 Yn 18 lyf yn gynghwyl, yn cyfnoddiad y gallwn gwiris five yn llunio, lle mae'n ceisio pa yn lwykoedd cymryd unrhyw, yr ydych chi'n fath translateb am y dyfodol o'i eu maeddiad oedd y Prif, dyfodol o'r prif시�dd ychydig Glff Clwyddonedd, yr iawn, iawn, yr iawn, brydyn nhw'n gwirionedd ym Llywodraeth, yn rhywbeth ym Llywodraeth i fy nesgyn Ym Llywodraeth ym Leol Llywodraeth a'r Llywodraeth ym Llywodraeth. ..a chyfwyr o'r cyfwyr, ac yn gweithio'r cyfwyr o'r cyfwyr. Dwi'n gweithio'r dda nhw'n gwaith o'r dda i'r cyfwyr yn ymddangos o'r ddweud ymddangos, oherwydd rydyn nhw'n ddwy i'r ddweud, ac mae'n gweithio'r ddweud yn ddweud. Rwy'n gweithio'r ddweud y pethau'r cyfwyr, rydyn nhw'n gweithio'r ddweud y pethau a'u ddweud. Y ddweud y Brexit yw'n amser o'r ddweud y Gwasanaeth Brydor, affects is crucial and obviously I might be leaving and then finally there's time, what about the impact on the EU itself which not a lot of people are thinking about. Well, I think the deal is not as irrelevant as many people say it was. Whatever happens it was after that argument. It does crystallise a shift in the EU's thinking on benefits so that the ECJs where yng Nghymru yn ddefnyddio y Llywodraeth Cymru'r Éa eu bod yn ddefnyddio lŷosol mewn ddylanfod gwirio a os ydych yn ddeall pan ymweld hefyd yn byw i ymddangos fel y byw. Mae'r meddwl ddefnyddio łaf yw trefyn o dreamodd cyfle oherwydd mae'r ddweud o gweithio frechu y blaen ac mae'r fawr o feaeth arlaedd eraill. Mae hwn yn parw ydyn ni yw llyfr llefydd yn ddefnyddio eich ysgol iawn o ddeall o'r ddweud o gweithio frechu cyfle o ffrygu'r ddweud o'vew yn ddefnyddio'r daith. Felly mae'r gweithio ar gyfer y Llywodraeth. Mae'r gyfnodol syledd yn bwyd. Mae'r gyfnodol yn ymweld yn ddechrau eu gofod ddiddordeb yn y Llywodraeth Gallwch Ddwygogol. Rwy'n gweithio'n ddig RESALFALИY, ac mae'r meddwl am yr cyfle dda i'r gyflwyno-igol o gyflymu pan-lalufio'r Gweithio Europeane. Llywodraeth i'n gweithio'r Rhaglen. Rydw i'n gweithio'n Llywodraeth i eu Llywodraeth i'n gwneud ychydigol, Ym mwyaf ei ddweud y Cymru, fe hwn yn yllaf i chi i ddweud ymlaen y orientol yn llwyloedd i'r llwyloedd, sydd i ganddig i chael ei amlwg, yn ychwrs cwrdd yn llwyloedd yn llwyloedd y cyfan, ac mae hynny'n cael ei ddwyddoeth yn ei wneud cyhoeddiadau. Mae'n gweithio bod Gweithraedd cyfl CC yn ddod yn Sufietteau, a mae'n cyfrifiadau trafodaeth a'r hufydllfa. If you add together the Schengen optite, the GEOJ opt in the Euro optite, the sort of optite from the Charlotte Department of Rights, and now the optite from the Everclystic Union, the UK is quite a peculiar EU member state, very different from other countries, not in the Euro. So, in a way, is that somebody put it to me in the Council Minister's a few days ago, we have a three-tier, tier EU part, the Eurozone, the Europarts who are at least in theory mostly pre-ins, and then the UK. I don't think that matters rather the UK or the EU, because there's so long as the UK remains a member of the EU. And then the third thing I think is interesting about the deal is setting down some quite serious principles for the relationship between the Eurozone and the non-Euro countries. This is the bit that George Osborne, our Chancellor, cared most about, and it's a very technical, some very bitter argument between the British and the French in the middle of the night, the final studies on the 18th of February. But setting down principles like non-Euro countries don't have to pay the bailites of Euro countries, that the Euro group mustn't start taking decisions on matters which should be considered by the wider ecofin at 28. The idea that the rule book for the banking union, there should be a common rule book for all the countries in the banking union, and that the country is not in the banking union, but those not in the banking union don't have to follow the rules so closely, that was actually the source of the most important argument between the British and the French at the summit itself. I think this is my personal view is that most of my own country is not in the Euro, not John the Euro for a very long time indeed. That goes against the club of the theology of Brussels, which is to say that everybody except the group from Denmark with John the Euro is back soon. So I think that therefore I think the relationship between the outs and the ins is quite important and it's important to get the principles right, and as you know the British have a genuine worry that caucusing of the Euro's own countries could damage the interests of the city of London or more generally the single market as a whole. I think the British got most of what they wanted there, and if they stay in the EU this will be a source of much discussion in the future. A lot of the arguments were sort of settled with a score draw between the British and the French, and if the British stay in they'll come back again when the capital markets union takes off. Should the big one regulator for the whole capital markets union or capital British have their own regulator for their most capital markets union, that's an argument to come that possibly treats his change with the developments in the Euro zone and these arguments will come back again. So that's why the deal is I think quite interesting. It's not featuring very much in the referendum campaign. Cameron thought that his deal would lead to a buzz in the opinion polls in favour of staying in, because he thought that he could convince the British people that he had to transform the EU, that he was an alchemist who would turn lead into gold. He failed in that ambition, partly because he hasn't transformed the EU, partly because the Euros get depressed, gave the deal such a drumming that the British people are not even prepared to give many crates at all. He said yes for the modest, if quite sensible reforms that in my view he achieved. He made a strategic error in my view, which was for the sake of holding his party together, which has been his number one occupation for a very long time, the sake of holding his party together, he really wouldn't make the case for the EU until quite recently. He didn't try and shift public opinion until quite recently. He missed opportunities like the review of EU competencies which carried out in 2014, 36, I'm going to forget, I'm going to be very important in this report. Well research detailed reports on EU transport policy, EU research policy, EU animal health policy, looking at what the EU does in beneficial to Britain or not. These reports concluded, guess what, just about everything the EU does is fairly beneficial to Britain on balance, which wasn't the resultatory Eurosceptics hoped for, they got very angry about these reports. Therefore to placate them Cameron Berryburn, the first batch of six was published, I remember on the day that Prince William's son was born, that's not a coincidence, the press went off grief on them. The last batch of reports was published in December 2013 or 2014, I forget which, just on the day that Parliament went into recess I remember that play as well. Again no effort was made to use these reports to shift public opinion to understand that EU was beneficial. Cameron was only doing all the referendum campaign, he's left it a bit late because the referendum campaign started effectively on the day of the site on 19th February. Public opinion was then roughly half and half in favour of membership or leaving membership and it's still roughly half and half so he's left it a bit in my view and his concern is to keep Tory party together which is an understanding concern. But this meant that he couldn't prevent himself from saying that he was good per se, his line was that he was not good, it's pretty ghastly but with my wonderful reforms I'll make it good and that's not a very convincing line. To be fair to the Prime Minister he's now, he's now, he's come out all guns blazing now, he's trying extremely hard, I say he should because if he loses he's out within probably more than days. So the referendum itself, I'm going to list the six reasons why the in campaign might win, the six reasons why the out campaign may win. You may notice that I think the arms campaign has stronger arguments working in its favour, I fear, I hope I'm wrong of course because I'm fit in. Let me start with the in campaign though. The best argument we have is what does Iote need? They can't tell you. I talked to Matthew Elliott, the boss of Vote Leave. He said he's not prepared to tell you what Iote needs because it's not his job to work out what Iote needs, it's the job of the British government post the referendum to get the best deal possible for Britain. Britain's just strong and poor at one country, they've really laughed so much they'll give us a good deal. But it is difficult I think that they don't tell you which of the various models they would go for, of course they don't agree on which model they'd go for and I'll come back to that. Secondly, most of the serious politicians are for in. Boris Johnson is very popular, extremely popular politician who's for out but he's a joker and he's not very serious and he's all over the country. He himself said that his views on the EU have been, he's been careering around like an out of control super market trolling. That was his own description of his own views on whether he should support membership just before he came out. So arguably Cameron is a very good salesman and is fairly trusted in respect of Unlidled England and the fact that the out campaign, apart from Boris, doesn't have any serious hitters other than Nigel Farage who is a good communicator but obviously he's very toxic to many voters is I think a problem they face. Third factor, there is a bias to the status quo in most referendum campaigns, there's historians of referendums we've told you. We saw this in Scotland a bit, the last minute people prefer the status quo. Fourthly, this may not be a strong argument but the government is making the case that we need the EU for our security. This is a new argument that nobody ever made in Britain until last autumn. I'm not sure it's too very convincing because most British people think that NATO provides their security and the spy services do as well. They've never heard of the Europol, they don't know what the Europe in the West is and they don't really understand that the EU plays quite an important role and say Russia policy by imposing sanctions on Russia because of Ukraine and so on. So I'm not sure if this argument is going to be very convincing but the government is trying to make it. It may work with a few people. Fifthly, outside interventions. I think they can help. I think that Irish political leaders can make a difference because they are respected as very close partners, allies of the British. If they say we would like you to stay in because of common economic interests and common security interests, I think flushing those in England will miss them and I think Obama plans to come to England and say something along those lines too and I think that will be quite helpful. Maybe if other European leaders intervene it will be less helpful. Final point for helping in Scotland. Obviously as little as Sturgeon has said Brexit will hasten the day when there's a second Scottish referendum to which the Eurosceptics say well of course it won't so long as the oil price remains low. First of all we don't know how long the oil price will remain low and secondly I don't declare it to be on Scotland but I'm not sure economic factors are necessarily the ones that matter the most but quite a lot of Scottish voters I think. Issues of identity may be more important. So the more intelligent thought that will flow from voters in Britain may hesitate to take a step that could lead to the break of the United Kingdom. Well let me switch to the arguments on the other side which I think are very hard for you. Firstly the devil has the best tunes as far as I'm concerned. The Outs campaign have beguiling fairly simple arguments that appear to be easy to make in a simple sign way. Do you want to pay 10 billion pounds of international health service or to the Brussels bureaucrats? Do you want to control your borders or not? Do you want your legislators and your judges to be British or foreign? Then they make the trade point. When people like me say if you leave the EU you couldn't lose access to the civil market they say rubbish look at China, America, Canada and Argentina. They all trade with the EU so they have access to the civil market and they're not members of the EU so of course we can go on trading. They align the difference between a civil market and a free trade area which of course if you try to explain that to them it's very hard. I couldn't do it in less than three minutes but by the time I've done that I've lost the audience. So the evidence is staying in the EU are all complicated economic, numerical, boring, rational and hard to explain. This is our problem. Second advantage of the out-of-campaign now, they have to press on this now. The most influential British newspapers, the Mail, the Express, the Mail, the Tel Aviv Express, probably the famous influential Mail, strongly you're a skeptic, unbelievably biased in the way you report things, particularly the Daily Mail which is soviet in the way it reports it. It blames most of the world's problems on the EU. You only have to open it to get shocked. Even a hard one for the Germans like myself is quite shocked by the Daily Mail. I think media analysts have been saying for years that written media doesn't matter anymore. It's all social media. I don't believe that written media matters hugely to the political classes. It's given cover for so many Tory Eurosceptic MPs to come out for out. It's made them feel comfortable, it's made them feel like other people on their side. I'm afraid it affects the way the BBC report. The BBC bends over backwards to be neutral. It's under so much pressure all the time. It gets thousands of emails every day complaining about its pro-EU bias. Last Sunday, for example, Andrew Maher interviewed Boris Johnson and interrupted him quite a lot of times because he waffled Boris. Immediately there was a Twitter storm that Boris was interrupted 47 times in the previous week that Prime Minister was only interrupted 23 times. This proves the BBC's bias. It's a pathetic example, but they just never let up. They attacked the BBC the whole time with a very deliberate reason, which is that they think the BBC will decour into not making the same mistake again. Next time the BBC will make sure Andrew Maher's told a lot to interrupt so often. I fear some of this may work, so if you watch the BBC's reporting, they'll have some serious support by a very serious economic statement saying jobs will be lost. To make it balanced, they have to find some second-rate article that nobody's ever heard of that says jobs won't be lost, and they'll give the second-rate article that nobody's ever heard of equal status to a very reputable thing. That's how it works. So I think the press does matter. Thirdly, the strength of the campaigns. The out-campaigns, there's several of them, but they have unlimited money donated by millionaires and millionaires and hedge funds. They have a lot of resources, a lot of expertise, a lot of very brilliant people running their campaigns, and I wish I could say to them about the in-campaigns, but I can't. They're under-resourced, under expertise, if there's such a word, and they're not, at the moment, very inventive in regarding what the other lots say. The man, the team running the main out-campaign vote me, ran the those-a-b referendum campaign. They run other campaigns, Dominic, Cummings and Mathieu, and they're extremely clever and extremely proficient, and I wish we had people like them on the other side. And number 10, frankly, has looked a bit out of control as well, not in control of things. Number 10 believed that Boris and Go would come out for in. They believed that he sent it to ADMPs, and the Tory party would come out for out. They were wrong on both counts. Let's hope they get better. Fifth point, the Labour Party is in a pretty awful state of mind with a Marxist leader who's basically anti-EU, but pretends he's pro-EU for an easy life. He's not putting energy, resources, money, effort into making the case for Europe. Many of his front-benchers will do so, but this is a problem, because Labour voters are distinctly more pro-EU than Tory voters, but they're not being mobilised. The trade unions also are not mobilising their members. Most trade unions are weakly to in, but because staying has become Cameron's project, and you're lastly right to be conservative, they're reluctant to help Cameron. I think a lot of trade unionists and trade union organisers are sitting on their backside while they're doing their thing. My fourth point, my fifth point, the business lobby is going to be less strong than I thought they would be. They have been covered also into cowardice in my view. Many of them are reluctant to speak out for in, even if they are for in because they don't want to upset stakeholders, shareholders, customers, suppliers, not enough directors and so on. So any 36 of the FT's biggest 100 companies, the FT 100, came out in a recent letter. Last point, my most important one, the EU is in a handful of messes, isn't it? We all know that. Those of us who like the EU would have accepted this in regards to the many ways the Euro crisis has not resolved. The refugee crisis, despite what happened last night, is certainly not resolved, and every time the EU is in a mess, it helps the out campaign. They say, do you want to stay in this awful organisation that is out of control, which is acrimonious, where they can't reach agreement with what to do, and all these refugees who see flooding into Germany, they all get German passports in two years, then they'll come to Britain instead of jobs. Then Turkey's going to join the EU in five years, and 70 million terms for the market is through your jobs. A lot of people believe that because they've been in the press. So that's why, as we've gathered, I'm not very optimistic about the outcome, but it's certainly too soon to be sure what will happen. And what about the impact on the UK if Brexit happens? The five main models of post-Brexit, the one that is best for the economy, of course, is Norway. It's Norway's part of the signal market. But as you know, it pays into budgets, it takes free room to labour, and it has no say on the rules. That's why I don't think it's politically viable, because any British government with post-Brexit would not accept free room to labour, because it believes that you, because you don't like free room to labour. So Norway won't be on the options, it won't be on the cards. Normal Switzerland's the EU would not offer a Swiss. The Swiss model is broken down. The Swiss model of bilateral agreements through which the Swiss will adopt EU rules and regulations, but without accepting the software, the rule that we were able to adjust this information, doesn't do with bilateral treaties with the EU, is broken down. The Swiss had a referendum on rejecting free room to labour with the EU two years ago, and they voted against this. But they can't implement that referendum result, because if they did, they would lose access to the signal market and they would know it. So the Swiss people's verdict has not been implemented. I don't think it will be. But the EU itself believes that the Swiss model isn't working. It wants the Swiss to accept a role of the ECJ. The ECJ are duplicating free room to the Swiss. The Swiss don't accept that, so the model is broken down. Thirdly, the most likely option probably is the free trade agreement, the Canada option. Britain would negotiate as much of access as it could in the way that Canada has done, but if you look at the Canada deal, it's still largely about tariffs. It tries to go beyond removing tariffs to removing some non-tariff barriers, but not very many. Canada will not have access to loads and signal markets. For example, public procurement of Canadian companies are not allowed to compete in European public procurement contracts and will not be allowed to. The car industry has no mutual recognition of each other's standards. Financial services are not covered. So the Canadian deal would be pretty bad for the British economy, but it would be better than the fourth option, which is WTO membership, which is basically no FTA, no particular deal with the EU. I have WTO rules which limit how high your tariffs can be. I know that Oxford Economics will shortly be publishing an analysis of the economic costs of all five options that I haven't come to think of yet. They concluded that the WTO membership is the most painful option for Britain, and it would lead to a GDP loss of 4% of British GDP. They haven't published that thing yet. I'm just giving you one. The fifth option, which is perhaps not very broad, is the Turkish option, which is customs union. The Turkish customs union of the EU doesn't have a say on the tariffs that the EU imposes on the rest of the world. It has limited access to some parts of the market, but not very many parts of it. I don't think that's a very satisfactory option. All these options, all five options, would not give Britain access to the FTAs that the EU has negotiated in 53 other countries. We would lose our trade deals that we now benefit from. Of course, the skeptics deny that and say that some of the other convention means that international treaties continue if one country leads part of another country. I think that most of the EU let's think that we would lose the benefits of these deals. Britain would have to negotiate the rules from scratch during the two years under Article 50 of the EU Treaty that you're allowed to negotiate with Brexit with the exit. Difficult to negotiate 53 trade agreements from scratch to cover us, because Britain doesn't have any trade negotiations. They're all far in 1973 with the EU as the Irish ones were. Of course, we have to negotiate our own trade agreements in the future with others from scratch, so we have to negotiate with the US. The Americans have said that the trade rep is sailing in Washington. We're busy with teaching that Britain wants to have to have its own deal, but that's fine. We'll have to wait until the end of the queue. We've removed the leverage of the EU, which allows Britain to negotiate quite good trade agreements through the EU. In the short term, the main economic consequence of Brexit would be a massive sterling crisis. We're seeing that we're ready. The pound has gone down 8% in recent months. It went down 2% the day after Boris Johnson said it was coming up. Of course, that's not entirely bad if economy is the same, but it's other than we equal. If it goes down too far, it gets quite bad. There would be a short term crisis in which, if it hadn't just before the vote, it could help to push the vote towards an end, in fact. I think all these options I've described are very bad for the city of London, except for the Norwegian option. That I think is still quite bad for the city of London, because the other four options would not allow the city the so-called single passport, which means that Goldman Sachs comes to London as a big subsidiary in London, from which you can do business all over Europe, selling products, advice, shares, bonds, whatever. Without being regulated by other European governments, that's the so-called passporting. The city of London is a success, and much of it, not all of it, quite a lot of it is built on this passporting. That is very much part of the single market, and I can't see any of the options I've mentioned, except for Norway, allowing Britain to stay part of the single market. I should have said the Swiss option does not be with some access to the European financial services market. Financial services will, by all two exceptions, are excluded from the Swiss option. But even with the Norwegian option, of course, for the city, the rules will be written by the rest of the EU, which would be a bizarre situation if the UK holds the greater part of the EU's financial services market, but the rules will be written by the other, by the member states of the EU. We would apply them in the city if we wanted to enjoy the passporting arrangements, which would be a very bizarre situation, hardly sustainable. I think the city would be particularly badly hit by Brexit, particularly badly. So it's no coincidence that the investment banks are speaking out strongly of favour membership, but if that helps our cause, I don't know. The Goldman Sachs is with us, and let's hope it does. Some of the hedge funds are against, because they don't like the limits on their bank's bonuses and the other rules that the EU proposes on them. I'm almost coming to the end of this section. I'm not falling, taking too long to speed up. A big problem for the UK economy with post-Brexit would, of course, be free-roomed labour limitations, because, as I said before, whatever happens post-Brexit, we would not allow unlimited free-roomed labour with the EU. It means that when a foreign bank in London or a British manufacturing firm in the Midlands wants to hire a Frenchman or a German or an Irishman to come and work in his or her company, you'll have to get a work permit, just like hiring an Indian requires today. Probably you'll get some of them through and some of them you won't get through, but I know this. I tried to hire an American to work for my big town. It was so bureaucratic and complicated. I gave up at the end. It takes at least six months. It's difficult and complicated and they don't always let you have to do the work. So that'll be a real cost of the British economy. The biggest cost of all, I think, is just foreign investment. Already the CBI will tell you there is a reduction in FDI, foreign director investment, into Britain, because of the threat of Brexit. If Brexit actually happens, there will be a loss. People are interested in Britain for many reasons other than access to the symbol market. That is a seriously important reason for the financial firms, for the car manufacturers, for the pharmaceutical firms and for some of the business advice services. Final section, I'll do this in two minutes. What happens to the EU itself if we can use it? Well, I don't foresee a dramatic shift in the economic philosophy of the EU. I mean, a lot will of course be less economic. We're different without the British to push for free trade and the symbol market, but not dramatically, because there are others like the Irish and sometimes the Germans and the Nordics who share Britain's broadly pro-market perspective. So I wouldn't expect a dramatic shift there, although the Germans think they'd be a bit of a shift and one of the reasons why they're so keen to keep us in. Foreign security policy, obviously the British are important contributors to British EU foreign policy. They are central contributors to EU defence policy. Defence policy without the British would be much less serious than it is, and foreign policy would be weakened. Defence policy could well evolve in an anti-NATO direction, because one of the jobs the British do in the EU is stop the creation of operational headquarters being set up that could rival or damage what NATO does. I think the bloke of standing with the EU would be greatly damaged if the British left. That's the sort of the intangible loss of the EU soft power. I think the Justice and Home Affairs area would be damaged by Brexit. This is bizarre given that Britain is not ashamed of them. We have an octite from JHA, a peace and judicial cooperation, but actually where we do take part we're very big contributors. If you talk to Europol, the British feed more intelligence into Europol than any other member state. It's not a coincidence that the man running Europol is Rob Wainwright of Britain, or the man running Europe just until recently was Mike Kennedy another Brit. The British have been very positive, particularly also in some countries terrorism operations. I think those areas would suffer. I think Marine Le Pen said not long ago that if the British leave, it would be like the Berlin Wall of Fall in 1989. I think she's right. It will be a big step in European history. The narratives have become disintegration, not integration. I think your skeptics all across the continent will be boosted, strengthened, they'll have a swagger in their stride, they'll feel they can win, and the prospect of Marine Le Pen winning the French presidency will be high. People will start to think it could just happen. Maybe not likely, but not completely impossible. I think this is obviously very bad for those of us who think the EU for all its force is a good idea. And then the final consequence of Brexit, which I think will be the German question that comes back, is the thing that everybody talks about, sort of in private, nobody talks about in public. Throughout the history of the EU, one country has never been preeminent before. For most of the EU's history it was Germany and France, then for a while the Tony Blair was Britain and Germany and France. For the last five or six years Germany has dominated the EU to an extraordinary degree. It's unhealthy to Germany and unhealthy for the EU and many sensible Germans know this very well. This is a product of the British being increasingly centre-tached, the French economy being weak and Holland being a weak leader, the Commission being a weak institution, and Germany having a relatively strong economy. In most ways very successful and effective leader in over the Merkel. But I do think of the British League that the whole question of Germany's preponderance becomes a much bigger problem for the French and the Italians. I was in Italy recently and they are very well aware of this and that is the number one reason why the Italians are terrified of the prospect of Brexit is because they think, as one said to me, we don't want to be left alone in the room in the French and the Germans. So I think it kind of destabilises the power relationship.