 John, you have the floor. Thank you, John Glenn. I'm predictably in the position that pretty much everything has been said, but not everyone has said it. So I will try to differentiate a little bit, but I think main points have already been mentioned. Let me add one on European banking. Of course, one of the side effects of the regulation has been effectively a seeding of the international capital market business, the investment banking business, to non-Europeans, essentially American banks. And I don't think that was intentional, but it's certainly been one effect. I would like to hope that Akonori is correct in his optimism. As the new managing director of the IMF pointed out in her inaugural speech last week, as the IMF gets ready to issue its forecast in the world economic outlook, they find that 90% of world GDP is in economies that are slowing. Now, we haven't seen the data. Japan has essentially been at full employment. The U.S. has been the only large economy growing above trend if we use the metric of falling unemployment rates. And the U.S. unemployment rate, as you probably saw, has now fallen to 50-year lows, even though participation rates aren't as high as they were back then. And what this suggests is that your slowing growth in the EU, which is starting point below trend at this time, and the major emerging economies, all the major emerging economies, are suffering at this time from a slowdown in growth. So it's worth asking what is the cause? Is there a common thread? And there are a couple. The principal one is weakness in fixed investment in capital goods equipment and the software. And that runs through virtually all economies, and especially advanced economies. And it's worth asking why is that occurring in a time in which monetary policy is accommodative to aggressively accommodative and interest rates are generally at historic lows. It suggests some kind of deep uncertainty. And the fact that, as I can only point it out, a substantial amount of the most important sovereign bond markets and now trading at negative yields is something I think that none of us ever anticipated could occur on a sustained basis. And I don't think we all understand it completely. How can this be possible? How can this be sustained? And what is the message? Certainly low inflation is one of it. But given the outlook for growth, given the consensus outlook for growth, given the likelihood, if anything, that the fundamentals point to a weakening of energy prices and commodity prices, it's somewhat hard to see why at least inflation expectations are going to change substantially in the near term. And they could even potentially work lower. So this is likely, there's every reason to think this very unanticipated and abnormal situation will continue. Let me switch then to the policy side. Or let me add, we've seen a growth in concerns about things like regional inequality, regional differences in growth rates within economies, within countries, adding to inequality. And inequality perceived as an increasingly important problem for economic policy. Also awareness that things like gender concerns, gender inequality also undermines economic growth, plus concerns about climate. These are important. I would maintain that these concerns have been heightened by the sluggishness of growth. If growth seemed more robust, these would seem less threatening. So let me just turn briefly to the policy setting and just make the following simple points. I was happy to hear mention of the G20. The initial G20 meeting in November at the leader's level in November 2008 had four agenda items. One, restore global growth. Two, repair and reform the financial systems. Three, avoid new trade protectionism and promote new trade liberalization. And four, reform the international financial institutions. And I would say the grading, if we were teachers grading the pupil, we would say incompletes on every single one of them. And there's, so the question is, is there a possibility for policy to make in the near term an important improvement in expectations and performance? And I would say very difficult at this time. One, a growing perception that we've seen that monetary policy accommodation seems to have run its course and increasing feeling among monetary authorities that they have been, as Jean-Claude said, the only game in town, but that game is ending. I would paraphrase, everyone remembers Mario Draghi's remarks in London in August 2012 when he said, we'll do whatever it takes. He was referring to saving the euro. And he went on to say, and believe me, it will be enough. But not that many people paid such close attention when he spoke again and when he spoke at Jackson Hole two years later and said, with regard to improving performance of the European economy, he said, we'll do whatever we can. And believe me, it won't be enough. What he said was fiscal and monetary, fiscal and structural policies are needed. But are those, are those kinds of improvements likely? We still have the institutions, the G20, the Bretton Woods institutions, et cetera, that exist. They've been augmented by the regional finance arrangements. But do we really think that the international safety net and the institutional framework that we have put in place is adequate to represent a bulwark against new dangers, and I would say incomplete as well. Thank you. Thank you very much indeed. What you said is very stimulating. You're summing up of the program after the crisis and the poor results. At least, of course, we avoided the equivalent of the 30s in the 20th century. And it was extremely likely. What we did in the time and since then corresponds to an underlying set of problems in the advanced economy in particular, which is really totally dramatic. And it's very difficult to understand the monetary policies of the central bank if we don't realize that we are in an extraordinarily demanding environment in the advanced economy, because let's not forget, it was a crisis of the advanced economies.