 My name is Paul Newberg and I'm the Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and one of the million and a half partners in this three-day set of meetings. Our thanks go to USIP and to the rest of our partners here for what has so far been a very dynamic sort of discussion. We began diplomatically on Wednesday with a series of discussions that were led by the United Nations and the World Bank and we're concluding today by coming back to diplomacy with three very, very fine commentators who have worked not only across questions that have been raised over the last few days but in particular those as they apply to the Congo. What we're going to try to do is spend about 45 minutes among the three speakers outlining the questions that really arise from questions of diplomatic engagement in Central Africa and that have resonance across a much wider and broader world as you began to hear in the last panel. So we'll talk about that and then I will ask the panelists themselves to have an interchange among the three of them and then we'll open up to questions as well. So let me do a brief introduction of our three panelists in alphabetical order and then we will assume the order of play by working in reverse alphabetical order. So Major General Patrick Camarita, whose bio you have in your packet, sort of exemplifies efforts of the United Nations and its peacekeeping missions to deal with the myriad challenges that all the actors in this region have faced for many, many years. He has been military advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations. He has led peacekeeping missions across the world. He is a retired member of the Royal Netherlands Armed Services. And for our purposes this morning, what is particularly interesting for us is that he was one of the commanders of the peacekeeping forces in the eastern part of the Congo. Diane Orantlicher currently on leave from American University Law School is the deputy in the war crimes office at the Department of State in the United States. She's written extensively on issues of transitional justice and is one of the leading experts on war crimes and their relationship to local justice and mostly on the broader context of transitional justice, an issue about which we've talked somewhat generally over the last couple of days and I hope we can focus on somewhat more specifically today. The DRC is one of her areas of responsibility at the Department of State now. And third, Howard Wolpe whose career spans virtually every side of diplomacy as a member of the House of Representatives, as an academic scholar and a writer, as an advisor to the State Department and previously also as the director of a very innovative program on leadership development and state building at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. Mr. Wolpe has testified any number of times and written extensively as well about the need to look at a new paradigm of diplomacy, not only for Africa but for conflict regions across the world. And so with that I'm going to introduce Mr. Wolpe first. He will be followed by Diane Orantlicher and then by Patrick Kamir. Thank you very much Paul and delighted to have been invited to join in this panel today. I just do want to just clarify the biography for a moment because I no longer have an affiliation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center and about seven weeks ago I retired from the State Department. So now I am fully officially retired and free at last I guess so I speak as an individual today and not as an any official capacity. I want to begin first by just to kind of underscoring a point that Raymond made in his remarks about the dangers of approaching the Congo or any conflict situation in the fragmented or segmented fashion. And one of the challenges that I discovered at the State Department was we have all sorts of constituency pressures that impinge upon the bureaucracies. And so one department seizes the issue of conflict minerals. Another takes the issues of sexual violence. Another third will focus upon human rights atrocities. And that kind of segmentation of course gets in the way of dealing with the underlying issue, which is the war, which is the conflict and what we can do about bringing the conflict to an end which will in the course of that process begin to deal with the issues of conflict minerals of sexual violence and of human rights atrocities. When I left the State Department the first time after serving as five years as President Clinton's special envoy to the Great Lakes region, the World Bank brought me on as a consultant for a while. And I expressed to them my great frustration as a diplomat and earlier as a policymaker in conventional approaches to peace building and my own belief that it was time to begin to re-examine the assumptions we bring to the table when we think about how to help a nation in war make peace. I observed that you can put a lot of pressure on leaders and get them to sign a piece of paper for claims that there is an agreement, but that doesn't mean that you've dealt with any of the trust issues underlying their relationship or any of the issues underlying their conflict. And that is why so many efforts at peace building remain inherently unstable and unsustainable. And what I argued was that I thought it was necessary that we begin to engage and then let me say what is the conventional approach? First it's for pressure on leaders to sign agreements. Second element of that approach is to have a checklist of institutions modeled on the Western experience that must be established, which we see as the basis of stable transparent democratic governance until we talk about checks and balances, about the importance of civil society, about standing up an independent electoral commission and we go on and on. And then the third conventional assumption is that we focus upon elections as the sort of the benchmark of democratic societies. And I would submit that in all those instances those assumptions are fallacious, that you don't get to democracy and you don't get to peace by approaching issues in that fashion. That the starting point of our analysis must be the societies themselves and a recognition that these are essentially divided societies. If you look at Western democracies across the world that are stable, they are characterized not only by periodic elections, but they're also characterized by a set of underlying agreements about constitutes the nation state. There's a sense of recognition of the interdependence of the actors that comprise the nation state. There's an understanding about the rules of the game. There's an understanding about modes of political discourse that are designed to solve problems rather than simply to encourage lame throwing. You don't have any of those prerequisites in most of these divided societies. And what I argued at the bank was that there were specifically four imperatives that had to be addressed directly with key leaders of the society. Not meaning just political leaders, military, political, and civil society leaders as well. If you couldn't address those four imperatives, you never were going to get sustainable peace anywhere. The first of those imperatives is to change the conflict paradigm, the war paradigm in which politics is understood to be, excuse me, my voice, I'm losing it, a zero-sum game, a winner-take-all affair in which one person's success or victory can only come at the expense of the other guy. There's no recognition of interdependence or the value of collaboration. And unless people come to understand collaboration with others, even their competitors, as a matter of their light and self-interest, I don't think you can have sustainable peace. Secondly, you must deal with the broken trust and the fragmentation of relationships that have occurred among key leaders as a result of their conflict. That trust, those relationships, have to be re-established so people can have confidence that when they enter two agreements, they will be sustained. Thirdly, you've got to have some minimal agreement on the rules of the game. How is power going to be shared? How will it be organized? Who should be at the table when decisions are made? And then finally, you've got to strengthen the skills of key leaders, again from all sectors, in communications and in negotiations so that they are better able to put themselves in the shoes of the other. And in that fashion, identify solutions that will satisfy the interests of all and get away from the zero-sum winner-take-all mentality. Well, I don't think you can do that by abstract institutional fixes. I think you can only do that by establishing processes in which you bring into a long-term training program the key leaders of the society to begin to address those four challenges. And the World Bank decided to experiment, and we chose Burundi as our first case because it was a terribly polarized and divided society. There had been a peace agreement signed, but no one thought it would stick. And they gave us about a million dollars to begin our work. And I brought in two world-class trainers, people who were skilled in the techniques of conflict transformation, and in the building of new political cultures. And these people were phenomenal. I participated in the training myself, and what we did is we established about a two-year program for what was initially designed for about 100 leaders drawn from all sectors. And it was so powerful in its impact that within six months' time, the Hutu and Tutsi leaders who had been absolutely demonized by one another came to us and asked if we would quickly organize that kind of training for their military commanders to prepare for the ceasefire that had not yet been signed. So in November of 2003, we brought 37 military commanders directly from the battlefield into this training experience in Nairobi for six days. The training is very experientially, it's not very little lecture content, it's based upon simulations, upon interactive exercises that are designed to put people into hypothetical situations where they confront the same dilemmas and issues and choices they face in the real world. But since they're hypothetical, when they sit back to analyze their behavior, they're much less defensive, and they can see what worked, what didn't work, and then take those lessons and then apply them to the real world experience. Now in every instance, we structure these as continuing programs. You cannot do this kind of work on a one-off basis. The initial six-day retreat is invariably powerfully transformative. We found that it takes no more than three days, literally three days, to break down the ethnic and political stereotypes so that people begin to see each other as individuals, not out of their ethnic and political boxes. And then when they turn to substance the last few days, and we give them certain techniques for problem-solving, the whole environment has been so transformed that instead of people that are trying to make points and serve as adversaries, they now see themselves as people of different interests who are trying to find common solutions. It's a very, very powerful methodology. But you've got to maintain it over time, because they come out of that experience in the first six days, transformed by it, they go back into their communities where all the pressures impinge upon them, people where they're seen as traitors, they are dealing with the enemy now, what's happened. Yes, you've got to bring them back every two or three months to reinforce their skills and to strengthen and deepen their relationships. Well, that process was so successful in the Burundi case that we were then invited by the diplomatic community in Congo to move into Kinshasa to determine if we could get the same kind of buy-in among Congolese leaders that we had achieved in Burundi. Because one of the strategic challenges here is not only to get the training right, it's to get the right people into the room. I mean, you can take 100 people off the streets that all benefit by the experience, but unless you get people that are influential and strategically positioned, it won't work. So we spent a lot of time for a few months in both cases. In asking Burundians and then Congolese, who should we involve in this training in the initial phases? Well, in the Burundi case, things expanded so quickly that we were asked to train up the entire higher command of the army over a long-term process and then to do training of trainers. And that army today in Burundi, despite all the political problems and fragmentation, they have within the political class, remains one of the most cohesive and professional in the African continent. And they're contributing now to peacekeeping and Somalia and doing some remarkable things. In the Congolese case, I was told by the diplomats when I first came in, they were desperate because they realized they'd done no preparation for the election. They'd invested $430 million in the logistics, but there'd been no political preparation for the election. And they were very pessimistic that anything could happen, but they were desperate enough to ask us to see if we could try. They were convinced that the language that we kept hearing was there's no political will. Among the Congolese leaders, they're fat and sassy, they're making money off the transition. Why should they want to become involved in this? Well, as I began to make my rounds, and I'd worked with these guys for several years as a special envoy earlier, I discovered what the diplomats were interpreting as a lack of political will was fundamentally the mistrust they had of each other because of the Mobutu legacy was creating this terribly fragmented political culture where every individual saw themselves as surviving only at the expense of the other guy. And they couldn't contemplate the possibility of working in a collaborative fashion, but when we offered to them the possibility of a training program, not a negotiation, a training program to build their capacity so they could then resolve their problems themselves, they all endorsed it. Every side of the political community, the churches, the civil society, all the rest. And then we began our work, and it had so much impact just within the first couple of months, dealing with national elites, that the diplomatic community and top Congolese leaders asked us to quickly move into the kivus to begin our work there because that was the most volatile region, they were afraid of the election would yield more violence. And so we were able to bring together in the kivus, first in North and in South, about 40 leaders of all the various communities. And we had the same impact there, it was stunning. People came out of the work in North Kivu establishing local mechanisms to manage their conflicts in the course of the election. We were then asked the same thing, much the same thing happened in South Kivu. But one of the things we also discovered, and this is the one point I do want to make that differs a little bit from Severin's analysis, I agree with her entirely. You've got to operate all levels, national and local. One of the things that we discovered is that all this wonderful work we did on the ground in reconciling communities, and there was not one instance of political violence North or South Kivu throughout the election process, not a single instance. But immediately after the election, Mr. Kabila and the central government decided to go after Laurent Nacunda again. And there were three instances in which Nacunda and Kabila had reached an agreement. In all three instances, the government violated the agreement and went back to war. And what we discovered was that Kinshasa was directly implicated in propagating the violence in the East. So you can't separate the national and the strategic broader issues from the local dimension. I would argue, in fact, that dealing with local conflicts is the easiest part of it. At one point after the Goma Conference, we were asked to work with all the new peace signatories. And we brought together all the Tutsi militia and the Maimai militias, and even one or two people from the FARDC. And we created so much confidence among these former enemies that they began to share military confidences with each other. But then the war was launched one more time. And a lot of that was eroded. So you've got to operate at all levels simultaneously. I think my time has probably elapsed. So let me stop for now. Thank you very much. It's a pleasure to be here. When I first learned about this conference, I was really delighted to hear that USIP was organizing it. It addresses the subject of keen importance to my boss, Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, and to my office at the State Department, the Office of War Crimes Issues. So I'm really delighted to be part of this program. I'm going to be focusing on the kind of work that my office is involved in in addressing sexual violence in Congo in particular, but also in other parts of the world. As everyone here knows, I think really impossible to overstate the scope of the scourge that's addressed here. Sexual violence particularly, but by no means exclusively in the DRC is rampant. It's endemic. It's entrenched. And it's often, if not always, merciless. But it's not inevitable. And that's really a key conviction of the work we do in my office. To say that, though, isn't to underestimate the formidable challenges that we routinely face in trying to reverse the soul-shattering trends of violence we've seen in countries like the DRC. Last week, Secretary Clinton said, and I quote here, the horrific mass rates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo last summer and our failure as in an international community to bring the conflict there to an end and to protect women and children in the process stands as a tragic rebuke to our efforts so far. So obviously, she's acknowledging we've been at this for a while and trying quite hard, and we have a lot of failures behind us. But while acknowledging the scale of the challenges ahead, the Secretary spoke not about intractability of the challenges, but rather of responsibility. The rates, she said, are a stark quote reminder of the work still ahead of us. So I want to talk a little bit about the work still ahead of us in addressing this challenge. The work ahead of us has many components in the State Department, really a very comprehensive range. Ranging from pursuing strategies aimed at ensuring women's inclusion and security planning, I believe our Ambassador for Global Women's Issues, Alain Bevere, spoke about this yesterday at this conference. And they ranged to, at the other end of the spectrum, supporting preventive measures in regions where women and children are most vulnerable to sexual violence. But the part of the comprehensive strategy that my office is most involved in has a particular focus, which is ending impunity for sexual violence and other atrocities. There's a basic premise behind these efforts. Quite simply, we have to change the risk calculus of those who order, permit, and commit sexual violence, even in wartime, to those who believe that sexual violence advances their war aims and make no mistake about it. Rape is often deliberately deployed as a tool of warfare. And as well as to those who think they can simply get away with sexual violence, we need to send a different message, which is you can't, you can't get away with it. You will face justice. Or at least there has to be a decent chance people think they will be prosecuted and held to account in other ways for these offenses. Right now, the chances of facing some kind of justice are all too small to have a meaningful impact. There's also another reason why my office is committed to working to helping to end the impunity for sexual violence and other serious crimes in the DRC. And that's out of respect for the choices of many of the rape survivors, women and children, that my colleagues and I have met in the Congo. These are people whom the law has failed repeatedly. But despite that, they desperately want justice. And I want to acknowledge that this is not the first priority of many survivors. And it's certainly not the sole priority of any of the survivors of rape I've met. They have many other needs, some of which are urgently important. Dealing with the devastation of their communities, their own personal economic devastation, urgent medical needs and so forth. That said, I've been quite awed and impressed by the truly tenacious efforts of many women in the Congo to find justice in courts that have provided very, very little cause for confidence. Nonetheless, many of the people I have met in the Congo are very committed to ringing justice out of this system. So in short, my office defiantly refuses to be guided by the Roman maxim in war, the laws fall silent. We're very much committed to ensuring that there is law even in war. So how then do you begin to tackle this incredible challenge of violence and it's lawless violence in vast areas of the DRC, particularly in the east? And we're talking about areas that don't even have judges. And where judges are deployed, they often don't have courts, literally. And when there are courts, they often lack basic equipment. And very importantly, are not equipped to provide basic levels of protections. It's a very serious problem to victims and witnesses who participate in proceedings. When it comes to the civilian judiciary, moreover, the DRC judiciary doesn't yet even have jurisdiction over basic international offenses. So they do have jurisdiction over crimes of sexual violence under a 2006 law. So how do you begin to tackle a set of challenges that's that formidable? First, a guiding principle for our efforts in this area are that we believe that any efforts to help Congolese courts protect the country's citizens better than they now do will succeed only when we're a partner, when the government and Congolese civil society itself lead and truly own the processes of reform. Including by defining the priorities of what reform will achieve. Well, we as a country and others assist the Congolese government and citizens in meeting their aspirations. With that in mind, we welcomed recent statements by senior DRC officials, including its Minister of Justice, proposing the establishment of specialized chambers within Congo civilian courts that would have jurisdiction over serious crimes under international law and foreign judges participating alongside national judges for transitional period in these especially challenging cases. If this initiative were properly implemented, I think the proposed chambers could play a valuable role in helping to end impunity. And I keep on saying helping to end or beginning to end, because it's going to be a very, very long term project. A similar specialized chamber within international participation in Bosnia has helped that country restore the rule of law also under extremely challenging circumstances. The international judges in that chamber have brought specialized expertise and moral support to their national colleagues, while their presence has also helped to bolster public confidence in Bosnia again in ethnically charged cases. So against that background of experience elsewhere, the DRC proposal, and again, if properly implemented, would have another advantage, which is that it would help, and this is really important, that it could help strengthen in a much more fundamental way and help catalyze broader reform in the Congolese judicial system. When I talk about being properly implemented, although I don't have time to talk about this very much, I do think that the active participation of civil society organizations in shaping the way this model would work is critically important. And I want to acknowledge that one priority that's very important to many of the citizens of Congo, with whom I've engaged, and I know this is true for many of you as well, are meaningful reparations for the devastating crimes they've endured. And so that is part of the agenda that needs to be pursued. For now, that proposal that I mentioned is just a proposal, but we think it has promise. And we look forward to examining with the DRC government how its proposal might be implemented and made effective, not only for victims of sexual assault, but certainly with the expectation and aim of ensuring that rape survivors finally receive the protection of law even in war. Thank you. Also for me, it's a pleasure and an honor to be here today to say a few words on this important subject, sexual violence, and the failure to protect. And I'm standing here also as an individual retired and at many times under short contracts by DPCO and UNIFAM, particularly focused on the fight against sexual violence in armed conflict. I'm not an academic, I'm a practitioner. And what I'm saying in the few minutes that are allocated to me and a lot have been said already, so it is what I had written down, I've thrown away, I'm speaking from the heart. I left in February 2007, the Democratic Republic of Congo, where I served for two years in a bit as the general officer commanding the Eastern Division, headquartered in Kiesangani. And since that time, I've been back five times. The last time was two months ago, in my capacity as the chairman of the Dutch Foundation of Refugees, I've also a little job there. And spoke for a lengthy period of time with local NGOs, international NGOs, and medicine some frontier, and so on, and so on. Civil society, and for people who have heard about Pansy Hospital, Dr. Mugwege, have anybody ever been in Pansy Hospital? Right. I spent the whole day, I mean, I know Dr. Mugwege very well. Good friend over the years, very brave man. And I spent a day in Pansy, and it was terrible again to be there and to see the suffering of the victims, the survivors of sexual violence. And why do we read every time and again in the papers and on CNN we see that the United Nations, which is deployed in the Congo, is quite a sizable force. Never enough, but it was quite a sizable force. Why they fail to protect civilians under imminent threat? And in particular, sexual violence, which is part of it. Why? And I can talk about this subject for hours. But I will not do that. But I spoke last week with the former undersecret general of peacekeeping, Mr. Jean-Marie Guainot, after the dramas in Voulungu, where the mass rape came to the surface. And where again, the United Nations did not what they were supposed to do to protect civilians under imminent threat. And he said to me, Patrick, are you also very sad? I said, yes, I'm very sad. Because not that you can be behind every Congolese or every Sudanese or every Liberian, no. But when I see the Department of Peacekeeping Operations briefing the Security Council, saying that they should step up patrolling activities, provide more community liaison interpreters, increase the number of mobile operating bases. And in the words of one of the program reps in the Security Council, they should be more reactive, instead of reactive, to be more proactive. And the Security Council pointed with appreciation to the launch of an operation called Shop Window, where deploying and patrolling activities on the scale of a battalion were undertaken. It is a shame, as a military commander, it is a shame that the Security Council and DPCO must tell those commanders on the ground what to do. And he said to me, are you also sad? I said, yes. So what can we do now? Let's say on the strategic level. And the first thing is to provide leadership. Everything starts with leadership. So provide leadership. Second, it had started Security Council. The Security Council pay a visit to the Congo. I don't hear anybody from the members saying to, again, to President Kabila, I want Bosco Natanga on the plane to the Hague. I don't hear anybody saying that. They talk about a few small fishes. Second, it's no good to keep on bashing President Kabila, but try to get the confidence of President Kabila as the SRSD, the Special Representative and the Force Command, and get a political engagement with him. Try to convince him that you should not address political issues militarily. Gunda was a political issue. Adil Artahamwe is a political issue. If you try to solve those political issues militarily, you create hundreds of thousands of IDPs and you create a lot of people being raped and gang-raped and people being killed. So try to engage with him to address those issues politically. And make sure that you can convince him to call for a weapon-free zone in the eastern part of the Congo. Only people with a weapon permit can carry a weapon, not when they are of duty, but only when they are on duty. And every person who has a weapon, you take the weapon, either the local police or the United Nations, when they are mandated to do so. I did it in Ituri when I was there in 2005, and it was a very, very pleasant way of doing business. You have a weapon, have you got a permit? No, you give it to me. You don't want to give it to me? I take it from you. Very simple. Sometimes those things can be quite simple. And try to convince President Kabila that withdrawing the United Nations in 2011, or be completed in 2011, is a very bad idea. And everybody I spoke to in the DRC in July said it will be catastrophe, catastrophe. And that is something that everybody and their dog should tell Kabila, and use the wise leaders in Africa to tell Joseph, don't do it. It's a bad idea. Then the second point is fight impunity, fight impunity. And I said, I mentioned the name Bosco, but you cannot have peace if there is no justice. And I accept grinding my teeth that for a short period in order to stop the fighting, you have to talk to those guys. But soon afterwards, you continue with preparing the file, and then the people should be called and be arrested, as simple as that. But you start with the big fish, not with the small ones. In 1946, you had the big fish after the Second World War. But that continued over the years. Still even today, you have, they are very old, but you have the smaller fish being arrested in Europe of the Second World War. Then a very important issue is to train the FRDC, because that is not an army, that is a group of people coming from all sorts of places, being rebels and former rebels or whatever. Mr. Peter Karim, also a very unpleasant character, is certainly a colonel in the FRDC. No training, no nothing. And you think that you can build an army with those people, so you have to train them and you have to vet them and you have to arrest those people who have the file. Unfortunately, you had not so long ago a session here where two Dutch sisters who made a film, Weapon of War, they are now in the Congo and they are promoting a training film for the FRDC. And they are promoting the mobile cinema, which goes from village to village to village to talk about the issue of rape. Very interesting. Then a few issues on the, let's say, proactive way of the United Nations to do business. First, the United Nations, the military division must tailor make the force. Not the standard battalion, 850 with so many armored vehicles, etc. So tailor make the force. Try to get as many females as possible. Trained, particularly for sexual violence. That goes, we started in 2005, no 2006, units where we had female soldiers involved, not the cooks or the communicators, etc., the drivers, people who had been trained for that to reach out to the local population. Women are talking particularly to women, not to male patrol commanders. But if you have a female, you sit in the village and you talk to the local leaders and the women, then you get the information. And the second point is get the right presence, profile and posture. And unfortunately you had in the C-34, the C-34 is a group of countries in peacekeeping, and they debate now for years on protection of civilians and robust peacekeeping, what is robust, the definition of robust. And stop talking about all those seminars all the time, because on the ground people have to go on patrol and they must know what to do. And the last point I will make is the communication with the civilian community. And many times we hear when we see those dramas in Volungu and Kivanji of Alikali, they say, you know, we have not been communicated to the population, we don't know what's going on, we have no interpreters, etc., etc., etc. It's no good to tell me when I visit, we have a vacancy of 40% of interpreters. They say, yeah, okay, now, what have you done about it? And then there is a deafening silence. I mean, that's no good. You should do something about it because otherwise you cannot communicate. Don't drive from A to B in a vehicle and then say there was nothing to report. Sit in the village for a couple of days, eat with them, talk with them, and get to know what's going on. Then you will be effective because you have a lot of mobility to go from one place to the other, quickly by air, so that you have the spoilers on the wrong foot. Those are measures that bring a, to ensure a secure environment so that the villagers can go back to the village and not sitting in an IDP camp and grow a crop. That is what is necessary and that is what in the pre-deployment training should be taught to all the peacekeepers. When you go to Africa, you use African glasses to look through, not your Dutch glasses or your American glasses, African glasses, because otherwise you will not get the problem solved. Last is, I always say, the mandate is as strong as the will of the leadership to implement because you can have the best troops, you can have the best equipment, etc. If you have an SRSG or a force command where it's not the guts to implement the mandate, nothing will happen and the rape and the gang rape continues. Thank you. Thank you, all three of you, for your initial presentations. Before we open up to questions from the floor, I have one question for each of you, if you don't mind, just to elaborate some of your comments. Diane, could you talk a little bit about the relationship between local justice and war crimes? That's a broad question, so I'm going to... No, it is. I think there are a couple of things that need to be said. One is that we're now at a point where we've had, let's say, 17 years of experience with international tribunals in the contemporary era, so I'm not talking about Nuremberg. And I think one of the broad lessons that those who are involved in this area have derived from this experience is that it's critically important to bring justice home. And there may be some cases where it's necessary to have an international tribunal involved for at least some suspects. I very much agree that Bosco and Taganda belong in the Hague, but if you don't make us a priority providing protection at home, meaningfully, by courts in the country concerned, you will never achieve the long-term protection that we're trying to achieve through international justice efforts. Bringing justice home, though, raises all kinds of questions, and I don't want to take up... I know there are a number of questions in here, so I don't want to get too much into this, because I could go on at length about this subject. But it does also mean, if it really relates to Howard Wolpe's point about now sort of taking a template around the world and saying, this is the kind of court you should have because it's the kind we should have, it does mean ensuring that local voices play a central part in the design of justice, and that may mean listening to their priorities about the kinds of offenses that they want prosecuted, the kinds of reparations that are important to them, and that sort of thing. That said, we are part of an international community that has together created some international standards, and there's a very important role, I think, for people outside any particular country to play in sort of ensuring that those standards are maintained and doing so for victims, not for ourselves. So I know that's very abstract, but I hope it is at least a little bit responsive to your question. Howard, could you talk a little bit about some of the regional politics and the role of outside actors? I'd be pleased to. Can I make one just to reach out on this last issue of justice? I have a bit of a kind of classic view on this one. I have no quarrel with the importance of trying to put in place mechanisms to hold people accountable and the culture of the community, and clearly that's important. But we need to understand that when people commit these mass crimes or these particularly vicious atrocities, it's not because they know that they don't know that's not a nice thing to do, that those actions are reflective of the more fundamental issue of the dehumanization that is taking place between these communities where people just don't see each other as of the same universe, as of the same community. And that's why I always come back to the fundamentals here. How do you restore a sense of connection between people so they begin to understand this in a very different way? Well, I don't think we'll ever get to the kind of results we would like. Now, switching to the international, when I became a special envoy my second time around under Secretary Clinton, I discovered that this wonderful partnership that we had developed when I was a special envoy earlier in the 96 to 2001 period between Europe and America had completely collapsed. That's an overstatement, but it had really dissipated. There was no longer the kind of coordination and unity of purpose or proactive efforts that were being made. I had established with Aldo Aiello, who was a European Union special envoy at the time, a wonderful partnership. And with that partnership we were able to work with both the Lusaka and the Zambia peace processes, one dealing with Burundi, the other with the Congo, and bring to the table a united international position. And where players on the ground did not have the capacity of playing one of us off against the other. And it was very, very effective. All of that had collapsed. In fact, we were at one point in the last few years, we were in a situation where different international players were giving conflicting advice to Kabila. And even the force commander at the United Nations at one point was encouraging Kabila to pursue military action against Nekunda. Not with the support, I should say, of the political side of the UN. But that's what was happening. It was such a disjointed operation. So the first thing I did when I became a special envoy this time was to call my, the new special envoy for the European Union, Roland van der Thier, who was an extraordinary individual. He and I bonded instantly. We agreed entirely on the need to regenerate this kind of partnership to build a coordinated effort, especially on the issue of security sector reform. Where people were working together and the Congolese government was not trying to take something here and something there and never assuming real ownership of the process. And the other thing we discovered is that there was no Africa involved. The South Africans had pulled out, the Angolans had pulled out of any international engagement. So we reached out and brought South Africa and Gola into the fold. And most recently China. And I was very encouraged that we were really beginning to put together a much more coordinated effort. We developed a document of benchmarks that we thought were important for the Congolese to adhere to to guide donor participation. We wanted to sit down with the Congolese as the next step to negotiate that. So at the end of the day, there would be a collective common ownership of the way forward. Unfortunately, I left my job, Roland van der Thier, was about to move on to become South African ambassador. The Belgians who have been key to this exercise, the head of the African Bureau is wonderful. It's about to become a ambassador to Germany. And now we may need to kind of hope we can revitalize this process, which was really making some advances. So that's what we've been doing. Patrick, I would be remiss if I didn't ask you to talk to the audience just a little bit about Monusco and the continuing mandate. Could you just speak a little bit about that? Yeah, only recently on the 1st of July, Monusco changed in Monusco. After the Security Council realized that President Gabila's request to complete the withdrawal of the United Nations in December 2011, so it is now a stabilization force and in fact they should prepare for the withdrawal. But they still have a mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat. And the Council doesn't have to give a priority in that. I always say if the UN is deployed and there is a problem and you see the people start running, the women with the kids on the hip and the yellow bows on the head, where are they running to? To the United Nations. What do they expect? Protection. So do you have to write in a mandate that it is a priority to protect civilians? No. That's automatically implied why you are there. So, still at Monusco, that is still the mandate. And there is now a growing problem of if you start withdrawing, you cannot fulfill that mandate anymore, properly. You see the same thing happening in Chad, where Unurkat is on the way out, that means that the military are packing up and everybody should know, don't knock on the door because we have nobody there anymore. And as I said, all my interlocutors said it will be a catastrophe. And that is something that on all levels, people should discuss with President Gabila and his government and how can they help in, yes, the United Nations is not there forever, but how can they help to stabilize that? But if the attitude, unfortunately, of the political attitude of President Gabila is that the eastern part of the Congo is fine, and when he visited Ponzi Hospital after the oil tank exploded, maybe you remember that where you had 200 people killed and so many hundreds of children, etc. burned, badly burned, a number of those patients were in Ponzi Hospital. And Ponzi Hospital is not equipped for that because of this rape and gang rape victims, but a number of them were there and President Gabila paid a visit. And Dr. Mugregge said, please, Mr. President, can you go to this room and say some encouraging words to the patients? And he refused. He refused. He said, I'm only here for these victims. And Dr. Mugregge said very briefly, it's a shame, Mr. President, because those people expect you to say a few encouraging words. They are the victims of rape and gang rape. He refused. He walked out. So if that's the attitude of the interest in what's going on there, it will be a catastrophe. And all those people who are committing those things are criminals. I mean, you can go one way or the other, but people have certain elements of interest there, and unfortunately that country is so rich that it's all the time an economic interest. Peter Karimbo is trading timber. You have a number of the CNDP forming the Gundagai sitting on top of the mines. And they have now an FEIDC uniform and half of their unit is from the former FEIDC and the other half is CNDP. He runs the North Kiwis. And you can do whatever you like. This guy, Colonel Emmanuel, sits on the mine. He runs the mine, period. You want not to come even close to him. What are we going to do about it? You can bash Kabila, but you have to try to get the confidence of him to help him to stabilize it really and to get some peace over there. And that means also that our friends from the east of the country, Ronda, stays out of it. Uganda, stay out of it. And government should say to those countries, please, you know, mind your own business. Thank you. Do any of the panelists have any questions to one another before we open to the floor? I'll take silence as a no. We will now open for questions from the floor. I would ask a couple of things. One is that we've had a few days. Anyone who hasn't yet had a chance to ask questions, please feel free to do so first before we go to those who have had ample opportunity to interact with previous speakers. And secondly, if given the time, we can keep to questions and not speeches, that would be very helpful. There are members of the staff with microphones. Could you please identify yourself? My name is Yiren. I'm from Congo. I'm from Bukavu. And I have a particular question to Dr. Wolby and the two major general comers. I don't know how to pronounce your name. I'm sorry. So I understand that building trust is a very important issue in Congo. And I had the chance to meet some people who are involved in the cohesive leadership project in Congo. But I would like to have the appreciative if I could get your intake concerning two major issues. The first one is about the leadership. I'm not talking about individual leadership, but I'm talking leadership as a structure in itself. My word might not be politically correct, but it's mostly about the integrity issue. And the way I would describe the group itself or the structure is made of criminal elite. So how would you address issues of integrity about those elites? My second question is about the Congolese ourselves. I just came from... I went from Bukavu, Goma, Kinshasa and I spent some two hours in Kisangani. I had the chance to speak with all sort of population. There is a widespread myth about conspiracy. It's all about Anglo-Saxon. It's all about Rwandans. And no one is willing to face the reality, look ourselves in the mirror and say, what are we doing? What is the way out? How would you help Congolese including elite and even people involved in the leadership project that you are carrying out in Kinshasa to deconstruct this myth about conspiracy? My other question about Major General is about the Pakistani Contaget. This is second-hand information. It's not true. I'm not sure, but people are talking about it. About what? Pakistanis. People are... I'm not saying that it's true. It's second-hand information. They are saying it seems as if they have a double agenda. They are implementing Islam in eastern part of DRC. They are going to those rural, remote areas or in the periphery and trying to... They have a program about scholarship, but the scholarship is conditioned by conversion to Islam. What are you doing about it? The second question, that's my personal opinion. How about we talk about... Thank you, thank you. Let me take the second of the two questions you posed to me first. The leadership training initiative of which you speak is known in the Congo as the initiative for leadership and the building of cohesive leadership. I forget the exact French acronym that translates into English. Michel Casa is the former United Nations humanitarian worker who directs that on the ground. And what we've been doing to address the issues you're speaking of in terms of the Rwanda dimension and in terms of the local tensions is twofold. First of all, there's been a lot of work going on bringing together community elites within both North and South Kivu including some of the more recent refugee elements. But secondly, we've also begun a program with Rwandans and Congolese. There was a very, very successful workshop that brought together 20 members of the Congolese National Assembly with 20 members of the Rwanda National Assembly just a few months ago that the trainers were there, I was not telling me it was one of the hardest programs they ever managed because initially the suspicions were so great and the tensions were so deep. But by the end of the process, they came out with a program of recommendations to diffuse those tensions both ways. That was profoundly useful and they decided they wanted to maintain their process and continue with further joint training across that border. So that's how we're working to try to build more cohesive leadership structures both within the region and as between Rwanda and Congo. Now, on the first part of the question, if I understand it, I'm not sure if you're referring to the corrupt individuals or sort of the warlord mentality. If it's the warlords you are speaking of, one of the comments that is frequently made about the kind of work that we do is that the warlords have a vested interest in the status quo and may be difficult to bring into the process. To some extent, that's true. But in my experience, you don't need everyone. What you're trying to do is achieve a critical mass of strategically influential players. And if you get a sufficient number of those, they begin to create a very different kind of political environment. Now, more broadly, the issues of corruption, which are not unique to the Congo, but perhaps more pronounced than the Congo, is a reflection of four decades of mobutuism and literally the institutionalization of corruption at the behest of the head of state and the absence of any judicial systems and the creation of a culture where everyone was convinced that they could only get ahead by surviving for themselves. And so you've got to begin that process of beginning to build a sense of community, a sense of interdependence, so people understand it's not in their enlightened self-interest to allow corrupt practices to continue. And one last comment. When you're looking for evidence of the impact of this work, those of you who follow the Congo are aware of the Goma Conference, which was the first time when Kabila got nervous, decided he better do something for peace. And he organized this monstrous conference of 1,200 or more poppy, more people, which is not the way to make peace. But everyone came together. And out of that Goma Conference, emerged a set of agreements that were pretty phenomenal. And of the participants, I forget the exact number, but of very significant percentage, were alumni of the training programs where we had brought together folks from the East and the West all together. So they were the ones that had the bonds that enabled them to negotiate these agreements. Fatal Khmeri had been in our process, for example, Azarius Ruberwa had been in our process and played a key role in these conferences. So I just say that that's, for me, at the end of the day, that's the way we should be proceeding. Patrick, do you want to respond to that? On the question on the Pakistani, I think it's a rumor which might have been rooted in the fact that they are doing, like, all the other contingents, some quick impact projects to win the hearts and minds of the local population. And maybe they have painted a local mosque or something that might have fueled. But I have never seen or heard in the time that I commanded the division that they were trying to preach or trying to convince people to be, to their religion. No, I haven't. But it might have been misunderstood by, you know, they have working on Roman Catholic churches, they have been working on mosques. I've seen pictures of that, but I don't think that that has a real truth. Do you have some questions on this side? Thank you. My name is Teresa DeLanges, and I've just been returning from two years in Afghanistan. And I'm really very interested in the transitional justice issues here because of the precedent setting, and I think it will make a difference to women around the world. So I'm wondering if anyone in the panel can speak to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights who actually went to the Congo to have consultations with the women victims about what reparations would look like in the context of the April report of the special repertoire on sexual violence. Reparations, how they would have to be different and look different for sexual violence victims. That prosecutions are one piece, but for transformative change around gender equality, that reparations really need to be redefined and reconfigured. Dan, do you want to turn it? You know, I can't speak to it in detail. The reports I've seen of the panel and the input they received included Dr. Mukwege, as I recall. We're really just powerful and profound and worth attention. My recollection, but it's unreliable because it's just not foremost in my brain right now, was that women survivors expressed a very broad range of needs and impressed on the panel members both the desperate importance of justice but including an emphasis on reparations that addressed really a very broad range of needs where women live. They're devastated communities. Reparations that address their immediate and often dire economic needs. They're medical needs which are often quite profound. And in a very comprehensive way, I don't know what I can say other than I think it's very important to build on that. And as we move forward in trying to sort of build on the recent initiative of the government that this has to figure centrally in the development of what a new paradigm of justice looks like. It's premature to have specific recommendations about how their input would look in the Congolese judicial system but I think that panel's work provides a great beginning and I think the critical thing is to incorporate the perspectives of victims as we develop these models. It hasn't really been done very successfully in many places and I think it's really going to be important to make that a priority. Let me limit myself to the United Nations that is deployed in a mission. The head is security council. That's where the head starts. Then you have the SRSG and before the SRSG you have the under Secretary General for Peacekeeping who is doing the vetting of future force commanders and SRSGs. Secretary General appoints them. Many times unfortunately you see that those appointments are very politically influenced. You're not always having the most competent and skilled person at the helm. And if you have not the most competent person who is leading the mission, the mission will suffer. If you have not a force commander who is competent and lead, the mission will suffer. So that's where the head starts. The rest of the fish is the mission. Everybody and their dog that is working to implement the mandate. Well, division commander, the brigade commander. I can give you an example if you like. No, no, not a name. But Mr. Bosco in the tanga, that's why I'm so keen on him, Mr. Bosco in tanga. For two years we tried to, in the time that I was division commander, for two years we tried to capture him. We also tried to capture the Gundar, but for two years Bosco. And once we had a chance, because every time he managed to get out, once we had a chance. We had confirmed intelligence that he was having a meeting in a hut in Boonea, the district of Ituri. So I said to my brigade commander, that you get him. That or life doesn't matter. Such a bad man. The next day, I called him, he said, and, ah, it was difficult, there were everybody seeing bodyguards, you know. And at the end of the day he walked out. Instead of having the guts, if he had not the guts to go in the hut, just to go and circle it and wait till he comes out for a pee. Because the pee is always outside the hut. He didn't have the guts to do it. We had the best, I mean, we had the best battalions there, the weaponry, everything. There were a handful of bodyguards, no match. This guy walked out and continued till today to be a very bad egg. And I can tell you another one. In February, I was also in Goma. I had dinner in a restaurant called Le Chalet. A guest who was sitting next to me. Bosconatanga. I choked in my chicken that I was eating. Because I could have strangled him on the spot. Five telephones in his hand doing all the bad things. This guy is now in the FRDC, commanding FRDC troops that are supported by the United Nations. So, you know, if you have not the guts to do it, then how can you command properly troops? Sorry, you know, that is your command. You are responsible and accountable for what you're doing. Unfortunately, in the two years, I lost 26 peacekeepers because of fighting. I was responsible for them. I'm accountable for that. You can take me on when I send them to do things on Monday and on Thursday, I had to say goodbye to them, six of them, eight of them, because they were killed. I'm accountable. I'm responsible. But that doesn't mean that I'm guilty unless I have done my job improper. I've overlooked things. And you can say you made mistakes there, my child. Out. Okay, here you go. Well, I think it was one instance if I just may interject that I think the Kunda actually appeared at the press conference of the United Nations on one occasion. When the Kunda was, but he was a political problem, you cannot address that militarily. Certainly not with the FRDC, and then asking for the United Nations and then the United Nations said yes, instead of saying no way and tell President Kabila, more president, don't do it because you create such a problem because you will fail. We've seen it. Okay. Just to respond to your question, the fish is in the Congo, the head of the Congo is Kabila. So the fish starts by spoiling in the head. We all know that we have a leadership problem. Let me introduce myself. I'm George Alula. I met with Dr. Mukwege here in Washington in 2007 and he asked me a question to know you were a presidential candidate in 2006, nothing on the political side to support me what I'm doing. I'm only a physician. So he gave me that like a challenge in 2007 and I come out with this book. The Congo glasses, as General just say, to say this is an economic war where sex is used as weapons. I publish it by myself. I'm not trying to market my book here but this is just to tell you that the Congolese side of the story is in my book. Thank you all of you. Thank you all of you. Those who have been in Africa and who are trying to help my people. I'm a seven year old young boy survivor of the first war in Congo and also my niece has been raped by four military during this situation. So just to say thank you to all of you to be the voice of your brother and sister of the Congo. But we lost 6 million people. 2 million people are out. 6 million people is 67 countries in the world all put together with less than 400,000 people. 37 states in the United States have less than 6 million people. We need an holistic approach to just bring you to success on Norable whoopee. With what you did you spent 15 years in Africa of your life. It will be good as we have seen the end of everything that happened with African America in the White House that during your lifetime to see this continent for which you get 15 years turn around the situation. We need a Marshall plan in the Congo we need a Marshall plan. Everything one of you are doing here without the resource it's and it doesn't really bring to the solution that we're looking for in the Congo. Taking out the UN force in the Congo. We the Congolese can ask the question with 1.4 billion you can rebuild the DRC army and to take over the all the Pakistanis force because the Congolese used to be the force in Central Africa we are just ready to play our role. Use the leadership of the Congolese diaspora which is less spoiled on the integrity side we will work with our brother to bring the solution and peace in the Great Lakes region. Thank you for your attention. Questions I'm Monique Biedel with falling missiles for our campaign for peace in Congo. Two questions we've talked about why and Taganda needs to be arrested. We have not talked about why he hasn't been arrested other than this really actually wonderful anecdote. I appreciate comments from Diane about the State Department's efforts to encourage the appropriate parties having arrested. Also I just returned from a week in Nairobi a bunch of Congolese civil society organizations attempting to participate in the conflict mineral summit that recently happened between the OECD and the ITGLR. And their participation was stymied by the presence of CNDP rebels within the security detail of the Congolese delegation. I appreciate comments from Howard Wolpe about the level of interest from diplomatic actors in providing political protection to civil society groups. We get all the time from our partners saying I've gotten threatening phone calls I'm having soldiers showing up at my house I have to go into hiding for two to three weeks to what extent do the higher level diplomatic actors put pressure on the government to provide political protection to civil society groups. Thank you. Do you understand me? It is the State Department does support the apprehension to go into Ganda. It's difficult to say a lot about specifically what we're doing in that regard. I do think it's very important that there be the government has to be prepared to support this. There's not a lot more I can say about that but I appreciate the question. I think I was the first American official without authorization to call for a more aggressive approach to get Bosco in and at one point there was some concern that I was violating American policy because we had this strange policy with regard to the international criminal justice which we have since at least modified so now we're much more affirmatively aggressive now in urging Bosco's apprehension but the argument you ask why it hasn't happened the argument that has been made both by Kabila and by Kagami is that the removal of Bosco would cause major political problems and possibly lead to a further fragmentation and more military action by CNDP elements. It was always my view the longer we waited the more Bosco would build up his own militia support group and make his removal more difficult rather than less difficult and I think that's what's come to pass but that has been the argument no one wanted to risk upsetting this this agreement that had been reached between Rwanda and the Congo there was some suspicion that when they reached their agreement they would do joint military action in the Congo to go after the FDLR the one part of that agreement was the Rwandans would take care of Nekunda but that Bosco would remain in place by the Congolese now we keep being told that at some point the Congolese government will relent and allow him to be arrested but I believe it when I see it they keep delaying that process the latest human rights watch report on the activities of Bosco and every day that we leave him there is causing more people being killed and raped and tortured since then but Kabila stops it now the other question that was asked was there's also something else like the civil society well I mean from my perspective we've never invested sufficient resources in Congo or in Africa generally we have had a significant increase both in the Bush administration and more recently in the Obama administration and investing much more in Africa which has been excellent I do worry that the impact in the most recent election is a major scale back of resources available for foreign assistance generally including foreign assistance for Africa and so I think we're going to be in for a very, very difficult period in that regard on the issue of the civil society protection we've been in the lead I think it's fair to say in pushing the United Nations and I agree entirely with the general's analysis which some of us have been making earlier for a more aggressive forward leaning posture there was a French general who used to head up Manurka in the Chad that went out to the Congo to Goma on a short visit under contract with one of the refugees international I think it was and discovered that there was just no proactivity whatsoever they had these dozen helicopters they weren't being used there was no effort to more aggressively establish an international presence all the things the general was alluding to so what's necessary is to change that mindset to change that culture within the United Nations system and that will do a lot to provide more protection I'm afraid we've actually come to the end of this formal session so let me on behalf of all of us thank our three speakers I'm sure we'll actually walk out slowly in case you want to ask them another question privately and thank you all for joining us this morning and the last few days