same way and that's just the way I felt about it I thought I really, after all those years with John Walker socializing, being one of his crew members in the communications gang, I thought I knew John Walker pretty well. I guess I was really hoping that, no, this couldn't be true. This could not be happening. Not to Johnny Walker, not to the Navy and not to the country. He was a fun person. He was a lot of fun to be with, very professional on the job. We became really good friends. He was my best friend in the Navy. To this day when I tell somebody that my best friend is in jail for spying, it still knocks me back. I don't know how to react to myself hearing myself say those words. I never thought of Michael as a criminal. To know that he knowingly, voluntarily sold secrets to the Russians. I think that is the one thing that really knocks my feet out from underneath me as far as being a friend of this person. It's very puzzling to me how people can let themselves get caught up into something that can be so damaging to themselves and to their loved ones. It's just very hard to imagine anybody who would be willing to throw it away for greed. The most heartbreaking thing about getting involved in that was I was taken for a serious ride, and I mean like this. My father promised me, and I'm not sure why he said this, but he had promised me about $5,000 a month for your basic espionage provider, which was me. During my entire espionage career, short-lived as it was, long for some people though, I received a total of $1,000. You lose all around. I lost my wife, lost my dog, lost my car, my house, my dignity. The next time you're faced with the annoyance, the boredom, the trouble of observing security requirements, remember that more careful attention to security might have stifled the espionage careers of these individuals before they got started. This is the end of the road for John Walker, the United States penitentiary at Marion, Illinois, the maximum security prison in the United States. Here, he will spend the rest of his life behind bars and jagged concertina wire. For a prisoner in Walker's category, the opportunities for fresh air and exercise are strictly limited. Even the sky above is scarred with greeting. For Jerry Whitworth in the U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas, Arthur Walker in the Federal Correctional Institution, Petersburg, Virginia, and Michael Walker in the U.S. Penitentiary, Louisburg, Pennsylvania, the prospects are also dim. And we have reached the end of a story that has wound its way from here to Navy ships and stations at the ends of the Earth, and finally to federal prisons across the nation. In time to come, are there to be other discoveries, other days of dishonor? Whether this will happen again may depend on what you decide, because the one lesson we can learn from this story of treason, broken promises, and broken lives is that in the long run, our nation's security against espionage rests squarely on some very simple elements. The faithfulness and alertness of millions of people, people like you and me. The Walker Spy Ring, lessons learned.