 Good afternoon you are very welcome to this afternoon's webinar discussion on the future of US foreign policy hosted by the Institute of International and European Affairs. I'm Katrina Perry RTE journalist current six one news anchor and former Washington correspondent. I'm delighted to be chairing this time session, which comes just days after one of the most anticipated presidential elections in modern US history and it's not over yet as we all know. And we can see by the record turn out just how important it was for American voters as well. And it's being watched closely by the international community. And I don't think anyone who is even remotely interested in politics has been able to tear themselves away from the coverage, or if you're like me get more than a couple of hours of sleep snatched here and there all week. So while we all continue to keep a close eye on the remaining counts, and how they're going and wait to see who will be the next president of the United States. Today we're going to take a step back and look at the broader geopolitical picture and consider just what the future holds for US foreign policy. We don't have a president elect just yet we're going to look at the impact that either possible outcome will have so whether that's a continuation of the policies of the Trump administration with which of course world familiar, or what could be in store with a new Biden administration, which might be similar in many ways to the Obama administration of which he was vice president but of course the world has moved on quite a lot in the past four years. You know, under President Trump we saw the US move away from international organizations like the UN NATO, the most recently the WHO. We saw it withdraw from international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the Iran nuclear deal and Iraqi relationship at times with the EU, while at the same time forging new relationships with countries that previous had not welcomed case in point of course being Kim Jong-un in North Korea, and the approach taken by President Trump was outlined clearly I think in January 2018 in the National Defense Strategy document, which referred to interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, as the primary concern in US national security and that the central challenge to the US prosperity and security was the reemergence of long term strategic competition and primarily from China and Russia so we'll discuss that today along with the relationship with the Middle East and we're delighted to be joined by a stellar lineup of experts from some of the United States top think tanks and academic institutions. So let me briefly introduce our panellists for this afternoon's discussion. I'll do that in alphabetical order so we have Dr Michelle Dunn who's the director and senior fellow of Carnegie Enderman's Middle East Programme where her research focuses on economic and political change across the region. Michelle previously served as Middle East specialist in the State Department from 1986 to 2003 under Republican and Democratic presidents, serving in the National Security Council, the secretary's policy planning staff, USMC in Cairo and the US Consulate General in Jerusalem. We also have Dr Elizabeth Economy, who's a senior fellow at Stanford University, she's an institution and a senior fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Elizabeth is an award winning author of several books on Chinese domestic and foreign policy, including the Third Revolution Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state and by all means necessary, how China's resource quest is changing the world. And also joined by Dr Angela Stent, who is the director of the Center for Eurasian Russian and East European Studies, and a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University. Angela also serves as non resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and previously served in the Office of Policy Planning at the State Department, and the claimed expert and author her latest book is Putin's World Russia against the West and with the rest. So let me begin talking to our fantastic panelists there. Let me just say that today's discussion is fully on the record, and we'll begin with initial remarks from each speaker. We'll have a bit of discussion and then we'll get to the audience questions now if you do have questions, please submit them using the Q&A function through zoom there which you should see on your screen. You can see us but we can't see you so please do include your name and any affiliation you may have or who you're representing with your question. And you can also feel free to join in the discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIEA. So without further ado, let's get going to you Elizabeth first. I'm an expert. And before we get to the future of US-China relations and the implications of the presidential election, could you talk us through how that relationship has evolved in recent years, and broadly speaking the debates that are ongoing in US foreign policy circles about how China's rise may reshape the global order and how the US should manage that. So thank you so much Katrina. It's really a pleasure to be here and to be part of such a stellar panel, particularly at this moment in time. So happy to say a few words about how the US-China relation has gotten to where it is today and where I think the debates right now, the most important debates sit. So here we are frankly speaking is a period of US-China relations since before normalization in 1979. In the United States there is a widespread, although not uniformly held belief that China poses a systemic challenge that it is bent on advancing globally and undermining the liberal international order that it is stealing a technology and that it wants to replace the US as the dominant power in East Asia. COVID-19 reinforced a sense within the US that China could not be trusted and an accelerated calls for reviewing supply chains and decoupling. In China there is a widespread belief that the United States is bent on containing China, that it does not want China to succeed, and that this derives from a position of US weakness not strength, and that ultimately China will try it. So briefly how do we get here. I think there are really three inflection points over the past decade or a little bit more. The first was in 2008 and the global financial crisis and that was a moment when I think Chinese ambition to be on par with or even surpass the United States began to crystallize. You had Chinese officials talking about moving away from the dollar as the world's reserve currency. You had a sort of more assertive Chinese foreign policy with regard to the South China Sea. You had proposals for a new relationship among major powers. The second inflection point was really and I think perhaps the most transformative was the advent of Xi Jinping as the leader of China in 2012. His policies have been both more repressive and authoritarian at home and more ambitious and expansive abroad and this has had a transformative impact on how the US understands China and the US-China relationship. And all I would say the US has become convinced that at least for the foreseeable future, China is not pursuing a policy of reform and opening that it's not committed to upholding the liberal international order. And thus that the US policy of engagement, which is what has guided the United States for probably four decades now is no longer a policy that is valid that is workable. Just to give you a couple of examples of the policies that have contributed to the change in US thinking. On the political front I would point to significant new constraints on the internet and media in China, kicking out the journalists from the major US newspapers like the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. This is an egregious human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the Hong Kong national security law, and along the management of foreign NGOs, which resulted in the number of foreign NGOs active in China, dropping from over 7,000 before January 2017 to under 500 today. And that was significant because the civil society and international NGOs in the United States were one of the sort of pillars of US support for a robust and proactive and positive relationship with China. So by cutting down the sort of opportunities for an interaction between US civil society and Chinese civil society, the Chinese government also cut down on US support. On the economic front, I think we've seen little progress on the type of structural economic reform that people in the US were expecting in China. Obviously the Chinese Communist Party playing a much stronger role in private firms, especially technology firms. And that has had an important influence on US thinking with regard to companies like Huawei or Tik Tok or WeChat. There's a sense that there is no such thing as a private Chinese firm, that every Chinese firm must be responsive to any demand by the Chinese government. Programs like Made in China 2025 and Xi Jinping's new dual circulation theory also are understood in the US is creating an uneven playing field for multinationals and have resulted in again a reduction of support from the US business community for China. So you have two pillars of the US-China relationship in the United States, both suffering as a result of Chinese policies and that's both resulting in a diminished support for a proactive policy. And then finally on the foreign policy front, we've seen a much more assertive Chinese foreign policy around sovereignty issues with regard to Taiwan, the South China Sea, India border disputes, the Belt and Road Initiative, the US sees as exporting poor labor, environmental and governance standards, as well as laying the groundwork for the spread of Chinese technological and military influence. US has also become concerned about undue Chinese influence in the United Nations, and this was exemplified by the World Health Organization's relatively slow response to COVID-19 and there is a sort of significant narrative in the United States that that resulted from Chinese influence. And then finally, the US has become concerned about efforts to advance Chinese interest within the United States through institutions like the Confucius Institutes or the Thousand Talents Program, intellectual property theft from universities and companies. And the third and final inflection point was the election of Donald Trump, and the Trump administration came in, it reassessed and it reset US policy. I characterize it as moving from a policy of engage but hedge to an approach of compete, counter and contain. The Trump administration publicly identified China's revisionist power and a strategic competitor in its national security strategy, as Katrina alluded to in her opening remarks. I think it's important to understand the Trump administration policy as two different policies though and the one hand you have President Trump, his America first platform. He's not interested in multilateral arrangements or US leadership on the global stage as contrary to mention the leaves of allies and partners are more constraints on US power as opposed to enablers of US strength pursues a unilateral policy toward China focused on trade overwhelmingly and North Korea. The administration though at a broader level is much more internationalist and multilateral than I think many people give them credit for. And I think I would point to five priorities, again from the broader administration. First, promotion of a free and open Indo Pacific strengthening ties among the quad countries Japan, India, the US and Australia, and also trying to bring Europe into Asia just as an economic actor but also to try to engage Europe as a strategic player. Second limiting Chinese influence with the United's within the United States so sort of pushing for the closure of those Confucius institutes, you know launching FBI and US Department investigations on IP theft and the 1000 talents program. This is a suite of policies that are related to technology. This is a serious area of concern in the US so developing an entity's list, export controls, the idea of a clean supply chain, a willingness to move toward decoupling of the two economies, all to try to protect core US technologies and also to prevent the United States from somehow inadvertently contributing to China's civil military fusion effort. And then forth pushing back on the Belt and Road Initiative I'm happy to talk about that more people are interested fifth, I would say calling out Chinese human rights practices in Xinjiang and Hong Kong sanctioning those responsible and elevating Taiwan within the context of US policy in Asia. Now pushing back against Chinese influence in the United Nations so even though the US isn't interested in leading in the UN at all. We are interested in preventing China from leading in the UN so pushing back against Chinese officials from assuming leadership positions in more UN agencies. I'm going to just characterize the Trump administration policy toward China as a whole, I would say that it is overwhelmingly reactive and defensive, as opposed to proactive or offering an affirmative policy of US leadership. There's also no clear strategic objective it is, again about preventing China from gaining ground as opposed to looking out and trying to figure out where does the United States want to be three or five or 10 years. What do we want that US China relationship to look like. So finally, as we enter the next four years what are sort of the significant debates underway in the United States. I'll just finish up with these quickly. I think first, there's a debate around to what extent China wants to supplant the United States think most people in the foreign policy community agreed that China wants the United States out of East Asia. There's a secondary debate where there's less consensus around whether China wants to replace the United States is the sole superpower. A second is how high a fence and large a yard. Do we want to construct to protect US technology. Right now the administration finds a national security threat associated with virtually every technology Chinese technology, but there is significant pressure from the US business community to use a scalpel, not a sledgehammer and to, you know, help preserve some access to the Chinese market. A third what does it take to compete effectively with China. The current administration is about a robust foreign policy building up the military, working with allies and partners in the Asia Pacific to push back against China. I think in a democratic administration there would be an equal focus on, you know, strengthening America at home so returning to ideas about what makes America great in terms of immigration and education and innovation. And how do we best engage our allies and partners, I think, you know, we've seen over the past four years, this administration that relies more. A little more of coercion some bullying, a hard edged persuasion, whereas I think it's clear that a Biden administration is more prone to think in terms of engagement and consultation. And then finally, I think a big and outstanding question is, you know, should we attempt to find areas of common purpose and common ground with China. Some people believe that we have no need for such a thing that China poses an existential threat. Many other people, however, believe that there are areas such as climate change, the pandemic proliferation where it's critical that the United States work with China, and then indeed finding these areas of common ground are incredibly important for arresting the free fall in the country. So I'll just conclude by saying I think the biggest debate of all is really whether the divisions that the United States and China are facing across values and security and economics will harden into some semblance of a cold war, or whether we should be working hard to arrest this process. Thanks very much. Thanks Elizabeth well plenty to unpack there which we will try and get to later on in the session but for now let's go to Michelle on Middle Eastern matters. And again before we get to what four more years of President Trump might look like or a new Joe Biden administration what that might mean for relations in the Middle East. Could you begin by painting picture for us of the current state of play. As we said earlier we saw President Trump withdraw the US from the Iranian nuclear deal, moving of the embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, continuing instability in Syria and elsewhere so how has President Trump's approach in the region differed to what we saw before that with the Obama administration. Thank you Katrina and thank you to the IEA for inviting me to be part of this panel. You know what's interesting Katrina is, I think that in some ways, you know, President Trump has pursued goals that you know in some ways have been declared US goals for a long time, right preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, defeating wars such as the Islamic State, helping regional allies defend themselves supporting the security of Israel, fostering peace between Israel and Arab neighbors. But, you know, Trump has taken these things to an extreme. And he has pursued them in ways that I think that that shocked Americans as well as the international community. I mean in a very unilateralist style, very transactional, you know, willing to apply a great deal of pressure without really any regard to whether it's bringing results. I mean for example, against Iran or consequences on on people and appearing blind and deaf to the concerns of a lot of long term allies in the region as well as sort of ordinary people in the region. And also, cruder than you know Trump has been cruder than his predecessors in taking steps in the Middle East to serve domestic US political constituencies and here I'm thinking, particularly to evangelical Christians or very large voting block in the United States. You know, steps that Trump took related to Israel to to please them. Trump was also has been cruder in favoring authoritarian leaders over citizens. I mean, let's be let's be frank about this. I mean foreign policy tends to be a government to government elite to elite thing and it often tends to favor the rich and powerful over ordinary citizens but again, Trump took this to an extreme. And I just want to speak about, you know, a couple of things that aren't often talked about when people look at the Middle East they're often looking at it as though it's a diplomatic chessboard with you know, MBS and MBZ and you know all these leaders on it which you know it is but there are so many people there, and a number of the things that President Trump did really had a profound effect on people in the Middle East. So for example, the so called Muslim ban, this restricting access to the United States for people from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen, which President Trump did, you know, really blocked access to the United States for hundreds of thousands of people every year just to give you a sense of that in 2016. More than 800,000 people from those five countries received non immigrant or immigrant visas to come to the United States by 2019 only 23,000 people did you see you know what an enormous difference that is, then there's refugee policy, which you know at a time when the Middle East has several wars going on and obviously large flows of refugees have come from the Middle East toward Europe. Trump really cut access to the United States by for refugees I mean in 2016, the United States accepted 110,000 refugees last year the Obama presidency, Trump cut that steadily 45,000 refugees in 2018 18,000 in 2019 and a total of 15,000 for 2020 and by the way we've accepted far less than that because of the pandemic. So, you know, and also Trump tilted the refugees that would be accepted toward Christians and away from Muslims historically, you know over the past 20 years, the, the, the percentage of refugees that the United States has accepted that have been Muslim have been about 40, about 40% average over all those years. Trump cut that to less than half and he explicitly discriminated in favor of Christian refugees. So then there's lots of other things there's the effect of the maximum pressure campaign against Iran Iranian sanctions on the Iranian people, as well as Trump overruling US congressional efforts to cut off weapons sales to Saudi Arabia for the war in Yemen, which is, you know the war in Yemen has had horrific consequences, and by the way that's not completely Trump's fault I mean the United States started started reporting that war under President Obama, but at any rate, as, as that war has gotten worse and worse, the US Congress did want to cut off weapons to to Saudi Arabia and Trump blocked that. And then there's the whole issue of Israel and the Palestinians and the way President Trump really tilted US policy, let's face it US policy on the issue has always favored the interest of Israel. You know that Trump took it to an extreme, you really, you know, and took it to a way that has had real human rights consequences for Palestinians. So, you know, it's really, it's really interesting Katrina by the way, if you look at in the Middle East, you know we've been hearing that a lot of the leaders of the Middle East would really like to see President Trump reelected. Not every single one of them but but many of them would much prefer they've developed close relations with Trump and they would like to see him reelected, not so much the citizens. A group called the error barometer did some really interesting polling before the US elections in a group of Arab countries, and these are among ordinary citizens they showed very low approval ratings of Trump and a huge preference for Biden to be elected. So we've got this, you know, sit leader citizen gap in the Middle East. And, you know, it Trump as I said just tilted us policy so much further towards the leaders toward the powerful and towards authoritarian leaders. Katrina I think you're muted. Thank you. And thank you for that Michelle and just to bring everyone a little bit of a news flash while we've been talking there they've released another Toronto votes in Pennsylvania and Joe Biden has now moved ahead of Donald Trump. I'm still counting but the margin there is now 5000. So on it goes closest ever. And Angela let's move on and talk about Russia. I mean that must be one of the frequently mentioned foreign nations in this election campaign as it was in 2016. Can you set the scene for us in terms of how us Russia relations have evolved in recent years. I know you contend that relations are currently at their worst point since the mid 1980s so you might talk us through maybe why that is, especially considering that Trump argues that he really wanted to mend us Russia relations. Thank you and I'm delighted to be part of this cost. We're on the cliffhanger day but you know we'll we'll wait. Um, so the kind of bad state of relations began in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, and it launched a war in Ukraine and I think we have to remember that this is a war in which 14,000 people have already died, and it's not over their casualties practically every day. So at that point of course you had President Obama in office, dealing with President Trump and of course you had an agreement to throw Russia out of the G8 and then sanctions on Russia, because of what was happening in Ukraine and because the Russians refused to acknowledge anything that they were doing. So that was that's when it sort of began to deteriorate quite markedly and then of course we got 2016. So without rehearsing everything that happened there, we do know that the Russians intervene quite heavily in the 2016 election campaign. And we had to get Donald Trump elected, because Donald Trump said he wanted to deal with Russia. He didn't see why we had to have bad relations with Russia. He sort of intimated that Ukraine was really part of Russia, people in his family and and people in his businesses met with different Russians. And then of course you had the hacking and leaking of emails from the Democratic National Committee, and other things, which, you know, we're supposed to again tilt people in favor of Donald Trump. And we know that when his, he was elected four years ago they opened the champagne bottles in Moscow. So they were very hopeful. And then of course President Trump came up against the unpleasant reality that because of the knowledge of what Russia had done in the 2016 election, and because the intelligence agencies all agreed and they documented in a report that was then partly declassified so that everyone could read it, exactly what the Russians had done both in terms of manipulating social media and actual cyber interference. And so President Trump was unable to implement the kind of policies he wanted, because the knowledge of what Russia did in 2016 has made Russia a very toxic subject. It hasn't been such a toxic domestic subject in the United States since I think the era of Senator Joseph McCarthy. It's very hard to have often a reason to debate about Russia because of this. And many people in the Democratic Party believe that President Trump was not legitimately elected four years ago, because the Russians put him in power. I don't agree with that. I think that's an exaggeration. I would also point out, maybe we can get into that in the Q&A, that this year there has been much less Russian interference. There's been Russian social media interference and I think some penetration of voter records, but it's markedly less than it was four years ago. So then you have to ask, what did the Trump administration accomplish with Russia? And the answer is not very much. I'm going to go back to repeat what Elizabeth said. There is no Russia policy in the Trump administration. It's completely bifurcated. You have Donald Trump, who has his own views, who wanted to make a deal with Russia and have everything work out, and then you have the rest of the executive branch and the US Congress, who have been very tough on Russia. And almost from the beginning, the US Congress took away the ability of the president to impose or remove sanctions by executive order because they didn't trust President Trump. He would have liked to have gotten rid of all of the sanctions that were there after Ukraine. And so now it's all enshrined in congressional legislation, mounds and mounds of sanctions, and they're very hard to remove. So the policy is actually consisted of withdrawing from the agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces, and then not doing anything really to extend the new start agreement. This is the agreement that controls strategic nuclear weapons. We in the Russians between us possess 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. This is a very important agreement. The Trump administration argued, again, to come back to China, that they wouldn't make any deal with Russia. They wouldn't sign an extension of this agreement, unless Chinese nuclear weapons were included. The Chinese said no, thank you very much. So this is an agreement that expires on February the 5th. There has been some last minute attempts by the Trump administration to come to an agreement with the Russians to extend it. But the Russians have rejected that. So we're now it's a cliffhanger. If Biden wins the administration would have two weeks to extend this agreement. So there was some movement there. Then the other aspect of the policy, as I said, has been rafts of sanctions on Russia on Russian energy projects. And they, they continue there. And apart from that, most of the traditional channels of interaction really have been broken off. There were a couple of times when they met and talked about strategic stability. Trump and Putin had a couple of summits the most infamous one being in 2018 when President Trump seemed to indicate that he believed Putin's denials of election interference over the conclusions of his own intelligence agency. So from the Russian point of view, Trump has been a disappointment. He wasn't able to deliver the relationship again is worse and it's been really anytime since before 1985. Because, in fact, what's happened is Russian diplomats have been expelled, and there have been these these other economic sanctions on Russia. Now, very quickly, what might it look like going forward. If Trump were to be realized to be declared the winner. Then of course, I think what you'd see is the continued decline of professional diplomacy, which has happened under the Trump administration. I mean the State Department has really been neutered in many ways and and unable to carry out the normal functions of diplomacy that would continue, and therefore you maybe wouldn't have a by far patient between Trump's own policies, and and that of the rest of the executive branch, let's assume the same would be true for the Pentagon, let's for instance. And so he might be able to do more, but it's unclear exactly how much he could do, as long as Congress, you know holds the key to lifting or increasing the sanctions that you know there's a limit to what he can do. If you had a Biden administration and we can go into more detail on this. I think it would be different you would have the restoration of traditional diplomacy. You have professional diplomacy, you'd have the restoration of different channels of communication between different government agencies and their counterparts in Russia. You would definitely have an extension of the new start treaty, and then discussions about further arms control. And then you could have a host of other areas where the US right could work with Russia on climate because obviously you'd have a different policy under Biden administration on global health. Again, if the US were willing to rejoin the World Health Organization, and we could certainly work with Russia we Russia has the fourth largest number of covert cases so we're both very, very high up there. On the other hand, you probably would have an emphasis in a Biden administration on the pursuit of human rights, the support of human rights and democracy programs in Russia, which is something that of course has been absent in the Trump administration. And of course the Russians wouldn't like that and I think there would be a review of some of the sanctions but we don't know whether they would continue them or somehow modify them. So the relationship I think with Russia would be different. Having said that US Russian relations don't change that much between administrations, just because the issues that one has to deal with, don't go away. They're very similar issues over the past 30 years. The aberration really has been in the Trump administration, where you've had a president who really wanted to change the rules. I would end by saying, again, referring to something that Elizabeth was talking about too. I think Trump and Putin in many ways share a similar worldview, and that is that allies constraint that absolute sovereignty is really very important, and that smaller countries have less, less sovereignty than big ones. And so I'll end there. Great, thanks for that Angela. And Elizabeth Angela has kind of looked forward there to what Kings might look like in the future and I know at least one US network is now referring to Joe Biden as the president elect. So you might tell us what you think US-China relations might look like under Biden administration. Let's take a moment to be emotional. Okay, so I guess, you know, what would be this truly substantive difference. I think there would be a toning down of the anti-China rhetoric. I think there would be an effort to have a strategic objective to have an end point in mind for what the US would like the relationship with China to look like, so it wouldn't just be a constant pushing back across the board, you know, with many, you know, perspectives. I think there would be clearly as, you know, Angela suggested a runun emphasis on diplomacy and professionalism in terms of our relations with allies. We're not going to be launching, you know, a tariff war in Europe at the same time as we're trying to do something in China. Either be a step back and I think a look at what the tariff war with China has accomplished or hasn't accomplished and I think by all of the sort of analyses that have been done have indicated that the US has suffered as a result and has gained nothing. So I think after a careful and close look at all of those tariffs there would probably be a pulling back in many cases because it clearly has not achieved the result that the Trump administration, you know, promised that it would. And again, I think there would be an effort to find areas of common ground and common purpose so I think on climate change on pandemic. You know, perhaps working on global public health in third countries, there would be that sense that the Obama administration had that it's important to find areas of engagement with China. And I said that I don't think there would be the same Obama era policy where we would be willing to trade off. So in a sense, maybe pull back on the South China Sea in order to gain something on on climate change. I think there's been a learning curve in terms of the fact that China will simply take advantage of that, you know, Xi Jinping stood in the Rose Garden and promised that he was not going to militarize these seven artificial plants that he had created, and then he went and did it. So that lack of trust I think in the US China relationship will continue. I don't see that being bridged anytime soon on the part of the United States. But I think, again, there will be an effort to to arrest this freefall. I think so let me just conclude by saying I don't think that the overall orientation of the United States toward China the overall understanding of the challenges that China presents to the United States. I don't see a significant shift in in that element of US China policy. Okay, thanks Elizabeth Michelle you might outline for us what do you think things might look like under, as I say it's now being referred to as president elect Joe Biden. Well one thing I want to point out Katrina is that we're not going to know for a while what the balance in the US Senate is. So, assuming we have a President Biden, it's not clear whether he will have congressional majorities to work with and that that is going to affect some of the policies on the Middle East right and we have I believe we have four Senate seats that have still not been decided. It doesn't look likely to go to runoffs into January. I would say the Democrats have a shot at three out of four of those seats but they need to capture at least two of them, and then have the Vice President Kamala Harris to have a voting majority right so we're not going to we're not going to know exactly the policy making climate that Biden would have for a while. Now there are a number of things that he can do just by that Trump did by executive order and that Biden has already promised by executive order. Some of those are things I mentioned for example this Muslim ban on, you know, access to the United States for people from those five countries, Biden has promised he will cancel that on day one. He's also promised that he would increase the number of refugees accepted in the United States 225,000 in his first year which would be even more than President Obama accepted. So some of those things he can and will do right away on some of the other issues on Iran of course this is would be one of the big changes would be, you know, a Biden administration will want to get back into an agreement related to Iran's nuclear program. But again, depending on how the Senate comes out, you know, the Senate, the Congress can constrain his ability a bit to lift sanctions and things like that, although I would say that an administration always has a good deal of discretion on how to how strictly to apply sanctions and so forth so certainly Biden there will be a disposition to get back into some kind of an agreement certainly to work more closely with Europe on this issue, and to consider some sanctions relief on Israel as well I don't I don't think that Israel is going to be a major priority for the Biden administration at this point but but certainly the Biden administration would want to reverse some of Trump's policies in other words like reopen sort of ties with the Palestinians, maybe a Palestinian or PLO mission of some kind in the United States. He may push some face some pushback on things like that from the Senate if it's if the Republicans have majority there on arms sales, but then let me mention there are a couple of things that I think the Republicans would probably agree with Biden on this could be restricting arms sales and, and particularly those that that might fuel the conflict in Libya. I'm sorry, in Yemen and maybe Libya we could talk about that separately. And this issue of human rights that some of the other panelists have mentioned I actually do think that, for the most part, Senate Republicans have wanted to do more on standing up for human rights in the Middle East and that they would support Biden in that. So, you know, there are, you know, Biden has promised a couple of other things he's promised a reassessment of the US relationship with Saudi Arabia. We don't know exactly what that means or where it will go there's some very, very big questions there. And then there's the overall issue of how the United States kind of reduces its involvement in the Middle East, you know, militarily at least. That's going to be a very hard question. And I think that, you know, it would be if the Republicans hold the Senate it would be really important for a Biden administration to to work out something with with Senate Republicans on how to do that. And also, you know, to work with our allies in Europe or in around the world I think you know a Biden administration is not doesn't want to rock the boat in the Middle East doesn't want to destabilize doesn't want to create vacuums they've seen the problems that can come from creating power vacuums. They had they're going to have a lot of hard, hard questions to face and let me just say Katrina Middle East is a place that's in turmoil, it's going to be in turmoil. The whole political economic basis of the Middle East oil, as we know is changing as world energy markets and that is going to bring, I believe, more popular uprisings more changes in governments. And I think that's going to present the next US administration with with a lot of challenges as to, you know, as the United States wants to withdraw from this area of the world and devote more time for example to Asia. How do they do that while the Middle East itself is sort of coming apart at the seams. Okay, and just to bring you another news update that network that had decided to call President Biden president or sorry Vice President Biden president elect. It's nice that the Pennsylvania although Biden is in the lead it's too close to call. So we're still at that anyone can win stage of this count so just to keep the drama going for a bit longer this afternoon. Now you've all agreed there though that if Joe Biden is the next president that he will recommit the US to the international order to kind of reestablishing its place in the world. And I'm just wondering Angela, what do you think that might mean for a Russia China cooperation, will they seek to sort of counterbalance a resurgence United States. Russia and China clearly have been growing closer and closer in the last few years, particularly since 2014 just as relations with the West deteriorated the Chinese stepped in. They signed a major gas deal with the Russians and they really back the Russians at a time when the US and the Europeans were seeking to isolate Russia. So this has been going on for some time. And what we've seen as a result of the sanctions for instance all the dual policies of a trade war with China and more and more sanctions on Russia is that the Russians and Chinese for instance in. Now they do more than 50% of their trade in the non dollar in other words the de dollarization of their economic relationship. And so there's there's a backstory there that obviously they are both looking to maybe create an international financial system, which is not dominated by the US we're not there yet. We're far from it but you know then they're both committed to what they call a post Western global order. I think that means different things for Russia and for China, China understands it's the rising power. It doesn't really believe I mean the Russians believe that you should have a tripolar daughter if you like running the world, the US China, Russia that each other's fears of influence, and they don't interfere with each other. I think the Chinese don't believe there's going to be such a world they believe there's going to be, you know, a bipolar world if you like China in the US, but they don't nobody talks about that publicly. So for the moment you have an increasing strategic relationship, a couple of weeks ago, Putin was asked about whether Russia might have a military alliance with China. And he said, at the moment, no but you know he could, he could see that happening in the future. And so I, and Russia has been trying to position itself in the, in the covert era as a leader in global health, a leader in the world health and of course announced its vaccine before the Chinese did, Russian China both now have a vaccine that their own populations are taking. So I think they would be rather wary of the specter of a Biden administration of the US coming back and seeking to reprise the role that the US really was playing before Trump was elected, although will be difficult to do that soon so I think from their point of view, they were quite, you know, happy to see a United States become more isolationist and less involved in world affairs. So I think, you know, the US as was already mentioned has defined Russia and China as the two major major strategic competitors of the United States. And I think, I think you would see Russia and China yes continue to work close more closely together and seeking to ensure maybe that the US doesn't achieve, you know the status that it had before, although it's not going to be easy for them to do that. Okay, Elizabeth, do you want to row in on that one. Sorry, sure. Now I agree with what Angela said I just I was smiling because, you know, often when I'm in China they talk about the Russians it's it's become like, you know, the Russians are kind of the the second the little brother or something they're the second tier player, and that is the way that China looks at Russia so formally, you're never you'll never hear Xi Jinping say that in fact, on a couple of occasions he has said that Putin is his best friend literally his best friend in the international community so sometimes early on in the Trump administration I wanted to go and let Donald Trump know that because you know he used to say that Xi Jinping was his best friend I was like nah, actually she thinks Putin's his best friend so you know in that kind of world of autocratic leaders, but, but I do think it's, I think it's the relationship is likely to undergo some stress, and I think, as China increasingly challenges Russia in some areas where Russia has been more dominant. For example, as an arms leader and innovation in arms and exporter of arms and China itself begins to be more innovative in that sector and becomes a larger exporter of arms I think that's problematic there was that I'm sure Angela knows that little incident I believe that the Chinese were stealing some of their military technology. That's, I think, a potential problem. You know, I don't know for sure and I'd be interested in Michelle's take on this whether or not China's rise in the Middle East might pose some issues for Russia because China's been content, always to be an economic player right it gets all the spoils and the stakes of being the military. Engager, but I'm not sure that China's going to be content and they've, they've made a few forays into trying to negotiate Middle East peace here there and not with any real success but, but I just see them stepping up in ways that that might threaten some of Russia's role roles, then finally maybe in the Arctic. And that's an area where the two have been working together. But again, I'm not sure that Russia would really welcome China. From my perspective is trying to change the notion of Arctic governance to make it about the global common so it's no longer governed just by the countries that you know border the Arctic, even though China's 900 miles away so that's really an Arctic but it likes to call itself a, you know, near polar power. So I think it's trying to change the definition of the Arctic in ways that and the issues of the Arctic that would allow it to play a larger role and a role equal to that of Russia the United States and the others on the Arctic governance the governance board. I'm not sure whether Russia would welcome that. You know, I think it wants to maintain some element of leadership in some of these institutions where it's not being elbowed aside by China. I mean I would defer to Angela on that but as I'm watching China I just, I feel like Russia should be wary of this sort of creeping Chinese influence presence and ambition. Can I say something about that. Yeah. Yeah. So I mean I think those are all very important points so I mean Putin has made the decision clearly in the last few years that he would rather be if he's going to be a junior partner to either the US or China. He's accepted that Russia is now the junior partner to China, again, although, as you say, both of them say old Bajigian Ping says put his best friend. I have a picture in my book of the two of them making believe me Russian pancakes together, whose teaching, she had to make pancakes and then she was apparently given some special Russian ice cream, and one of his recent birthdays and things like that. So there's this eloquent, you know, over the top, praise of each other that you see publicly but the reality is different. So I think in the Arctic, it's a very important area. Russia really thinks that, you know, it wants to dominate and control the Arctic. And it's got this new Arctic strategy we'll see whether it's ever implemented, but we're both economically, militarily geopolitically, it wants to be the number one country there. The Chinese have come in and they have this polar Silk Road, now which they're discussing or implementing with the Russians, and they are working on some energy project. But actually the Chinese don't have the technology that the Russians need the US has that. And because of the sanctions, Exxon have to pull out of this project there. But I do think that in the longer run and this is true in a number of different areas, China will challenge Russia. And it'll be very difficult for Russia to push back on this challenge. Another area is clearly Central Asia. The whole Belt and Road project, there's nothing in it for Russia despite what you read and what the Chinese say. So I think in the longer run, China is a much greater challenge for Russia. But in the short run, and I think the Russian leadership isn't thinking about the longer run, China is at the moment a much more congenial partner than the United States. Okay, thanks Angela. Michelle, Elizabeth mentioned there about China weighing into Middle East and that US Middle Eastern involvement. Would you want to make some remarks on that? Yes, just on this issue of Russia and China in the Middle East, you know, up till now we see them playing different roles. I mean Russia obviously has become very involved militarily in Syria and now in Libya. It has cultivated a bit of a military relationship with Egypt and tried to do more there. China though of course is getting more and more involved economically. And I just want to point out that both of these have caused problems or tensions between the United States and some of its allies. One of the things that either a Biden or a Trump administration will face is this issue of whether to impose sanctions. These cats countering America's adversaries through sanctions act. These cats are sanctions against countries that buy Russian weapons. So the two that are really important here are Turkey and Egypt. Turkey having bought the Russian air defense system in Egypt, having bought some Russian fighter aircraft. And these, of course, you know, Turkey and NATO ally, Egypt, a long time military ally of the United States. Turkey's actually taken delivery of that equipment and sanctions are, I think expected to be imposed. Egypt hasn't taken delivery of the aircraft yet, but they're ready to go. And, you know, that could so that's going to be, you know, that's something where I think the United States is trying to push back on on on Russia. And then the other the other issue is China economically. And I would say, you know, we've seen the Trump administration has started to try to push back on China in terms of technology in terms of 5G going around to US allies in in the Middle East and trying to persuade them either to to not not work with Huawei, for example, on 5G. And one of the big issues there though I think is Israel, because Israel has extensive you know, economic technological cooperation with China and I think Israel is going to resist, you know, US efforts. The US will be persistent in trying to limit economic ties and technology transfer and surf with between between Israel and China. But that's a major part of sort of Israel's economic plan and I think they're going to, they're going to resist. And just to remind everyone if you do have any questions for our panelists use the Q&A function on Zoom there with a number of questions in already which we'll get to in just a moment but you can use that function and remember do include your name and your affiliation because we can't see you even though you can see us. And this is obviously hosted by the Institute for International and European Affairs so we might try and bring a European dimension into some of what we're doing here at the moment and Michelle you were just talking there about Russia and China in the Middle East but do you see the US leaning on Europe in the future to take more responsibility in the Middle East. Well, so some things I think will change if there is a Biden administration, and some things will not. What I think will probably not change is, you know, the continued US effort to, you know, persuade European allies to spend, you know, 2% on defense and so forth I think that's probably going to go on. Certainly, you know, a Biden administration will, you know, take a much more cooperative and approach and, you know, with Europe in the Middle East. I, as I said I do, I think there was going to be. There will be some tension, perhaps over Israel Palestine issues, although the Biden administration will be a little bit, you know, will take a somewhat softer and more sympathetic approach to Palestinians than the very rough approach that Donald Trump took. It's still probably not going to be as as critical of Israel and settlements and so forth as as European allies would like. So there'll be some, you know, there'll be some discussion on that. And there will be a lot more cooperation, you know, on Iran but one issue that I want to point out that it could be we'll see where the Biden administration will go on this. You know that some of the top arms purchasers in the world are in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia the UAE, Egypt, you know, have been among the among the top four arms purchasers in the world, and who's competing for those arms sales. We are United States and our European allies. I guess Russia and China sell them some arms but it's mostly us. Right, and we are competing with each other, and frankly, we are fueling wars in the Middle East by competing with each other for these arms sales. So the question will be, you know, will the Biden administration, if there is one to take a different approach that I think, you know, with this, I haven't even mentioned this recent normalization between the United Arab Emirates. And Israel, which is a very important development. And but the cost of that was that the Trump administration promised these fighter aircraft, these F 35 very advanced fighter aircraft to the UAE as part of that deal and we'll see whether that will go forward that's a kind of a long process in the United States to carry out an arms sale like that. But if it does go forward, this is going to kick off a new arms race in the Middle East. Israel's already put in its shopping lists to maintain its qualitative military edge. And then others who wanted those aircraft like Egypt like Turkey, they're going to be upset that the UAE got them so as I said new arms race. I do think a Biden versus a Trump administration will take different approaches to that. I think from a Trump point of view and arms race is fantastic. Just more sales and you know, so forth and really no, no thought to the humanitarian consequences of that. I've already seen from, from Democrats and from Biden that they're a little troubled by this, you know, by, by, by fueling this arms race in the Middle East and so we might see, you know, an attempt to to reel that in a bit and an attempt for the United States to have a conversation with some of its European allies, particularly France, Germany, Italy, UK, who are selling a lot of arms to the Middle East, you know, could we can we all work together to rationalize this somehow. So we're talking about the EU US relationship in relation to the Middle East, but what about China and I'm thinking, you know, how does a partnership like that balance the economic ties and that element of the relationship with China with calling out the human rights abuses, particularly on thinking of the Uyghur population. I would say over the past three and a half years. You know, again, I, I spoke at the outset about how the Trump administration reassessed China policy in a fairly dramatic way. I think that there's also been a rethink in Europe that has evolved over the past few years. And it's a rethink that has brought it not to the point of the United States but frankly much closer to the point of the United States and part of that I think the United States did play the role of, you know, a wake up call in some respects I think alerting Europe for example to the potential downsides of, you know, Huawei and your critical telecommunications infrastructure, and we've seen you know one country after the other in Europe move to restrict Huawei, or to ban it outright or try to do it in some kind of regulatory framework that doesn't make it sound like they're banning it but they really are. You know how to balance these things I think, you know, Europe and the United States have come together already on issues like Xinjiang on Hong Kong they stepped up they put forward resolutions in the United Nations. And the United States has levied sanctions on officials that are responsible what we deemed to be responsible for the detention and and labor and reeducation camps in Xinjiang. I think there are discussions in Europe about whether there are more measures that some could take along those lines should they be enacting some kinds of sanctions in this regard. And I think there are parliamentary alliance that's developed that includes legislators in the United States in Europe, and some in Asia, all of whom are committed to a much stronger tougher policy on China it's been fascinating to watch it evolve. And on the security front, I think, if you look at the super national organizations that the EU Commission and the NATO, they are both very assertive when it comes to China, very much more, you know, very much closer to a US position than some of the independent countries within the EU. So I think there are a lot of pressures, frankly, that are acting upon European nations to move them in a direction that will be tougher that will force tougher choices when it comes to that trade off between trade and human rights and I think, you know, one of the big and last holdouts Angela Merkel, right just recently indicated like okay, actually, I'm beginning to see, or she's getting a lot of pressure to see that China is not a benign actor. It's not a way that China conducts itself in Hong Kong or it's, you know, mass diplomacy it's Wolf Warrior mass diplomacy it's coercive actions in Australia, all of these things, combined to present a picture of a China that is much more challenging than I think some European nations, understood, or that they wanted to recognize right and you want to think I can just keep doing business. And at the same time, you know, sort of push off these other kinds of issues so I think there's a shift underway in Europe in the understanding of China, that's going to lead them to a tougher approach, having said that. Sorry, let me also say, I think some of Xi Jinping's policies, for example the dual circulation theory which really is about maintaining a much more closed circle of innovation and manufacturing and consumption so much more insular economic policy, I think that will add to the impetus, you know, frankly to move in a tougher direction, but look, they're going to continue to push forward with, you know, trying to strike, you know, investment treaty, you move forward and retrade it area so I think that's all going to continue. But I do think there's a greater realization in Europe of the whole package that China presents, and many of the longer term issues that need to be thought about now, before you know it's too late. Hey, thanks Elizabeth. And Angela, you've written that one of the most pressing challenges for the next US administration is going to be Russia's conflict in Ukraine. How do you see that playing out. So I think we can bring Europe into this so I mean one thing that you can say is in the Obama administration there was close coordination with Europe over the sanctions on Ukraine and over Western policy toward Ukraine. And it was particularly Chancellor Merkel and President Obama who worked together. We know that in the Trump administration Angela Merkel has been almost demonized. There's been a lot of anti German feeling and policy expressed by the President himself and some of the people around him. And so the kind of cooperation on working together on Russia and Russian related issues really disappeared. Now as far as Ukraine's concern, clearly, it's France and Germany and then Russia and Ukraine within the Normandy format that have been working together to try and implement the 2015 Minsk agreements that are supposed to end this conflict. At the beginning of the Trump administration, we had a special envoy for Ukraine, and then all of that got caught up in the impeachment hearings. It's hard to believe that you know a year ago we were gearing up for impeachment hearings, which of course happened in January. And since then, because of everything connected with the impeachment and the relationship with President Zelensky. The US, you know, we don't have a special envoy anymore we obviously have people who are still working on it in the State Department but we don't have that level of a person. I think in a Biden administration, they will reappoint someone who will take charge of this. We need to work more closely with the Europeans. And so far they haven't wanted us in this Normandy format, maybe we won't be at least we need to work more closely with them. But having said that, unfortunately, these Minsk agreements haven't been implemented barely, because the Russians and Ukrainians have a very different understanding of what their implementation means and particularly the sequencing. The Ukrainians think the Russians should withdraw to behind the border. And then they can start negotiating things the Russians say they're not going to withdraw their troops until the Ukrainians allow elections in the, the two republics that have been set up in southeastern Ukraine. There's been some prisoner exchange, but not enough. In the beginning of Zelensky's tenure and office it looked as if something might move, but we're really stuck with frozen. So I think going forward, the question is, do you need something to replace the Minsk agreements. And if so, what would that be and so far nobody's come up with a with a good solution to that. And if not, is there any other way to move forward on this. Because it's you know I say it's a frozen conflict but as I said at the beginning, people are still dying there. So it's quite intractable. And it doesn't, you know, there's very little sign that the Russians want to move ahead. I think the current Ukrainian government really doesn't is a little bit stuck in terms of knowing what what to do going forward. Okay, thank you all for those contributions we've got a lot of questions from people who have tuned in so go switch over to a couple of those. The first one comes Michelle from an old colleague of yours and Cairo Peter gunning. He says great panel, which I agree it is a great panel well done to all of you. What is the outlook for the State Department in resources personnel and morale under both scenarios, either Biden or Trump administration. I mean, similar question to that from no faculty who's a former ambassador to the US. And he's saying, if Joe Biden does win. Is it too much to expect that the loss of professional expertise in recent years can be easily or quickly restored and you will have touched on that your initial contributions about that sort of shrinking of the State Department so Michelle as this can primarily come from a former colleague of yours you might kick off that. Yes, look, so let me just say, you know, should President Trump have a second term. First of all, we don't know if if Secretary Pompeo would continue as Secretary of State it would be typical. And we've heard rumblings already that if if Trump continue me, he would do a pretty big cabinet change. So, you know, there, there can be a little bit or better or a little bit worse situation inside the State Department under Trump depending on who is Secretary of State but but I think you know if Trump can word to continue you know we continue to see diplomacy very much troubled and in fact Trump took a recent step regarding civil servants that sort of politicizing, you know, making making civil servants within within the State Department more subject to kind of political pressure and so forth I don't want to go into details but it's a dark situation for the State Department, if Trump has a second term. If Biden, you know is becomes President, then there certainly will be an energetic, I think, attempt to rebuild the State Department I think there there's already been some looking into whether for example people at sort of middle and senior ranks who left under Trump could be, you know, allowed to come back somehow. So this will be a big project. But but you know I think it will happen and certainly there would be a turnaround in morale. I don't know who would be Secretary of State under Biden. There's a short list of names. And again, to go back to the Senate it does depend a little bit, I think, as to whether the Democrats have their majority in the Senate or they don't the Republicans hold the majority, which of those candidates on Biden's short list would be most viable, but any of them I think would, you know, would undertake kind of the revival of diplomacy and the, you know, rebuilding of the State Department. I think one of the names on that short list is the Irish woman Samantha power the former US ambassador to the UN. So there would be a particular interest probably in this country in her in her being appointed appointed if in fact Joe Biden is the president after all the votes are cast. And Elizabeth there's some questions in here relating to China from Tim Hagan who says he's watching on YouTube. Now he's asking, What do you think about Chinese popular influence abroad, or is it only a partnership of convenience and does any amount to copy Chinese world perspectives. What do you think of the spread of illiberal democracies Chinese influence in our ally allies like Turkey, and is a new TPP possible. So lots to unpack there. Wait, okay, not sure where that last part just came in from the left. Let me start with the last one and then just take the first one I think is a new TPP possible I think there are definitely people within a potential Biden administration who would be interested in reviving TPP I can say among you know the Asia, you know group of people there certainly be a lot of interest, because there's a belief that you know our strongest asset is working with our allies and having being part of a high end trade agreement is important it's important for us leadership. It will be, frankly, a wash likely in terms of, you know what it will bring to the US economy some some loss of jobs will be gained. But as an assertion of you know the US in the region it's incredibly important. And it's also something that would re engage a notion of, you know, having China look outside itself and want to be part of something larger, and then as a mechanism of again promoting some domestic reform in China in the way that the WTO did so there's, there would still be that element of it so I think there's a big group that would be for it. But of course there will be, I think, still a fair amount of opposition within parts of the Democratic Party that would be very concerned around labor issues and loss of jobs and so I think there'd be some negotiations that would have to be take place and frankly we'd have to, we'd have to figure out our way back in, because the agreement is done, and it's, it's operable now and so how we manage to renegotiate is will be a pretty significant issue. And as to the issue of China's export of its model and concerns around the spread of illiberal, you know, sort of authoritarian countries, you know is China exporting elements of its model. This is another big debate I didn't mention this one this is another big debate in the United States and I fall down on the side that yes indeed it is exporting elements of authoritarianism, and it's, you know doing it in part through the Belt and Road, you know, offering cyber, you know, training seminars to Belt and Road countries on how to manage the internet how to control the media and civil society. It is, you know, pushing for changes in norms within the United States around human rights around internet governance. I very much see China as advancing or buttressing, you know, its own, its own model abroad, right and trying to ensure that norms and values as they're expressed in the international system, align more closely with those of China. I would also say this is simply a defensive mechanism, right that China is just trying to make the world safe for itself. But in doing that, you are essentially undermining the liberal international order so you know the best, you know, defense is a good offense and that's how I look at China's efforts. So that's all the elements of that I think. Yeah, I think you did there yet. And you mentioned Belt and Road initiative there and there is a question in on that I don't know. Angela if you maybe want to take this one or Elizabeth and Michelle, and this is from James Kitt he's saying, what role do the panelists believe the role of international development particularly in the African content continent will have on the dynamics of international relations between us versus China, etc. I will we see the US using foreign aid to check the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in East Africa. I definitely say something we have done. Actually, we have begun the process of responding in a more than just rhetorical way to the Belt and Road. The Congress has taken a lead on this through the Asia reassurance initiative act and the build act we've constructed an entirely new institution called the Development Finance Corporation that is devoted to providing financing for infrastructure projects in lesser developed countries, and this is, you know, directly targeted at competing with China on the Belt and Road Initiative. We have a joint effort with the Japanese and the Australians to undertake partnerships in infrastructure, and we have what's called the blue dot initiative which is a kind of certificate sort of a certification process right or providing consulting services to countries that might be interested in having potential projects reviewed to see whether they are in fact sustainable sustainable in the context of, you know, social development or environment or certainly in terms of debt sustainability which has been a big issue for the Trump administration so I think we're nowhere really in terms of actually competing I would say these are baby steps they're important. I think what's interesting is that many other countries are also energized around this this is not simply an issue of the US and China. Japan is very engaged. Europe is becoming more engaged because they're concerned about the 17 plus one initiative and Chinese influence within Europe and some of the central and southern European countries in particular with the Belt and Road. So I think that there's an awakening, especially with the digital Silk Road. You know, because that deals with fiber optic cable satellite systems, you know, and and e commerce, and these things that will get embedded, you know, for the rest of the century, in terms of Chinese standards and Chinese influence. I think that there is growing concern and interest in much of, you know, the advanced economies over China's, you know, spreading influence. So, you know, it remains to be seen how much we can actually do. I think one last point on this and that is, sometimes it's important to look at the actual level of investment because people will be surprised to know that the largest investor in Southeast Asia is Europe. The second is Japan, and third is China and US they go back and forth, largest in Africa is the United States. So, China's like fifth. So, sometimes these things get a little bit overblown, but China is doing a lot of infrastructure and that's, and that's what this is really all about. Angela, do you want to weigh in there on sort of international development and emerging economies and Russia's role in that. I think I'll take a pass on that. Okay. Right well we have another question here from Michelle and this is from Valerie Hughes member of the Irish Syria Solidarity Movement. And she says if then if there is a new Biden administration, what lessons have been learned regarding Syria from the Obama days. Well, obviously, you know what what the terrible tragedy that has unfolded in Syria has been, you know, a searing one. And I think it's, it's one that the people from the Obama administration are still a bit arguing with themselves over. As we know during the Obama administration, there was a camp that wanted the United States to somehow do more in Syria, although, although short of a military intervention, wanted to do more to support the Syrian opposition and perhaps to work with Turkey or others to create more zones and so forth. And then there were those who didn't want to do that including President Obama himself and that that camp one out. So, I think there's still a bit of an argument going on about, could this situation in Syria have turned out better? Had had the United States worked more effectively with allies, be it in Europe, Turkey, etc. Or, or was there no help for it, that that it was going to be as bad as it has been. And the United States was wise to keep its hands off it as much as it could. Of course there is US military involvement in Syria because of the campaign against the so cold Islamic State. So, I, you know, I think that one hasn't been quite, quite resolved. I would say, you know, that there isn't, there certainly is not an appetite for the United States to become more involved. Now, you know, there's an ongoing debate about how much involvement the United States should have to ensure that the so called Islamic State doesn't doesn't reemerge in a big way in Syria, you know, and become a global terrorist threat. Again, so, you know, but I think, you know, just the, the app, certainly the appetite for American military interventions military involvement overall in the region is low. There, there may be an appetite for a more effective American military diplomatic role. What I would say is if we look at sort of the three burning conflicts in the Middle East right now Syria Libya and Yemen. And the last one Yemen that I believe the people in the Biden camp, you know, think is most amenable to international diplomacy and American involvement to to resolve that one to wind that one down. Sadly, you know that the, the, the conflict in Libya has just become more and more complicated with more and more international players. In Syria, I think, you know, is is, you know, you know, look, we'll see what will happen politically inside of Syria. You know, there are questions about the fortunes of Bashar al-Assad, I will say this that I think if there's a President Biden there will be a different American approach, you know, should some of these things break in the Middle East and should there be, should there be future possibilities of course for military intervention. Okay, thanks. And I'm not sure if you want to get engaged with that from a Russian perspective and we also have So, I mean, you know, one of the ways you know I said that one of the ways that Russia got out of the isolation that the West was trying to impose on it after 2014 was to move closer to China. And the other of course was to go back to the Middle East in a way that it hadn't been since the Soviet collapse by beginning its bombing campaign in Syria. So obviously the Russians are at the moment committed to see Bashar al-Assad prevail to end the civil war. It's obviously much more difficult than maybe they thought it would be they've now had some more conflicts with Turkey in the area which they had more or less worked out between them. So they're backing him that doesn't mean they're gonna back in forever. But the other thing it's important for Russia that by going into the conflict in Syria, in the way they did in 2014 that was be their entree into the Middle East as a whole. They've become much more influential there. Like in the Soviet times, it's very pragmatic they don't they're not choosing ideological sides obviously they're backing Assad, but otherwise, they're the only major power there that has good relations cordial relations with Iran and other Shia groups with all of the United States and with Israel and obviously Russia's two newest partners in the Middle East are both US allies Saudi Arabia and Israel. One thing I didn't mention at the beginning is that one of the you might say successes of the Trump administration vis-a-vis Russia at least was brokering an agreement between Russia and Saudi Arabia earlier on this year in April after this oil war between them. The OPEC plus agreement now holds for the moment. So I don't see Russia, you know, it's, it's not going to retreat from the Middle East. I, if you look at what's happening in Syria, I think the problem for Russia could come, you know, after the Civil War is over, in terms of its relationship with Iran, do Iran and Russia want the same things in a post conflict Syria. I think that's not clear yet. But certainly the Russians will do anything to push back against a greater involvement by the US in Syria, which I wouldn't necessarily see coming and they, you know, portrayed themselves as the ones who've been so successful in defeating, what they call terrorism there. And the other thing is, of course, at the height of the war there, the second largest foreign group of fighters for the Islamic State did come from Russia where Russian citizens or Central Asians working in Russia. So I see this is one of the major gains of the Putin administration over the past, you know, five, 10 years is the return to the Middle East. And we have another question for you Angela as well. And this one is from Darren Moriarty of the IEA. And he's saying they recently held an event with representatives from Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova marking 10 years of the Eastern partnership. What difference do you think a Biden administration if Joe Biden is the next president might bring to pushing and promoting that Eastern partnership agenda. I think they're much more committed to it obviously in the Trump administration is that, you know, they would a Biden administration would pay more attention to Ukraine. I talked about that before it would also their people who around Biden who were very involved with Georgia earlier on so they certainly want to support Georgia in its, in its attempts to, you know, shore up its independence although it's, it's more complicated now. I think the Biden administration would be more supportive of the kind of activities that the Eastern partnership has pursued and encouraging these neighbors of Russia to remain independent and to pursue, you know, whatever foreign policy path they want, and to strengthen their own institutions of governance and transparency in the rule of law. Thank you. This one is for Elizabeth from Patrick Paul Walsh in UCD. How does conflict over intellectual property square with the flows of Chinese students to American universities and interactions between academics in the top 30 universities in both countries. Yeah, it's a big issue in the United States now is you know how to remain open and remain open to Chinese students and not to assume that you know every Chinese student graduate student working in a US University lab is somehow there at the behest of the Chinese and, you know committed to stealing intellectual property. I think, you know, on the one hand we've made some good strides, doing deeper investigations for example the FBI and unearthing that you know some 200 different ostensible graduate students are actually sent by the People's Liberation Army. And so, you know, making sure that when we do have, you know, Chinese graduate students working in US labs that, you know, they're not coming from the PLA, I think is important. I think, you know, universities will need to make a determination about whether or not, you know, money that's coming from the Defense Department to do sort of, you know, contract work in high security areas, you know, perhaps that's not shouldn't be open to foreign universities writ large. You know, is that something that we ought to be considering or should universities be just open places of research, you know, should they be taking Defense Department contracts to begin with, and should we, you know, just think in terms of that broader, you know, universe of scientific research and you know we're all part of a, of a global effort, you know, to find a scientific truth, which has I think the way that many scientists approach it not just in the United States but everywhere. So I think this is an area of some significant debate and has yet to be fully resolved in the United States. But I imagine that a Biden administration would take a lighter more careful approach. I think the Trump administration administration has reset sort of the situation and now it's time to recalibrate a little bit and to try to figure out what the nuances of a policy ought to be. I'm conscious that we're approaching time here so we have maybe one time for one last question this is from me guard lead the head of policy with trochra. Thank you to the panelists for a really interesting discussion my question is as Ireland takes up a non permanent seat on the UN Security Council with the campaign focus, including climate change as a driver of hunger and insecurity. What potential do the panelists see for a shift in US openness to see the Security Council act more robustly on the issue of climate security. Michelle do you want to jump in there first or Liz with whichever. Sure, I can start. So, well, I mean, clearly, we see that if Biden becomes president, then he completely, you know, reverses the approach in the United States to climate change and, and, and also international institutions but on climate to be honest with you this may be the most important changed that that a Biden administration would bring in terms of not only the future of the United States of the future of the world, you know, so that's I think it's certainly going to be different to say briefly in, in, in the Middle East. This is, you know, becoming more and more of an issue in the Middle East the Middle East is already one of the hottest driest regions of the world, and we are seeing now, we are seeing parts of the Middle East are going to become so hot as to be uninhabitable, and we're seeing most important water supplies diminish and then we're seeing it, you know, parts of parts of land become unarable so food security there so they're already some big problems we're seeing the possibility of a water war between Egypt and Ethiopia, for example. So there are going to be some big security problems that are climate change related and I do think a Biden administration will be much more willing to work with other players in the world, including the United Nations and other international institutions on these issues. So if you want to jump in on the UN Security Council on climate. I think I think Michelle is absolutely right this is going to be a sea change in terms of the US approach on climate change and I would just point to the fact that it won't just be coming from the administration but that you know close to 70% of Americans, Republicans and Democrats want the United States to be doing more on climate change believe that this is one of the most important issues that we need to be addressing. And so I think there's domestic, you know, desire to do more and then within the Democratic Party, one of the main areas of the platform is a green new deal. And to whatever extent the Biden is a Biden administration would decide to incorporate elements of that it will incorporate elements of that so I think the whole idea of the United States pushing forward in a really significant way at home, and non clean energy. I think it, you know, will will and again drive an international policy on climate change that we much more forward looking and, and responsive to really addressing the issue so extremely optimistic on that front for the United States if there's a Biden presidency. So we leave it there lots to mull over as we all await the final outcome of this election, while we're glued to the various news outlets and whatnot over the next while. Could be hours could be days who knows, but thank you to Dr Michelle done Dr Elizabeth economy and Dr Angela Stent who just had to leave a couple of minutes early there because she had another engagement to get to but on behalf of everyone listening ladies thank you very much those absolutely fascinating discussion and to everyone watching. Thank you for joining us.