 Book 2, Sections 9 and 10 of Politics by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jennifer. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 2, Sections 9 and 10. Section 9. In the governments of Lassa Demon and Crete, and indeed in all governments, two points have to be considered. First, whether any particular law is good or bad when compared with the perfect state. Secondly, whether it is or is not consistent with the idea and character which the lawgiver has set before his citizens. That in a well-ordered state the citizens should have leisure and not have to provide for their daily wants is generally acknowledged. But there is a difficulty in seeing how this leisure is to be attained. The Thessalian Peniste have often risen against their masters and the Helits in like manner against the Lassa Demians for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait. Nothing, however, of this kind has yet happened to the Cretians. The reason probably is that the neighboring cities, even when at war with one another, never form an alliance with rebellious serfs. Rebellions not being for their interest, since they themselves have a dependent population. Whereas all the neighbors of the Lassa Demians, whether Arjives, Messenians or Arcadians, were their enemies. In Thessaly, again the original revolt of the slaves occurred because the Thessalians were still at work with the neighboring Achaians, Perhabians and Magnesians. Besides, if there were no other difficulty, the treatment or management of slaves is a troublesome affair. For, if not kept in hand, they are insolent and think they are as good as their masters. And, if harshly treated, they hate and conspire against them. Now, it is clear that when these are the results, the citizens of a state have not found out the secret of managing their subject population. Again, the license of the Lassa Demian women defeats the intention of the Spartan constitution and is adverse to the happiness of the state. For a husband and wife being each a part of every family, the state may be considered as about equally divided into men and women and therefore in those states in which the condition of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no long. And this is what has actually happened at Sparta. The legislator wanted to make the whole state hearty and temperate and he has carried out his intention in this case of men, but he has neglected the women who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury. The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly valued, especially if the citizen fall under the dominion of their wives after the manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and a few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythology would seem to have been right in uniting areas in Aphrodite for all warlike races are prone to love either of men or of women. This was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness. Many things were managed by their women, but what difference does it make whether women rule or the rulers are ruled by women? The result is the same. Even in regard to courage, which is of no use in daily life and is needed only in war, the influence of the Lacedaemian women has been most mischievous. The evil showed itself in the Theban invasion when, unlike the women of other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion than the enemy. This license of the Lacedaemian women existed from the earliest times and was only what might be expected. For during the wars of the Lacedaemians, first against the Argives and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians, the men were long away from home and, on the return of peace, they gave themselves into the legislator's hand, already prepared by the discipline of a soldier's life in which there are many elements of virtue to receive his enactments. But when, like Courges, as tradition says, wanted to bring the women under his laws, they resisted and he gave up the attempt. These then are the causes of what then happened, and this defect in the Constitution is clearly to be attributed to them. We are not, however, considering what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong and the disorder of the women, as I have already said, not only gives an error of indecorum to the Constitution considered in itself, but tends in a measure to foster avarice. The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality of property. While some of the Spartan citizens have quite small properties, others have very large ones, hence the land has passed into the hands of a few. And this is due also to faulty laws, for although the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale or purchase of an inheritance, it allows anybody who likes to give or bequeath it, yet both practices lead to the same result, and nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held by women. This is owing to the number of heiresses and to the large dowries which are customary. It would surely have been better to have given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones. As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on anyone whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving her away descends to his heir. Hence, although the country is able to maintain fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand hoplites, the whole number of Spartan citizens fell below one thousand. The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property for the city sank under a single defeat. The want of men was their ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings, they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no lack of population was experienced by them. Indeed, at one time, Sparta is said to have numbered not less than ten thousand citizens. Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization of property. Again, the law which relates to the procreation of children is adverse to the correction of this inequality. For the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as he could, encouraged the citizens to have large families. And there is a law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from military service, and he who has four from all the burdens of the state. Yet it is obvious that, if there were many children, the land being distributed as it is, many of them must necessarily fall into poverty. The Lassimodanian constitution is defective in another point. I mean the efferalty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the effers are chosen from the whole people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former times, and quite recently in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the effers who were bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them, so that in this way, as well together with the royal office, the whole constitution has deteriorated and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The efferalty certainly does keep the state together, for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or due chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained. This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence because they have due honor in their own persons, the nobles because they are represented in the council of elders, for the office of elders is a reward of virtue, and the people because all are eligible to the efferalty. The election of effers out of the whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish. Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not determine with them merely on their own judgment, but according to written rules and to the laws. Their way of life too is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution, they have a deal too much licensed, whereas in the case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures. Again, the council of elders is not free from defects, it may be said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue, and that therefore there is an advantage to the state in having them. But that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body, and when men have been educated in such a manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to have taken bribes, and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs, and therefore they ought not to be irresponsible, yet at Sparta they are so. But, it may be replied, all magistracies are accountable to the affers. Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other manner. Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish, and it is improper that the person to be elected should canvass for the office. The worthiest should be appointed whether he chooses or not, and here the legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other parts of his constitution. He would have his citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this ability in the election of the elders, for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice almost more than any other passions are the motives of crime. Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another time. They should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men. At least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state. Neither did the first introducer of the common meals called fidisha regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost as in Crete, but among the last mundane means everyone is expected to contribute and some of them are too poor to afford the expense. Thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can scarcely take part in them, and according to ancient custom those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain the rights of citizenship. The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censored and with justice. It is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpetual generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king. The charge which Plato brings in the laws against the intention of the legislator is likewise justified. The whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only, the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their power was preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell, for of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than war. There is another error equally great into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods for which men contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, the error in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them. Once more the revenues of the state are ill-managed. There is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans they do not look closely into one another's contributions. The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial, for he has made his city poor and his citizens greedy. Enough respecting the Spartan constitution of which these are the principal defects. End of Section 9. Book 2, Sections 9 and 10 of Politics by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jennifer. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 2, Sections 9 and 10. Section 10. The Creighton constitution nearly resembles the Spartan and in some few points is quite as good, but for the most part less perfect in form. The older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later, and the Lassidomanian is said to be and probably is, in a very great measure, a copy of the Creighton. According to tradition, like Courages, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charles, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete, for the two countries are nearly connected. The Lysians are a colony of Lassidomanians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to this day, the Paraisae, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed to have enacted. The island seems to be intended by nature for Dominion and Hallus, and to be well situated, it extends right across the sea, around which nearly all the Helens are settled. And while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the others almost reaches to the region of Asia, about triopium and roads. Hence Minos acquired the Empire of the Sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others. And last he invaded Sicily, where he died near Chemicus. The Cretian institutions resemble the Lassidomanian, the Helids are the husbandmen of the one, the Paraisae of the other, and both Cretans and Lassidomanians have common meals, which were anciently called by the Lassidomanians, not Phedicia, but Andrea, and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals originally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions are similar, for the Office of the Effors is the same as that of the Cretan Cosme, the only difference being that whereas the Effors are five, the Cosme are ten in number. The Elders too answer to the Elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the Council. The Kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosme have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in the Ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the Elders and the Cosme. The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lassidomanian, for in Lassidemia everyone pays so much per head, or if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more popular character. They are of all the fruits of the earth, and cattle raised on public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the Paraece, one portion is assigned to the gods and to the service of the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women and children are all supported out of a common stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation and eating, which he conceives to be a game. He likewise encourages the separation of men from women, at least they should have too many children, and the companionship of men with one another. Whether this is a good or bad thing, I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the Lassidomanian, there can be no doubt. On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta everyone is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi. The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been already made about the Lassidomanian elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment and dispensing with written law is dangerous. It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not discontented at it being excluded from it, for there is no profit to be made out of the office as out of the efferalty, since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi being in an island are removed from temptation. The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private individuals, and they are allowed also to resign before their turn of office has expired. Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule. Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit to justice. This shows that the Cretan government, although possessing some of the characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close oligarchy. The nobles have a habit too of setting up a chief. They get together a party among the common people and their own friends, and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation. Distance has the same effect as the less dominion prohibition of strangers, and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Periesi are contented in Crete, whereas the Hellits are perpetually revolting. When lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the government of Crete. End of Section 10. End of Book 2, Sections 9 and 10. Recording by Jennifer Hilo, Hawaii. Book 2, Sections 11 and 12 of Politics by Aristotle. This is a LibriVox recording. Our LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jennifer. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 2, Sections 11 and 12. The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government, which differs from that of any other state in several respects, though it is in some very like the Lassendomanian. Indeed, all three states, the Lassendomanian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian, nearly resemble one another and are very different from any others. Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent. The superiority of their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people remain loyal to the constitution. The Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant. Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Lassendomanian are the following. The common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan Fidicia and their magistracy of the 104 to the Ephers. But whereas the Ephers are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit. This is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor that an ordinary one. But if there is some distinguished family, they are selected out of it and not appointed by seniority. This is far better. Such officers have great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lassendoman. Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state for which the Carthaginian constitution would be censored apply equally to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy, and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard, but also determined by them, and anyone who likes may oppose it. Now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, but they should choose the supreme council of one hundred, and should hold office longer than other magistrates, for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office. These are oligarchical features. They are being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates, and not some by one class of judges or jurors, and some by another, as at Lassendoman, are characteristic of aristocracy. The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth. A man they say who is poor cannot rule well, he has not the leisure. If then elections of magistrates for the wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended. For the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them, their kings and generals, with an eye both to merit and to wealth. But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way, and to this his attention should be first directed, even if you must have regard to wealth in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example. And, where virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves, and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore, they should rule who are able to rule best, and even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for them when in office. It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one man. The legislator should see to this, and should not appoint the same person to be a flute player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance with both constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I said, this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters. The duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all. The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to their colonies. This is their panacea, and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods. Such is the character of the last dominion, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated. End of Section 11. Book 2, Section 12 of Politics by Aristotle This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jennifer. Politics by Aristotle. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Book 2, Section 12. Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a private station. About most of them, what is worth telling has already been told. Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered. And of these, some have only made laws. Others have framed constitutions. For example, like Hergius and Solon did both. Of the last dominion constitution I have already spoken. As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the state. According to their view, the Council of Areopicus was an oligarchical element, the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. The truth seems to be that the Council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of the citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts, which are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When the law courts grew powerful to please the people who were now playing the tyrant, the old constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Iphialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopicus. Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now see. All this is true, it seems, however, to be the result of circumstances and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian War, began to get a notion of itself and followed worthless demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon himself appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates, which was absolutely necessary. For without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from the nobles and the men of wealth, that is to say from the Pentecostio Medini or from the class called Tsukitie, or from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers who had no share in any magistracy. Mere legislators were Zulucus, who gave laws to the Episephran, Locrians, and Charondes, who legislated for his own city of Catana and for the other Chelsidian cities in Italy and Sicily. Some people attempt to make out that Anomocratus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art, that Thales was his companion and that Lycurgus and Zulucus were disciples of Thales as Charondes was of Zulucus, but their account is quite inconsistent with chronology. There was also Fililaus, the Corinthian who gave laws to the Thebans. This Fililaus was one of the family of the Bacchia dei and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother, Halcyon, had conceived for him and retired to Thebes where the two friends together ended their days. The inhabitants still point out their tombs which are in full view of one another, but one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other not. Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes so that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb. Fililaus, that it might. This is the reason why they settled at Thebes and so Fililaus, legislated for the Thebans and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children which they call the laws of adoption. These laws were peculiar to him and were intended to preserve the number of the lots. In the legislation of Charondes there is nothing more remarkable except the suits against false witnesses. He is the first to instituted denunciation for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern legislators. Characteristic of Filis is the equalization of property, of Plato, the community of women, children, and property, the common meals of women, and the law about drinking that the sober shall be masters of the feast. Also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands so that one should be as useful as the other. Draco has left laws but he adopted them to a constitution which already existed and there is no peculiarity in them which is worth mentioning except the greatness and severity of the punishments. Pidekas, too, was only a law giver and not the author of a constitution. He has a law which is peculiar to him that if a drunken man do something wrong he shall be more heavily punished than he were sober. He looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard but only to expediency for drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence. Andrew Domus of Regime gave laws to the Chelsidians of Thrace. Some of them relate to homicide and to heiresses but there is nothing remarkable in them. And here let us conclude our inquiry into the various constitutions which either actually exist or have been devised by theorists. Please visit LibriVox.org He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of governments must first of all determine what is a state. At present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain act others, no, not the state but the oligarchy or the tyrant and the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state a constitution or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is a composite like any other whole made up of many parts these are the citizens who compose it. It is evident therefore that we must begin by asking who is the citizen and what is the meaning of the term for here again there may be a difference of opinion he who is a citizen in a democracy will not often be a citizen in an oligarchy leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens or have obtained the name of citizen any other accidental manner we may say first that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place for resident aliens and slaves share in the place nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty nay resident aliens in many places do not possess even such rights completely for they are obliged to have a patron so that they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register or to old men who have been relieved from state duties we do not say simply that they are citizens but add in the one case that they are not of age and in the other that they are past the age or something of that sort the precise expression is immaterial for our meaning is clear similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and exiles but the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense against whom no such exception can be taken and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice and in offices now of offices some are discontinuous and the same persons are not allowed to hold them twice or can only hold them after a fixed interval others have no limit of time for example the office of a die cast or ecclesiast it may indeed be argued that these are not magistrates at all and that their functions give them no share in the government but surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the power do not govern let us not dwell further upon this which is a purely verbal question what we want is a common term including both die cast and ecclesiast let us for the sake of distinction call it indefinite office and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens this is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen and best suits all those who are generally so called but we must not forget that things of which the underlying principles differ in kind one of them being first, another second, another third have when regarded in this relation nothing or hardly anything worth mentioning in common now we see that governments differ in kind and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior those which are faulty or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect what we mean by perversion will be hereafter explained the citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy but not necessarily to other states for in some states the people are not acknowledged nor have they any regular assembly but only extraordinary ones and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates at like a daemon for instance the efforts determined suits about contracts which they distribute among themselves while the elders are judges of homicide and other causes are decided by other magistrates a similar principle prevails at Carthage where certain magistrates decide all causes we may indeed modify our definition of the citizen so as to include these states in them it is the holder of a definite not of an indefinite office who legislates and judges and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things the conception of the citizen now begins to clear up he who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that state and speaking generally a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life two but in practice the citizen is defined to be one of whom both the parents are citizens others insist on going further back say to two or three or more ancestors this is a short and practical definition but there are some who raise the further question how can this third or fourth ancestor come to be a citizen Gorgias of Leontini partly because he was in a difficulty partly an irony said mortars are what is made by the mortar makers and the citizens of Larissa are those who are made by the magistrates for it is their trade to make Larissians yet the question is really simple for if according to the definition just given they shared in the government they were citizens this is a better definition than the other for the words born of a father or mother who is a citizen cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state there is a greater difficulty in the case of those who have been made citizens after a revolution as by Cleistines at Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants for he enrolled in tribes many medics both strangers and slaves the doubt in these cases is not who is but whether he is ought to be a citizen and there will still be a furthering state whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state for what ought not to be is what is false now there are some who hold office and yet ought not to hold office whom we describe as ruling but ruling unjustly and the citizen was defined by the fact of his holding some kind of rule or office he who holds a judicial or legislative office fulfills our definition of a citizen it is evident therefore that the citizens about whom the doubt has arisen must be called citizens three whether they ought to be so or not is a question which is bound up with the previous inquiry for a parallel question is raised respecting the state whether a certain act is or is not an act of the state for example in the transition from an oligarchy or a tyranny to a democracy in such cases persons refuse to fulfill their contracts or any other obligations on the grounds that the tyrant and not the state contracted them they argued that some constitutions are established by force and not for the sake of the common good but this would apply equally to democracies for they too may be founded on violence and then the acts of democracy will be neither more nor less acts of the state in question than those of an oligarchy or a tyranny this question runs up into another on what principle shall we ever say that the state is the same or different it would be a very superficial view which considered only the place and the inhabitants for the soil and the population may be separated and some of the inhabitants may live in one place and some in another this however is not a very serious difficulty we need only remark that the word state is ambiguous it is further asked when are men living in the same place to be regarded as a single city what is the limit certainly not the wall of the city for you might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall like this we may say is Babylon and every city that has the compass of a nation rather than a city Babylon they say had been taken for three days before some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact this difficulty may however with advantage be deferred to another occasion the statesman has to consider the size of the state and whether it should consist of more than one nation or not again shall we say that while the race of inhabitants as well as their place of abode remain the same the city is also the same although the citizens are always dying and being born as we call rivers and fountains the same although the water is always flowing away and coming again or shall we say that the generations of men like the rivers are the same but that the state changes for since the state is a partnership and is a partnership of citizens in a constitution when the form of government changes and becomes different then it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same just as a tragic differs from a comic chorus although the members of both may be identical and in this manner we speak of every union or composition of elements as different when the form of their composition alters for example a scale containing the same sounds is said to be different accordingly as the Dorian or the Phyrgian model is employed and if this is true it is evident that the sameness of the state consists chiefly in the sameness of the constitution and it may be called or not called by the same name whether the inhabitants are the same or entirely different it is quite another question whether a state ought or ought not to fulfill engagements when the form of government changes for there is a point nearly a lie to the proceeding whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not but before entering on this discussion we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the virtue of the citizen like the sailor the citizen is a member of the community now sailors have different functions for one of them is a rower another a pilot and a third a lookout man a fourth is described by some similar term and while the precise definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him there is at the same time a common definition applicable to them all for they all of them have a common object which is safety and navigation similarly one citizen's differs from another but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all this community is the constitution the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member if then there are many forms of government it is evident that there is not one single virtue of the good citizen which is perfect virtue hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man the same question may also be approached by another road from a consideration of the best constitution if the state cannot be entirely composed of good men and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well and must therefore have virtue still in as much as all the citizens cannot be alike the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide all must have the virtue of the good citizen thus and thus only can the state be perfect but they will not have the virtue of a good man unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good again the state as composed of unlikes may be compared to the living being as the first elements into which a living being is restored are soul and body as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite the family of husband and wife property of master and slave so of all these as well as other dissimilar elements the state is composed and therefore the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same any more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by his side I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same but will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide to this we answer that the good ruler is a good and wise man and he who would be a statesman must be a wise man and some persons say that even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind for are not the children of kings instructed in writing and military exercises as Euripides says no subtle arts for me but what the state requires as though there were special education needed by a ruler if then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man and we assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be absolutely the same although in some cases they may be for the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a citizen it was the sense of this difference which made Jason say that he felt hungry when he was not a tyrant meaning that he could not endure to live in a private station but on the other hand it may be argued that men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey and he is said to be a citizen of a proved virtue who is able to do both now if we suppose the virtue of a good man to be that which rules and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and obeying it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise since then it is sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must learn different things and not the same but that the citizen must know and share in them both the inference is obvious there is indeed the rule of a master which is concerned with menial offices the master need not know how to perform these but may employ others in the execution of them the other would be a degrading and by the other I mean the power actually to do menial duties which vary much in character and are executed by various classes of slaves such for example as handicraftsmen who as their name signifies live by the labor of their hands under these the mechanic is included hence in ancient times and among some nations the working classes had no share in the government a privilege which they only acquired under extreme democracy certainly the good man in the statesmen in the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use if they habitually practice them there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave this is not the rule of which we are speaking but there is a rule of another kind which is exercised over free men and equals by birth a constitutional rule which the ruler must learn by obeying as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry or the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders of a general of infantry and by having had the command of a regiment and of a company it has been well said that he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander the two are not the same but the good citizen ought to be capable of both he should know how to govern like a free man and how to obey like a free man these are the virtues of a citizen and although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject the virtue of a good man will include both for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a subject e.g. his justice will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds the one qualifying him the rule the other to obey and differing as the temperance and courage of men and women differ for a man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman and a woman would be thought locations if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man and indeed their part in the management of the household is different for the duty of the one is to acquire and of the other to preserve practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler it would seem that all other virtues must equally belong to ruler and subject the virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom but only true opinion he may be compared to the maker of the flute while his master is like the flute player or user of the flute from these considerations may be gathered that the answer to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen or different and how far are the same and how far different end of book three sections one through four book three sections five through nine of politics by Aristotle this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Joe it book three sections five through nine five there still remains one more question about the citizen is he only a true citizen who has a share of office or is the mechanic to be included if they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens not every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying for this man is a citizen and if none of the lower class are citizens in which part of the state are they to be placed for they are not resident aliens and they are not foreigners may we not reply that as far as this objection goes there is no more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding slaves and freed men from any of the above mentioned classes it must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state for example children are not citizen equally with grown up men who are citizens absolutely but children not being grown up are only citizens on a certain assumption nay in ancient times and among some nations the artisan class were slaves or foreigners and therefore the majority of them are so now the best form of state will not admit them to citizenship but if they are admitted then our definition of the virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every free man as such but only to those who are freed from necessary services the necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of individuals or mechanics and laborers who are the servants of the community these reflections carried a little further will explain their position and indeed what has been said already is of itself when understood explanation enough since there are many forms of government there must be many varieties of citizen and especially of citizens who are subjects so that under some governments the mechanic and the laborer will be citizens but not in others as for example in aristocracy or the so called government of the best if there be such and one in which honors are given according to virtue and merit for no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a mechanic or laborer in oligarchies the qualification for office is high and therefore no laborer can ever be a citizen but a mechanic may for an actual majority of them are rich at Thebes there was a law that no man could hold office who had not retired from business for ten years but in many states the law goes to the length of admitting aliens for in some democracies a man is a citizen though his mother only be a citizen and a similar principle is applied to illegitimate children the law is relaxed when there is a dearth of population but when the number of citizens increases first the children of a male or a female slave are excluded then those whose mothers only are citizens and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those whose fathers and mothers are both citizens hence as is evident there are different kinds of citizens and he is a citizen in the highest sense who shares in the honors of the state compare Homer's words like some dishonored stranger he who is excluded from the honors of the state is no better than an alien but when his exclusion is concealed then the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow inhabitants as to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same and in others different when they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man but only the statesmen and those who have or may have alone or in conjunction with others the conduct of public affairs six having determined these questions we have next to consider whether there is only one form of government or many and if many what they are and how many and what are the differences between them a constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state especially of the highest of all the government is everywhere sovereign in the state and the constitution is in fact the government for example in democracies the people are supreme but in oligarchies the few and therefore we say that these two forms of government are also different and so in other cases first let us consider what is the purpose of a state and how many forms of government there are by which human society is regulated we have already said that in the first part of this treatise when discussing household management and the rule of a master that man is by nature a political animal and therefore men even when they do not require one another's help desire to live together not but that they are also brought together by their common interests and proportion as they severly attain to any measure of well-being this is certainly the chief end both of individuals and of states and also for the sake of mere life in which there is possibly some noble element so long as the evils of existence do not greatly overbalance the good mankind meet together and maintain the political community and we see that men cling to life even at the cost of enduring great misfortune seeming to find in life a natural sweetness and happiness there is no difficulty in distinguishing the various kinds of authority they have been defined already in discussions outside the school the rule of a master although the slave by nature and the master by nature have in reality the same interests is nevertheless exercised primarily with a view to the interests of the master but accidentally considers the slave since if the slave perish the rule of the master perishes with him on the other hand the government of a wife and children and of a household which we have called household management is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties but essentially for the good of the governed as we see to be the case in medicine, gymnastic and the arts in general which are only accidentally concerned with the good of the artists themselves for there is no reason why the trainer may not sometimes practice gymnastics and the helmsman is always one of the crew the trainer or the helmsman considers the good of those committed to his care but when he is one of the persons taking care of he accidentally participates in the advantage for the helmsman is also a sailor and the trainer becomes one of those in training and so in politics when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and lightness the citizens think that they ought to hold office by turns formerly as is natural everyone would take his turn of service and then again somebody else would look after his interest just as he while in office had looked after theirs but nowadays for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and from office men want to be always in office one might imagine that the rulers being sickly were only kept in health while they continued in office in that case we may be sure that they would be hunting after places the conclusion is evident that governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice and are therefore true forms but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms for they are despotic whereas a state is a community of free men 7. Having determined these points we have next to consider how many forms of government there are and what they are and in the first place what are the true forms for when they are determined the perversions of them will at once be apparent the words constitution and government have the same meaning and the government which is the supreme authority and states must be in the hands of one or of a few or of the many the true forms of government therefore are those in which the one or the few or the many govern with a view to the common interest but governments which rule with a view to the private interest whether of the one or of the few or of the many are perversions for the members of a state if they are truly citizens ought to participate in its advantages of forms of government in which one rules we call that which regards the common interests kingship or royalty that in which more than one but not many rule aristocracy and it is so called either because the rulers are the best men or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens but when the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest the government is called by the generic name a constitution and there is a reason for this use of language one man or a few may excel in virtue but as the number increases it becomes more difficult for them to attain perfection in every kind of virtue though they may in military virtue for this is found in the masses hence in a constitutional government the fighting men have the supreme power and those who possess arms are the citizens of the above mentioned forms the perversions are as follows of royalty tyranny of aristocracy oligarchy of constitutional government democracy for a tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interests of the monarch only oligarchy has in view the interests of the wealthy democracy of the needy none of them the common good of all eight but there are difficulties about these forms of government and it will therefore be necessary to state a little more at length the nature of each for he who would make a philosophical study of the various sciences and does not regard practice only ought not to overlook or omit anything but to set forth the truth in every particular tyranny as I was saying is monarchy exercising the rule of a master over the political society oligarchy is when men of property have the government in their hands democracy the opposite when the indigent and not the men of property are the rulers and here arises the first of our difficulties and it relates to the distinction drawn for democracy is said to be the government of the many but what if the many are men of property and have the power in their hands in like manner oligarchy is said to be the government of the few but what if the poor are fewer than the rich and have the power in their hands because they are the stronger in these cases the distinction which we have drawn between these different forms of government would no longer hold good suppose once more that we add wealth to the few and poverty to the many and name the governments accordingly and oligarchy is said to be that in which the few and the wealthy and democracy that in which the many and the poor are the rulers there will still be a difficulty for if the only forms of government are the ones already mentioned how shall we describe those other governments also just mentioned by us in which the rich are the more numerous and the poor are the fewer and both govern in their respective states the argument seems to show that whether in oligarchies or in democracies the number of the governing body whether the greater number as in a democracy or the smaller number as in an oligarchy is an accident due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few and the poor numerous but if so there is a misapprehension of the causes of the difference between them for the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth wherever men rule by reason of their wealth whether they be few or many that is an oligarchy and where the poor rule that is a democracy but as a fact the rich are few and the poor many for few are well to do whereas freedom is enjoyed by all and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim power in the state 9. Let us begin by considering the common definitions of oligarchy and democracy and what is justice oligarchical and democratical for all men cling to justice of some kind but their conceptions are imperfect and they do not express the whole idea for example justice is thought by them to be and is equality equality not however for everyone but only for equals and equality is thought to be and is justice neither is this for all but only for unequals when the persons are omitted then men judge erroneously the reason is that they are passing judgment on themselves and most people are bad judges in their own case and whereas justice implies a relation to persons as well as to things and a just distribution as I have already said in the ethics implies the same ratio between the persons and between the things they agree about the equality of the things but dispute about the equality of the persons chiefly for the reason which I have just given because they are bad judges in their own affairs and secondly because both the parties to the argument are speaking of a limited and partial justice but imagine themselves to be speaking of absolute justice for the one party if they are unequal in one respect for example wealth consider themselves to be unequal in all and the other party if they are equal in one respect for example free birth consider themselves to be equal in all but they leave out the capital point for if men met and associated out of regard to wealth only their share in the state would be proportion to their property and the oligarchical doctrine would seem to carry the day it would not be just that he who paid one Mena should have the same share of a hundred Menae whether of the principal or of the profits as he who paid the remaining ninety-nine but a state exists for the sake of a good life and not for the sake of life only if life only were the object slaves and brute animals might form a state but they cannot for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice nor yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse for then the Terranians and the Carthaginians and all who have commercial treaties with one another would be the citizens of one state true they have agreements about imports and engagements that they will do no wrong to one another and written articles of alliance but there are no magistrates common to the contracting parties who will enforce their engagements different states have each their own magistracies nor does one state take care that the citizens of the other are such as they ought to be nor see that those who come under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or wickedness at all but only that they do no injustice to one another whereas those who care for good government take into consideration virtue and vice in states once it may be further inferred that virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called and not merely enjoys the name for without this end the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliances of which the members live apart and law is only a convention a surety to one another of justice as the Sophist lycophron says and has no real power to make the citizens this is obvious for supposed distinct places such as Corinth and Megara to be brought together so that their walls touched still they would not be one city not even if the citizens had the right to intermarry which is one of the rights peculiarly characteristic of states again if men dwelt at a distance from one another but not so far off as to have no intercourse and there were laws among them that they should not wrong each other in their exchanges neither would this be a state let us suppose that one man is a carpenter another a husbandman another a shoemaker and so on and that their number is ten thousand nevertheless if they have nothing in common but exchange alliance and the like that would not constitute a state why is this? surely not because they are at a distance from one another for even supposing that such a community were to meet in one place but that each man had a house of his own which was in a manner of his state that they made alliance with one another only against evil doers still an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state if their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as before their union it is clear then that a state is not a mere society having a common place established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange these are the conditions without which a state cannot exist but all of them together do not constitute a state which is a community of families and aggregations of families in well-being for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life such community can only be established among those who live in the same place and intermarry hence arise in cities family connections brotherhoods, common sacrifices amusements which draw men together but these are created by friendship for the will to live together is friendship the end of the state is the good life these are the means toward it and the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life by which we mean a happy and honorable life our conclusion then is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions and not of mere companionship hence they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political value or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue from what has been said it will be clearly seen that all the partisans of different forms of government speak of a part of justice only end of book 3 sections 5 through 9 there is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state is it the multitude or the wealthy or the good or the one best man or a tyrant any of these alternatives seems to involve disagreeable consequences if the poor from the rich or the poor from the rich or the poor from the rich or the poor from the rich or the poor from the rich what are the consequences if the poor for example because they are more in number divide among themselves the property of the rich is not this unjust no by heaven will be the reply for the supreme authority justly-wilded but if this is not injustice pray what is again when in the first division all has been taken and the majority divide anew the property of the minority is not evident if this goes on yet surely virtue is not the ruin of those who possess her nor is justice destructive of a state and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot be just if it were all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity be just for he only coerces other men by superior power just as the multitude coerces the rich but is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers and what if they in like manner rob and plunder the people is this just if so the other case will likewise be just but there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust then ought the good to rule and have supreme power but in that case everybody else being excluded from power will be dishonoured for the offices of a state are posts of honour and if one set of men always holds them the rest must be deprived of them then will it be well that the one best man should rule nay that is still more olacarchical for the number of those who are dishonoured is thereby increased someone may say that it is bad in any case for a man subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion to have the supreme power rather than the law but what if the law itself be democratical or olacarchical how will that help us out of our difficulties not at all the same consequences will follow most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion the principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is one that is maintained and though not free from difficulty yet seems to contain an element of truth for the many of whom each individual is but an ordinary person when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good if regarded not individually but collectively just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse for each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence and when they meet together they become in a manner one man who has many feet and hands and senses that is a figure of their mind and disposition hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry for some understand one part and some another and among them they understand the whole there is a similar combination of qualities in good man who differ from any individual of the many as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are not beautiful and works of art from realities because in them the scattered elements are combined although if taken separately the eye of one person or some other feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture whether this principle can apply to every democracy and to all bodies of men is not clear or rather by heaven in some cases it is impossible of application for the argument would equally hold about brutes and wherein it will be asked do some men differ from brutes but there may be bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless true and if so the difficulty which has been already raised and also another which is akin to it that is what power should be assigned to the mass of free men and citizens who are not rich and have no personal merit are both solved there is still a danger in allowing them to share the great offices of state for their folly will lead them into error and their dishonesty into crime but there is a danger also in not letting them share for a state in which many poor men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies the only way of escape is to assign to them some deliberative and judicial functions for this reason Solon and certain other legislators give them the power of electing to offices and of calling the magistrates to account but they do not allow them to hold office singly when they meet together their perceptions are quite good enough and combined with the better class they are useful to the state just as impure food when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome than a small quantity of the pure would be but each individual left to himself forms an imperfect judgment on the other hand the popular form of government involves certain difficulties in the first place it might be objected that he who can judge of the healing of a sick man would be one who could himself heal his disease and make him whole that is in other words the physician and so in all professions and arts as then the physician ought to be called to account by physicians so odd men in general to be called to account by their peers but physicians are of three kinds there is the ordinary petitioner and there is the physician of the higher class and thirdly the intelligent man who has studied the art in all arts there is such a class and we attribute the power of judging to them quite as much as the professors of the art secondly there's not the same principle applied to elections for a right election can only be made by those who have knowledge those who know geometry for example will choose a geometrician rightly and those who know how to steer a pilot and even if there be some occupations and arts in which private persons share in the ability to choose they certainly cannot choose better than those who know so that according to this argument neither the election of magistrates nor the calling of them to account should be entrusted to the many yet possibly these objections are to a great extent met by our old answer that if the people are not utterly degraded although individually they may be worse judges than those who have special knowledge as a body they are as good or better moreover there are some arts whose products are not judged of solely or best by the artists themselves namely those arts whose products are recognized even by those who do not possess the art for example the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder only the user or in other words the master of the house will be even a better judge than the builder just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook this difficulty seems now to be sufficiently answered but there is another akin to it that inferior persons should have authority in greater matters than the good would appear to be a strange thing yet the election and calling to account of the magistrates is the greatest of all and these as I was saying are functions which in some states are assigned to the people for the assembly is supreme in all such matters yet persons of any age and having but a small property qualification sit in the assembly and deliberate and judge although for the great officers of state such as treasurers and generals a high qualification is required this difficulty may be solved in the same manner as the proceeding and the present practice of democracies may be really defensible for the power does not reside in the dicast or senator or ecclesiast but in the court and the senate and the assembly of which individual senators or ecclesiast or dicast are only parts or members and for this reason the many may claim to have a higher authority than the few for the people and the senate and the courts consist of many persons and their property collectively is greater than the property of one or a few individuals holding great offices but enough of this the discussion of the first question shows nothing so clearly as that laws when good should be supreme and that the magistrate or magistrates should regulate those matters only on which the laws are unable to speak with precision owing to the difficulty of any general principle embracing all particulars but what are good laws has not yet been clearly explained the old difficulty remains the goodness or badness justice or injustice of laws varies of necessity with the constitutions of states this however is clear that the laws must be adapted to the constitutions but if so true forms of government will of necessity have just laws and perverted forms of government will have unjust laws section 12 in all sciences and arts the end is a good and the greatest good and in the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all this is the political science of which the good is justice in other words the common interest often think justice to be a sort of equality and to a certain extent they agree in the philosophical distinctions which have been laid down by us about ethics for they admit that justice is a thing and has a relation to persons and that equals ought to have equality but there still remains a question equality or inequality of what here is a difficulty which calls for political speculation for very likely some persons will say that offices of state ought to be unequally distributed according to superior excellence in whatever respect of the citizen although there is no other difference between him and the rest of the community for that those who differ in any one respect have different rights and claims but surely if this is true the complexion or height of a man or any other advantage will be a reason for his obtaining a greater share of political rights the error here lies upon the surface and may be illustrated from the other arts and sciences when a number of flute players are equal in their art there is no reason why those of them who are better born should have better flutes given to them for they will not play any better on the flute and the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior artist if what I am saying is still obscure it will be made clearer as we proceed for if there were a superior flute player who was far inferior in birth and beauty although either of these may be a greater good than the art of flute playing and may excel flute playing in a greater ratio than he excels the others in his art still he ought to have the best flutes given to him unless the advantages of wealth and birth contribute to excellence in flute playing which they do not moreover upon this principle any good may be compared with any other for if a given height may be measured against wealth and against freedom in general may be so measured thus if a excels in height more than b in virtue even if virtue in general excels height still more all goods will be commensurable for if a certain amount is better than some other it is clear that some other will be equal but since no such comparison can be made it is evident that there is good reason why in politics men do not ground their claim to office on every sort of inequality any more than in the arts for if some be slow and others swift that is no reason why the one should have little and the others much it is in gymnastics contests that such excellence is rewarded whereas the rival claims of candidates for office can only be based on the possession of elements which enter into the composition of a state and therefore the noble or free born or rich may with good reason claim office for holders of offices must be freemen and taxpayers a state can be no more composed entirely of poor man than entirely of slaves but if wealth and freedom are necessary elements justice and valor are equally so for without the former qualities a state cannot exist at all without the letter not well section 13 if the existence of the state is alone to be considered then it would seem that all or some at least of these claims are just but if we take into account a good life then as I've already said education and virtue have superior claims as however those who are equal in one thing ought not to have an equal share in all nor those who are unequal in one thing to have an unequal share in all it is certain that all forms of government which rests on either of these principles are perversions all men have a claim in a certain sense as I've already admitted but all have not absolute claim the rich claim because they have a greater share in the land and land is the common element of the state also they are generally more trustworthy in contracts the free claim under the same tithe as the noble for they're nearly akin for the noble are citizens in a truer sense than the ignoble and good birth is always valued in a man's own home and country another reason is that those who are sprung from better ancestors are likely to be a better man for nobility is excellence of race virtue too may be truly said to have a claim for justice has been acknowledged by us to be a social virtue and it implies all others again the many may urge their claim against the few for when taken collectively and compared with the few they are stronger and richer and better but what if the good the rich the noble and the other classes who make up a state are all living together in the same city will there or will there not be any doubt who shall rule no doubt at all in determining who ought to rule in each of the above mentioned forms of government for states are characterized by differences in their governing bodies one of them as a government of the rich another of the virtues and so on but a difficulty arises when all these elements coexist how are we to decide suppose the virtues to be very few in number may we consider their numbers in relation to their duties and ask whether they are enough to administer the state or so many as will make up a state objections may be urged against all the aspirants to political power for those who found their claims on wealth or family might be thought to have no basis of justice on this principle if anyone person were richer than all the rest it is clear that he ought to be ruler of them in like manner he was very distinguished by his birth ought to have the superiority for all those who claim on the ground that they are free born in an aristocracy or government of the best a like difficulty occurs about virtue for if one citizen be better than the other members of the government however good they may be he too upon the same principle of justice should rule over them and if the people are to be supreme because they are stronger than the few then if one man or more than one but not a majority is stronger than the many they ought to rule and not the many all these considerations appear to show that none of the principles on which men claim to rule and to hold all other men in subjection to them are strictly right to those who claim to be masters of the government on the grounds of their virtue or their wealth the many might fairly answer that they themselves are often better and richer than the few I do not say individually but collectively and another ingenious objection which is sometimes put forward may be met in a similar manner where some persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to make the justice laws or to legislate with a view to the good of the higher classes or of the many when the case which we have mentioned occurs now what is just or right is to be interpreted in the sense of what is equal and that which is right in the sense of being equal is to be considered with reverence to the advantage of the state and the common good of the citizens and a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed he differs under different forms of government but in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue if however there be some one person or more than one although not enough to make up the full complement of a state whose virtue is so preeminent that the virtues or the political capacity of all the rest admit of no comparison with his or theirs he or they can be no longer regarded as a state for justice will not be done to the superior if he is reckoned only as the equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue and in political capacity such a one may truly be deemed a guard among men hence we see that legislation is necessarily concerned only with those who are equal in birth and in capacity and that for men of preeminent virtue there is no law they are themselves a law any would be ridiculous to those who attempted to make laws for them they would probably retort what in the fable of Antisthenus the alliance said to the heirs when in the council of the beasts the letter began haranguing and claiming equality for all and for this reason democratic states have instituted ostracism equality is above all things their aim and therefore they ostracised and banished from the city for a time those who seem to predominate too much through their wealth or through their friends or through any other political influence mythology tells us that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for a similar reason the ship Argo would not take him because she feared that he would have been too much for the rest of the crew where for those who denounced tyranny and blame the council which Perriander gave to Thrasybulus cannot be held altogether just in their sender the story is that Perriander when the herald was sent to ask council said nothing but only cut off the tallest heirs of corn Tilliag brought the field to a level the herald did not know the meaning of the action but came and reported what he had seen to Thrasybulus who understood that he was to cut off the principal men in the state and this is a policy not only expedient for tyrants or in practice confined to them but equally necessary in olacarchies and democracies ostracism is a measure of the same kind which acts by disabling punishing the most prominent citizens great powers do the same to whole cities and nations as the Athenians did to the Samians Kayans and lesbians no sooner had they obtained a firm grasp of the empire than they humbled their allies contrary to treaty and the Persian king has repeatedly crushed the Medes, Babylonians and other nations when their spirit has been stirred by the recollection of their former greatness the problem is a universal one equally concerns all forms of government true as well as false for although perverted forms with a view to their own interests may adopt this policy those which seek the common interest do so likewise the same thing may be observed in the arts and sciences for the painter will not allow the figure to have a foot which however beautiful is not in propulsion nor will the shipbuilder allow the stem or any other part of the vessel to be unduly large any more than the chorus master will allow anyone who sings louder or better than all the rest to sing in the choir monarchs too may practice compulsion and still live in harmony with their cities if their own government is for the interest of the state hence where there is an acknowledged superiority the argument in favour of ostracism is based upon a kind of political justice it would certainly be better that the legislator should from the first so order his state as to have no need of such a remedy but if the need arises the next best thing is that he should endeavour to correct the evil by this or some similar measure the principle however has not been fairly applied in states for instead of looking to the good of their own constitution they have used ostracism for factious purposes it is true that under perverted forms of government and from their special point of view such a measure is just and expedient but it is also clear that it is not absolutely just in the perfect state there are great doubts about the use of it not when applied to excess in strength, wealth, popularity or the like but when used against someone who is preeminent in virtue what is to be done with him mankind will not say that such a one is to be expelled and exiled on the other hand he ought not to be a subject that will be as if mankind should claim to rule over Zeus dividing his offices among them the only alternative is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler should be the order of nature and that men like him should be kings in their state for life end of book 3 sections 10 through 13 book 3 sections 14 through 18 of politics by Aristotle this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon politics by Aristotle translated by Benjamin Joed book 3 sections 14 through 18 section 14 the preceding discussion by a natural transition leads to the consideration of royalty which we admit to be one of the true forms of government let us see whether in order to be well governed a state or country should be under the rule of a king or under some other form of government and whether monarchy, although good for some may not be bad for others but first we must determine whether there is one species of royalty or many it is easy to see that there are many and that the manner of government is not the same in all of them of royalty is according to law one, the Lacodemonian is thought to answer best to the true pattern but there the royal power is not absolute except when the kings go on an expedition and then they take the command matters of religion are likewise committed to them the king in the office is in truth a kind of generalship irresponsible and perpetual the king has not the power of life and death except in a specified case as for instance in ancient times he had it when upon a campaign by right of force this custom is described in Homer for Agamemnon is patient when he is attacked in the assembly but when the army goes out to battle he has the power even of life and death does he not say quote when I find a man skulking apart from the battle nothing shall save him from the dogs and vultures for in my hands is death end quote this then is one form of royalty a generalship for life and of such royalties some are hereditary and others elective two there is another sort of monarchy that is not uncommon among the barbarians which nearly resembles tyranny but this is both legal and hereditary for barbarians being more servile in character than Hellenes and asiatics than Europeans do not rebel against a despotic government such royalties have the nature of tyrannies because the people are by nature slaves but there is no danger of their being overthrown for they are hereditary and legal where for also their guards as a king and not such as a tyrant would employ that is to say they are composed of citizens whereas the guards of tyrants are mercenaries for kings rule according to law over voluntary subjects but tyrants over involuntary and the one are guarded by their fellow citizens the others are guarded against them these are two forms of monarchy and there was a third three which existed in ancient Hellas called an isymnice or dictatorship this may be defined generally as an elective tyranny which like the barbarian monarchy is legal but differs from it in not being hereditary sometimes the office was held for life sometimes for a term of years or until certain duties have been performed for example the middle Ineans elected Pythagoras leader against the exiles who were headed by Antominidus and Alcheas himself chose in one of his banquet odes that they chose Pythagoras tyrant for he reproaches his fellow citizens for quote having made the lowborn Pythagoras tyrant of the spiritless and ill-fated city with one voice shouting his praises end quote these forms of government have always had the character of tyrannies because they possess despotic power but in as much as they are elective and acquiesced in by their subjects they are kingly four there is a fourth species of kingly rule that of the heroic times which was hereditary and legal and was exercised over willing subjects for the first chiefs were benefactors of the people in art or arms they either gathered them into a community or procured land for them and thus they became kings of voluntary subjects and their power was inherited by their descendants they took the command in war and presided over the sacrifices except those which required a priest they also decided causes are the with or without an oath and when they swore the form of the oath was the stretching out of their sceptre in ancient times their power extended continuously to all things whatsoever in city and country as well as in foreign parts but at a later date they relinquished several of these privileges and others the people took from them until in some states nothing was left to them but the sacrifices and where they retained more of the reality they had only the right of leadership in war beyond the border these then are the four kinds of royalty first the monarchy of the heroic ages this was exercised over voluntary subjects but limited to certain functions the king was a general and a judge and had the control of religion the second is that of the barbarians which is a hereditary despotic government in accordance with law a third is the power of the so-called icing need or a dictator this is an elective tyranny the fourth is the lackademonian which is in fact a general ship hereditary and perpetual these four forms differ from one another in the manner in which I have described five there is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has the disposal of all just as each nation or each state has the disposal of public matters this form corresponds to the control of a household for as household management is the kingly rule of a house so kingly rule is the household management of a city or of a nation or of many nations section 15 of these forms we need only considered two the lackademonian and the absolute royalty for most of the others the lackademonian a region between them having less power than the last and more than the first thus the inquiry is reduced to two points first is it advantageous to a state that there should be a perpetual general and if so should the office be confined to one family or open to the citizens in turn secondly is it well that a single man should have the supreme power in all things the first question falls under the head of laws for a perpetual generalship might equally exist under any form of government so that this matter may be dismissed for the present the other kind of royalty is a sort of constitution this we have now to consider and briefly to run over the difficulties involved in it we will begin by inquiring whether it is more advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws the advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak only in general terms and cannot provide for circumstances and that for any science to abide by written rules is absurd in Egypt the physician is allowed to alter his treatment after the fourth day but if sooner he takes the risk hence it is clear that the government acting according to written laws is plainly not the best yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with a general principle which exists in law and this is a better ruler which is free from passion than that in which it is innate whereas the law is passionless passion must ever sway the heart of man yes it may be replied but then on the other hand an individual will be better able to deliberate in particular cases the best man then must legislate and laws must be passed but these laws will have no authority when they miss the mark though in all other cases retaining their authority but when the law cannot determine a point at all or not well should the one best man or should all decide according to our present practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment deliberate and decide and their judgments all relate to individual cases now any member of the assembly taken separately is certainly inferior to the wise man but the state is made up of many individuals and as a feast to which all the guests contribute is better than a banquet furnished by a single man so a multitude is a better judge of many things than any individual again the many are more incorruptible than the few they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little the individual is liable to be overcome by anger or by some other passion and then his judgment is necessarily perverted but it is hardly to be supposed that any member of persons would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same moment let us assume that they are the free man and that they never act in violation of the law but fill up the gaps which the law is obliged to leave or if such virtue is scarcely attainable by the multitude we need only suppose that the majority are good men and good citizens and ask which will be the more incorruptible the one good ruler or the many who are all good will not the many but you will say there may be parties among them whereas the one man is not divided against himself to which we may answer that their character is as good as his if we call the rule of many men who are all of them good aristocracy and the rule of one man royalty then aristocracy will be better for states than royalty whether the government is supported by force or not provided only that the number of men equal in virtue can be found the first governments were kingships probably for this reason because of old when cities were small men of eminent virtue were few further they were made kings because they were benefactors and benefits can only be bestowed by good men but when many persons equal in merit arose no longer enduring the preeminence of one they desired to have a commonwealth and set up a constitution the ruling class soon deteriorated and enriched themselves out of the public treasury riches became the path to honour and so oligarchies naturally grew up these passed into tyrannies and tyrannies into democracies for love of gain in the ruling classes was always tending to diminish their number and so to strengthen the masses who in the end set upon their masters and established democracies since cities have increased in size no other form of government appears to be any longer even easy to establish even supposing the principle to be maintained that kingly power is the best thing for states how about the family of the king are his children to succeed him and if they are no better than anybody else that will be mischievous but as a lover of royalty the king though he might will not hand on his power to his children that however is hardly to be expected and is too much to ask of human nature there is also a difficulty about the force which he is to employ should a king have guards about him by whose aid he may be able to coerce the refractory if not how will he administer his kingdom even if he be the lawful sovereign who does nothing arbitrarily or contrary to law still he must have some force wherewith to maintain the law in the case of a limited monarchy there is not much difficulty in answering this question the king must have such fools as will be more than a match for one or more individuals but not so great as that of the people the ancients observe this principle when they have guards to anyone whom they appoint a dictator or tyrant thus when Dionysius asked the Syracusians to allow him guards somebody advised that they should give him only such a number section 16 at this place in the discussion there impends the inquiry respecting the king who acts solely according to his own will he has now to be considered the so called limited monarchy or kingship according to law as I've already remarked is not a distinct form of government for under all governments as for example in the democracy or aristocracy there may be a general holding office for life and one person is often made supreme over the administration of a state a majesty of this kind exists at epidemis and also at opus but in the latter city has a more limited power now absolute monarchy or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all the citizens in a city which consists of equals is thought by some to be quite contrary to nature it is argued that those who are by nature equals must have the same natural right and worth and that for unequals to have an equal share or for equals to have an uneven share in the offices of state is as bad as for different bodily constitutions to have the same food and clothing where for it is thought to be just that among equals everyone be ruled as well as rule and therefore that all should have their turn we thus arrive at law for an order of succession implies law and the rule of the law it is argued is preferable to that of any individual on the same principle even if it be better for certain individuals to govern they should be made only guardians and ministers of the law for magistrates there must be this is admitted but then men say that to give authority to any one man where all are equal is unjust nay there may indeed be cases which the law seems unable to determine but in such cases can a man nay it will be replied the law trains officers for this express purpose and appoints them to determine matters which are left undecided by it to the best of their judgment further it permits them to make any amendment of the existing laws which experience suggests therefore he who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and reason alone rule but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast for desire is a wild beast and passion perverts the minds of rulers even when they are the best of men the law is reason unaffected by desire we are told that a patient should call in a physician he will not get better if he is doctored out of a book but the parallel of the arts is clearly not in point for the physician does nothing contrary to rule from motives of friendship he only cures a patient and takes a fee whereas magistrates do many things from spite and partiality and indeed if a man suspected the physician of being in league with his enemies to destroy him for a bribe he would rather have recourse to the book but certainly physicians when they are sick call in other physicians and training masters when they are in training other training masters as if they could not judge truly about their own case and might be influenced by their feelings hence it is evident that in seeking for justice man seek for the mean or neutral for the law is the mean again customary laws have more weight and relate to more important matters than written laws and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law but not safer than the customary law again it is by no means easy for one man to super intend many things he will have to appoint a number of subordinates and what difference does it make whether these subordinates always existed or were appointed by him because he needed them if as I said before the good man has a right to rule because he is better still two good men are better than one this is the old saying two going together and the prayer of Agamemnon would that I had ten such counselors and at this day there are magistrates for example judges who have authority to decide some matters which the law is unable to determine since no one doubts that the law would command and decide in the best manner whatever it could but some things can and other things cannot be comprehended under the law and this is the origin of the nested question whether the best law or the best man should rule for matters of detail about which man deliberate cannot be included in legislation nor does anyone deny that the decision of such matters must be left to man but it is argued that there should be many judges and not one only for every ruler who has been trained by the law judges well and it would surely seem strange that a person should see better with two eyes or hear better with two ears or act better with two hands or feet than many with many indeed it is already the practice of kings to make to themselves many eyes and ears and hands and feet for they make colleagues of those who are the friends of themselves in their governments they must be friends of the monarch and of his government if not his friends they will not do what he wants but friendship implies likeness and equality and therefore if he thinks that his friends ought to rule he must think that those who are equal to himself and like himself ought to rule equally with himself these are the principal controversies relating to monarchy section 17 but may not all this be true in some cases and not in others for there is by nature both a justice and an advantage appropriate to the rule of a master another to kingly rule another to constitutional rule but there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny or to any other perverted form of government for these come into being contrary to nature now to judge at least from what has been said it is manifest that where men are like and equal it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be lord of all whether there are laws or whether there are no laws but he himself is in the place of law neither should a good man be lord over good man nor a bad man over a bad nor even if he excels in virtue should he have a right to rule unless in a particular case at which I have already hinted and to which I will once more recur but first of all I must determine what natures are suited for government by a king and what for an aristocracy and what for a constitutional government a people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in the virtue needed for political rule are fitted for kingly government and the people submitting to be ruled as free men by men whose virtue renders them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom are those among whom there naturally exists a warlike multitude able to rule and obey in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their dessert but when a whole family or some individual happens to be so preeminent in virtue as to surpass all others then it is just that they should be the royal family and supreme over all or that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation for as I said before to give them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the founders of all states whether aristocratical or olacarchical or again, democratical are accustomed to put forward for these all recognize the claim of excellence although not the same excellence but are quotes with a principle already laid down for surely it would not be right to kill or ostracize or exile such a person or require that he should take his turn in being governed the whole is naturally superior to the part and he who has this preeminence is in the relation of a whole to a part but if so the only alternative is that he should have the supreme power and that mankind should obey him not in turn but always these are the conclusions at which we arrive respecting royalty and its various forms and this is the answer to the question whether it is or is not advantageous to states and to which and how Section 18 we maintain that the true forms of government are three and that the best must be that which is administered by the best and in which there is one man or a whole family or many persons excelling all the others together in virtue and both rulers and subjects are fitted the one to rule the others to be ruled in such a manner as to attain the most eligible life we showed at the commencement of our inquiry that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state clearly then in the same manner and by the same means through which a man becomes truly good he will frame a state that is to be ruled by an aristocracy or by a king and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a statesman or a king having arrived at these conclusions we must proceed to speak of the perfect state and describe how it comes into being and is established end of book 3 sections 14 through 18