 Part 4 Propositions 1-5 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by OK. The Ethics by Benedictus Spinoza, translated by R.H.M. Elwes. Part 4 Propositions 1-5 Propositions 1-5 No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true. Proof. Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve. Part 2 Proposition 35 Nor have they any positive quality on account of which they are called false. Part 2 Proposition 33 Contrary wise, insofar as they are referred to God, they are true. Part 2 Proposition 32 Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were removed by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true, a true idea would then be removed by itself. Which Part 3 Proposition 4 is absurd. Therefore, no positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true. Quad Errat Demonstrandom Note, this proposition is more clearly understood from Part 2 Proposition 16 Corollary 2. For imagination is an idea which indicates rather the present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external body. Not indeed distinctly, but confusedly, whence it comes to pass that the mind is said to err. For instance, when we look at the sun, we conceive that it is distant from us, about 200 feet. In this judgment we err, so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance, when its true distance is known, the error is removed, but not the imagination. Or in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains the nature of that luminary insofar as the body is affected thereby, wherefore, though we know the real distance, we shall nevertheless imagine the sun to be near us. For as we said in Part 2 Proposition 35 Note, we do not imagine the sun to be so near us because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is affected thereby. Thus, when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected into our eyes, we imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though we are aware of its real position. And similarly, other imaginations, wherein the mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural disposition of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or diminished, are not contrary to the truth and do not vanish at its presence. It happens indeed that when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings. But the contrary also happens, namely that we fear an evil which will certainly come and our fear vanishes when we hear false tidings. Thus, imaginations do not vanish at the presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but because other imaginations, stronger than the first, superveen and exclude the present existence of that which we imagined, as I have shown in Part 2 Proposition 17. Proposition 2. We are only passive insofar as we are a part of nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts. Proof. We are said to be passive when something arises in us, whereof we are only a partial cause, Part 3, Definition 2. That is, Part 3, Definition 1, something which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature. We are passive, therefore, insofar as we are a part of nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts. Quadrat demonstrandum. Proposition 3. The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Proof. This is evident from the axiom of this part. For when man is given, there is something else, say A, more powerful. When A is given, there is something else, say B, more powerful than A, and so on to infinity. Thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other thing and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. Quadrat demonstrandum. Proposition 4. It is impossible that man should not be a part of nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause. Proof. The power whereby each particular thing and consequently man preserves his being is the power of God or of nature. Part 1. Proposition 24. Corollary. Not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained by the actual human essence. Part 3. Proposition 7. Thus the power of man insofar as it is explained through his own actual essence is a part of the infinite power of God or nature. In other words, of the essence thereof. Part 1. Proposition 34. This was our first point. Again, if it were possible that man should undergo no changes, save such as can be understood solely through the nature of man, it would follow that he would not be able to die, but would always necessarily exist. This would be the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite. Namely, either of man's power only in as much as he would be capable of removing from himself all changes which could spring from external causes. Or of the infinite power of nature whereby all individual things would be so ordered that man should be incapable of undergoing any changes, save such as tended towards his own preservation. But the first alternative is absurd, by the last proposition the proof of which is universal and can be applied to all individual things. Therefore, if it be possible that man should not be capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can be explained solely through his own nature, and consequently that he must always, as we have shown, necessarily exist, such a result must follow from the infinite power of God, and consequently Part 1 Proposition 16 from the necessity of the divine nature insofar as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given man, the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of extension and thought must be deducible. It would therefore follow Part 1 Proposition 21 that man is infinite, which by the first part of this proof is absurd. It is therefore impossible that man should not undergo any changes, save those whereof he is the adequate cause. Quote Errat Demonstrandum Corollary Hence it follows that man is necessarily always a prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and that he accommodates himself there too, as much as the nature of things demands. Proposition 5 The power and increase of every passion and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own. Proof The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone. Part 3 Definitions 1 & 2 That is, Part 3 Proposition 7 The power of a passion cannot be defined by the power whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but as is shown in Part 2 Proposition 16, must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own. Quote Errat Demonstrandum End of Part 4 Propositions 1-5 Recording by OK Part 4 Propositions 6-10 Of The Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by OK The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Ellways Part 4 Propositions 6-10 Proposition 6 The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him. Proof The force and increase of any passion and its persistence in existing are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own by the foregoing proposition. Therefore, Part 4 Propositions 3, it can overcome a man's power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him. Quote Errat Demonstrandum Proposition 7 An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion, contrary there too, and with more power for controlling emotion. Proof Emotion insofar as is referred to the mind is an idea whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existence than before. See the general definition of the emotions at the end of Part 3. When therefore the mind is assailed by any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished. Now this modification of the body, Part 4 Proposition 5, receives from its cause the force for persistence in its being which force can only be checked or destroyed by a bodily cause. Part 2 Proposition 6 In virtue of the body being affected with a modification contrary to, by Part 3 Proposition 5 and stronger than itself. Part 4 Axiom Wherefore, Part 2 Proposition 12 the mind is affected by the idea of a modification contrary to and stronger than the former modification. In other words, by the general definition of the emotions the mind will be affected by an emotion contrary to and stronger than the former emotion which will exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion. Thus an emotion cannot be destroyed nor controlled except by a contrary and stronger emotion. Quad Erat Demonstrandom Corollary An emotion in so far as it is referred to the mind can only be controlled or destroyed through an idea of a modification of the body contrary to and stronger than that which we are undergoing. For the emotion which we undergo can only be checked or destroyed by an emotion contrary to and stronger than itself. In other words, by the general definition of the emotions only by an idea of a modification of the body contrary to and stronger than the modification which we undergo. Proposition 8 The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotions of pleasure or pain in so far as we are conscious thereof. Proof We call a thing good or evil when it is of service or the reverse in preserving our being. Part 4 Definitions 1 and 2 That is Part 3 Proposition 7 when it increases or diminishes helps or hinders our power of activity. Thus in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain we call it good or evil. Wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain which necessarily follows from that pleasurable or painful emotion. Part 2 Proposition 22 But this idea is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is united to body. Part 2 Proposition 21 That is, there is no real distinction between this idea and the emotion or idea of the modification of the body save in conception only. Therefore, the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotion in so far as we are conscious thereof. Quadrat demonstran Proposition 9 An emotion whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us. Proof Imagination or conception is the idea by which the mind regards a thing as present. Part 2 Proposition 17 Note but which indicates the disposition of the mind rather than the nature of the external thing. Part 2 Proposition 16 Corollary 2 An emotion is therefore a conception in so far as it indicates the disposition of the body. But a conception by Part 2 Proposition 17 is stronger so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present existence of the external object. Wherefore an emotion is also stronger or more intense when we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us. Quadrat demonstrandum Note when I said above in Part 3 Proposition 18 that we are affected by the image of what is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing conceived were present I expressly stated that this is only true in so far as we look solely to the image of the thing in question itself for the things nature is unchanged whether we have conceived it or not. I did not deny that the image becomes weaker when we regard as present to us other things which exclude the present existence of the future object. I did not expressly call attention to the fact because I purpose to treat it the strength of the emotions in this part of my work. Corollary The image of something past or future that is of a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future to the exclusion of time present is when other conditions are equal weaker than the image of something present. Consequently, an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense other conditions being equal than an emotion felt towards something present. Proposition 10 Towards something future which we conceive as close at hand we are affected more intensely than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely than if we conceive that it is long passed away. Proof In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand or not long passed away we conceive that which excludes the presence of the object less than if its presence of future existence were more distant from the present or if it had long passed away this is obvious therefore by the foregoing proposition we are so far more intensely affected towards it. Quad Errat Demonstrandum Corollary From the remarks made in definition 6 of this part it follows that if objects are separated from the present by a longer period than we can define in conception though their dates of occurrence be widely separated one from the other they all affect us equally faintly End of Part 4 Propositions 6-10 Recording by OK Part 4 Propositions 11-15 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by OK The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elwes Part 4 Propositions 11-15 Proposition 11 An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is when other conditions are equal more intense than an emotion towards that which possible or contingent or non-necessary Proof Insofar as we conceive a thing to be necessary we to that extent affirm its existence On the other hand we deny a thing's existence insofar as we conceive it not to be necessary Part 1 Proposition 33-1 Wherefore Part 4 Proposition 9 An emotion towards that which is necessary is other conditions being equal more intense than an emotion that which is non-necessary Quad Erat demonstrates random Proposition 12 An emotion towards a thing which we know not to exist at the present time and which we conceive as possible is more intense other conditions being equal than an emotion towards a thing contingent Proof Insofar as we conceive a thing as contingent we are affected by the conception of some further thing and assert the existence of the former Part 4 Definition 3 But on the other hand we by hypothesis conceive certain things which exclude its present existence But insofar as we conceive a thing to be possible in the future we thereby conceive things which assert its existence Part 4 Definition 4 That is Part 3 Proposition 18 Things which promote hope or fear or an emotion towards something possible is more vehement Quad Erat demonstrates random Corollary An emotion towards a thing which we know not to exist in the present and which we conceive as contingent is far fainter than if we conceive the thing to be present with us Proof Emotion towards a thing which we conceive to exist is more intense than it would be if we conceive the thing as future Part 4 Proposition 9 And is much more vehement than if the future time be conceived as far distant from the present Part 4 Proposition 10 Therefore An emotion towards a thing whose period of existence we conceive to be far distant from the present is far fainter than if we conceive the thing as present It is nevertheless more intense than if we conceive the thing as contingent wherefore an emotion towards a thing which we regard as contingent will be far fainter than if we conceive the thing to be present with us Quad Erat demonstrates random Proposition 13 Emotion towards a thing contingent which we know not to exist in the present is other conditions being equal fainter than an emotion towards a thing past Proof Insofar as we conceive a thing as contingent we are not affected by the image of any other thing which asserts the existence of the said thing Part 4, Definition 3 But on the other hand, by hypothesis we conceive certain things excluding its present existence But insofar as we conceive it in relation to time past we are assumed to conceive something which recalls the thing to memory or excites the image thereof Part 2, Proposition 18 and Note which is so far the same as regarding it as present Part 2, Proposition 17, Corollary Therefore, Part 4, Proposition 9 an emotion towards a thing contingent which we know does not exist in the present is fainter other conditions being equal than an emotion towards a thing past Quad Erat demonstrates random Proposition 14 A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true but only insofar as it is considered as an emotion Proof An emotion is an idea whereby the mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before by the general definition of the emotions Therefore, it has no positive quality which can be destroyed by the presence of what is true Consequently, the knowledge of good and evil cannot by virtue of being true restrain any emotion but insofar as such knowledge is an emotion Part 4, Proposition 8 If it have more strength for restraining emotion it will to that extent be able to restrain the given emotion Quad Erat demonstrates random Proposition 15 Desire arising from the knowledge of good and bad can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed Proof From the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is an emotion necessarily arises desire Definition of the emotions The strengths of which is proportion to the strengths of the emotion wherefrom it arises Part 3, Proposition 37 But in as much as this desire arises by hypothesis from the fact of our truly understanding anything it follows that it is also present with us insofar as we are active Part 3, Proposition 1 and must therefore be understood through our essence only Part 3, Definition 2 Consequently, Part 3, Proposition 7 its force and increase can be defined solely by human power Again, the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are stronger in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement wherefor their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external causes which when compared with our own power indefinitely surpass it Part 4, Proposition 3 Hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more vehement than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil and may consequently control or quench it Quote Errat Demonstrandum End of Part 4, Propositions 11-15 Recording by OK Part 4, Proposition 16-20 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by OK The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Ellways Part 4, Propositions 16-20 Propositions 16 Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil insofar as such knowledge regards what is future may be more easily controlled or quenched than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment Proof Emotion towards the thing which we conceive as future is fainter than emotion towards the thing that is present Part 4, Proposition 9, Corollary But desire, which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil though it be concerned with things which are good at the moment can be quenched or controlled by any headstrong desire by the last proposition the proof were of is of universal application Therefore, desire arising from such knowledge when concerned with the future can be more easily controlled or quenched than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment Quad erat demonstrandum Proposition 17 Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent can be controlled far more easily still than desire for things that are present Proof This proposition is proved in the same way as the last proposition from Part 4, Proposition 12, Corollary Note, I think I have now shown the reason why men are moved by opinion more readily than by true reason why it is that the true knowledge of good and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul and often yields to every kind of passion The fate of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet, Ovid Footnote The better path I gaze at and approve the worse I follow From the Metamorphoses Book 7, verse 20 Video melliora proboque deteriora sequo Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind when he says, he who increases knowledge increases sorrow I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclusion that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge or that a wise man is on a par with the fool in controlling his emotions but because it is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature before we can determine what reason can do in restraining the emotions and what is beyond her power I have said that in the present part I shall merely treat a human infirmity the power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately Proposition 18 Desire arising from pleasure is other conditions being equal stronger than desire arising from pain Proof Desire is the essence of a man definition of the emotions one that is the endeavor whereby a man endeavors to persist in his own being wherefore desire arising from pleasure is by the fact of pleasure being felt increased or helped on the contrary desire arising from pain is by the fact of pain being felt diminished or hindered hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human power together with the power of an external cause whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only thus the former is stronger of the true Quadrat demonstrandum Note in these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity and inconstancy and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason it now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason and which of them are contrary there too but before I begin to prove my propositions in detailed geometrical fashion it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance so that everyone may more readily grasp my meaning as reason makes no demands contrary to nature it demands that every man should love himself should seek that which is useful to him I mean that which is really useful to him should desire everything which really brings man to greater perfection and should each for himself endeavour as far as he can to preserve his own being this is as necessarily true as that a whole is greater than its part see part 3, proposition 4 again, as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the laws of one's own nature part 4, definition 8 and as no one endeavours to preserve his own being except in accordance with the laws of his own nature it follows first that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour to preserve one's own being and that happiness consists in man's power of preserving his own being secondly that virtue is to be desired for its own sake and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us for the sake of which we should desire it thirdly and lastly that suicides are weak-minded and are overcome by external causes repugnant to their nature further, it follows from posture 4 part 2 that we can never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of our being or living serves to have no relations with things which are outside ourselves again, if we consider our mind we see that our intellect would be more imperfect if mind were alone and could understand nothing besides itself there are then many things outside ourselves which are useful to us and are therefore to be desired of such, none can be discerned more excellent than those which are in an entire agreement with our nature for if for example two individuals of entirely the same nature are united they form a combination twice as powerful as either of them singly therefore, to man there is nothing more useful than man nothing, I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wishful by men than that all should so in all points agree that the mind's bodies of all should form as it were one single mind and one single body and that all should with one consent as far as they are able endeavour to preserve their being and all with one consent seek what is useful to them all hence, men who are governed by reason that is who seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason desire for themselves nothing which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind and consequently are just, faithful and honourable in their conduct such are the dictates of reason which I purpose thus briefly to indicate before beginning to prove them in greater detail I have taken this course in order if possible to gain the attention of those who believe that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful for himself is the foundation of impiety rather than of piety and virtue therefore, after briefly sharing that the contrary is the case I go on to prove it by the same method as that whereby I have hitherto preceded Proposition 19 Every man by the laws of his nature necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad Proof The knowledge of good and evil is Part 4, Proposition 8 The emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as we are conscious thereof Therefore, every man necessarily desires what he thinks good and shrinks from what he thinks bad Now, this appetite is nothing else but man's nature or essence See the definition of appetite Part 3, Proposition 9 Note and definition of the emotions 1 Therefore, every man solely by the laws of his nature desires the one and shrinks from the other etc Proposition 20 The more every man endeavours and is able to seek what is useful to him in other words to preserve his own being the more is he endowed with virtue On the contrary in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him that is to preserve his own being he is wanting in power Proof Virtue is human power which is defined solely by man's essence Part 4, Definition 8 that is which is defined solely by the endeavour made by man to persist in his own being Wherefore, the more a man endeavours and is able to preserve his own being the more is he endowed with virtue and consequently Part 3, Propositions 4 and 6 insofar as a man neglects to preserve his own being he is wanting in power Quote Errat Demonstrandom Note No one therefore neglects seeking his own good or preserving his own being unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature No one I say from the necessity of his own nature or otherwise then under compulsion from external causes shrinks from food or kills himself which latter may be done in a variety of ways a man for instance kills himself under the compulsion of another man who twists around his right hand wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword and forces him to turn the blade against his own heart or again he may be compelled like Seneca by a tyrant's command to open his own veins that is to escape a greater evil by incurring a lesser or lastly latent external causes may so disorder his imagination and so affect his body that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one and whereof the idea cannot exist in the mind Part 3, Proposition 10 but that a man from the necessity of his own nature should endeavour to become non-existent is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing as everyone will see for himself Part 4, Propositions 21-25 of The Ethics by Svinosa This is a LeBrewax recording All LeBrewax recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LeBrewax.org Recording by Dayana Möllinger The Ethics by Benedix Desiree The Ethics The Ethics The Ethics The Ethics The Ethics by Benedix Despinosa Translated by R. H. M. Elves Part 4, Propositions 21-25 Proposition 21 No one can desire to be blessed to act rightly and to live rightly without at the same time wishing to be, act and to live in other words to actually exist Proof The proof of this proposition or rather the proposition itself is self-evident and is also plain from the definition of desire For the desire of living, acting etc. blessedly or rightly is definition of the emotions Proposition 1 is the essence of man that is Part 3, Proposition 7 The endeavor made by everyone to preserve his own being Therefore No one can desire, etc. Quote Erodemonstrandum Proposition 22 No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavor to preserve one's own being Proof The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing Part 3, Proposition 7 Therefore, if any virtue could be conceived as prior there too, the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself which is obviously absurd Therefore, no virtue, etc. Quote Erodemonstrandum Corollary The effort for self-preservation is the first and only foundation of virtue For prior to this principle nothing can be conceived and without it no virtue can be conceived Proposition 23 Man in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas cannot be absolutely set to act in obedience to virtue he can only be so described in so far as he is determined for the action because he understands Proof In so far as a man is determined to an action through having inadequate ideas he is passive Part 3, Proposition 1 That is he does something which cannot be perceived solely through his essence that is by Part 4, Definition 8 which does not follow from his virtue but in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands he is active that is, he does something which is perceived through his essence alone or which adequately follows from his virtue Quote Erodemonstrandum Proposition 24 To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live or to preserve one's being these three terms are identically meaning in accordance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to oneself Proof To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but to act according to the laws of one's own nature but we only act in so far as we understand Part 3, Proposition 3 therefore to act in obedience to virtue is in us nothing else but to act, to live or to preserve one's being in obedience to reason and that on the basis of seeking what is useful for us Part 4, Proposition 22 Corollary Quote Erodemonstrandum Proposition 25 No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else Proof To endeavor where with everything endeavors to persist in its being is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself Part 3, Proposition 7 From this alone and not from the essence of anything else it necessarily follows Part 3, Proposition 6 that everyone endeavors to preserve his being However, this proposition is plain from Part 4, Proposition 22 Corollary For if a man should endeavor to preserve his being for the sake of anything else the last named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue which, by the foregoing corollary is absurd therefore no one etc Quote Erodemonstrandum End of Part 4 Propositions 21 to 25 Part 4, Propositions 26 to 30 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Diana Meilinger The Ethics by Benedict S. Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Alves Part 4, Propositions 26 to 30 of the Ethics by Spinoza Propositions 26 to 30 Propositions 26 Whatsoever we endeavor in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand Neither does the mind insofar as it makes use of reason judge anything to be useful to it save such things as are conducive to understanding Proof The effort for self-preservation is nothing else but the essence of the thing in question Part 3, Propositions 7 Which, insofar as it exists such as it is is conceived to have force for continuing in existence Part 3, Propositions 6 and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature See the definition of appetite Part 3, Propositions 9 Note But the essence of reason is not else but our mind and distinctly understands See the definition in Part 2 Proposition 40, Note 2 Therefore, Part 2 Proposition 40 Whatsoever we endeavor in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand Again, since this effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavors is so far as it reasons to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding This effort is understanding is Part 4, Propositions 22 Corollary The first and single basis of virtue nor shall we endeavor to understand things for the sake of any ulterior object Part 4, Proposition 25 On the other hand the mind, insofar as it reasons will not be able to conceive any good for itself save such things as are conducive to understanding Proposition 27 We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conducive to understanding or such as are able to hinder us from understanding Proof The mind insofar as it reasons desires nothing beyond understanding and judges nothing to be useful to itself save such things as conducive to understanding by the foregoing proposition But the mind, Part 2 Proposition 41, 43 and Note cannot possess certainty concerning anything except insofar as it has adequate ideas or what by Part 2 Proposition 40, Note is the same thing insofar as it reasons Therefore we know nothing to be good or evil save such things as really conducive etc Corollary Proposition 28 The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God and the mind's highest virtue is to know God Proof The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God That is, Part 1, Definition 6 than a being absolutely infinite and without which Part 1, Proposition 15 nothing can either be or be conceived Therefore, Part 4 Proposition 26 and 27 The mind's highest utility or Part 4, Definition 1 Good is the knowledge of God Again, the mind is active only insofar as it understands and only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously The mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand Now, as we have already shown the highest that the mind can understand is God Therefore the highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God Corollary Proposition 29 No individual thing which is entirely different from our own nature can help or check our power of activity and absolutely nothing can do as good or harm unless it has something in common with our nature Proof The power of every individual thing and consequently the power of man whereby he exists and operates can only be determined by an individual thing Part 1, Proposition 28 Whose nature Part 2, Proposition 6 must be understood through the same nature as that through which human nature is conceived Therefore our power of activity however it be conceived can be determined and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual thing which has something in common with us but not by the power of anything which the nature is entirely different from our own and since we can call good or evil that which is the cause of our pleasure or pain Part 4, Proposition 8 That is, Part 3 Proposition 11, Note which increases or diminishes helps or hinders our power of activity Therefore that which is entirely different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad Code error demonstrandom Proposition 30 A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature Proof We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain Part 4, Proposition 8 That is, by the definition which same Part 3, Proposition 11, Note when it diminishes or checks our power of action Therefore, if anything were bad for us through that quality which it has in common with our nature it would be able itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature which Part 3, Proposition 4 is absurd where for nothing can be bad for us through that quality which it has in common with us but on the other hand in so far as it is bad for us that is, as we have just shown in so far as it can diminish or check our power of action it is contrary to our nature Code Error Demonstrandom End of Part 4 Propositions 26-30 Part 4, Propositions 31-35 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elways Part 4, Propositions 31-35 Propositions 31 In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature it is necessarily good Proof In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature it cannot be bad for it it will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad nothing will follow from its nature Part 4, Definition 1 which tends to the preservation of our nature that is by the hypothesis which tends to the preservation of the thing itself But this Part 3, Propositions 6 is absurd in harmony with our nature it is necessarily good Corollary Hence it follows that in proportion as a thing is in harmony with our nature so is it more useful or better for us and vice versa in proportion as a thing is more useful for us so is it more in harmony with our nature For in so far as does not in harmony with our nature it will necessarily be different If different it can neither be good nor bad Part 4, Proposition 29 If contrary it will be contrary to that which is in harmony with our nature that is contrary to what is good in short bad Nothing therefore can be good except in so far as it is in harmony with our nature and hence a thing is useful in harmony with our nature and vice versa Proposition 32 In so far as men are a prey to passion they cannot in that respect be said to be naturally in harmony Proof Things which are said to be in harmony naturally are understood to agree in power Part 3, Proposition 7 not in want of power or negation and consequently not in passion Part 3, Proposition 3 Note, wherefore men in so far as they are a prey to their passions cannot be said to be naturally in harmony Quad errat demonstrandum Note, this is also self evident if we say that white and black only agree in the fact that neither is red we absolutely affirm that they do not agree in any respect so if we say that a man and a stone only agree in fact that both are finite wanting in power not existing by the necessity of their own nature or lastly indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in no respect alike therefore things which agree only in negation or in qualities which neither possess really agree in no respect Proposition 33 Men can differ in nature in so far as they are assailed by those emotions which are passions or passive states and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant Proof The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely through our essence or nature Part 3 definitions 1 and 2 but it must be defined by the power that is Part 3, Proposition 7 by the nature of external causes in comparison with our own hence it follows that there are as many kinds of each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected Part 3, Proposition 56 and that men may be differently affected by one and the same object Part 3, Proposition 51 and to this extent differ in nature Lastly, that one and the same man may be differently affected towards the same object and may therefore be variable and inconstant What error demonstrates random Proposition 34 In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions they can be contrary one to another Proof A man, for instance Peter can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain because he, Peter possesses something similar to that which Paul hates Part 3 Proposition 16 or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also loves Part 3, Proposition 32 and note or for other causes of which the chief are enumerated in Part 3 Proposition 55 note It may therefore happen that Paul should hate Peter Part 7 Consequently, it may easily happen also that Peter should hate Paul in return and that each should endeavour to do the other an injury Part 3, Proposition 39 that is, Part 4, Proposition 30 that they should be contrary one to another But the emotion of pain is always a passion or passive state Part 3, Proposition 59 Hence men, in so far as by emotions, which are passions can be contrary one to another Note I said that Paul may hate Peter because he concedes that Peter possesses something which he, Paul also loves From this it seems at first sight to follow that these two men through both loving the same thing and consequently through agreement of their respective natures stand in one another's way If this was so, Propositions 30 and 31 of this part would be untrue But if we give the matter our unbiased attention we shall see that the discrepancy vanishes For the two men are not in one another's way in virtue of the agreement of their natures that is, through both loving the same thing but in virtue of one differing from the other For in so far as each loves the same thing, the love of each is fostered thereby Part 3, Proposition 31 That is, definition of the emotions 6 The pleasure of each is fostered thereby Wherefore it is far from being the case that they are at variance through both loving the same thing and through the agreement in their natures The cause for their opposition lies as I have said, solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ for we assume that Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession while Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost Hence, the one man will be affected with pleasure the other will be affected with pain and thus they will be at variance one with another We can easily show in like manner that all other causes of hatred depends solely on differences and not on the agreement in his natures Proposition 35 In so far only as men live in obedience to reason do they always necessarily agree in nature Proof In so far as men are assailed by emotions that are passions they can be different in nature Part 4, Proposition 33 and at variance one with another but men are only said to be active in so far as they act in obedience to reason Part 3, Proposition 3 Therefore, whatsoever follows from human nature in so far as it is defined by reason must Part 3, Definition 2 be understood solely through human nature as its proximate cause But since every man by the laws of his nature desires that which he deems good and endeavours to remove that which he deems bad Part 4, Proposition 19 and further since that which we in accordance with reason deem good or bad necessarily is good or bad Part 2, Proposition 41 It follows that men in so far as they live in obedience to reason necessarily do only such things as are necessarily good for human nature and consequently for each individual man Part 4, Proposition 31 Corollary In other words, such things as are in harmony with each man's nature Therefore, men in so far as they live in obedience to reason necessarily live always in harmony one with another Corollary 1 There is no individual thing in nature which is more useful to man than a man who lives in obedience to reason than a man most useful which is most in harmony with his nature Part 4, Proposition 31 Corollary That is obviously man but man acts absolutely according to the laws of his nature when he lives in obedience to reason Part 3, Definition 2 and to this extent only is always necessarily in harmony with the nature of another man by the last proposition Wherefore, among individual things is more useful to man than a man who lives in obedience to reason Corollary 2 As every man seeks most that which is useful to him so are men most useful one to another For the more a man seeks what is useful to him and endeavors to preserve himself the more is he endowed with virtue Part 4, Proposition 20 or what is the same thing Part 4, Definition 8 to act according to the laws of his nature that is to live in obedience to reason but men are most in natural harmony when they live in obedience to reason by the last proposition Therefore, by the foregoing Corollary men will be most useful one to another when each seeks most that which is useful to him Quadrat demonstrates random Note, what we have just shown is attested by experience so conspicuously as in the mouth of nearly everyone man is to man a god yet it really happens that men live in obedience to reason for things are so ordered among them that they are generally envious and troublesome one to another Nevertheless, they are scarcely able to lead a solitary life so that the definition of man as a social animal has met with general ascent In fact, men do derive from social life much more convenience than injury to laugh their fill at human affairs let theologians rail and let misanthropes praise to their utmost the life of untutored rusticity let them heap contempt on men and praises on beasts when all is said, they will find that men can provide for their wants much more easily by mutual help and that only by uniting their forces can they escape from the dangers that on every side beset them Not to say how much more excellent and worthy of our knowledge it is to study the actions of men than the actions of beasts but I will treat it this more at length elsewhere End of Part 4 Propositions 31-35 Recording by OK Part 4 Propositions 36-40 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by OK The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R.H.M.L.Ways Part 4 Propositions 36-40 Propositions 36 The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all and therefore can equally rejoice therein Proof to act virtuously is to act in obedience with reason Part 4 Propositions 24 and whatsoever we endeavour to do in obedience to reason is to understand Part 4 Propositions 26 Therefore, by Part 4 Propositions 28 the highest good for those who follow after virtue is to know God That is Part 2 Proposition 47 and Note A good which is common to all and can be possessed by all men equally insofar as they are of the same nature Quadrat Errat demonstrates random Note Someone may ask how it would be if the highest good of those who follow after virtue were not common to all Would it not then follow as above that men living in obedience to reason that is Part 4 Proposition 35 men insofar as they agree in nature would be at variance one with another To such an inquiry I make answer that it follows not accidentally but from the very nature of reason that man's highest good is common to all produced from the very essence of man insofar as defined by reason and that a man could neither be nor be conceived without the power of taking pleasure in this highest good for it belongs to the essence of the human mind Part 2 Proposition 47 to have an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God Proposition 37 The good which every man who follows after virtue desires of himself He will also desire for other men and so much the more in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God Proof Men insofar as they live in obedience to reason are most useful to their fellow men Part 4 Proposition 35 Corollary 1 Therefore Proposition 19 We shall in obedience to reason necessarily endeavour to bring about that men should live in obedience to reason But the good which every man insofar as he is guided by reason or in other words follows after virtue desires for himself is to understand Part 4 Proposition 26 Wherefore the good which each follower of virtue seeks for himself he will desire also for others Again Insofar as it is referred to the mind is the very essence of the mind Definition of the emotions 1 Now the essence of the mind consists in knowledge Part 2 Proposition 11 which involves the knowledge of God Part 2 Proposition 47 And without it Part 1 Proposition 15 can neither be nor be conceived Therefore in proportion as the mind's essence involves a greater knowledge of God so also will be greater the desire of the follower of virtue that other men should possess that which he seeks as good for himself Quadrat Demonstrandum Another proof The good which a man desires for himself and loves he will love more constantly if he sees that others love it also Part 3 Proposition 31 he will therefore endeavour that others should love it also and as the good in question is common to all and therefore all can rejoice therein he will endeavour for the same reason to bring about that all should rejoice therein and this he will do the more Part 3 Proposition 37 in proportion as his own enjoyment of the good is greater Note 1 he who guided by emotion only endeavour to cause others to love what he loves himself and to make the rest of the world live according to his own fancy acts solely by impulse and is therefore hateful especially to those who take delight in something different and accordingly study and by similar impulse endeavour to make men live in accordance with what pleases themselves Again As the highest good not by men under the guidance of emotion is often such that it can only be possessed by a single individual it follows that those who love it are not consistent in their intentions but while they delight to sing its praises fear to be believed but he who endeavours to lead men by reason does not act by impulse but courteously and kindly and his intention is always consistent Again whatsoever we desire and do whereof we are the cause insofar as we possess the idea of God or no God I set down to religion the desire of well doing which is engendered by a life according to reason I call piety further the desire whereby a man living according to reason is bound to associate others with himself I call honour footnote onestas by honourable I mean that which is praised by men living according to reason and by base I mean that which is repugnant to the gaining of friendship I have also shown in addition what are the foundations of a state and the difference between true virtue and infirmity may be readily gathered from what I have said namely that true virtue is nothing else but living in accordance with reason while infirmity is nothing else but man's allowing himself to be led by things which are external to himself and to be by them determined to act in a manner demanded by the general disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely in itself Such are the matters which I engage to prove in Proposition 18 of this part where it is plain that the law against the slaughter of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow men but not with beasts or things whose nature is different from our own We have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us nay as everyone's right is defined by his virtue or power men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men Still I do not deny that beasts feel What I deny is that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please treating them in the way which best suits us for their nature is not like ours and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions Part 3 Proposition 57 Note It remains for me to explain what I mean by just and unjust sin and merit On these points see the following note Note 2 In the appendix to Part 1 I undertook to explain praise and blame merit and sin justice and injustice Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in Part 3 Proposition 29 Note The time has now come to treat the remaining terms but I must first say a few words concerning man in the state of nature and in society Every man exists by sovereign natural right and consequently by sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the necessity of his own nature Therefore by sovereign natural right good and what is bad takes care of his own advantage according to his own disposition Part 4 Proposition 19 and Part 4 Proposition 20 Avenges the wrongs done to him Part 3 Proposition 40 An endeavours to preserve that which he loves and to destroy that which he hates Part 3 Proposition 28 As a result of reason everyone would remain in possession of this his right without any injury being done to his neighbour Part 4 Proposition 35 But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions which far surpass human power or virtue Part 4 Proposition 6 They are often drawn in different directions and being at variance one with another Part 4 They stand in need of mutual help Part 4 Wherefore in order that men may live together in harmony and may aid one another it is necessary that they should forego their natural right and for the sake of security refrain from all actions which can injure their fellow men The way in which this end can be obtained so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions Part 4 Proposition 4 In constant and diverse should be able to render each other mutually secure and feel mutual trust is evident from Part 4 Proposition 7 and Part 3 Proposition 39 It is there shown that an emotion can only be restrained by an emotion stronger than and contrary to itself that men avoid inflicting injury themselves On this law society can be established so long as it keeps in its own hand the right possessed by everyone of avenging injury and pronouncing on good and evil and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a general rule of conduct and to pass laws sanctioned not by reason which is powerless in restraining emotion but by threats Part 4 Such a society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called a state while those who live under its protection are called citizens We may readily understand that there isn't a state of nature and nothing which by universal consent is pronounced good or bad for in the state of nature everyone thinks solely of his own advantage and according to his disposition with reference only to his individual advantage decides what is good or bad being bound by no law to anyone besides himself In the state of nature therefore sin is inconceivable it can only exist in a state where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent and where everyone is bound to obey the state authority Sin then is nothing else but disobedience which is therefore punished by the state only Obedience on the other hand is set down as merit in as much as a man is thought worthy of merit if he takes delight in the advantages which a state provides Again in the state of nature no one is by common consent master of anything nor is there anything in nature which can be said to belong to one man rather than another all things are common to all hence in the state of nature we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him in other words there is nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice such ideas are only possible in a social state when it is decreed by common consent what belongs to one man and what to another from all these considerations it is evident that justice sin and merit are extrinsic ideas and not attributes which display the nature of the mind but I have said enough Proposition 38 whatsoever disposes the human body so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways is useful to man and is so in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways contrary wise whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man proof whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases also the mind's capability of perception Part 2 Proposition 14 therefore whatsoever thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable is necessarily good or useful Part 4 Proposition 26 and 27 and is so in proportion to the extent to which it can render the body capable contrary wise Part 2 Proposition 14 and Part 4 Propositions 26 and 27 it is hurtful if it renders the body in this respect less capable Quad Eret demonstrates random Proposition 39 whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest which the parts of the human body mutually possess is good contrary wise whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad proof the human body needs many other bodies for its preservation Part 2 Proposition 4 but that which constitutes the specific reality former of a human body is that its parts communicate their several motions one to another in a certain fixed proportion definition before lemma 4 after Part 2 Proposition 13 therefore whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion between motion and rest which the parts of the human body mutually possess preserves the specific reality of the human body and consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways and of affecting external bodies in many ways consequently it is good by the last proposition again whatsoever brings about a change in the aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific character in other words see preface to this part towards the end though the point is indeed self-evident to be destroyed and consequently totally incapable of being affected in increased number of ways therefore it is bad Quadrat demonstrates random note the extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the fifth part but I would here remark consider that a body undergoes death when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed for I do not venture to deny that a human body while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties where in the life of a body is thought to consist may nonetheless be changed into another nature totally different from its own there is no reason which compels me to maintain that a body does not die unless it becomes a corpse nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion it sometimes happens that a man undergoes such changes that I should hardly call him the same as I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet who had been seized with sickness and though he recovered there from yet remained so oblivious of his past life that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own indeed he might have been taken for a grown-up child if he had also forgotten his native tongue if this instance seems incredible what shall we say of infants a man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men however, I prefer to leave such questions undiscussed lest I should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues Proposition 40 whatsoever conduces to man's social life or causes men to live together in harmony is useful whereas whatsoever brings discord into a state is bad proof for whatsoever causes men to live together in harmony also causes them to live according to reason Part 4, Proposition 35 and is therefore by Part 4, Proposition 26 and 27 good and for the same reason whatsoever brings about discord is bad what errat demonstrates random end of Part 4 Propositions 36 to 40 recording by OK Part 4 Propositions 41 to 45 of the Ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by OK the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R.H.M.L.Ways Part 4 Propositions 41 to 45 Proposition 41 pleasure in itself is not bad but good contrary wise pain in itself is bad proof pleasure, Part 3, Proposition 11 and note is emotion whereby the body's power of activity is increased or helped pain is emotion whereby the body's power of activity is diminished or checked therefore by Part 4 Proposition 38 pleasure in itself is good contrary wise pain in itself is bad Quod erat demonstrandum Proposition 32 mirth cannot be excessive but is always good contrary wise melancholy is always bad proof, mirth see its definition in Part 3, Proposition 11 note is pleasure which in so far as it is referred to the body consists in all parts of the body being affected equally that is Part 3, Proposition 11 the body's power of activity is increased or aided in such a manner that the several parts maintain their former proportion of motion and rest therefore mirth is always good Part 4 Proposition 39 and cannot be excessive but melancholy see its definition in the same note to Part 3, Proposition 11 is pain which in so far as it is referred to the body consists in the absolute decrease or hindrance of the body's power of activity therefore by Part 4 Proposition 38 it is always bad Quod erat demonstrandum Proposition 43 stimulation may be excessive and bad on the other hand grief may be good in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad proof localized pleasure or stimulation titillatio is pleasure which in so far as it is referred to the body consists in one or some of its parts being affected more than the rest see its definition in Part 3, Proposition 11 note the power of this emotion may be sufficient to overcome other actions of the body Part 4, Proposition 6 and may remain obstinately fixed therein thus rendering it incapable of being affected in a variety of other ways therefore Part 4, Proposition 38 it may be bad again, grief which is pain cannot as such be good Part 4, Proposition 41 but as its force and increase is defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own Part 4, Proposition 5 we can conceive infinite degrees and modes of strength in this emotion Part 4, Proposition 3 we can therefore conceive it as capable of restraining stimulation and preventing its becoming excessive and hindering the body's capabilities thus to this extent it will be good Quad Errat Demonstrandom Proposition 44 love and desire may be excessive proof love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause definition of emotion 6 therefore stimulation accompanied by the idea of an external cause is love Part 3, Proposition 11 hence love may be excessive again, the strength of desire varies in proportion to the emotion from which it arises Part 3, Proposition 37 now emotion may overcome all the rest of men's actions Part 4, Proposition 6 so therefore can desire which arises from the same emotion overcome all other desires and become excessive as we showed in the last proposition concerning stimulation the myth which I have stated to be good can be conceived more easily than it can be observed for the emotions whereby we are daily assailed are generally referred to some part of the body which is affected more than the rest hence the emotions are generally excessive and so fix the mind in the contemplation of one object that it is unable to think of others and although men as a rule are a prey to many emotions and very few are found who are always assailed by one and the same yet there are cases where one and the same emotion remains obstinately fixed we sometimes see men so absorbed in one object that although it be not present they think they have it before them when this is the case with a man who is not asleep we say he is delirious or mad nor are those persons who are inflamed with love and who dream all night but their mistress or some woman considered as less mad for they are made objects of ridicule but when a miser thinks of nothing but gain or money or when an ambitious man thinks of nothing but glory they are not reckoned to be mad because they are generally harmful and are thought worthy of being hated but in reality avarice, ambition lust etc are species of madness though they may not be reckoned as diseases proposition 45 hatred can never be good proof when we hate a man we endeavour to destroy him part 3, proposition 39 that is part 4, proposition 37 we endeavour to do something that is bad therefore hatred can never be good quod erat demonstrandom note bene here and in what follows hatred only hatred towards men corollary 1 envy, derision contempt anger, revenge and other emotions attributable to hatred or arising therefrom are bad this is evident from part 3, proposition 39 and part 4, proposition 37 corollary 2 what so ever we desire from motives of hatred is base and in a state unjust this also is evident from part 3 proposition 39 and from the definitions of baseness and injustice in part 4, proposition 37 note between derision which I have in corollary 1 stated to be bad and laughter I recognise a great difference for laughter as also jocularity is merely pleasure be not excessive it is in itself good part 4, proposition 41 assuredly nothing forbids man to enjoy himself save grim and gloomy superstition for why is it more lawful to satiate one's hunger and thirst than to drive away one's melancholy I reason and have convinced myself as follows no deity nor anyone else save the envious the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected the greater the perfection where too we pass in other words the more must we necessarily partake of the divine nature therefore to make use of what comes in our way and to enjoy it as much as possible not to the point of satiating but to the point of satiating the greater the pleasure wherewith we are affected as much as possible not to the point of satiety for that would not be enjoyment is the part of a wise man I say it is the part of a wise man to refresh and recreate himself with moderate and pleasant food and drink and also with perfumes with the soft beauty of growing plants with dress, with music with many sports with theatres and the like such as every man for the human body is composed of very numerous parts of diverse nature which continually stand in need of fresh and varied nourishment so that the whole body may be equally capable of performing all the actions which follow from the necessity of its own nature and consequently so that the mind may also be equally capable of understanding many things simultaneously this way of life is the one that agrees best with our principles and also with general practice therefore if there be any question of another plan the plan we have mentioned is the best and in every way to be commended there is no need for me to set forth the matter more clearly or in more detail end of part 4 propositions 41 to 45 recording by ok part 4 of the Ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Deanna Meilinger the Ethics by Benedict Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Alves part 4 propositions 46 to 50 propositions 46 he who lives under the guidance of reason endeavours as far as possible to render back love or kindness for other man's hatred anger contempt etc towards him proof all emotions of hatred are bad part 4 propositions 45 corollary 1 therefore he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour as far as possible to avoid being assailed by such emotions part 4 propositions 19 consequently he will also endeavour to prevent others being so assailed part 4 propositions 37 but hatred is increased by being reciprocated and can be quenched by love part 3 propositions 43 so that hatred may pass into love part 3 propositions 44 he who lives under the guidance of reason will endeavour to repay hatred with love that is with kindness what erode demonstrates on them note he who chooses to avenge words with hatred is assuredly wretched but he who strives to conquer hatred with love fights his battle in joy and confidence he withstands many as easily as one and has very little need of fortunes aid those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully not through failure but through increase in their powers all these consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding that I have no need to prove them in detail proposition 47 emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good proof emotions of hope and fear cannot exist without pain for fear is pain definition of the emotions 13 and hope, definition of the emotions explanation 12 and 13 cannot exist without fear therefore part 4 proposition 41 these emotions cannot be good in themselves but only in so far as they can restrain excessive pleasure part 4 proposition 43 note we may add that these emotions show defective knowledge and an absence of power in the mind for the same reason confidence, despair, joy and disappointment are signs of a want of mental power for although confidence and joy are pleasurable emotions they nevertheless imply a preceding pain namely hope and fear therefore the more we endeavor to be guided by reason the less do we depend on hope we endeavor to free ourselves from fear and as far as we can to dominate fortune directing our actions by the sure counsels of wisdom proposition 48 the emotions of overestimation and disparagement are always bad proof these emotions see definition of the emotions 21 and 22 are repugnant to reason and are therefore part 4 propositions 26 and 27 bad proposition 49 overestim is apt to render its object proud proof if we see that anyone rates us too highly for love's sake we are apt to become elated part 3 proposition 41 or to be pleasurably affected 30 the good which we hear of ourselves we readily believe part 3 proposition 25 and therefore for love's sake rate ourselves too highly in other words we are apt to become proud quote error at demonstrandom proposition 50 pity in a man who lives under the guidance of reason is in itself bad and useless proof pity definition part 4 of the emotions 18 is a pain and therefore part 4 proposition 41 is in itself bad the good effect which follows namely our endeavor to free the object of our pity from misery is an action which we desire to do solely at the dictation of reason part 4 proposition 37 only at the dictation of reason are we able to perform any action part 4 proposition 27 thus in a man who lives under the guidance of reason pity in itself is useless and bad quote error at demonstrandom note he who rightly realizes that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature and come to pass in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of nature will not find anything worthy of hatred, derisen and damned nor will be bestowed pity on anything but to the utmost extent of human virtue he will endeavor to do well as the saying is and to rejoice we may add that he who is easily touched with compassion and is moved by another sorrow or tears often does something which he afterwards regrets partly because we can never be sure that an action caused by emotion is good partly because we are easily deceived by all's tears I am in this place expressly speaking of a man living under the guidance of reason he who is moved to help others neither by reason nor by compassion is rightly styled in human for part 3 proposition 27 he seems unlike a man end of part 4 propositions 46 to 50 part 4 propositions 51 to 55 of the ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Deanna Moylinger the ethics by Benedict Espinoza translated by R. H. M. Alps part 4 propositions 51 to 55 proposition 51 approval is not repugnant to reason but can agree there with and arise there from proof approval is loved towards one who has done good to another definition of the emotions 19 therefore it may be referred to the mind in so far as the letter is active part 3 proposition 59 that is part 3 proposition 3 in so far as it understands agreement with reason etc quote Eredemistrandom another proof he who lives under the guidance of reason desires for others the good which he seeks for himself part 4 proposition 37 therefore from seeing someone doing good to his fellow his own endeavor to do good is aided in other words he will feel pleasure part 3 accompanied by the idea of the benefactor therefore he approves of him quote Eredemistrandom note indignation as we defined it definition of the emotions 20 is necessarily evil part 4 proposition 45 we may however remark that when the sovereign power for the sake of preserving peace punishes a citizen who has injured another should not be set to be indignant with the criminal for it is not incited by hatred to ruin him it is led by a sense of duty to punish him proposition 52 self-approval may arise from reason and that which arises from reason is the highest possible proof self-approval is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action definition of the emotions part 25 but a man's true power of action or virtue is reason herself part 3 as the sad man clearly and distinctly contemplates her part 2 proposition 40 and 43 therefore self-approval arises from reason again when a man is contemplating himself he only perceives clearly and distinctly or adequately such things as follow from his power of action part 3 definition 2 that is part 3 proposition 3 from his power of understanding therefore in such contemplation alone does the highest possible self-approval arise code error demonstrandom note self-approval is in reality the highest object for which we can hope for as we showed in part 4 proposition 25 a man endeavors to preserve his being for the sake of any ulterior object and as disapproval is more and more fostered and strengthened by praise part 3 proposition 53 corollary and on the contrary part 3 proposition 55 corollary is more and more disturbed by blame fame becomes the most powerful of incitements to action and life under this grace is almost unendurable proposition 53 humility is not a virtue or does not arise from reason proof humility is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own infirmities definition of the emotions 26 but in so far as a man knows himself by true reason he is assumed to understand his essence that is his power part 3 proposition 7 therefore if a man in self-contemplation perceives any infirmity in himself it is not by virtue of his understanding himself but part 3 proposition 55 by virtue of his power of activity being checked but if we assume that a man perceives his own infirmity by virtue of understanding something stronger than himself by the knowledge of which he determines his own power of activity this is the same as saying that we conceive that a man understands himself distinctly part 4 proposition 26 because footnote land reads quote ipsus agendi potentia uvatur which I have translated above he suggests as alternative reading to quote quo which means whereby and quote care which means and that and footnote his power of activity is aided therefore humility or the pain which arises from a man's contemplation of his own infirmity does not arise from the contemplation or reason and is not a virtue but a passion what are the most random proposition 54 repentance is not a virtue or does not arise from reason but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm proof the first part of this proposition is proved like the foregoing one the second part is proved from the mere definition of the emotion in question definition of the emotions 27 for the man allows himself to be overcome first by evil desires secondly by pain note as man seldom live under the guidance of reason these two emotions namely humility and repentance as also hope and fear bring more good than harm hence as we must sin we had better sin in that direction for if all men who are afraid to emotion were all equally proud they would shrink from nothing and would fear nothing how then could they be joined and linked together in bonds of union the crowd plays the tyrant when it is not in fear hence we need not wonder that the prophets who consulted the good not of a few but of all so strenuously commanded repentance and reverence indeed those who are afraid to these emotions may be led much more easily than others to live under the guidance of reason that is to become free and to enjoy the life of the blessed proposition 55 extreme pride or rejection indicates extreme ignorance of self proof this is evident from definition of the emotions 28 and 29 end of part 4 propositions 51 to 55