 So, Vladislav, I want to turn to you please, Vladislav Finozemtsev, for where you sit, how do you see this whole conversation? Thank you so much. It was a very interesting question, a very interesting topic. And I reflected on this, I would say first of all that to me the question of new order seems to be more a question of a new framework. Because the world order is I think too strong for describing the current economic condition. So, the frameworks for economic cooperation, for economic competition, they have changed many times since in the last 100 years. And so what I see these days is that globalization, and you know what is called the end of history, the unification of the world, which was also cited by Mr. Deman Brial in our opening session is a little bit exhausted, because no order can I think persist without, no order can be universal. And so the major I would say challenge for the globalization is its own globality. Because the world is too different, many parts of it, they are too different from each other to be ruled and to be governed with one set of rules. So therefore I think that what we are seeing now is not so much the emergence of multi-polarity and global competition between different centers of power, but rather a new kind of regionalization inside the most globalized world. This regionalization would be managed by the major economic powers, for example, the United States and Europe on the one hand, and China on the other hand, but it would not be so much political differences, but a difference in economic models. So it's not about Asian century or Pacific century against Atlantic century. It's more about information on post-industrial economy against more traditional commodity economy or industrial one. And therefore I would say that United States and Europe will majorly, I would say, rely on the innovative economy on production of sophisticated and high-profile goods, which actually underline maybe not superiority, but so kind of self-expression of the people. So when you look on the United States these days, the most successful company is Tesla and SpaceX, which actually embodies innovation. If you look on Europe, the biggest European company by capitalization is Vermash, which actually specializes in producing unique and specialized goods embodying creativity of the European people. So my point here is that Europe and the United States will produce an economic model, which is based on, I would say, first of all, the sense of belonging to some, you know, maybe a billion or whatsoever, and on self-expression, while China and most of Asia will pursue the economic model built on mass production of cheap and high-quality goods, which would have a huge demand for them in many parts of the world, which are not so much, not so wealthy as Europe or the United States. And therefore I think this model can coexist for a while, and they can compete, they can expand the region of influences without engaging in kind of political confrontation, which was very obvious and very often seen in the 20th century. I would also point out that this competition between, I would say, information on post-industrial countries and resource-oriented economies and industrial economies will definitely result in much, I would say, in many rounds of this competition, because what we are talking about is a kind of catch and cut development, and I would say that since 1930s there was no any change in the first economy in the world, the United States led the world for around 100 years. Before it was very natural in Norway and France, over to Holland, when Britain overtook France, when Germany arrived, that's the huge industrial power, and then the United States came, but for the last 100 years there were a lot of attempts to challenge this hegemony, like by the Soviet Union in the 70s, by Japan in the 80s, and now by China. And so therefore I wouldn't say that we are now approaching some new economic order, because for this to happen it should be a proof that some country can overtake the leader, which is, you know, I would say the United States or the Atlantic civilization. It's hard to believe that it can happen because everyone, if one remembers the end of the 80s, everybody says about the end of the Cold War, about the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the economic shock in Japan was actually had happened at the same time. So in the 80s, the whole industrial system went into crisis, both in its Soviet version and its Japanese version, and this was the first step of new economic reality. So I would say, I would finalize that I cannot see the new economic order emerging. I can see another, you know, circle of economic change approaching, but this will not be a new order. This will be different frameworks, different models competing with each other, and it's very nice to say that these days economic issues and economic power is actually more significant than political and military one, which is quite contrary to what we have seen in the early 20th century. So hopefully this transition, whatever it might be, would be more peaceful and more complex than it was before and during the first or the second World War. Thank you very much. So you've got this vision of multiple, coexisting frameworks that sort of govern relationships amongst groups of countries, and I think that will raise the question of whether countries will be forced to be part of one framework or the other, or whether they can be part of multiple frameworks at the same time, and whether countries are willing and ready to be forced to take sides and join one framework or the other. And I think maybe when we come to Madame Toure, I mean in a way in Africa today, a big issue for many countries is that they're being asked to take sides and they don't want to. So how does one manage that as well? We'll come to that.