 As you all know, the EU-Turkey relationship covers everything from enlargement negotiation to the current massive issue of Turkey's role in the European and Middle Eastern migration crisis. It also covers issues like the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus, which is a huge issue and one which is being negotiated at the moment and which could develop in a positive way in months ahead, which would be very significant for the whole future development of European relationships in that part of the world. So without any further ado, Simon, perhaps you could get us going and bring us up to date in the simple tasks that you conduct for the Commission. Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I think of all the daunting tasks I've faced this year, the one that's worried me the most is how to present the complexity of the EU-Turkey relations and recent developments while respecting the 15 to 20 minute time slot I've been given. I'll do my best, but I'm sure we'll have plenty of space left for questions and answers and an exploration of some of the other avenues of this complex and detailed relationship. Let me start by saying that on the 15th of July, Turkey witnessed a direct attack on its democracy symbolised by the shelling of the Grand National Assembly, and I sometimes ask myself how would I as a British citizen have felt if the Royal Air Force had bombed the House of Commons? I think that's a question that at times is worth asking ourselves because it explains and allows us to better understand the profound shock of this coup on the Turkish population and perhaps why some of the Turkish politicians felt that the necessary empathy and understanding was not always shown by their European Union counterparts. I think we have to be clear, this was an unacceptable act in any country in the world and the EU was also amongst the very first actors to condemn the coup attempt, while at the same time expressing as well its solidarity with the democratic institutions in Turkey. There have been a very large number of visits in the recent weeks to Turkey. I myself have been to Turkey three times in the last four weeks with Commissioner Avramopoulos, President Schulz, Commissioner Hahn, High Representative Vice President Mogherini, we've also had contacts at the presidential level, and this has I think already intensified what was a very high frequency of high level visits from the EU to Turkey in the last 12 months. I think what we've seen in the last period is bringing back onto a track or a level of engagement the EU-Turkey relations which we've not seen for many, many years, certainly not since 2007. This has in part been triggered by the migration crisis and I intend to devote a fair amount of my short time today to also talking to you a bit about where are we on the EU-Turkey migration statement, the implementation, what does this imply, what is the real state of this. But let me start perhaps by taking a step back into history because I think it's worthwhile just framing the EU-Turkey relationship by looking at the stage of our development. Turkey is a candidate country for EU membership. We opened accession negotiations in 2005, so that's some 11 years ago. They initially progressed reasonably well but we've seen them actually effectively almost stall in recent years. So if we take a snapshot of where we are today, we've seen 16 chapters opened out of which only one is provisionally closed and we're also not able to close chapters at the moment because that is one of the consequences of the decision taken by all the member states as a response to Turkey's failure to implement what we call the additional protocol but which in simple terms means Turkey is not effectively recognising or allowing at least the customs union to be extended, the benefit of the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus. But there are reasons over and beyond this which explain why the accession process has not necessarily progressed as fast as we would want. First is quite clearly the unresolved Cyprus issue. Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 as a divided island. Unfortunately in the referendum on the Anham Plan at that time one side voted against but we've still been left with an issue which has constantly impacted on EU-Turkey relations. Partly as I said before because Turkey has continued to deny access to Cypriot vessels, Cypriot airplanes to its airspace and to its ports. I'll come on perhaps later in the presentation to how I assess the current situation in Cyprus and what this might mean but that had a direct impact on the negotiations in the sense that the European Union also said not only could no chapters be provisionally closed but eight chapters that were very closely linked with the customs union could not be opened with Turkey until Turkey effectively fulfills the commitment it gave at the time of its accession that it would apply the additional protocol and allow vessels and planes from Cyprus to travel to and from Turkey. But in addition to that we also have a further number of chapters which have been unilaterally blocked by Cyprus, meaning that key areas such as chapters related to the rule of law or also energy are not available for us to be able to as the European Union negotiate with Turkey. I think it's fair to say also we've seen a mixed view or mixed position from some of our member states. We had during the time of President Sarkozy's time as president in France particular difficulties with France who had said okay to carry on your accession negotiations but there are some chapters which you can't open such as agriculture, regional policy, budget because we don't want to give the impression that this is about Turkey joining the European Union. I must admit I've always struggled to understand quite what the purpose of accession negotiation should be if that wasn't the case but never mind. And all of this has of course had an impact as well on public opinion in Turkey from very high public support for a European Union membership of Turkey in Turkey in the early 2000s. We've seen that steadily decreasing over time and last but certainly not least I think we have to also recognize that the domestic politics in Turkey and particularly what we have seen at times on areas related to freedom of expression, rule of law have not always created a climate in which we are comfortable or member states are comfortable in seeing the accession process progress. If you take for example our annual reports on candidate countries we use quite strong language such as backsliding to describe the developments in the area of freedom of expression or the rule of law last year where we're seeing developments which have actually undermined some of the quite considerable progress we saw from Turkey in the initial years after it became a candidate country. Now but this relationship goes much beyond just an accession relationship. One thing I would just quote to give you an example is the importance of trade in our relationship. Turkey is a key partner for the European Union, it's our fifth biggest trading partner but equally the European Union is a key partner for Turkey. The European Union is Turkey's biggest number one import and export partner 40% of Turkey's trade occurs with the European Union and 70% of foreign direct investment in Turkey emanates and comes from the European Union and one of the reasons for this is for now 20 years we've had a customs union something perhaps which the British colleagues are now studying carefully to understand what this implies and what it doesn't imply also in terms of your ability to sign free trade agreements with third partners and when the customs union was signed with Turkey 20 years ago it was probably one of the most far-reaching ambitious trade arrangements that the European Union ever concluded with a party. Give you an example an industrial good produced in Turkey has today the same access to the single market as an industrial good produced in Dublin but what we're also seeing is that this trade relationship over time has also been overtaken by developments in the modern world so whereas the customs union 20 years ago didn't include services services dominate large parts of our economy today and one of the things my team are working on at the moment with my colleagues in DG trade is on a project to upgrade and modernize the customs union to extend it to the services sector extend it to public procurement cover agricultural products and also have an effective dispute resolution mechanism so that's one of the big axes of work we're seeing at the moment and where we're expecting to if all goes well present to the council a proposal for a negotiating mandate still this year on energy as well this is another area where we have a huge interest in working together Turkey quite clearly has the potential to become the primary transit country for energy supply to the European Union and is a key strategic partner for us we've intensified our discussions with Turkey over the last period we've seen a lot of work around the Trans Anatolian gas pipeline bringing the gas from Azerbaijan into the European Union where Turkey again plays a crucial role and will continue to do so it goes without saying that as a foreign policy actor Turkey is an important and strategic partner one only needs to look at the developments in Syria and witness the tragic events on an almost daily basis to see that the EU and Turkey working together will be an essential prerequisite for any solution to the Syrian crisis and putting to an end the the tragic humanitarian disaster we continue to witness it also comes back very prominently when we look at the migration crisis where I think it is the moment now to pay tribute to Turkey for hosting in relatively good conditions three million refugees in on its territory and if we see some of the debate that occurs within the European Union around this I think it's the right moment to pay tribute to that with Turkey having also taken other courageous decisions like for example opening its labour market to the Syrian refugees granting them full access to the education services to the health services with our support about which I'll come back to in a moment now I'd like just to take a step back to the migration crisis if we go back actually to around one year ago we were seeing in the month of September and October up to 10,000 people crossing the AGMC on a night large numbers of people losing their lives because the smugglers had many interests but ensuring the safe passage of people was not one of them and we were frankly in a bit of a mess and as a result of this I think the cooperation between Turkey and the European to try and solve European Union to try and solve this intensified and this culminated in what is called the EU Turkey Statement of the 18th of March 2016 which I think was a turning point in breathing some new life into our relations with Turkey but also into providing the beginnings of a solution together with the closure of the western Balkan route to the migration crisis that the European Union was faced with it provided both sides with a series of mutual commitments we on our side agreed to up our support in terms of funding also work with Turkey to accelerate the visa liberalisation process but it also provided a series of commitments on the Turkish side to effectively stepping up their action to combat the smuggling rings and stepping up their action to provide further support to the Syrian refugees on their territory now if you read the European Union press at times you would probably have the impression that the deal has collapsed the statement is failing and everything is not working well actually that is not at all the case and I think one of perhaps the best kept secrets in Brussels is that while the statement is still fragile it needs a lot of love and attention it is still holding up let me give you a couple of examples that back that up as I said before we were facing up to 10,000 people a night crossing the Aegean Sea and since the activation of the statement on the 18th of March the numbers have dramatically fallen we're now on an average of 94 per day since the 18th of March I think one thing that's also important to to really underline here is lives have been saved that's critical it's not something that we're actually very good at getting across if you take for example the first three months of this year January to March before the activation of the statement 366 people lost their lives crossing the Aegean Sea since the activation of this statement on the 18th of March there have been only 20 deaths I don't mean by that to suggest that 20 is an adequate figure it's 22 many but it's still a very significant reduction in the number of lives being lost in one week's time so that is on the 28th of September we will publish on the side of the commission our latest report on the implementation of the statement that will give you an impression of the different strands including for example the return package which allows people to migrate legally from Turkey to the European Union where so far I think just under 1500 people have been able to move and where work is currently ongoing in finalizing what is called the voluntary return scheme to bring to a more significant number of the people who can find legal path from Turkey to the European Union let me also just add all of this has been done in full and unequivocal respect of international law on the Greek side nobody has been returned to Turkey without there having been an individualized based assessment process which in perhaps part explains why the number of people that have actually been returned under the statement from Greece to Turkey still today is relatively lower to around 500 people I think this is one area where we do need to see improvements in the sense of sending a clear message to the smugglers that a passage to Greece in an irregular manner does not equate to being able to stay in the European Union where are we on some of the other strands that came about from this and much of which you'll read in the press let me turn to visa liberalization as I said one of the key commitments in the statement was that the European Union would support Turkey's efforts to fulfill the 72 benchmarks in the visa liberalization roadmap hope you note the clear sequencing support the efforts of Turkey to fulfill the benchmarks today we have around seven benchmarks that still need to be fulfilled we're working hard with the Turkish partners on this I myself have go very very frequently to Turkey I think I've been 23 times this year both in terms of negotiating the migration statement helping it hold it and working with our Turkish partners on this you'll have seen perhaps the one that features quite prominent in the press is the discussion about the anti-terrorism legislation quite clearly in the in the midst of the aftermath of the coup but also the threats that Turkey continues to face from both ISIS and PKK this is very sensitive but I think we have to be also crystal clear what this is about this is not about reducing Turkey's capacity to fight terrorism not at all this is about ensuring that the provisions of the terrorism legislation are not used in a way which stifles freedom of expression and leads journalists academics and others facing at times quite lengthy pre-trial detention on the basis of what they have said and the views they have expressed I'm fairly confident on my side that with goodwill on both sides there are solutions envisageable that will respect the red lines of both partners but I just want to also make the point because again sometimes you read in the press that there is this date of October by when visa liberalization must take place there is no such thing as a deadline to visa liberalization or a guillotine at which if Turkey hasn't got visa liberalization this prospect fades this is a process in which we're supporting the Turkey's efforts but the name of the game is you fulfill the benchmarks and then the commission will unequivocally confirm that to council and parliament who will need to take the decision in accordance with the normal procedures. Let me also turn to a another point on the facility for refugees in Turkey the European Union committed to providing an initial 3 billion euro followed by potentially a further 3 billion euro once the funds have been used up again this is a time something which one reads diverging views in the press let me be crystal clear on this and perhaps put an end to what I would describe it sometimes as the Monty Python-esque style rhetoric that emanates from parts of Turkey which seems to have no problem in simultaneously inviting European Union leaders to cut the red tape and inaugurate projects but then in the same breath claim that not a single euro of funds has arrived. Let me be crystal clear where we are on this the agreement to establish this facility was reached in February today some seven months later we have already committed around 2.2 billion euro for concrete programs and as of last night we had signed contracts of 700 million euro with over 500 million euro disperse concretely spent out on the ground making a difference this includes for example projects such as the provision of a little credit card to refugees so that with dignity they can take control of their own lives and use the funding provided by the European Union to buy food and other such items we're also very close to concluding contracts with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health which I'm still fairly confident will make this one this month that will bring over to the total over 1 billion euro already contracted in just a few months I think it's important to stress that and dismiss this image that occasionally crops up that no funds are flowing that is not correct. One of the other commitments we made in the statement was that we would further advance some of the preparatory work on some of the key chapters and we were able on the 30th of June to open the chapter on financial and budgetary provisions so-called chapter 33 and my team have also completed a lot of the preparatory work for the opening of other chapters such as energy education culture foreign security and defense policy and we're currently in the final stages of preparing some of the preparatory work around the migration security and rule of law chapters and one of the reasons why these chapters have not been able to be opened is because we are still not able to find unanimity amongst the member states notably with Cyprus having concerns which brings me to a point I want to just make I think we are facing a historic opportunity to see a settlement on the island I was very lucky to be able to have lunch earlier this year with the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community Mr Akinji and I went home that evening and I said to my family I think I've had lunch today with somebody who within the next 18 to 24 months I believe will be the Nobel Peace Prize laureate together with his co-leader the leader of the Greek Cypriot community I think this is a unique opportunity I think the negotiation methodology in particular the UN is using bringing the full ownership of both parties presents a wonderful chance to bring to an end a bitter divide I think it will also then provide the right moment to have a fresh look at EU Turkey relations where there should be no impediment to the opening of chapters I think what is crucial now therefore is to keep the engagement this is a relationship that matters for both sides and not lose the momentum and not lose the commitment for EU Turkey relations but this also involves a necessity for a constructive open and frank dialogue including on topics of difficulty or where we have differences of view and I can't end without just mentioning one word of concern on our side when we witnessed some of the developments in Turkey after the 15th of July coup and we look at the number of cases of people who have been arrested or dismissed I think if the latest figures I have we've seen around 40 000 arrests and over 100 000 people dismissed I think one of the key challenges that Turkey will face is ensuring that each and every individual is able to benefit from a fair trial a fair process with respect of the presumption of innocence and a case that is seen and is conducted in accordance with the highest standards of the rule of law I think this would be a challenge for any of our countries and this of course is something that I think on the side of the European Union while people have full understanding of the necessity to bring to justice the perpetrators of the coup in such a process this will raise many challenges and will be one I think that people will in our own public opinion follow very very closely and is likely also to play a role in determining the future direction of EU-Turkey relations I'll end there leaving plenty of space for some time and questions we are looking forward to hearing from the professor is professor of EU studies at the east town bull policy centre and he has a long distinguished career working for the United Nations and also as an academic in his own country and we welcome him by electronic communication and ask him to speak to us on this huge topic of his country's relations with Europe you're very welcome I also in particular thank the Institute for International and European Affairs and I greet of course my co-panelist Kevin Convay and Simon Simon Morgue as well as the participants so as a professor of EU studies I one of the first things I teach my students is about the difference between the various EU institutions and when I talk about the Commission I always make the point that the Commission is the best friend and ally of the candidate country of any candidate country I think Simon's folk was crystal clear on their sense and he has given a perfect illustration of of a real politic I would say how it works nowadays when Turkey has more and more difficulties to cope with the membership obligation so I would rather concentrate on the challenges ahead Simon Morgue mentioned some of them but I would like to go in the details of of these challenges and I would I would classify them into two I mean the internal challenges that the so-called Turkish challenges external the Turkish challenges I would I would summarize them in one sentence it is simply non-compliance with the Akiko Minotek I mean Turkey's Turkish governments practice and policies don't correspond to the Akiko Minotek of the European Union anymore since long time it's two different things I will give you some examples first technical examples Simon mentioned the 16 open chapters 15 are still ongoing the negotiations are proceeding I mean so-called proceeding one chapter is closed this is the tiniest one but the there are two chapters which are of particular interest to the candidate country Turkey which are under negotiation one is the environment chapter and the other one is the regional policy they are both open chapters they are they are discussed now with the relevant authorities on the both ends Turkey has tremendous environmental problems I will give you just one simple example the so-called environmental impact analysis doesn't apply in Turkey by degree and by law Turkey is negotiating the environment chapter with the European Union the second interesting chapter which is under negotiation is the regional policy well I mean we all know what is regional policy and how Ireland benefited from regional policy how important is the regions in Europe well we have a similar problem in Turkey and Turkey is an all-world centralized country and one of the requirements of the Kurdish politicians but not only Kurdish politicians of local politicians from everywhere in this huge country highly centralized is a bit of devolution and although not directly in in connection with the regional policy that letter well it helps very much like we have seen in Poland for instance or in in Romania you know the kind of decentralization well we are in Turkey not decentralizing at all actually we are centralizing more it has become I mean the Turkish system of decision making has become person there is only one person who decides in Turkey and that is the president Recep Tayyip Erdogan so discussions negotiations these are all nice words but these are also they are the harsh realities Simon mentioned the blocked chapters eight of them by the council the decision and the remaining ones unilaterally by the Republic of Cyprus for it's unfortunate especially for chapter 23 and 24 which are intimately related to the to the political questions I will come to it but there are three chapters that no one mentions not even the website of the Turkish minister of EU affairs these chapters are social policy competition policy and the public procurement let me give you one example for each of these chapters these chapters are not blocked at all by any member state and these chapters nevertheless don't offer and for a very simple reason because the Turkish government doesn't wish to open as for the social policy as you all know what means the social policy Turkey is Europe's record set up in terms of in terms of then workers in the working and the the very low which was pushed by the EU you know to apply is systematically delayed and in the meantime the debt of workers continue animated you can go and look at the statistics of ILO which are copied in every progress report report of the European Commission in the in October November each year competition policy in the one of the requirements of the EU to open the this chapter is for the state to stop helping the the state-owned institutions by subsidies well the Turkish government doesn't want to do that and then this chapter cannot be open it's one of the opening benchmarks and the third one is a public procurement the public procurement is over 100 billion Turkish lira which is 30 35 billion euro yearly huge budget where the government is which the government is using to to you know on a totally opaque non-transparent basis to distribute public markets and public procurement totally are in contradiction with the with the Akiko Minotel and the opening benchmark which which looks which looks for you know a transparent public bidding it is unfortunately not the case so I repeat and underline these three openable chapters are not even mentioned in the website of the Turkish Ministry of EU Athens so these are the technical problems related to the Akiko now let's have a quick look to the political non-compliance when I say political non-compliance I have in mind the example of the of Slovakia and the the the one of the former prime ministers of Slovakia Meshya who has been summoned by actually the three ambassadors of the French the bridge and the and the German visited this authoritarian prime minister in 98 I remember very well to tell them that if they continue like this they won't be in the next bunch of the of the candidate countries and this is exactly what happened in the meantime of course Slovakia had to change a government and had to comply with with the with the Copenhagen political criteria what I believe what I want to say about this is that Turkey doesn't comply with the Copenhagen political criteria anymore everyone knows this and if Turkey was not in the negotiation state or stage well I don't think that that negotiations would have started with with this candidate. So Simon Moorview has mentioned some shortcomings in terms of human rights violations I will skip the the past human rights violations especially those related to the Kurdish question recently I mean the the over what over a year now more than a year since July 2015 there has been widespread human rights violations in the towns and cities inhabited by the Kurdish citizens of Turkey entire towns and cities were raised you know to the ground and they destroyed to start with the the old Christian area of of the Armacir for instance the Sur neighborhood I mean I won't go into details of it but I would like to give you some figures which were already mentioned by Simon regarding the dealings of the emergency rule now this emergency rule has been declared of course in connection with with this attempted and thank god aborted to data this is perfect and all these conference all those who have been involved in it should be punished there is no doubt about that and the and the and the and the authorities have declared the emergency rule just for this but the consequences are are pretty far from you know being fair at least regarding the fair trial that each and every individual especially in a country country needs or requires 100 over 100,000 civil servants have been summarily fired business out of which 3,500 judiciary personnel 43,000 these figures are fresh I mean from the last weekend 43,000 people are into custody and out of out of this figure 24,000 are arrested without any any proper trial and 19 universities were closed 1919 and as well as 2100 secondary schools the reason is that all these education institutions were in one way or another related to this movement called gulen gulen is movement who is considered or declared as being behind the aborted coup d'etat 1254 associations and foundations have been in close and their properties have been transferred to the treasure together with with the spoliation of the goods of companies who are supposed to be related to the gulen is movement the figure the economists are now uttering nowadays are 12 billion Turkish lira of property transferred to the treasure 12 billion you divide by three so it makes around 4 billion euros just taken away from individuals without any proper trial just like like this in a optimum way 160 media outlets were shut down and they there are 122 journalists accused of all sorts of wrongdoings who are jailed this is definitely a record according to the committee for the protection of journalists and other human rights watchers the emergency rule will probably continue the general elections will probably be delayed they are already talking about delaying them from 2019 to 2020 which is not not tomorrow we don't know what is this why this hurry hurry and there has been 28 Kurdish mayors who have been dismissed but we need local elections to replace them no one expect any local election in a in a foreseeable future so these are the the overall situation regarding the internal challenges to the EU you know EU relationship not only your relationship by the way maybe we should talk about the western relationship of the country including NATO because which I would like to report that NATO is not just a military organization but also a political organization since 1949 well as for the external challenges I mean externally the sense that the challenges emanating from Brussels and other in the EU institutions when I say other I had in mind Luxembourg of course with with the European Parliament well I mean just few examples I mean the the commission writes progress reports about Turkey since 1998 all recent reports were negative full of little or or no progress regarding the chapters that are opened or those one not open but at least in the past few years ago there was a bright side and this bright side was about the Kurdish peace process the so-called Kurdish peace process well no more the only quote unquote bright side that the commission can still utter in the in the report is about this poor refugee deal I mean I don't have time really to go into details maybe it may come in the in the in the Q&A but this is basically where we are in terms of you know real politics but the the Turkey deal or the appreciation of Turkey doesn't of course end with the with the with the commission now we all know the attitude of President Juncker who openly and proudly announced on the 28th of October 2015 very much in connection with the so-called refugee deal that human rights violations I'm not quoting him but I mean this is basically what he said in the in front of the European Parliament human rights violation is not at all his concern or the concern of the Commission and because because the the key issue was the at the time the refugee deal and it still is the problem is that the the Council I think the the Council of the European Union is not at all in the same way of land you know when it comes to Turkey's membership recently Austria as you may know in the month of his Prime Minister but not only the Minister for NFS has announced loudly what almost all other capitals are thinking side namely to stop the Turkey's negotiation the Turkey's negotiations with the EU I mean nothing new there really I mean one should just go and look at the 18 months work plan of the three Presidents is the Netherlands Slovakia and Malta when you go in the enlargement paragraph there is no mention of Turkey so the Council is talking another you know another discourse another another way I mean not to mention of course the informal meetings that are taking since months now here and there where the freeze and the total end of the negotiations are discussed so I think at the end of the day the the relationship if we put aside the the refugee deal or which is also part of it actually you know the relationship between EU and the European Union has become an ad hoc cooperation actually exactly like for any other third country I mean the EU if it has a problem with Egypt or Saudi Arabia tackles this you know on an ad hoc matter you know doesn't go in the details of the human rights violations in Saudi Arabia or in Egypt or whatsoever so I mean this is I mean just to give you an illustration of it on the 9th of I think September yes it's few few days ago Mogherini and Han were in town I mean they were in the Inaqara they met the people and when they were in town 11 301 college professors have been summarily dismissed and this 28 elected Kurdish mayors that I just mentioned 10 minutes ago or seven in the Kurdish town have been dismissed as well no mention whatsoever very you know slight you know remarks here and there but clearly no you know no no big deal you know coming from the European representatives so I think Turkish liberals and Democrats had extreme difficulties to understand the sum of European Union institutions position and they feel literally abandoned and they everyone knew that that you know the EU had no leverage whatsoever on on EU and the transformation and the change process of the country like 10 years ago but but I mean to reach such a stage of real quantity is is considered as very much deceived and I would just mention one very latest opinion poll Turkish public opinion always was always pro-European but and then on the same time the Turkish public opinion was you know I would say clever enough or or you know sharp enough to consider that that you know this membership would never happen so the those who consider that she would never happen has risen to 70 percent now 70 70 which is which is which just really reflects unfortunately the reality so just one last word about about this you know the actual situation where anybody who doesn't please the government or the top leaders of the country you know is is is potentially you know in the danger of being arrested as we are talking now Ahmet Altan and Mehmet Altan two top Turkish intellectuals you know had been meeting with the with the with the police officers were questioning them I understand that they were they haven't answered their questions because they were accused of some obscure subliminal connection with the Gulenist movements nevertheless I would just end up by by quoting the sum of the names of 288 world intellectuals who have signed a petition for them I stop there Mr Chairman thank you Kevin Conley is director for Western Europe in the Europe Division of Foreign Affairs he is someone who has served this country in in Washington in London in San Francisco and in the United Nations in New York and has been involved also in the Northern Ireland peace process over the years and we look forward to hearing the the view from Ivy House. Good afternoon everyone and I welcome the opportunity to set out the Irish government's policy on Turkey as a contribution to today's discussion and just want to start by thanking the institute for providing the forum for important broader discussions and engagement on European and international issues which is to the benefit of of our wider public and I thank the institute for its its ongoing endeavors. I can be briefer than the previous two speakers and allow time for for question and answer and discussion because the government's position was recently set out comprehensively by Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Charlie Flanagan at a recent specially convened meeting at the Council of Europe which took place in Strasbourg on the 7th of September only a handful of foreign ministers attended Minister Flanagan was one of them and the Turkish Foreign Minister was also present for the meeting and so it meant that there was a direct engagement which I think was very important both in terms of conveying messages but also in terms of of making sure that the kind of conversations that are important that the European Union has with its partner countries take place in accordance with the agreements and rules which we've all agreed to and in this case the Council of Europe. The weekend before Minister Flanagan was also at the informal meeting of foreign ministers the Gimnik which took place in Bratislava and the Turkish Minister for European Affairs attended that meeting and similarly there was if I can use the diplomatic description robust engagement between EU foreign ministers and the Turkish Minister for Europe and I think I'll come back at the end to the importance of the word engagement in this context. The main points that Minister Flanagan made on these occasions were fairly clear obviously the attempted coup on the 15th of July was a criminal act and a direct attack on democracy in Turkey and the Minister expressed solidarity and sympathy with the Turkish people and condemned also the spate of recent terrorist attacks I think the situation in Turkey is so complex they were talking about some specific aspects of the situation but obviously the terrorist attacks that Turkey has suffered this last year and the large number of casualties are also a matter of international concern. The Minister was clear that Ireland supports a stable and democratic Turkey and he was very clear that we remain concerned that in the post coup situation some of the actions being taken are contrary to democratic norms the Minister summarized these in terms of the large numbers of people detained or suspended from their jobs whether they be judges lawyers teachers academics trade unionist business leaders the closure of media outlets as well as the reported conditions in which those allegedly involved in the coup were being detained that these were all matters of concern and the Minister was also clear that it was critical that legal processes take place under the presumption of innocence and that the core principles of human rights including freedom of expression and of the media which are at the heart of the conventions which we've all signed up to need to be respected the human rights and basic freedoms of minorities including the Kurdish minority were also core principles that we've agreed to Turkey and the other members of the Council of Europe. The Minister said that we understand and both in Ireland and at the European Union level the Turkey is going through a difficult time but that as friends we were saying to Turkey that it's important that they use the supports and tools that the Council of Europe provide and also that they work with the European Union in terms of the accession process and meeting benchmarks and criteria that are necessary. The Minister was clear that Ireland has been and remains a firm supporter of Turkish accession to the Union but that obviously accession means meeting clear benchmarks and criteria and Simon mentioned the annual reports and clearly before the coup there are concerns about the direction of travel in Turkey which the Minister and the Tisha have spoken about previously but obviously the post coup situation puts a whole other dimension in terms of those concerns. The Minister said we want to encourage Turkey to deal with the post coup situation in a way that strengthens democracy and the rule of law and we support Turkey in that regard. The Minister also made clear Ireland's wish that the Government of Turkey would restart the political process with the Democratic representatives of the Kurds and a view that this is a view that was stated by many EU Ministers in both discussions in the Gimnik and in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. That kind of summary is short but there's a lot of important detail and content there but it comes down and this really I suppose leads into the question and answer session to the EU's approach and engagement with Turkey and I think at this point in time the approach that Simon mentioned at the outset of engagement, engagement, engagement is the only really serious policy option that the European Union has in relation to Turkey. Turkey is a strategic partner the importance of its strategic engagement with Europe predates the migration crisis. The migration crisis adds a whole other dimension to it but irrespective of that the long-term direction of engagement in Europe is going to benefit better from a policy of engagement than any other approach at this time. I think an example of that which again it could be debated but in the immediate aftermath of the coup when there was some discussion about reinstating the death penalty in Turkey, Minister Flanagan, many other European ministers, the Commission, Vice President and High Representative Margarini made very clear in public statements in the clearest of terms that any consideration of a return to the death penalty would be very detrimental to Turkey's relationship with the European Union and in the period since then that issue has dropped off the agenda. There are many other issues of concern but I think that is just one simple example of clear engagement on the part of the European Union which had some impact in terms of the immediate consideration of options that were under discussion within Turkey. I think I can leave it at that and happy to participate in the questions and answers but I would underline the importance of engagement thus at least for the future interests and concerns of the people of Turkey. If one takes the long view Turkey has been on an interesting journey and the decision of the European Union to enter into enlargement negotiations with Turkey as mentioned is 11 years old at this stage in terms of the launch of the accession process. It's very clear that any such process still has and in the light of recent developments a considerable way to go but the actual process of engagement on all of the range of issues that accession covers provides the European Union and Turkey with the framework for serious engagement for a long time to come and I think the alternative to engagement is not going to actually achieve much compared to what engagement has the possibility of achieving while accepting the current circumstances are not any that we would wish. Thank you very much.