 need development economics or a political economy of industrial Asia, then you will know that Taiwan, both historically and in the present tense, is one of, in many ways, the most interesting economies in Asia from my vantage point, both because of the model and the unique ecosystem that it developed and also because some of the challenges, both legacy challenges and future-oriented challenges that it faces. So in that spirit, we're here to release this new paper. We left copies out in the hallway, and you can find it online as well, called Assuring Taiwan's Innovation Future. But as you'll see from the cover that flags a serious title, Assuring Taiwan's Future Economic Competitiveness, and from the blurb inside, it's part of a longer-term effort that we're now making here at Carnegie to blend more political economy and technology policy related work into our Asia programming across the platform. I've been here only about a year. We have always had very strong work on security policy across the Indo-Pacific. But we're doing more and more rebalancing of the program to include these other aspects of the Asian story. Mike is a big part of that build out here at Carnegie generally. Our center in New Delhi that you see up here, I'd say about 40%, 50% of the work in New Delhi now is on things like data localization, data privacy, technology work, global economy work. So in that spirit, we're trying to look at Asia in a somewhat more robust and multidimensional way than I think we have in terms of our legacy. So as part of that, we decided that we would take a look at this very interesting economy, as I was saying, Taiwan, by taking a multi-step, multi-project deep dive into, as the series title says, the future of Taiwan's economic competitiveness. Because that's a question of Taiwan's future of security. It's closely tied to its long-term economic competitiveness. But also because we're facing an era where there is going to be a lot of technological change, global economic disruption, and political risk, not just to Taiwan, but to really every major economy around the world. So we wanted to take one place, this very interesting economy, and do a multi-step deep dive to look at both what had worked for Taiwan in the past, some of the legacy issues, and then also how a place like Taiwan could deal with, as I said, technological, economic, and political disruption. Now if you've seen the data that's just come out for 2019, you could easily be impressed. Taiwan grew by 2.73% for the year. It grew even more robustly over 3.25% for the last quarter of 2019. And so at one level, Taiwan has a pretty robust economic story to tell. It's also having a pretty good trade war in terms of trade diversion as a result of what's happening between the United States and China. For instance, diversion back to Taiwan for production to avoid US tariffs on product from China. And partly as a result of that, as I said, the economy is growing pretty robustly. A lot of companies are reinvesting, including marquee companies in Taiwan. TSMC is one example. Pegatron, there are others. But what we really, there was an animating premise for this work, which was that while Taiwan might have the right economy for right now, the real challenge is not to have the right economy for right now, but for 10 to 15 years from now. And the further out you pull that thread, the more there's going to be a premium on forward thinking initiatives, both around the nature of the workforce, the nature of the industrial mix, and how an economy positions itself for the future. So that was the general item and concept of the project. And in terms of the innovation piece of it, we started with a basic historical proposition, which was that number one, innovation had been a source of comparative advantage for Taiwan historically. You can see that in Taiwan's extraordinary story in semiconductor and chip design, and with companies like TSMC and MediaTek and so on. But also that it had been an important basis for trans-Pacific links between Taiwan and the United States, and particularly the kind of brain circulation that characterized the relationship between Taiwan and Silicon Valley in the 1970s, 80s, and beyond. But as we jumped into this project, and we did it in partnership with the WTO and RTA Center at the Drulhai Institution for Economic Research, which is a leading economics think tank in Taiwan, what we found is that both of those historical legacies, being innovative, and also these trans-Pacific partnerships faced a new series of challenges. For one thing, and this is the story that I think is best known, the manufacturing ecosystem in Taiwan has really been hollowed out in some sectors. So much of the information communications technology device manufacturing and also design has moved across the Taiwan Strait to mainland China that according to Ministry of Economic Affairs data, 80% of ICT devices now that have Taiwan are basically manufactured with China, mainland China content. But that's actually not the most interesting part of the story. The more interesting part of the story is that fostering a startup sector in Taiwan that would replace those losses in manufacturing had been much more challenging than I think some of the popular narrative presumes. In other words, Taiwan has an incredibly vital startup sector, it's got amazing private sector incubators, accelerators, the government is very focused on this, the five plus two innovative industries plan and so on. But even with this vital startup sector, internationalization had proved to be a pretty persistent challenge for the startups that have emerged in Taiwan in recent decades. So too few of Taiwan startups were really international in either orientation or in the nature of their partnerships. And what's more, too few of them were in technology related industries. In other words, because they weren't in technology related industries, they couldn't simply swap back in. And I'll just give you an example that we talk about a little bit in the report. PWC did a survey of the startup ecosystem in Taiwan and it found that while 70% of Taiwan startups had been founded by first time founders, which is an interesting data point, only one third of those founders have educational backgrounds, actually in engineering, science, or information technology industries. Nearly 60% of all startup founders in Taiwan have backgrounds in the liberal arts or in business. And nearly twice as many startup founders have backgrounds in marketing as in all of the sciences combined. So it starts to tell you something about the nature of the emerging ecosystem that we're seeing in Taiwan. So with that as kind of the historical basis, what we and our partners from Junhua tried to do was to gather a bunch of stakeholders really on both sides of the Pacific. Video conferencing technology is an amazing thing. We have people in Silicon Valley, we have people in Taipei, we have people here on the East Coast. And to take a deep dive again into what had worked for Taiwan historically, what some of the challenges were that we could see, not for right now, but as we projected five to 10 years down the road. And then to be highly prescriptive in brainstorming ideas across industry, government, and capital markets players about how Taiwan, we then assist from the United States through new US-Taiwan partnerships, could try to deal with some of those emerging challenges that we saw. So I think what I'm gonna do, I'll just, let me talk a little bit about some of that historical background briefly. And then I'll talk about these five buckets of challenge that our group really began to focus on. And then it's hard to do justice to the report. So I encourage you to look at it, but there are all kinds of prescriptive recommendations in here. Some are for government, some are for both sides of the Pacific, some are for industry, but particularly because Alexa represents industry, I'm gonna let Alexa handle more of the prescriptive part of this. And I'll just talk about some of the structural challenges. Now, first on Taiwan as a model, as I said at the beginning, when I was a graduate student at Stanford 25, 30 years ago in a PhD program, if you studied the rise of industrial Asia, Taiwan was an incredibly interesting political economy and development economic story. And to those who say there's an East Asian development model as if that's a unitary thing, studying Taiwan is interesting and important because the model and the ecosystem that it was is in many ways different than what happened in Japan and South Korea as it's in. There really were three legs of the Taiwan model that made it so successful. The first and in many ways I would say most important was government competition policy. And so you had very forward-thinking technocrats like KT Lee, the foundation of institutions like Itry, the Industrial Technology Research Institute, the creation of a very vibrant venture capital industry, forward-thinking investments and the use of competition policy to create really a market-friendly and much more decentralized model of technology and industry development than you see, for example, in the South Korean model where there's a nexus between government and a few privileged firms, the so-called J-Ball. Taiwan had a much more decentralized model than what you saw in Korea historically in the 1970s and 80s. And one of the members of our convening group, Annali Saxanian, is the former dean of the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, has done really pioneering research both on the political economy of technology development in Taiwan and also the political economy of technology development in Silicon Valley. And some of the features that worked in the Valley, decentralization, market-friendly structures, that was recreated in Taiwan. Now that's not a surprise because of the second leg of this three-legged stool that worked in Taiwan. And that was internationalization. Taiwan, in effect, as Annal's work shows, discovered Silicon Valley in many ways before the rest of the world did. And if you look at how the semiconductor industry developed, the fact that transplants like Morris Jang, who founded DSMC, really came out of Texas Instruments, came out of U.S. firms, you had this extraordinary connection across the Pacific in the 1960s and 70s between Taiwanese who had worked in the Valley, worked in the United States, that created this intensive, persistent connection between California in particular, but the United States generally, and Taiwan across the Pacific. These were people who eventually went back to Taiwan, having advised the government, in many cases they founded their own firms. They were important fountains of advice for the government on creating the initial sprouts of the semiconductor and chip design industry in Taiwan. And so they created, in many ways, the model. But the point is internationalization was incredibly important to Taiwan's development, not just internationalization for export, but internationalization in terms of this process of what we call an atom called brain circulation that had linked the Taiwan ecosystem to the California ecosystem, the U.S. ecosystem beyond. And that's really the legacy that created so many of the connections between Shinduo in Taiwan on the one end and Silicon Valley on the other, and also created some of the first sprouts of the hardware industry in Taiwan. Now the third leg, of course, was innovation in Taiwan itself. Taiwan quickly went beyond its cheap labor advantage to become a source of innovation, quality production, efficiency, and to scale, particularly through the foundry model that developed that really diversified the way that business function from vertically integrated firms, really a pioneering way of developing industry there. And so this three-legged stool of government competition policy, intensive internationalization and brain circulation across the Pacific, and then indigenous innovation in Taiwan, particularly in these niche industries, really was a big part of what made Taiwan so successful. And I would really stress internationalization, integration into global supply chains, but also integration into global knowledge ecosystems. It wasn't just about industry and production, it was about knowledge, R&D, and research. It made Taiwan extraordinarily special, successful, and an interesting place to study. Now that brings us to some of the challenges that we see today. And we lay these out in the report in much more detail than I will hear. A lot has happened in the last 20 years, and I think Taiwan's been buffeted by change in its really two most important external economic relationships, one set with mainland China and the other with the United States. With China, as I said, so much of both R&D and production for export, integration into supply chains moved across to the other side of the strait. Shenzhen in particular has this very unique manufacturing ecosystem now that is not just about cheap labor advantage anymore. It's also about quick logistics, very fast production times. If you wanna prototype a hardware product, turn it around, tweak it, re-tweak it, do it on very short production cycles. In many ways, Shenzhen offers an ecosystem that's become particularly unique. That's beyond the scope of this paper, but there are other people that have written on that. So that's how Shenzhen partly became this wonderland of sort of mid-scale hardware that you see today. But the relationship with the US and the way the Taiwan-US relationship has changed, I think in many ways, is more interesting and important. Because the brain circulation that I described before was so persistently important to Taiwan's success in the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and beyond. One place to look at that is really to take a look at what's happened to the education partnerships between Taiwan and the United States. Taiwan faces a little bit of a talent gap today, and I'm gonna come back to that in a second, but to put it bluntly, there's less brain circulation going on between Taiwan and the US than there was in the past. There are less Taiwan students studying here before. More of them stay here and they don't go home, particularly at the graduate level. And so that's partly what new forward-thinking, new generation US-Taiwan educational partnerships, which we put some stress on in the report, would be designed to deal with. So let me start to put up some of these slides as a way of... Thanks. When our group took a look at some of the challenges across the board that really were defining the challenges Taiwan was facing, we focused on five in particular. One is the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics talent pool that Taiwan will have. And again, not for right now, but for 10 to 15 years from now. And the reality is that Taiwan faces significant obstacles in its effort to assure robust and growing STEM talent pool, particularly because there's so much more competition for STEM talent among so many more economies. This chart is an interesting example of that and I'm gonna come back to it in a second, but let me just... So you see where I'm going with this, lay out the five challenges. So one is how to assure a STEM talent pool. And in many ways, our group thought this was really the number one challenge that Taiwan is facing. Second is problems of scale. It's tough to be a small economy. It's particularly tough to be a small economy in some of the industries that are emerging for the future that need to leverage data. Big data is a big part of the story. It's not the whole story, but in a lot of industries it is. And China in particular has been able to leverage that to its advantage. Taiwan has a legacy ecosystem that's heavily dominated by hardware. And in some ways it's a victim of its own success because if you think about industries of the future, they begin with hardware, but increasingly they're about hardware software integration. Drone technology is a good example. We asked ourselves in this group, how could Taiwan get more of the value added to reside in Taiwan? So that industry for the future would leave more of the value added in Taiwan itself. And finally, what could the government do in terms of policy enhancement? So those were sort of the five challenges that we identified. Now STEM talent is an interesting one because Taiwan has such a talented and well-educated population. But the reality to be blunt about it is fourfold. One, Taiwan is in fact producing fewer science technology and engineering and mathematics graduates than in the past. Second, many of the graduates in engineering that it is producing are really concentrated in legacy fields, by which I mean electrical engineering and mechanical engineering, not in future oriented fields like computer science and data science. And if you look at this chart, for instance, you can see the number of engineers have been shrinking in recent years, but the more interesting part is basically what's happened in computer science where basically it's been flat over many years. So Taiwan is producing fewer engineers, but also not enough of the engineers, and it's not rising fast enough in the fields that are really going to fit the heart of industries like AI for the future, by which I mean computer science and data science. Third, there are fewer Taiwan students coming to the United States, and I'm not sure if I have that chart. Nope, I don't have that chart, so I'll come back to that in a second. Fewer Taiwan students coming to the United States, and of those that do, more of them are staying here. So if you look at PhDs, for example, we have a chart in the report, three out of every four Taiwan PhDs who get their PhDs in the US stay here in the US. They don't go home. And that's more than ever, than in the past. So if you're thinking about how Taiwan builds a future-oriented STEM workforce and talent pool for the future, you need essentially more engineers, more computer and data scientists, more of that brain circulation with the US, and more people going home as in the past, operating on both sides of the Pacific. And when we looked into the data we saw on both sides that Taiwan participants in our group and also the US participants in our group, some reasons for concern, but the good news is things that the government in Taiwan, in partnership with the United States, could do a lot to help alleviate that. The reality is because of that, there's actually a mismatch between supply and demand for talent, if you look out and you pull the thread into the future. This is a study by Oxford Economics that ranked 41 economies, Taiwan ranks dead last, out of 41 economies that are in this chart. This chart is not in the report, but this is in terms of matching demand and supply for STEM enabled, STEM qualified labor. So this is a challenge that Taiwan is gonna face. And we can argue over the scope and scale of the challenge, but the baseline of the challenge is something that obviously has been identified by people in Taiwan as a major challenge going forward. Second problem therefore, I'll come back to that. Second problem therefore is the problem of scale. Taiwan's a small economy, 23 million people, and it's always derived a comparative advantage from globalization, integration into global supply chains, connections to the global economy. And it's still a dominant player on that in many of these legacy areas. In semiconductors, chip design, things that are not just legacies, but really are future facing. It's absolutely a dominant player and for good reason. But if you think about some of the industries like artificial intelligence or AI enabled applications, AI enabled or cyber enabled applications for healthcare, for internet of things, for agricultural sciences. There are a whole series of metrics you can look at where Taiwan has a problem of scale because it's overcoming the problem of being a small economy. Now the good news is there are lots of small economies like Israel, for example, that have been able to leverage niche specialization. In Israel's case, it's cyber. Israel's a global cyber hub to really multiply their advantages and make strategic investments. And in the report, we talk a little bit about some of the things that Israel, Estonia, some other small economies have been able to do to basically leverage an interesting nexus between government policy, industry and education and the VC industry in ways that create new specializations that can scale globally. But that's one of the challenges that Taiwan is facing and you see it particularly acutely in industries like AI and all of the AI enabled applications. And a lot of the industry participants in our group, we heard about that quite a lot. I don't wanna drone on too much so I'll just quickly throw the other three and you can read more about them in the report. But so many of the industries of the future really are focused on, as I said, not just hardware, they begin with hardware, but ultimately it's about how software and hardware integrate. Now having strong hardware advantages and strong software advantages are good, but finding ways to integrate those two is gonna be increasingly important. And we talked in the report about some of the industries and how Taiwan could begin to leverage that. For us, the reality is that identifying sectors and industries is one place to begin. So the good news is that President Tsai Ing-wen's government with the five plus two innovative industries has picked out a lot of the right sectors. One piece of that is the so-called Asian Silicon Valley plan. Another is smart machinery for next generation original equipment and OED manufacturing. That's all good, but the question is in a world where there's growing competition in all of those sectors and where you have a lot of major economies that can put a lot of money and can also leverage scale to position themselves globally in those things. At least the neighbor across the Taiwan Strait. We asked ourselves how Taiwan could define some distinctive and unique comparative advantages for itself. You'll see in the report some references to being a trusted hub, a trusted vendor, a trusted tester, a trusted conduit. These are the kinds of things that we focused on and there are a lot of prescriptive recommendations in the report that are designed to basically define Taiwan uniquely, particularly at a time when many global firms and international governments have less trust, frankly, in mainland China created hardware and hardware software integration products. So for instance, we encourage the government of Taiwan to create a trusted vendor certification program that could basically define a set of metrics and Taiwan could become a global testing and a testing hub and a set of industries and also a vendor for AI and cyber enabled applications. You'll see more detail on that in the report but those are the kinds of things that we were trying to look at. We then looked at, as I said, how to leave more of the value added Taiwan but above all, there was this question of policy. What could government do in Taiwan both in terms of innovation strategy, forward thinking investments but also international partnerships? Alex will talk about some of those things but in particular, there are a whole series of recommendations around public-private partnerships. There are interesting things happening in Taiwan around accelerators, incubators, things that are actually sponsored by industry but unfortunately, if you look for example at the share of public sector spending in Taiwan's overall R&D spend, it's been collapsing over the last couple of decades. So the good news is there's a much larger and more assertive private sector focus on R&D but we really in our group encourage the public sector to do more particularly to try to resolve some of these timing mismatches in certain industries over time. So anyway, I encourage you to take a look at the report. We can, I was hoping this would be more of a discussion and not just me talking at you but I think for me the punchline is the things that made Taiwan so interesting and successful are all still there but there's a lot happening around Taiwan in terms of technological change and as I said, economic disruption before you even get to the questions of political risk then you pile in the questions of political risk not least from Beijing but also from things like the trade war and there really is gonna be a premium if you're thinking as we are in this project about Taiwan's long-term economic competitiveness. For forward-thinking initiatives in terms of investment in terms of educational initiatives and in terms of educational and industry partnerships to try to recreate some of that spirit that existed before but to compensate for some of the challenges that Taiwan has faced in recent years and as I said, it's not just about scale but it is about positioning the labor force the educational system and the public-private relationship and the relationship with the United States and other partners in ways that position Taiwan are a success in the face of those challenges over the long-term. So we can come back and talk about some of those but maybe that's a good segue for you to talk a little bit more, Alexa, about some of the first group of these. Sure, yeah. Can everyone hear me okay? Great. So thank you, Evan. It's my pleasure to be here with you today. My name's Alexa Lee. I'm a senior manager at Information Technology Industry Council. So just a little bit background about ITI. We are an industry association representing about 70 the world's biggest technology companies. We have offices in Brussels and have a para-association in Beijing. We have a staff in India and Brazil as well. So we do have global footprint around the world and we not only represent American companies but Koreans, Japanese, European and Taiwanese companies as well. So today, very glad to be here. So today I'm gonna share with you what are some of the opportunities that US and Taiwan can work together in the technology space. And as Evan mentioned, there are a lot of challenges facing Taiwan now but there are also a lot of opportunities. We all know that traditionally Taiwan has been very strong in the hardware manufacturing side of things but now they're just starting to look at how can we make sure we still win in the future technologies? So I think because of that, I think Taiwan should really probably start being a little bit active. They cannot just like hide behind a scene, keep doing what they do the best, just kind of manufacturing things, keep a low profile. I think that has to change. So if today I have one message for you today I hope you can bring home with you is that I think in the ICE space, Taiwan really should start being an active player on the global stage instead of being reactive to current events. So for that, I will structure my remark in four policy areas where I feel that the US and Taiwan can deepen their ties in technologies. So they are cybersecurity emerging technologies such as AI, privacy and digital trade. So first, I will begin with cybersecurity. So if you have been reading any news about cybersecurity, about tech policy in general, you will notice that there's a lot of discussion around the global supply chain security and a lot of that discussions have been driven by the concerns about Huawei, about Chinese telecom equipment. Is it safe to have their equipment in the network or can this kind of cybersecurity risk be mitigated or not? And on the Hill, there's a lot of NDA provisions. They're saying, oh, what are the best practices around supply chain? Can we just simply ban Huawei? Is that gonna solve all the problems? It's a lot of opinions and discussions around this issue but currently there's no easy solutions yet. But I think in a difficult time like this, Taiwan should really stand out and prove itself to be a trusted supplier and alternative source that can be reliable to the US as a partner. So for example, I think in the US administration right now, there's kind of like a rethinking about its industrial policy through federal policy, through cybersecurity certifications, through procurement requirements, through the NIST cybersecurity framework. There's just a lot of discussion right now. How can we kind of reframe that industrial policy? So in a time like this, will be really important for Taiwan. How can they just kind of raise their hand and be like, we are ready to partner with you as soon as you are ready? Those are some of the ideas that I haven't talked about as a trusted vendor program. How can Taiwan quickly prove itself as a partner in that way? I think that would be very important. So that's pretty much my first point on cybersecurity. And the second point is, I think Taiwan should really position itself as a cybersecurity leader in the Asia-Pacific region. At least you have that kind of ambition because I think people probably know that probably every single day, Taiwan is being, you know, having some cyber attack from Northern China. It has a lot of experiences and knowledge how to deal with that kind of cyber threat. So if you look at like, for example, like Middle East, Israel is such a cybersecurity hub partnering with the US on a lot of counter-terrorism efforts, you know, dealing with cyber threat in that area. And you look at Estonia is such a small country, but they are so important in dealing with cyber attack from Russia and they share that kind of information with all their European partners in that kind of atmosphere. So looking back in Asia, Taiwan actually have a lot of great stories and knowledge to share with all their Asian countries as well in this regard. And very glad to hear like last year, US and Taiwan actually have a joint cyber exercise that is definitely a good start and that kind of exercise should be mirrored into all their, you know, partnership opportunities in Asia as well. So that's my second point. And the last point on cybersecurity, I think is that this US-Indo-Pacific strategy that Secretary Pompeo pushed out last year. So I think they actually coalesce specifically Taiwan in that document. And if you look at that document, there's actually this cybersecurity partnership pillar on the document. So pretty much they're also, US is trying to figure out how can they increase US technology export to that region. And I think this policy objective pretty much align with what President Tsai's New Southbound policy is also looking at, you know, increase Taiwanese influence in the Southeast Asian countries as well. I see they're, you know, pretty much objective, pretty much aligned. So what Taiwan and US can do in that is really seeking opportunities for basic cybersecurity training for the Southeast Asian country, how can they build up their technical capability in those regard in those industries. I know that, for example, like the Japanese and the South Koreans, they are very active partnering with the US on some of the smart city initiatives in Southeast Asia already. So hope Taiwan is not too late in the game. So hopefully they can, you know, get out there and then make sure they do those partnerships with the US. So I think that's pretty much what's my recommendation on the cybersecurity. And so next I will move on to emerging technologies and AI. I think the first number one, when people talk about AI, it's really kind of like a buzzword. It's really hard to say, are you talking about the algorithm? Are you talking about the technology itself? Or are you talking about a certain application? It's really unclear when people start talking about AI, what are they actually referring to? But one thing everyone knows is that you need a lot of data to be able to train that algorithm to become a successful AI. But what people often forget is the quality of AI, the quality of that data is also very important for any AI application. So looking at Taiwan, it's a relatively small economy, of course, compared to the US, to China, to India. But that doesn't mean Taiwan doesn't have any advantage in AI. And for example, actually like, our companies like Google and IBM, they just view their AI R&D center in Taipei like last year. So definitely Taiwan have, you know, advantages in this space. But I think what Taiwan need to do is they really need to find that special niche and pursue a specialization in AI application because that is the way to succeed. For example, like small countries like Singapore, they focus a lot more on the financial aspect of AI. And in Europe, they focus a lot more on the transparency, accountability mechanism. Why is a human ethical impact about AI? And in China, they focus a lot on facial recognition. In Japan, they focus a lot on healthcare. So what is that area that Taiwan want to actually devote their energy and resources into? I don't have the answer yet, but I think that would be really crucial for Taiwan to find out what that is. So that's my second point on emerging technology. And the second point on the emerging technologies that we want to talk about AI, IoT, quantum computing, cloud. Currently, there's not a lot of clear answers and definitions in those area. And a lot of regulatory policy are just starting emerging. So this actually will be a perfect time for Taiwan to go see at a table and to kind of, you know, share, you know, that their expertise and figure out what those definitions are. For example, you know, and the ISO, IEC, the international standards body, they just start talking about, you know, what's some of the regulation around AI look like? What does it mean to have cloud? How can you regulate a cloud? And then at the OECD level, they just talk to about some of the AI policy principle. How can you make sure human is always a part of the AI thinking? And looking back in Asia, in APAC, people are just starting to talk about what are some of the cybersecurity best practices that should be built in to IoT devices? So a lot of those discussions are still very new and just start emerging. And I think what would be really important for Taiwan to make sure it has to see at a table and contribute meaningfully to those emerging discussion to shape that discussion of the future. So that's my, the second policy area. In the next policy area, I want to talk about its privacy. Taiwan actually has passed a privacy protection law. It's called the Personal Data Protection Act probably like a few years ago. And also Taiwan in December 2018, they also joined this so-called APAC CBPR program as the Cross-Bate Order Privacy Rule. This is pretty much like a privacy certification framework among Asia Pacific region that government that the companies agreed to adopt them. So Taiwan actually is one of the few Asian countries that actually sign up to it. Currently, if you look at the world, there are not a lot of countries that actually have a privacy protection regime and Taiwan is actually a few of them. So a privacy regime is good for consumers because when a consumer go online and use those technologies, they know their data is being protected. If there's any problem, they can just go online and then redress and they know their privacy rights is being protected in that way. They know that their data is not being compromised. So it's good for consumers. And from business side of things, it's also good because when consumer put their trust in this technology, they potentially, you can have the opportunity for company to innovate such technology and make it even more convenient for users. So it's definitely a win-win solution. And Taiwan actually has very good privacy rule in place that actually make itself stand out compared to all the Asian countries. So let's take a step back out of Asia. When we talk about privacy, everyone will agree that the European GDPR, the general data privacy rule is like the gold standard, is the highest privacy standard around the world now. And currently they are trying to figure out what are some of the interoperabilities for privacy rules to the Asian regions right now. And Taiwan actually is one of the few countries that already have APF-CBPR program. They should really start being a thought leader to figure out how can they bridge the gap to make sure we have a harmonized privacy regions around the world. So this is still an area very new. People are just start discussing this, but Taiwan is really very well positioned to be that kind of thought leaders in the world as well. And particularly one thing to mention, the Japan and EU, they just reached their privacy adequacy decision last year. And I think Taiwan is one of the few Asian countries too to potentially seek that kind of adequacy decision with Euro and potentially create a knowledge mechanism to have a privacy data transfer mechanism with the US as well. So that's privacy. And the last policy area I want to talk about is digital trade. So when we talk about digital trade, there's this new saying that data is a new oil and whoever controls more data is gonna win, is gonna be more powerful. I think that's like a very good analogy. But unfortunately there are lots of countries around the world that just start implementing this data localization requirement. They just think they can just put a custom at the border so their data will not flow out of the border and they can take the best advantage out of that. So for that is unfortunate to hear that because if the data cannot flow freely across the border, potentially a lot of good solutions that rely on data is not gonna be able to generate that good solutions that's important to humankind. For example, like identify foundation fraud, healthcare system, it will like slow down the potential to find a solution for that if you're just creating a trade barriers on data. So at the WTO level in Taiwan is a member of WTO, they are having this e-commerce initiative right now to discuss how can we not have trade barriers on data? How can we make sure data can really flow freely across border? How can we have good digital trade agreements among countries? And Taiwan is actually definitely understand the importance of data flows and they actually have good technology policy in place. They should really go on the active layer to promote good digital trade best practices. For example, like the US and Japan they just have a digital trade agreement which last year and for example, like the US and CA also have very good digital trade chapters and languages. So how can Taiwan take those good digital trade practices and promote that in its own kind of free trade agreement with FTAs or potentially trying to find opportunities to sign digital trade agreement with the US, Japan or Europe or all the countries as well will be really important. So just to sum up what I just said, I think there are full policy areas where Taiwan and US and the world can have more opportunities for cooperation and there are cybersecurity, emerging technologies, privacy and digital trade. So I really hope Taiwan can really stop being an active player on the global stage in the ICT space to make sure they grab that opportunity and just go for it. So for that, I will give the floor back to Evan and I look forward to your questions. Great, thanks. So we'll open it up but before we do I just wanna reinforce one thing that Alexis said. I think one of the themes that came up persistently as we discussed this set of issues with stakeholders both in Taiwan and the US it was that the key for Taiwan is to not, is to emphasize and leverage the things that are unique and special to Taiwan. In other words, to be a standard setter, to focus on the quality rather than the quantity of data. I have a colleague who compares data to labor. If you think about labor you can say, one advantage in a labor market is quantity of labor. But that's not the end of the story of a labor market. It's not just about quantity of labor. In a labor market often it's about the quality of labor, the skilling of the labor, the way you leverage and use the labor, how flexible the labor market is and the same could be said of data as well. So China has, mainland China has scale advantages in terms of data. The United States has some scale advantages in terms of quantity of data. Taiwan as I said when we were talking about the challenge is a smaller scale but it can lever as in my labor market analogy, the quality of the data, the governance of the data, the way it sets standards and then leverages and exports its standards on the regional and global stage including through organizations that it's a member of. It's an APEC economy. It's a WTO member in ways that would really leverage Taiwan's unique strengths and work to its advantage over time. So we have one example in there where we talk about data. You know in mainland China you have a lot of access actually to government data but the quality of the data is pretty low. In the United States there's less access to government data but the quality of the data is pretty high. And so we said you know Taiwan's comparative advantage could be to leverage both of those. To have open access to data including public sector data but high quality data and then to lever that in ways that are useful to global. Companies are useful in terms of data protections data standards and there's some other examples in here too. But the point is I think thinking out of the box in this way and trying to leverage strengths that are unique to Taiwan that's really the play that we keep coming back to. It's not to try to out us the US or out China China. It's really to take what's special and unique about Taiwan and lever those strengths ultimately as a standard setting economy in ways that would reduce Taiwan's benefit over time. Right so with that I hope you'll all read the paper but we were hoping for a discussion with all of you so we'll just open it up. Please start with Mike. Mike Nelson I'm here at the Carnegie Endowment. This is a rather general question but I've been to Taiwan a few times over the last 20 years and I noted 20 years ago there was a huge tech enthusiasm just as there was here. By 10 years ago it's a little bit more measured and the US were now in the deep depths of tech lash. Technology is the source of all things bad. Is that happening today in Taiwan and is that discouraging people from going into the tech sector and pursuing engineering jobs or making investments in tech as opposed to some of their field? Yeah I understand your questions on tech lash but I think for now in Taiwan see people still look at tech relatively positive and in fact I think President Tsai's policy like Evan mentioned like the five plus two and the Asian Silicon Valley initiative is kind of giving young people a new idea that it's not too bad to go to do startups and if you ask someone 10 years ago they'll probably be like your parents will probably tell your kids none of them don't go to startups you don't go to big technology companies in Taiwan give you a better job, secure salary, things like that but now because of those policies actually having an impact on young people they know that if you go to a good school in Taiwan a lot of those policies have the incubators in those very good technology programs in those universities is actually encouraging young people to take more STEM education and be a major in computer science is starting to have an impact and I see that more young people are willing to go to startups compared to 10 years ago so I think relatively speaking I think it's still very positive I know that for example in Japan they probably, you know the startup culture is a little bit different people were still thinking more traditionally about you should go to big companies but I don't think that's the case for Taiwan because I think they are still very active and wanted to be participating more so I think it's a good start but time will tell whether the policy actually is effective or not I'd like a few issues in addition to that one of the people that was in the group that we convened said that in many ways Taiwan is a victim of its own success that companies like TSMC and MediaTek had been so successful, so special and so unique that they still had basically soaked up a disproportionate share of the trained engineers in Taiwan and so because they pay well because they're stable, successful, important jobs that are central to the future of Taiwan's economy actually there had not been a lot of risk taking behavior particularly by next generation talent to go off and work in startups so that's one structural challenge which is Taiwan's been so successful that in many ways it's a victim of its own success okay then on top of that you have a few other layers of challenge one is brain drain rather than brain circulation essentially brain drain to the other side of the Taiwan Strait there's a figure in here I don't want to quote this statistic because I don't want to quote it wrong but a very large number of engineering of talented engineers from Taiwan are actually working on the other side of the Taiwan Strait now and that's a problem if you think about the incubation of domestic industries at home third I mentioned this PWC startup survey it's a very interesting survey because they survey the founders of a large number of startup firms in all different industries I flag the educational backgrounds of the founders but it also points to some structural challenges facing startups one is they're disproportionately focused on the domestic market but it was as I said internationalization that was so successful so one challenge is how to marry this extremely dynamic vibrant startup sector in Taiwan which is incontestable and the fact that actually there's a lot of VC money floating around in Taiwan but a lot of it is going to firms that are not international orientation or there's Taiwan VC money actually going somewhere else outside of Taiwan so those are some things that better public-private partnerships better and different policy enhancements public incentives and changes in kind of the educational composition the workforce could be designed to alleviate over time so those are the kinds of things that I think are challenges but there are actually a lot of interesting startup initiatives in Taiwan there's this thing we've mentioned called the startup stadium there's this thing called appworks they basically function as incubators or accelerators for companies and a lot of the most successful Taiwan companies actually are forming privately sponsored accelerators and incubators including university banking incubators so we looked at some ways to marry that up with the industries that have been identified in the 5 plus 2 industries plan that's part of the challenge that they're going to have going forward and we have some ideas I think for how US-Taiwan partnerships could also do that as well does that make sense? Great, thanks Ken and then we'll come around please Ken Lee with all the Brookings the mainland has really made a major effort over recent years to be very actively engaged in standard setting and you know for obvious reasons but they're playing a big role there the US if anything has been criticized for not taking that seriously enough my assumption is the mainland the standards the mainland is promoting and a lot of these areas are not exactly the standards that Taiwan would be promoting how much of a role can Taiwan play given the mainland's resources and enormous focus on shaping international standards in these technology areas Do you want to take that because it gets at some of the standards I think about it? So I think there's a lot of concern about like in the technology space people are talking about oh the Chinese are you know writing a lot of standards in those international standards body but I think one thing also to emphasize is that yes maybe they are creating a lot of standards you know domestically for themselves but also maybe internationally but the quantities of standards this doesn't necessarily mean they produce good standards that will be adept and a set by all international players so for example US companies are still going to the standard body meeting and they're still trying to discuss and forge a consensus with all the partners as well so whatever if the Chinese standards not good enough to be accepted they won't be accepted and what we don't want is that we definitely want Chinese to be a part of the international process to make sure they don't go home and create their unique standards that's totally not interoperable with anyone else so I think the quality questions is also very important to look at when we talk about Chinese activities in the standards whoa see I think there's a lot this is an interesting question because I think there's a lot of industry variance and industry specific specificity to it so if you look at like I've spent a lot of my time in my career looking at things that would be implicated by the belt and road for example I used to be a US official I worked on Central Asia I worked on South Asia one of the most interesting effects of the belt and road particularly for big things like power generation is because China builds it or Chinese firm builds it China construction Sino-hydro when they build it they build it to a Chinese standard a mainland Chinese standard right a People's Republic of China standard so essentially one of the interesting implications of something like the belt and road is China can export its indigenous engineering standards and make them default regional and global engineering standards simply because it's combining sheer market power it's deploying these technologies to scale like no other economy with the export right so when you combine that take something like hydropower right they built all these dams domestically now I think Sino-hydro does something like 50% of dams globally that's incredible so you use you leverage your domestic scale to become the standard set right but that's in things like power generation or hydropower now think about some of the things that are AI enabled or cyber enabled where frankly multinational companies and a lot of governments around the world don't want to rely on Chinese standards don't trust Chinese technology and that's not just a function of the trade where there's a national security component there's an industrial policy component there's a political risk component which is being exacerbated every day and is being stressed you see it in every statement by US officials and so this comes up a lot in this paper because frankly at a time when there are a lot of governments and G7 or OECD economies that regard mainland Chinese standards as less trustworthy Taiwan has a potential opportunity to as I said and we emphasize that adjective trust become the trusted vendor the trusted tester the trusted standard setter but I would be looking not at some of the big ticket infrastructure things where China's basically exporting its technology but things that are AI and cyber enabled where there's going to be a premium on the kinds of things that Taiwan can offer that begin with institutions regulatory structures, legal environment openness of the economy and those are things that American firms American government actually would find very appealing in Taiwan it's one reason why I think you see you mentioned Qualcomm, Microsoft and a lot of these companies making new R&D investments in Taiwan that's precisely why that's happening and you can see it you mentioned healthcare for instance Taiwan's incredibly high quality healthcare system Japan is making a lot of investments in AI enabled healthcare you can imagine that being a comparative advantage for Taiwan where it can leverage both its healthcare system the openness of it cyber protections and the quality of its data in a way that makes it essentially a trusted standard setter around AI enabled healthcare applications so I think that's a long way of saying it depends on the industry but it's not just about quantity and there is a very unique play potentially for Taiwan Sure, please David Brown from SICE Hi, thank you both for helping me understand a subject that I'm not familiar with I have a question about education and I very much understand your focus on the STEM first degree holders but I think if I heard you correctly you said that many of the startups are in fact being founded by people who have degrees in social sciences and marketing and so forth Liberal arts and marketing Liberal arts and marketing Okay if that's the case why just focus on the STEM people why not having a... Is there a role for facilitating the people with non-STEM degrees from playing more of a role in this area? I can, that's too much So I think that's an important point We focused on STEM because a lot of these future industrial standards are gonna be decided essentially around research questions and applications from data science and computer science and also because the overhang of this liberal arts legacy and the startup sectors you have a lot of retail and consumer focused startups in Taiwan So you had this problem of emerging industries that required certain sets of engineering skills where there's a gap and then you had the startup sector in Taiwan not really filling that gap because of legacy issues but also because of this educational qualification requirement question But that doesn't mean that set of skills is irrelevant and there's a set of recommendations here around marrying business training with technical training So we recommended for instance there's a set of recommendations here around training in business operations for graduates of technical schools and technical and engineering subjects and vice versa and it doesn't have to be PhD degrees in data sciences it could just be basic skill sets that incorporate insights from the data sciences into a different business but ultimately we were focused on STEM because we were focused on how Taiwan changes its industrial mix from these legacy industries to future facing industries So it wasn't just for us I mean I think it wasn't just about liberal arts versus engineering it's also the kind of engineering and so there's a chart in here that actually breaks down engineering degrees and as I said it's not a surprise that disproportionately you see electrical and mechanical engineering because that's what's relevant to semiconductors, chip design but the problem is if you think about some of the industries of the future that's not the end even within engineering that's not the engineering workforce you need make one other point which is that another potential comparative advantage Taiwan is bilingual education So essentially to leverage English language to become a truly bilingual economy in a way that would distinguish Taiwan from other economies in the Asia Pacific region there's been a lot of talk about that in Taiwan there's steps toward making Taiwan a genuinely bilingual economy a genuinely bilingual place and you can see how that could have really important effects in terms of comparative advantage and competitiveness So consider for instance even engineering education to be an English language enabled engineering education hub in Taiwan would make Taiwan very attractive as an educational destination for students from all over the world who are not just going to Australia the UK, the United States and so on So marrying English language business operations training and technical training together in creative and interesting ways that's some of the challenge that we thought Taiwan's government could rise to Now, and the US can play a particularly important role on that as well Do you want to add anything to that? Yeah, I will just emphasize the importance of English language skill like the language skill is very important because for example when the Taiwanese start out when they start to build up the program they often just look at Taiwan itself as a market skill because they don't necessarily think about oh, your product can potentially be used in US or UK because without that language skill they don't necessarily have a bigger ambition and to better position themselves to have global opportunities whereas in startups in Israel when they figure out their plan when they start building their product they already think about how can we sell this product to US or other bigger markets outside of Israel and I think because they traditionally have a really good language and bilingual kind of culture in itself as well so that will be a key to help Taiwanese startups think globally and have bigger market size in that way so I think that's definitely a key Hi, I'm Miki Song and I'm an intern of the US Foundation and what situation or what element made the EU GDPR like a global gold standard despite of the techno nationalism around the world and do you think that EU GDPR is a can be successful global standard that every country should comply with? I should take that So that is a very good question I think it's just the fact that the European GDPR was effective May 2018 it has a lot of group privacy thinking into the modern digital economy for example, if you're a consumer you have individual rights you have the right to address, redress your right to be forgotten there's a lot of the data collection and the processing practices are good for the digital economy and they pretty much already is the highest standard in the world for sure, that's you know and the thing is that the big companies pretty much have no problem complying with them because they can just hire a bunch of privacy lawyers like a privacy army but what would be as hard is like the small companies they may not have that amount of resources to have put in that much of resources to make your privacy program strong but no matter what, the GDPR is the gold standard in the world, that's nothing to question and on the question whether that should be replicated to other countries it depends on whether the country feels like they are ready to have such a strong privacy protections but I would do say that for example in Asia like Japan has a good privacy protection because they think their privacy standard is pretty much already interoperable the EU system so for Taiwan it's also having its comprehensive privacy rules it's a member of APS-CVPR are they ready to identify some of the gaps with the EU GDPR program and potentially seek that kind of adequacy decision with the EU I think that would let themselves to decide so How many economies have adequacy decisions built from the EU? Not a lot so the US has this privacy show agreement with Europe and Argentina and Canada the other two big economy has I think New Zealand also has one I think Asia, only Japan and New Zealand are the one currently have and Korea is considering it for now So the point of an adequacy decision is that you are certified by Brussels as having an adequate level of data protection and thereby get access to European data so you can globalize your access to data so that's something we recommended in here for Taiwan because that's a way to basically create a new set of global connections for Taiwan but in this case leveraging Europe Oh yeah, Bill Thiel I have a kind of a political question here let's assume that Taiwan reaches a point where it's beginning to produce competitive products and getting them accepted in other markets and China sees this happening and compels the recipient countries to say to choose Taiwan and China for trade benefits and so forth Do you see that kind of a scenario working out do you see China having to leverage the ability to do that sort of thing and what would Taiwan be able to do to work around that? Well, first of all, Taiwan is producing competitive products for other markets it's one of the most competitive economies in the world already so that's true in a whole variety of industries Second, a lot of these supply chains are integrated across the Taiwan Strait Third, I think, frankly, the growing distrust of China is an opportunity for Taiwan and that's a point I made earlier and it's a point we make in here but we make it more as a technological point than just as a political point although they're connected the lack of trust in China-Ardena technology is related to political risk national security issues that's what you see playing out on 5G, AI in the US-China relationship and some of the European relationships with Chinese firms and so on so the question is how Taiwan positions itself in that and that's an opportunity for Taiwan and there's no question that the political risk is there but the real core questions are the technological and regulatory ones is Taiwan prepared to leverage the strengths that it really has openness, quality of data, strong regulatory institutions, rule of law it's democratic institutions it's the trust that other economies have in it in a way that would make it attractive in a lot of these industries it doesn't have to be zero sum across the Taiwan Strait but often it will be on things like who do you trust to do the testing who do you trust for cyber enabled applications and there I mean I think the questions are really policy questions for Taiwan but those are things that more US-Taiwan partnerships could be helpful too and to answer your very direct question very directly our view is that the United States should be pursuing those kinds of partnerships with Taiwan and Taiwan in turn should be pursuing those with the United States and these are different legs of basically an innovation strategy for Taiwan but also for the US-Taiwan relationship there's a lot being made now for instance of a trade agreement essentially a US-Taiwan free trade agreement and my view is that the time has never been better for that because the will is there in Taiwan to do things that are harmed but where the will wasn't necessarily there in the past but as we say in the conclusion to this a trade agreement alone doesn't position Taiwan necessarily for success in a lot of these future-facing industries in part because a trade agreement will be focused on legacy industries in some ways although it would have e-commerce chapters and so on so you need multiple legs to this and that's what this paper was really focused on does that make sense? Okay, first. Hi I'm Jennifer Chang from the Global Taiwan Institute and I have a question for Alexa you mentioned that Taiwan should strive to be a cybersecurity leader in Asia and I was wondering if you could elaborate on what are Taiwan's comparative advantages in cybersecurity and then you also mentioned some of the applications of that which would be, you mentioned cybersecurity training in Southeast Asia I was wondering what, how can Taiwan specifically contribute towards we have cybersecurity issues in Southeast Asia? Yeah, so I think when I talk about how Taiwan can position itself to be a cybersecurity leader in Asia is because it has a lot of knowledge and expertise dealing with cyber attack from men in China day-to-day basis and particularly each country has this mechanism called CERT it's a cyber emergency response team so each country have this kind of team to deal with cyber attack when something happens so potentially with with Taiwan's day-to-day experiences and knowledge with that it can potentially do a lot of exercise and CERT to CERT cooperation with all the nations in Asia Pacific region so Taiwan can definitely take that leadership and voluntarily go to like-minded country and have those exercise and then for your questions on Southeast Asia I think it just, like the US is thinking about how can they increase its US technology export to the Southeast Asian region and Taiwan is also looking at this new sales bound policy to go into gaining their influence into that region as well and then on the technology from for Southeast Asian countries they don't necessarily have like the big Amazon, Facebook or Google they're just really start thinking about how can we even have attack industry for ourselves that very basic questions like that so a basic cybersecurity training technology or system how do they even build their AIR&D program how where do they put that resource into like basic questions like that I think the US and Taiwan can bring storm together and potentially defend the ties in that area Hi I'm Tim White with the Mansfield Foundation I noted several times you mentioned areas where the Taiwanese and US governments can work closer together on developing policies and strategies together I noticed also that you have one person from AIT on your group and several people with varying degrees of connection to the Taipei government in their opinion is there enough communication going on between Washington and Taipei on the government level to meet the needs that you highlight in that government's government field and if not do they have any ideas on how that can be enhanced Well I don't want to speak for them but I think there are a lot of areas in which basically the governments in Washington and Taipei could enhance communication and actually coordination one example we're given here is regulatory frameworks the more the US and Taiwan can concert regulatory frameworks the more they'd be in a position both to be in harmony which enables more investment but also then to become joint standard setters around regulatory issues in the APEC context for example so we use that as an example there are also some discussion in here of university based partnerships so there are both official and unofficial vehicles there to facilitate educational exchange we talk about some vehicles where different stakeholders could come together in an advisory capacity essentially a trans-specific advisory panel that would bring industry, R&D, capital markets and yes some regulatory players together so without speaking for AIT I think the point is that there are lots of opportunities around areas that governments can affect like regulation and regulatory issues and the sky's the limit on some of that I think the first challenge is to get those things concerted in a way that allow the United States to basically work with Taiwan in a broader regional and global context and if you look at things like the AMCAM in Taiwan says you look at their white paper there's lots of recommendations along that we were trying to focus on things that other people had not do you wanna add anything to that? Yeah, okay, perfect. Others before we call time, please. Emma Raffaeleff, I work with Alexa at ITI and I noticed that this is the first and kind of like a series of papers you'll explore I think kind of related to the last gentleman's question just sort of a thought or a question about the remainder of the series and I know it's focused a lot on U.S. and Taiwan kind of continuing to develop the partnership and how to also influence that from the U.S. side but some of the points that you both made throughout and also that are contained in the report the extent to which Taiwan also can work with other governments in Southeast and kind of Northeast Asia hopefully I don't know what thought you've given to kind of expanding on that a little bit more in terms of different partnerships and other recommendations with those governments since I think that's an important part of the piece as things in Washington continue to be relatively uncertain and moving and tenuous in terms of how like procedure will go there's still lots of opportunity aside from just working with the United States. Sure and I mean that's why the paper talks about it isn't just about Taiwan one part of it is about innovation strategy in Taiwan another part of it is where Taiwan U.S. partnerships can slot in and then Taiwan is a member of APEC Taiwan is a member of WTO we talk about those contexts which get you into the global piece we talk about Europe and GDPR we talk about Southeast Asia and so on my suspicion is that'll be replicated everywhere we go the next piece of this project is on energy taking a look at security, affordability, sustainability not just in terms of fuel mix but in terms of what Taiwan's energy future scenarios look like we're doing that again in partnership with the July Institution of Economic Research but also another think tank in Taiwan as well and we're going to continue to replicate that in some other areas as well so it's an intrinsic part of the conversation No that's perfect All right any last words from anybody? All right well I'm really glad you came out I hope you'll read the paper I hope you'll read the next papers in the series we're excited about it and particularly what I'm excited about it is I think these are serious issues of public policy both within Taiwan and for the U.S. and Taiwan to collaborate and cooperate on and so it's a highly prescriptive really policy focused report it's not pitched at 100,000 feet you may find a little leady in places but that's good I mean that's how better policies develop and we did it through a partnership that brought government capital markets industry together which is a nice model because if you want to talk about public policy and the economy we're on things like regulation you have to involve the industry and capital markets in some way so we'll see how this evolves over time but as I said this is part of an effort that we have here at Carnegie to not just look at 100,000 feet and not just look at the Asia-Pacific region in terms of security dynamics but in other dynamics as well and we're really glad we got Alexa and others involved I'm glad you came over to help give your views It's a very interesting report so thanks for coming out please read the paper and you'll see some subsidiary pieces that come off this as well Please Sure Yes Yeah, we're going to try to do the next so we're trying to focus on different areas as I said that really cut at the core of Taiwan's future competitiveness and if you go back to the way I started the talk today I said if you look at the 2019 data and particularly at the fourth quarter of 2019 data Taiwan's economy is doing pretty well especially in comparison to other economies in the Asia-Pacific region but having the right economy for right now doesn't necessarily mean you have the right economy for 10 to 15 years from now given the degree of industrial evolution and technological change so the premise of the project which doesn't presuppose the findings is that there are things that Taiwan, Taiwan in the US Taiwan and others can do to position Taiwan to have the right economy not just for right now but for down the road so the next thing in this series we're going to look at energy but that doesn't mean we're done with innovation obviously the goal is not to write a paper drop it and then walk away from it so you'll see more on this too but we wanted to look at different aspects of Taiwan's economic trajectory so now that I've raised the bar we'll have to have you back for another now we've got to write another paper on energies so anyway thanks for coming out today we really appreciate it, thank you thank you thanks