 Hello and welcome to News Clicks Show Mapping Fortlines where we discuss major geopolitical issues around the world. Today we're going to be talking about one of the oldest issues in Asia which is the Indo-China border dispute, it's as old as the 50s and 60s and the last couple of months there have been some major incidents, there was an incident, there was a skirmish in June in which at least 20 Indian soldiers died and some casualties were recorded in China also. Again over the past couple of weeks there has been some escalation, shots have been fired on the Himalayan border. The latest news is that on Thursday the foreign ministers of these two countries met in Moscow on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting and they reached a consensus, they reached an agreement and released a statement with five points on how to de-escalate the situation. So now there's a lot of discussion and there is a lot of hope as well that this may mark a moment in which tensions may come down. So we're going to talk more about this and we have with us Prabir Prakas. Prabir, thank you so much for joining us. So as I said the ministers met on Thursday and just before that a couple of weeks ago the defense ministers of the countries had also met and this is the statement that came out in some ways is good because it talks about the need to de-escalate how it's not, the situation is not good for both countries, how earlier agreements and earlier statements, the spirit of that on P should be followed on. But of course it's still unclear if these are just words right now or if there's going to be any concrete implementation. So how do you see the statement and does it lay out a roadmap? Well it doesn't lay out a roadmap, that's very clear. It only has essentially broad positions and the need for countries not to fight each other, reach an agreement and follow on what when earlier President she and Prime Minister Modi had met, follow on that course. So that sort of is saying that we should get perhaps return to the earlier path that we had and this is some way a diversion. That's the broad sense of the statement that I think we should get. What it does not mention and that's important. It does not talk about a return to status quo anti. That has been India's position earlier and it doesn't also talk about a line of actual control and I think both these points need to be registered for what they are. One of this is that as you know and I think everybody knows unless you of course follow the Indian media who sort of kept silent on this, there is no line of actual control which both sides agree on and which has been fixed on a map. So as a consequence when we talk of a line of actual control and when the Chinese talk of line of actual control, quite often they are talking of different lines of control. So therefore talking of return to status quo anti based on the original line of actual control is in some sense, not recognizing what is the issue on the ground. Why does India do it? Because it says my line of actual control is the actual line of control. And therefore you should return to my interpretation of the line of actual control. Now the point again is and this we have discussed earlier between the two positions. It has always been true that there has been an area which both sides have petrified both sides have had in summer, winter is much more difficult. The petrol these areas and therefore they claim that this is as per their line of control. But the reality is it means there are undemarcated areas where clearly both sides do not have fixed positions or fixed cans or fixed posts. And they have been patrolling these areas and the large part of the current conflict is actually trying to set up permanent positions and it's not only the Chinese, we seem to also have done it. This has been what the international press has said. So we don't really know the truth of this. The argument has been that if we look at the pictures, the satellite pictures, we have used the satellite pictures from one particular organization in Australia. Which again, the provenance of all of this is open to question. But the point is that there are similar pictures which you seem to indicate. Again, by Western agencies, not Chinese agencies, Western agencies, we'd say that India has also changed the status quo and in the sense that areas which might have petrol, we're now buildings of permanent installations or buildings of permanent infrastructure. Now, nobody knows the truth or the falsity of these claims because not nobody but we cannot verify for the falsity or correctness of these claims. So we let that pass. But what we do know is there is a large area which currently is getting settled by both sides trying to build infrastructure and positions over there. And the last Indian statements regarding the Chosul sector where we had this clash of the shots after 1962 or I think said later, 45 years is what the Indian papers seem to say. That we have fired shots and been fired 45 years after the last round. I think in 80s, there was an incident of some time. Now, if you take that into account, if you see what is being said, it is said that India actually took over the heights, the range, facing finger forward on the Pong Song, So Lake. And therefore, it seems to be something again, which we have occupied, which we felt fell under our line of actual, within our line of actual control. But till now, we didn't seem to have installations over that. Now, we have been also saying that about the Chinese. They're from finger eight, they've come up to finger four. This is something that should not have been done and so on. But the point is it does seem to indicate both sides have been trying to take over what would be called the heights or the ridges in this area because that gives you strategic command of the surrounding area. So leaving that out, the interesting point that emerges in this discussion is there is no mention of status quo ante and there is no mention about the line of actual control. Both these have been left to future discussions. The question is whether future discussions will take place or will it get into the freeze that we have currently? Both sides strengthening their infrastructure on their side, interpretation of the line of actual control, without engaging with the others. So hopefully there will be no future engagements after this talks and they will be able to resolve it by senior officers on the ground or if need be putting it bouncing the ball up, getting more senior officers or the political leadership to intervene. But it does seem to indicate that both sides have realized that at the moment, let's not go further. It seems to be. So the fact they met, there must have been preliminary discussions and some kind of an agreement arrived beforehand that there is a need to resolve this temporarily. The degree to which it will be resolved, we have to see. But there is a need to at least resolve this temporarily. I don't think this meeting would have taken place without that head over being done, first with the defense ministers and then now with the foreign ministers. And the second part of it, I think that's also important, that unlike the past, where each side has issued a separate statement, this is a joint statement. Now that itself, it's how the things are conducted is also important. So if we take small comfort from the fact there is a joint statement, it would seem to indicate that both sides do want now to settle the issue. For the Indian side, even more than the Chinese, there is also the other element of the fact that we are not as prepared as the Chinese in terms of building infrastructure at the Ladakh border. So if you have to position 25,000 to 30,000 troops, which it seems to be what we are now planning to do, it means a huge investment that has to be made both in terms of building very quickly infrastructure, which means we have to import a lot of prefabricated stuff and post it there. Also, we need fuel to be heated if we want to be functional. Without fuel, we can't survive the winter there, very clearly. And we also need then also heated workshops, because things will go wrong. So there's a whole bunch of things that we need to have to do, and we need to do it very quickly. As I said, posting 25,000 to 30,000 troops at those heights. And these are formidable heights. We're looking at a Siachen glacier equivalent scenario across the entire line of control on the Ladakh side. So that's not a minor issue. So all of that will have to be done. Even the more than the Chinese soon, it is really the weather which is going to turn our enemy. Because as we know, this is minus 20, 25 degrees for the next three months post October. So that is a rather daunting scenario that is going to come about. So I think India has that pressure on it also to normalize relations or at least reach a certain kind of status quo. And also, of course, the Chinese have the issue of the Indian market, market access we have been retaliating in this way. So let's hope that all these issues will be further discussed. And we shall see some kind of normalcy return between India and China. Let's accept the fact that it's been set back decades. So whether it will continue to be de-freeze, like what is going to descend on the Ladakh border right now. Or is it something that is going to lead to at least restoration, if not of status quo and of some kind of normalcy between the two countries? So like you said, a key component here has to do with what actually happens on the ground with respect to the militaries, the discussions between the officers, a staged de-escalation process maybe. But I want to take a look at the larger regional scenario also. So we do know that both countries at this point of time for different reasons cannot have a kind of conflict. China is facing a wide variety of pressures from the United States in terms of the trade war in terms of other kinds of assaults on the tech sector. India on the other hand is going through a COVID economic crisis of unprecedented proportions. But nonetheless at least we do know that in India, there has always been a section of the establishment which has been far more hawkish towards China, which is pushed for a conflict like situation. So at this point, how do you see the regional strategic implications of this conflict? Is it likely to, are they likely to play a role in, say, furthering this contradiction or are they likely to contribute in de-escalation? Well, this is of course looking into a crystal ball done of this. So it's very difficult to see which way it will go. What has happened at least is the decision is not being left now to some commanders on the ground who by engagement which both sides do not want, could lead to a further escalation. That I think is a very, very welcome measure. And I'm not going to say who's at fault, who is not because these are really not the issues. Any human being at any point of time can make a mistake. But these are two countries which are both nuclear armed, which have certainly a military size which is significant. So war at those heights who wins or loses is not the issue. There's no question. Both would lose. Who lose more is the only question that is there. I think that's a very, very welcome issue that both sides have agreed that they now need to talk more seriously. If we read the Chinese paper, they have said we don't trust the Indians, because they've said this a number of times, but they don't agree to, they don't implement what they have agreed. But I guess that's a complaint that could come up from this side as well. So I'm not going to get into this kind of jingoistic statements. The Indian media, if you look at it, we should have gone to war at least five times by now. So Indian media goes to war against Pakistan in the morning and against China in the evening is what is to be said in this kind of times. Of course, at the moment there seem to be war against Bollywood and against the film also in Karnataka. That seems to be also media pastime. But leaving those issues out, what you said is the larger geo-strategic issues. I think in this both sides have a much bigger stake than what might be seen superficially. China is economically at the moment, not in the position that India is. It is actually relatively stronger. It is the only major economy which has registered growth in the last quarter. And that's because we've been able to control the pandemic, which almost no big economy has been successful in that as yet, particularly countries like United States, India, Brazil, for example. So this puts China at a stronger economic hold position regarding with respect to all countries, not only India, but it is also true because the Indian economy has taken a huge hit in the last quarter. The largest fall we've ever had is the largest fall among the big G20 countries. Plus, if we add up the informal sector fall, which has really not been counted in this fall, and India's informal sector is a big contributor, then probably our fall is somewhere near 35 to 40%. So that's a huge hit we have taken. So this is not the right time for us to go to war. On top of that, the COVID-19 continues unchecked. As we know, numbers are rising, will soon cross 100,000. And at this rate, we'll probably overtake the United States in the total number of cases, probably in a month or so. So we are in a very, very bad situation, both economically and pandemic-wise. And as we know, we have discussed a number of times in NewsClick. Unless you control the epidemic, you're not going to get your economy back. So that's the bottom line over here. And the fact that this is not the best time to go to war for two other reasons. One is, of course, the condition of the economy we've discussed and all of that. But also because of the fact that you have now subzero temperatures coming up. And this is certainly not the time that anybody can get into war on the normal front. So I think both ways, weather-wise, economy-wise, this is certainly not the time for India also to get into war. And we are, as we said, also for winter, we are less prepared than China is because China has been in Tibet for a much longer time. And therefore they have the preparations much more advanced in terms of how to meet the winter. So I think this is not a good time for India to get into war. And you said what you said is right. China is already fighting not only the economic war, trade war, as it is said to be, but also a tech war. And the war against Huawei has been extended in various ways. The various new restrictions have been put. Other companies that cannot also use American equipment and trade with Huawei. That's a band that's been put. And also the SMIC, the other chip manufacturing company, which is the 10th largest chip, no, it's the fifth largest. The fifth largest chip manufacturing company in the world, which is in China. That is being threatened with Huawei like sanctions. And if that happens, then they will also have a lot of issues. So the question that arises is, is this the right time for China to also open a front against India? The answer is no. So both countries have strong reasons why they should not go to war or should normalize their relations. India has already put a lot of restrictions on Chinese capital from coming into India. Now, Chinese capital was instrumental in a lot of the startups which need capital in India. So that will not happen. For instance, if you say, for instance, Paytm. In fact, it was funded by venture capital from, I think, Alibaba. Similarly, Tencense has also been investing in India. So both Alibaba and Tencense have made a lot of investments in Indian startups. That sector is not going to get money. Also, that fact is that we have also now under conditions which we do not apply to any other country in the world, we have applied to Chinese apps. So we said they have been taking data out to their servers. Therefore, we are banning them. Not that we are trying to tell them to localize their servers in India. Just outright ban them. And the ban that has been extended has been actually a Korean game which Tencense was really implementing, owning, and so on. But all of this aside, this means that there is a loss of revenue and loss of future revenue in China that is going to accrue. So therefore, if this happens for China, that's also an economic future hit. Not current hit. Current hit, it doesn't make that much of a difference. But it could be a big future hit for their companies. And it will also leave the Indian market therefore much more open to American capital, which is what China would also not like in this current context of a trade war, tech war that they're having. So I think that is also to be seen that China would like to normalize relations. But now the normalizing of relations is not only unfreezing the border, which is one part of it, that at least the whole thing should be such that we go back to the state that we were in, that the stalemate should not lead to further clashes. Things should go back to a more peace posture. So to say this engagement on both sides, which are serious and no further shouting matches to fisticuffs or to firing off shots, all of that. But does it mean that there is no economic normalization that takes place between India and China? I think that Indian government has to keep in mind that if there has to be normalization in the border, the Chinese expectation would also be normalization of economic relationships. And that's something that I think would also figure in the talks that would happen. So I think India's geostrategic answer is that going to American camp does not help. I think they have realized, look at the map would have convinced them that America is not really very close to either India or China. Therefore, if anything happens to the Himalayas and borders, they're unlikely to be very important in this scenario. It's also important that Russia has played this role, that they have made it possible for a line of communication to remain open between India and China. So geostrategically, I think this is also an important issue that it's not the United States who is determining what's happening in the world. The other players also there. And Russia, we saw in Syria earlier. We have seen with Turkey earlier, even now with Turkey. And you can also see between India and China. Russia is acceptable as a via media for setting up meetings. It doesn't participate on them. It does not do as the United States does. Act as if everybody is under their sovereign rule and they can bash heads together and tell people what to do. That's what it tried to do when the 1962 war took place. And India sought American assistance. And the result was that they said, well, in the Kashmir, you have to do ABCD. After which India really decided to go back to non-alignment. So I think this is the other issue that strategically India has to realize. And I think this is a realization even Mr. Jay Shankar, who's as Indian foreign minister, who's very close to the United States throughout his life, I think is also beginning to realize that India is too big a country to become a junior partner geo-strategically to even United States, which may be the biggest player in the world today in geo-strategic terms. But it is nevertheless a failing weakening power with very little ability to help other countries, their economies or any other way. In fact, what it demands is now rent. Essentially, it says give me money for ABCD. You have to open your market to me. You have to give me patents in India for my ABCD drug companies. So all of this is not an equal game. And I think increasingly Indian establishment will begin to understand that the United States, you're never going to be an equal player. You're only going to be subservient. And if you don't, if you stand up to them, then you're still going to be hit with hammer. Even if you do go to them and say, I'm willing to be your partner, in spite of even after that, you will have to pay in order to remain a partner. So that kind of relationship I think is increasingly becoming clear to India is not going to serve India's long-term interest as well. But let's face it, as Ambassador Bhadrakumar said to me the other day, there's a huge lobby inside the Indian government, inside the policy establishment, which wants to be subservient to India. And this has been true right from the beginning, right from Nehru's days. And there has been this line, this lobby which has operated. And that was one of the reasons that in 50s, we had supported the Tibetan insurrection as we know, which led finally to Dalai Lama escaping into India. And that was at the behest of the Americans. Those are not things that I'm saying. Those are things with the American officers have written books. America, there's a history of writing books after they were retired. And you get bestsellers, a lot of money, name known and so on. And all these books are now available to show what was the CIA's role in the insurrection in Tibet in the 50s. So that is what Ambassador Bhadrakumar was speaking about the other day in our discussion news click. So if you take all the into account, I think maybe it is time has come to India to realize it's a big country. And it has to play an independent role in the world, not as either enemy of one or the subservient, their power to another. Absolutely. Thank you so much for being here for talking to us. That's all we have time for today. Keep watching news click.