 Good morning. Thanks for braving the snow. I'm going to provide a brief overview on what this summit means in historical context. I was in the NSC staff for five years in the Bush administration and was sucked into the mechanics and politics and diplomacy of some of these visits in the past. This is the eighth visit or the eighth meeting between presidents Obama and who. It's only the second summit state visit. There's a big difference between whether you're meeting on the margins of a G20 or a multilateral session where you have with interpreters roughly half an hour of discussion. Big difference between that and what president who will do which is full ruffles and flourishes and honors a dinner by laterals meetings with CEOs and a complete focus for 48 72 hours on US-China relations. And it's only the second one of those. The last one of course was in November 2009 when President Obama visited China. And my impression was that the Obama administration intended to basically continue the general trajectory of the Bush administration's China policy, strong alliance relations and then build cooperation where you can with Beijing and wanted to frame that during the president's visit to Beijing. They did so in a joint statement which talked about respecting each other's core interests and other things. But I think most administration officials would acknowledge that the next year 2010 was a bit of a disappointment in US-China relations at the Copenhagen summit on climate change in China's surprisingly assertive stance on territorial disputes in the East China Sea with Japan and the South China Sea with certain ASEAN states. China's passive almost enabling stance towards North Korea in the wake of the North's attack on the Cheonan and so forth. And so the second half of 2010 the administration I think quite visibly reasserted and redemonstrated if you will to Beijing the depth of American strategic influence in Asia. Secretary Clinton at the ASEAN regional forum in June said the US has a national interest in freedom of navigation and inserted the US in the South China Sea dispute in a way we had not done before when Japan and China came into controversy over the Senkaku or Diao Yutai islands and Japan arrested a Chinese fishing captain and China embargoed Japan. The administration you know quite visibly reaffirmed our defense commitment to Japan as it pertains to those islands. Trilateral US Japan Korea defense exercises and so forth and we go into this summit now I think with both sides eager to add a little more stability to the relationship. I think that the US has made its point. I think the Chinese side recognizes that it overstepped somewhat this last year and both want out of this a more stable relationship for 2011 and arguably 2012 because this will be president whose last summit before the leadership transition presumably to Xi Jinping in China. So this I think both sides hope will set the tone for at least two years. Can it? I think in some ways yes it can. First because these bilateral summits matter a lot especially to the Chinese leadership. Bonnie is going to talk more about the optics and the protocol and how important that is but Hu Jintao is essentially a dungist which is to say follows Deng Xiaoping's maxim of 30 some years ago to lay low, bide your time, build your strength and the relationship with the US is foundational for China. You have to get that right as a Chinese leader so it's important to the Chinese side and this will really focus the mind and you can see evidence that China has at least tactically adjusted its position in a range of areas. The Renminbi has appreciated 3.9% since June. China's rhetoric and diplomatic actions on the North Korea problem are somewhat more helpful, somewhat more helpful. Secretary Gates had a reasonably positive visit to Beijing and reopened military to military ties. Beijing has agreed to engage the ASEAN countries in the code of conduct on a multilateral diplomatic discussion on the South China Sea has softened the tone towards Japan so across the board on almost all these issues China has somewhat softened its stance. And finally summits in the US are particularly important because Beijing can't control the can't control all of you the way they can script and control a summit in China. On the other hand, I think there are some real limitations and this will likely not be a sort of historic summit or a transformational summit in US-China relations. First, because as the two leaders work on a joint statement which is being prepared, it is very hard for me to imagine how they can come up with a verbiage to satisfy the multiple audiences they have to satisfy. China's domestic audience, the US and then of course our allies. Very hard to do. I think the joint statement will probably be fairly workman-like descriptions of where we cooperate. Secondly, I think most of these adjustments in Chinese behavior on the Renminbi, on the South China Sea, on mill to mill, we've seen before in many cases, not all. The joint committee on commerce and trade, JCCT, there were some important incremental moves forward. But almost all of these, in one way or another, are reversible, particularly the military and military dialogue that Secretary Gates is open. It's quite clear that the PLA will cut this off in an instant if we sell arms to Taiwan, for example. And the Renminbi has appreciated and then been repag to the dollar before. So it's reversible. And ultimately, the summit is not going to be able to fix the structural problem in US-China relations and in Chinese politics, and particularly the fact that Hu Jintao is essentially a lame duck. And there's a quite intense competition for the leadership succession in 2012. And some real questions about whether the PLA is playing along with this script. And you've all heard about the test of China's new stealth fighter. There are questions about whether Hu Jintao knew it was coming, whether it was coincidental or not. My own discussions with administration officials suggest to me that indeed, who was surprised by this, and there's real worry that it was a spoiler move by the PLA, although we don't know. So those structural problems are not going to get fixed by this summit, but it will put a floor under the relationship and in terms of relationship maintenance be important and in fact indispensable because the leader's relationship really is at the core of US-China ties.