 I'll kick off with basically a comment, so I think it's mostly on Carol. You mentioned that something you had found was that the links between the FDI companies, the larger exporter-aided companies to the local economy were relatively limited in Africa as opposed to elsewhere, and that's probably true, and what we have seen in our investment is that when you go to places where you have lots of sort of smaller companies in the same area or bigger clusters, etc., the chances of you sort of bringing more and more the production of various inputs into that location are better. But as the DFI concerned with creating jobs, our approach, our learning has been that in most cases, the big chunk of the jobs is not in the companies that we finance, it's in the upstream, downstream, it's somewhere, it's in the connections. And we see really, really, really large connections, maybe not in manufacturing, but let's say mobile telecommunication, which in the beginning of this century, just after the turn of the millennium, was very much the DFI thing, the private sector hadn't entered that again yet, and the development finance institution were doing it at the time when Moe Ibrahim sold his cell-tel company operating in a number of countries in Africa. He said that he had, I think he said he had one million points of sale, small companies selling those scratch cards and selling their time, etc., which was the start of a huge number of businesses, some of which actually are our clients now in a number of sectors. So there was a sort of a big impact on SMEs from that. Likewise, when we invest in power sector, we think that the employment input is huge, not in that windmill park providing lots of employment, but in the use of power, people having access to power. Likewise, if you look at, let's say, forest replantations in southern highlands of Tanzania, there are these thousands and thousands of small holders all around them planting trees since they think that the market is going to be there for their product. So we see lots and lots of sort of connections between large and small companies, even in Africa. Yeah. And I think that that's precisely where some of the opportunities are for employment generation from large-scale FDI investments. In our study, we don't find those linkages for manufacturing, we just don't. But obviously in other sectors, you're going to see it. I mean, if I look at the Irish example, I mean, this is where most of our employment growth in our SME sector came from, was from large FDI firms like Intel, like Dell, coming into Ireland back in the 1990s, and then it was through all of the supply chain linkages that we had this massive growth of employment in the domestic sector. So it's those kinds of linkages that I think the real opportunities are. I mean, it's obviously the case that it there in other sectors, but in manufacturing, you just don't see it. Just surprising. Okay. We have lots of hands up. So. Thank you. Roger Williamson Institute for Development Studies. A question to Andy and Carol, particularly, but others, welcome to comment. Implicit in what you've said, there's probably quite a story about jobs in rural areas and urban areas. What do you think that story is? So my name is Ricardo Santos from UNUWider in Mozambique. And thank you so much for the presentations, first of all. And my question is the first one is a little bit of a provocation to Andy. And to see if it would be possible to add in your reflection, two other crises that have been, that are topics of this conference. So one is how does it relate to the migration refugee crisis, considering that Africa seems to have a little bit of a demographic labor market's own dynamics in the world that suggests that migration from Africa is an evidence. And the other is how does that relate also with something we talked about in the trade session, it's global value chains and this trend of manufacturing more and more automated. So therefore labor saving. And if I could then ask Carol to give us a hand on Mozambique. And so it seems that Mozambique has a very shallow formal economy which gives, which suggests that FDI in Mozambique has a potential of making a shock of introducing the introduction of a new formal industry in Mozambique might switch the structure of the market in a way that complements what Sam was suggesting, which is kind of, it's not, the current structure is not enough. It needs to be changed in a way. But which FDI would work there? Hello, my name is Lea Nakatama from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I have also a question to Andy. Thank you very much for the very informative presentation. I was wondering if you've considered gender gap as part of your analysis. You talk about agriculture in formal sector investments, sectors where investments have been made. They are very, the gender dynamics are there and such. And then again, education, relationship with fertility and such things. So I was kind of missing that link in all of this. So when we talk about people who need jobs, who are these people? And do we need to consider also some sort of discrimination that we need to address as part of the solution? Thank you. Andy, do you start? Yeah, I think there's a set of questions. I think some of this comes down to is who's going to create all these jobs? That's an issue. I mean, at the moment, there seem to be three sources. There's obviously, there's a foreign investment and that obviously, I would include in that the spillovers into local firms that feed or are supported or thrive through foreign investment. Then there's, and so that creates a lot of, particularly a lot of jobs for parts of the labor force that have slightly more skills, a bit more education. And they're probably higher, the productivity, higher productivity jobs. Then you got SMEs, which of course, as Carol pointed out, they employ a lot of people, but probably the net gain is not significant and they're very low productivity, but these are the way most people stay alive. And then there's also state and enterprise, which we haven't really talked about very much. Perhaps there's a discussion behind that. I mean, there's a silent, a silent sort of right word. There's a kind of resurgence of developmentalism, particularly if you look across some of the middle-income countries, like Indonesia, where the state and enterprises survived the privatisation process and are now largely minority-owned state and enterprises, where governments use a variety of mechanisms, formal and informal, and whether those achieve the developmental objectives that they hope, I think it is an open question at the moment. But I think there's an issue about if you wanted large-scale employment, the kind we're talking about for rural people or for those with low levels of education, or low levels of formal education, it seems to me SMEs are limited in what they'll ever deliver, apart from just about staying alive. Foreign investment is very good for the economy and national development overall, also certainly if the government is able to put in place a framework that manages foreign investment. I mean, a lot of people talk about the relationship between aid and growth in the econometrics. I don't think maybe people realise that the FDI and growth relationship is also incredibly difficult to find in the econometrics. So it really suggests there's a huge heterogeneity in how governments manage foreign investment and whether they're able to put in place some of these things. I think there's also an issue, I mean, one of the issues around deindustrialisation or reindustrialisation or whatever you frame it. I mean, Roderick talks a lot about his thesis is that trade liberalisation has created a situation where protected industries suddenly can't compete. He also did mention China. I mean, I think you can't ignore the fact that most countries, if they're moving up the value-added chain, are going to be competing with China and bits of East Asia, and that's not an easy thing to do. So in terms of the kind of rural urban story taking each of the questions in turn, I think there's, I mean, East Asia was very successful in promoting rural manufacturing, where the assumption would be that manufacturing is very much an urban affair. But again, it takes a developmental estate to put these things together, and of course there's limits to that, and there's the thing about the financing and so forth. I think there's also an issue about, I mean, obviously there's this, the numbers that on responding to Ricardo, the numbers on refugees and migration, of course, are going to be a big deal over the next 7, 200 years, I would expect. I mean, if you believe the projections and the medium variant projections, you're talking about an extra billion jobs in Sub-Saharan Africa every decade. So that's a huge number of jobs. And if they're high productivity jobs, there's not going to be, there's not necessarily going to be a large number of them. So I think, again, it sort of comes back to who's going to create these jobs and, you know, how's that going to be done, and what role is the state going to take in managing, if they're managing foreign investment, which is easier for, you know, China can manage foreign investment, but it's much harder for countries with less technical expertise and less clout when it comes to negotiating with large companies. And then underlying this is always sort of a question to mark about technology and automation that comes back to the deindustrialization thesis, which is basically arguing, you know, over the next 50 or so years, I mean, even if you live in an OECD country, I'd worry about what jobs my children will get, let alone, you know, children in Mozambique. And so the opportunities that perhaps came up for East Asia aren't the sort of opportunities that will be there in over the next 30 to 50 years, because a lot of the things that are being done, yes, simple things that once 3D printing becomes on industrial scale, it's going to change a lot of these opportunities for national economic development. But in all this doom and gloom, I don't actually have any answers, but I think there's some interesting avenues to go down in terms of some of the conceptual ideas about inclusive structural change, but also some of the field work and looking more closely at countries and how, you know, how was it East Asia did provide, at least for a period of time, a substantial number of essential proportion or a substantial increase in job creation over time. And on the gender dynamics, I can see I could speculate about them, but I don't know, so I probably shouldn't speculate. Tonning, do you want to add to this or...? Can you come back? Okay, okay. Yeah, I don't think I have answers to these questions, but I guess I can comment a little bit. So first on the rural urban issue, it's clear that the types of policies that you would try to put in place to promote job creation in urban areas are going to be different to those in rural areas. I mean, you're seeing a lot of rural urban migrations, so a lot of people are coming to the cities to find jobs, but I think the same principles will probably apply in terms of developing and promoting agribusiness in linking in small holders with larger scale operators. There's also potential in terms of agritourism, those kinds of things, so I think that there is, it's just a matter of, you know, as what Andy says, it's just a matter of having a state that is developmental state that is thinking about the rural areas in the same ways they're thinking about the urban areas. So yeah, I think that there are a different set of policies that that would be put in place. On the Mozambique case, I mean, I don't know what sector you should attract FDI into Mozambique, but what I would say is that, I mean, what makes more sense is to think about the supply chain and think about where the linkages could potentially be. That's not an easy thing to do, you can't really know, and sometimes it is just a shock that happens and then just things happen organically after that. But I mean, I'd be interested to read more about it and to think more about that one. But I mean, the principle is there that, I mean, you track the foreign firms, if you have kind of the underlying capabilities there for firms to benefit from the linkages with those FDI firms, and you do see, in other cases, you do see these productivity spillovers emerging. The only other comment on the gender gap, and I think, I mean, it's not something that featured in our research, so I can't comment specifically on it, but I do think that it's something we have to pay attention to. It's for the job opportunities are, I mean, there is a gender dimension there. We know from other studies that it's women, the jobs created for women are different than the jobs created for men in many of these cases, so certainly I would say more research is needed there to push that agenda. Not that anyone asked me a question, but... No, Joe, don't let that stop me. No, exactly, quite. Just to pick up on two things, I think the issue of technological changes is, I think, very relevant for many countries, and in particular, low-income countries. The graphic I showed about the projected number of individuals in Mozambique, workers without a full primary education, is very interesting when we think about that technology is typically replacing people at the lower end of the skill spectrum, in many cases, right? So that's going to be incredibly more challenging, and just to give one anecdotal example, a lot of the discussion around industrialization in Mozambique and actually many other sub-Saharan African countries is agro-industry. We've got huge amounts of agricultural production. Why don't we put the value added through agro-industry? A lot of technological changes are happening in agro-industries, so cashew nut production now. There's new technologies which are coming in which can de-shell the cashew nuts very cheaply, much more efficiently, than having a room full of 500 women de-shelling them, and that is extremely challenging. And there's firms in Mozambique now who are setting up high productivity cashew nut de-shelling operations and can't find the workers because they need higher-skill workers and they don't work in those regions. They're not available in those regions. So there are these kinds of shifts happening which are making the manpower planning even more acute and difficult. And it's very difficult for anyone really to know what's really going to happen. Predictions are always wrong, essentially, when it comes to these very long-term changes. The only other point I think I'd like to mention is that we often think about industrialization in a very country-specific way, but it's very clear that the real patterns and drivers underlying successful cases of industrialization have to take into account the global environment. What's happening with the... What is the opportunity cost of cheap labor? Where are the opportunities for labor-intensive manufacturing? Where are the... What are the global trends in the value chains? Again, very difficult to predict, but that's where we need to think about how can some of these sub-Saharan African countries take advantage of opportunities that open up in terms of these broader global patterns. It makes it much more difficult to figure out, but I think we have to move out of the kind of national silo of thinking. I think it's only about our local policies. We have to think of that in a wider context. And that's why regional trade policy is so important. Oh, sorry. Yeah. Okay, so everyone, let me just throw in a few thoughts which respond to the questions that we may before we take the next round. On the rural urban issue, but also the sort of formal versus informal employment composition of jobs. Development economics, traditionally, I had this view that this goes back to classical development economics, but eventually the process of development is defined by a movement of people from agriculture into something like manufacturing or from informal into formal employment, the classic Lewis type mechanisms. What we actually see in Sam's graph, the projections for Mozambique quite ably showed that is the informal sector is actually probably still going up in many of these economies. Now, as economists, we can sort of continue to talk about employment almost in that classical sense, almost eventually the informal sector is going to kind of wither away. But the evidence is against us. This is a point made by Marcia Chen and the WeGo group. Marcia has a paper coming out with wider, by the end of the year, on informal employment. And one big point that she makes is that economists have got to start thinking a little bit differently about informal employment. Informal employment is not something that's going to wither away. Actually, it's probably going to become bigger and bigger in our lifetimes. And this actually goes to the point about gender raised by the person from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland. There's, of course, a lot of women work in the informal sector. It's a very female sector, not exclusively so. And so if you're looking for ways to improve the empowerment of women in employment, to raise their productivity and ultimate their earnings, you're looking at the informal sector to a degree. But that also includes large investments in the care economy because women, disproportionately in the care economy, looking after family members and sickness and health, whether they hold an informal job or a formal job. To degree, you can start to invest some of the resource rents that you get from things like extractive industries in improving support to women in the care economy. Some mechanisms of social protection provide additional income to the households to allow women to cope with those time burdens. But the challenge of generating female employment is a very large one. And I don't, in any of that, want to suggest that the discussion around formal employment is going off track, but is not. But as we've seen from both Carol and Andy and Sam, we don't want to be pessimistic, but we have to be very realistic. Particularly as we might be starting to have some headwinds, including the reshoring potentially of jobs back to the developed world. And that's certainly something that politics in the richer world is in favor of, reshoring jobs back to the United States and so forth. Ricardo's point about just sort of the interconnections between the jobs crisis and some of the other crises that were raising in the conference. One thing we haven't actually discussed in this session is climate change. And wider has actually done a lot of work on climate change, including for Mozambique. And of course, climate change is going to impact particularly the availability of livelihoods in the agricultural sector. The potential interest of foreign investors, for good or bad, in the agricultural sector. Something that we have been looking for in terms of Mozambique, also Vietnam, and other economies. So the forces driving migration, environmental refugees, are much more than simply jobs per se. They will be environmental stress and climate change. Those, of course, those forces, the very forces can destroy jobs as well. And that leads to me to the thought about, you know, one question that we need to think about, perhaps in this session a little bit more, is the jobs and livelihoods for the vast number of displaced people we have now, internally displaced people within the conflict countries, Syria, Iraq, Libya, refugees. You know, we used to think of their job crises as not peripheral, but in some ways, you know, small numbers. But they're very, very large numbers now, as we can see. They actually have a lot of capital, some of them. There's quite a lot of what we might call diaspora capital, access to funds. You know, how might that be deployed for reinvestment back in these economies as they reconstruct, as they stabilize from water peace? Jules Carbinias in the audience might want to come in on these points, because Jules works on humanitarian economics. So I think those are my just kind of additional thoughts on these issues. One final one is, again, this was set off by thinking about SAM's paper. And this, again, is how we've changed in development economics that, you know, we used to think of developing countries as very capital constrained. And you think back to the classical, you know, two-gap, three-gap model. You know, the problem is getting capital. But what SAM showed was actually, Mozambique can get a lot of capital, a lot of foreign investment. It has a current macro problem, but that's not associated with its longer-term investment prospects. So, you know, one thing that's improved is we seem to have improved the capital flow problem, not for all countries, not for all sectors, but it's better than it was 30 years ago, partly through the actions of FIN Fund and the other DFIs, but also through private investors. But we still have this jobs crisis. So, it seems to me that, as development economists, we've got to rethink some of our basic premises or at least question them. You know, are these capital scarce economies anymore? Anyway, those are my thoughts. Next three. We start from the back. Thank you. My name is Rob Foss from the FAO. I like very much the presentation, but I most like the last two intervention because I think those are the issues we should be talking about. A lot of the presentations sounded very traditional in old-fashioned talk about structural chains, moving from low productivity to higher productivity sectors, without looking more precisely what's happening within those sectors and between those sectors and what dynamic is really going on. So, first question is, for instance, and since I work for the Food and Agriculture Organization, I think I should say, is agriculture really a low productivity sector? If you... Some recent studies done for Africa, if you calculate agricultural outputs per hour of work and not per worker, then a lot of the differences with the non-nuclear culture sectors disappear. What's the point there? You could say, well, what does it matter to a farmer if his income is still low, whether it's then, by that definition, called a higher sector? But what it means, there's a lot of under-employment which could be used. And some lot of farmers used the off-season to find employee in other sectors already to diversify. What it also means is a lot of potential to develop, to raise productivity, create more production, if there's better use of that surplus labor in the sector. And what we see, and that's the dynamics coming from food industries and from dietary change, change in dietary patterns, there's a lot more scope to do so. With urbanization, income grows, also in Africa, we see more demand for fruits, vegetables, meats and so on, which can be used in the off-season or can be produced in the off-season from the staple crops and so on. Now, and we see that happening and that's changing quite a bit of the dynamics, but what it means, we need to look at the dynamics between the sectors and what facilitates that that dynamics takes place. So that requires investing in rural urban linkages in cold storage, in cold transportation and better distribution systems to make that happen. And out of that, you can create a lot of jobs. So we see a lot of that dynamics. It's very uneven and that's what you should look at. On rural urban linkages, what we find is that those can be very strong dynamizers of both of poverty reduction, and stimulate agriculture productivity growth, particularly if it's through non-farm activities, not necessarily rural, but in smaller, small townships, small rural townships, small cities, rather than what happens in the big cities. And the several parts of Africa we've seen that dynamics are growing. So again, those linkages and strengthening, looking at that would be important. The final point is where Andy started out, which we didn't see at the back at the end, is this demographic bulge. There's one constraint, and that's where the real jobs crisis is bound to be concentrated, is in this huge bulge. Because even if we manage to do this, agriculture has become a larger employer or help absorb this growing labor force, where we know non-agriculture sex can't do it, we also find in our practical work is that a lot of youths don't want to work in agriculture or stay in rural areas. So what needs to be done to change that around? And I think that's where we'll find, at least over the coming couple of decades, where we find huge problems and a real crisis which will spill over to other crises, migration, conflict. What have you? Mr. Campagnier, thank you very much. I just want to come back also to what Sam said, where saying we don't really know where the next big opportunity for labor-intensive activities might emerge, and the remark of the representative of FAO on demographics. I was really struck last year by the African economic outlook, which went at length on demographics, and just there is one indication with regard to how the workforce will evolve between 2010 and 2050. Sub-Saharan Africa, 830 million more. North Africa, 80 million additions, so it's over 910 million increase in the workforce for Africa alone. China, minus 150 million. Europe, minus 100 million. So I think these are seed changes which really resonate very much with Ricardo, but not our Ricardo, David Ricardo, meaning a change in comparative advantages where Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular has been for so long land abundant, relatively land abundant, and relatively labor scarce, which was the contrary in Southeast Asia, so no wonder that each region specialized where they had a comparative advantage, and this might change right now. And my question maybe to the panelists, I don't know who would like to take this up, is that do you see this happening? Carol, you have done some research in Ethiopia, for instance, I understand that Chinese investments have started to relocate even from Cambodia or places like that into, for instance, Ethiopia, but what I hear is really anecdotal. And my question is whether we see that actually this relative abundance of labor is materializing in an opportunity for industrialization. Also maybe in Rwanda, because Rwanda, from what I understand, the government very much wants to emulate the Southeast Asian miracle recipe, and it is a labor abundant country, so do we see this starting to happen? Because if it doesn't happen, it means that the Syrian refugee crisis, as we see it today in Europe, is a courtesy visit compared to what looms ahead of us. And maybe just a final question to Andy. With regard to aid, if I understand you correctly, we should all switch to South-South cooperation, India, Chinese style, meaning focusing much more on infrastructure and investing on, well, this is a question, whereas actually South-South cooperation as exercised by China in Africa is kind of the type of changes that you think might really impact on the capacity for industrialization and greater investment in labor-intensive activities. I can clarify first. A final question and now very short. All right, thank you. I'm Susan Kavma from Uganda. The first one is a clarification from Andy, the difference between industry and manufacturing. I saw it appearing in the presentation you gave. Then, Tokaro, you mentioned that we should focus on the large firms and I was wondering that, besides FDIs, it is government, but we know that most of the governments in developing countries are resource constrained, especially most of them are running budget deficits. And then if you look at the employees in public firms on a permanent basis, and given the baby boom, a youth has to wait for 40 to 50 years before this person retires at 70 or 60. So I want how we can go about promoting these large firms as opposed to the small firms that are producing indecent jobs. Then the other question is to do with the lack of capabilities that you mentioned, Karo, in your presentation. What is the problem? Is it skills gap that they don't have the skills? The human resource doesn't have the skills for the management or it is an experience problem? And as Sam was presenting, I thought about the issue of job creation and productivity. And I thought that perhaps for developing countries, the focus should be more on job creation, given the high population growth rates we have. Because I asked myself, what is the incentive to invest in productivity technologies that will increase labor productivity when I can get an extra pass on cheaply? So I think we need to think about that. So the incentive to really boost productivity amidst this high supply of labor. And lastly, the jobless growth. What could be causing this jobless growth? I think Sam, you mentioned that most of the productivity is in the mining sector. And perhaps we need to think about how we are locating resources in the different sectors. Could it be that there is a misallocation of resources even on the macro level that we end up having the jobless growth? Because we know that in most of these developing countries, it is agriculture where people are, majority are. But for some reason, they don't get the share that is seen in other countries. Thank you. Hi, thanks. So I think there's an interesting question in terms of aid, ODA, and what the international community might do about any of these things. I mean, some of my recent work has shown how most middle income countries could reallocate. Changes in fiscal policy would be more than enough to bring three quarters of the world up to $5 a day. After the first or second year of that of transfers, of course, presumably it would create a multiplier effect of some kind. And then there'd be huge sums of money potentially for infrastructure and economic development. So one thing actually building what Tony said, I think in addition to the capital question, the good news in a way is that I think there's many countries, but not obviously not the poorest in the world, have substantial resources now in terms of money that could be spent. I mean, some of the recent work we were doing as well, the spending on regressive fossil fuel subsidies is over $1 trillion a year in the developing world. And that could be redirected for one piece of work we were doing. So I mean, at the moment, the annual ODA budget is whatever, $138 billion a year of which I think 25% is combined to economic infrastructure and production as categorized by the DAC. So that actually now, that sort of gives you whatever, $35 billion. So there's potentially $100 billion there that's most of which is going into social spending. So there's a question mark. I'm not sure what my actual opinion is on this. It's a thought. Is there a situation where many developing countries are now in a situation to fund social policy, but it's quite difficult to fund long run infrastructure when the benefits are over 20, 25 years time. It's difficult for politicians to be spending a lot of money. I mean, yeah, it's the sort of a kind of shift from, it would really shift the kind of ADA's poverty reduction or has become a social development to effectively, I don't know, ADA's concrete. You can see in a way the Asian infrastructure bank is obviously thinking ahead on some of these issues. There's an enormous need for infrastructure in developing countries. And it's the upfront costs are very high and the benefits take a lot of time to come. It seems to me that's an interesting area for aid to think about a bit more. And obviously you could not only with a B short run stimulus in terms of enormous amount of job creation, you'd obviously be pushing the production possibility frontier and increasing long run economic development. On some of the other issues, but as I say, I'm not sure how I feel about this. But I think there's a debate to be had there, I think. I mean, on some of the other issues, I think, well, in an ideal world, the countries that were labor abundance, those people could migrate to the countries with labor shortages. And that would be what Arthur Lewis originally intended in, although there was only a smaller account of the open economy in the original model, a major exposition of the model. You know, Europe is going to be 100 million people less than maybe migration Europe isn't so bad. But then these are very difficult political arguments to make, I think, particularly this moment in time. And I think the final thing would just be are to respond, Rob, on thinking about agriculture. At the point you made about different ways of measuring productivity, I think that's really interesting. I hadn't thought about that before. I guess it comes back to the kind of response of which countries have ever got rich on agriculture. I mean, that's the kind of, if you can come back to it with a response on that. But maybe it's not about getting rich, it's about providing reasonable jobs. But who's going to provide those jobs? I think it's still an underlying question. Is it SMEs? Is it state-owned enterprises? Is it foreign direct investment? Who's the employer? And just a quick afterthought, I don't know where things are with land reform in terms of the debates around land reform and agriculture at the moment. I'm just aware that land reform was an absolute prerequisite in East Asia for building a capital-owning class in a national bourgeoisie. And so I don't know when where debates around land reform are in Africa at the moment, but I'd be curious to have that kind of hear more about that sort of things. Thank you for the questions. I don't have too much extra to add on top of what Andy said. I do agree with a lot of what he said, particularly in terms of the short-term benefits from infrastructural investment and the jobs that can be created from that. I think that's an important point. Going to the question about the relocation, I'm not sure what the evidence is actually on that specifically. Like you, most of the evidence I have is anecdotal and that there is somewhat of relocation of firms from Southeast Asia to African countries, but I'm not sure if it's materialized to the extent that it could, but we certainly identified as an opportunity in our work as something where jobs could be created in the future. The question relating to the focus on foreign firms and the focus on large firms, I think that there can also be a focus on the productive, small to medium-sized enterprises and allowing them to or facilitating them, graduating into becoming larger firms, but in some ways that involves picking winners at the end of the day. And there's something to be said for formal sector employment and promoting formal sector employment because it's from that basis you can build a tax system which will inject resources into the public sector that can then be used for whatever social spending or for infrastructure investment or whatever the case may be. In terms of the capabilities, I think it's a combination of a number of capabilities. The number of studies that have shown that the management that in many developing countries, the capabilities in terms of managing larger firms and managing firms with both a certain size threshold are difficult and there have been some interesting experimental work that's looked at providing management training to small to medium-sized enterprises and has seen very significant effects on productivity as a result of that. So it's an emerging area that is being looked at, but there are also other things like skills mismatches and investing in skills, also experience, also learning and all of these things. So the capabilities stems across a range of different areas, but it also relates to a lack of underlying complexity in terms of the types of sectors that are productive or that types of sectors that are in operation domestically. You don't have the sectors there to begin with. You don't have that experience and that learning that you can't feed into the supply chain as a result of it. So I think that's all I'll say. Yeah, just I guess two or three comments. So first apologies to the first comment if they found the talk a little bit traditional and boring. However, what I would say in response though is that I think some of the issues that you were raising about the importance of value chains and intersectoral linkages, I don't think anyone would deny not at all. But if you look at the kinds of studies that are done in Mozambique on those points, they do come back to fundamental issues. Fundamental issues, for example, why on value chains getting going? Lack of infrastructure, lack of access to capital, problems with electricity. So a range of these fundamental issues come back time and time again. And I think that's important and that comes back also to the issue about what is the magnitude of the challenge that we're facing. Also with respect to intersectoral linkages, I mean a lot of the work we have done has actually looked at that in some more detail. So there is some academic work I can point you to comparing, for example, Mozambique and Vietnam in terms of the quality and the nature of the multipliers linking different sectors. So I'd be happy to show you that. With respect to job creation versus job productivity, I think it's an interesting, very interesting point. In a sense my answer would be both please. Of course we want the job creation in terms of the new firms and formal sector firms creating lots of new jobs. But we have to remember that those that can't find jobs there are going to go somewhere and they're typically not going to just be unemployed. They will be working. And so raising the productivity of these other workers is also fundamentally critical. Whether we like it or not, they're very likely to go into agriculture. So raising the productivity of workers in agriculture remains a crucial task. And that was why I was mentioning that point. Finally, why have we got this jobless growth? Well, I think if I'd love to be able to give you the answer, I guess, I think there's lots of different theories. One of the theories that comes out of a long tradition of sociology and political science is this kind of extraversion of African elites. I think that's quite an interesting one. But maybe more simply and more practically, what's easier? Is it easier to negotiate with a large investor, a foreign investor, or get agriculture going? And I think part of this comes back to a state effectiveness problem. It's very difficult for some of the low income countries to manage and effectively intervene in complex areas such as agriculture. It's much easier to write a law and say, okay, here you go, Anadarko, you don't pay tax. And that is potentially, I'm not saying it's the only reason, but I think it's part of reason about state effectiveness. And that is an issue that's ongoing. Thank you. And then I'll give you some final thoughts. Starting with jobless growth, to my mind, one of the biggest problems is there just is not enough deployment of expansionary fiscal policy in the richer world. But a lot of the debates in the richer world would be quite easily resolved if the richer world would just accept that it could actually run a more expansionary fiscal policy. Because the cost of borrowing is now extraordinarily low because of monetary policy. Monetary policy is basically run out of traction. This is the zero interest rate debate and so on. We need a fiscal expansion. It needs to be coordinated across the richer world. Insofar as it's coordinated across the richer world and would generate more jobs in the richer world, but also have secondary multiplier effects on the developing world. But it will also allow the richer world to stop these endlessly stupid debates about we cannot afford to invest more in the developing world. We cannot afford more humanitarian aid. We cannot afford to invest more in development banks, in multilateral banks. The fiscal constraint is not there. What is there is a sort of ultra-conservative fiscal conservatism which John Maynard Keynes would be spinning his grave about. So that's a rather old-fashioned Keynesian view. And I think that is my answer to jobless growth. My final point is, this comes off Jules's point about demographic change, the youth bulge in Africa, the declining workforce in China. In some ways, what we've got to break away from is the idea that globally there is what economists call a lump of labour fallacy. The lump of labour fallacy is that my job takes your job away. What we've seen over a thousand years is enormous population growth and more jobs created. Politicians in the richer world cynically operate with the lump of labour fallacy. They say what is an American job should not be a Chinese job, should not be a Mozambican job. We know from development economics that if we get growth in Vietnam going at 8% or whatever it is, we generate a lot more jobs for Vietnamese obviously, but a lot more jobs for foreign investors trading with Vietnam, for global value chains that connect Finnish companies and British companies and whatever with Vietnamese companies. You know, we get some winning games. So we have to change the narrative around jobs from this if I have a job, you don't have a job, to if I have a job, two of you might have a job, because I'll have more income, I'll need more services, there'll be more growth, more employment. Yeah, that's what we have to change. So that's my final thought. There will be many more questions, but we have used up our time. There is no way I can summarize this discussion in the end, but let me finish with one point. In agriculture, there has been lots of thinking over the decades on how you can use basically the modern sector or government or large companies to improve the productivity of the small holders. There you have your extension, you have your agricultural research, you have your input supply, you have your seed industry, et cetera, et cetera. What we now have given that there is this large informal sector is a question that what would be the equivalent of research and extension and input supply for all those informal sectors? How can the formal sector link to all those people who can't find those jobs in the formal sector? One famous example is the cell phone and the mobile payment systems. One part of what has been really inefficient in the informal sector is how you pay and how you get paid, the payment systems. And we have MPSS and others now going on. There are many other things. How you learn things, how you train yourself and all sorts of educational side and many other areas where somehow linking the larger companies or the formal sector to the informal sector or the semi-formal sector, there seems to be lots of potential. And for instance, at FinFUN, we have seen a number of interesting projects that are exactly in that space trying to bring those two things together. So there is an interesting area. Thanks.