 All right. Good morning, everyone. Nice to see everyone still going strong on this final morning. I'm Dan Critzvillian. I'm the editor of Foreign Affairs Magazine. It is my immense pleasure to be on stage with these four speakers. I confess that the term co-opetition was new to me before I got this assignment, and I spent probably too much time going down a rabbit hole trying to understand the game theory behind it and failing to. But I don't think you really need to understand the theory to understand that this concept I think really goes to the heart of what I see as the central tension in foreign policy and geopolitics, international relations today. In some ways, it's the steepest challenge that policymakers and leaders face. And it also goes to the question that has the theme that has defined these entire four days, which is trust. And it's really how do you preserve trust in certain areas in a world that is fundamentally competitive? We're not going to overcome some of those competitive dynamics. So how do you still preserve space for progress on shared challenges, addressing threats, continuing to drive progress and innovation, even without wishing away or ignoring the fact that you do have those competitive dynamics in a world that will continue to get more complicated geopolitically? I will very briefly introduce our speakers as I go to each of them. But since the conceit of this topic is in some ways that policymakers should learn from those in the private sector, I'm going to start with the private sector, then we'll go to our couple of public sector leaders, and then close with the private sector again. I'm going to start with Tok Ninami, the CEO of Centauri Holdings in Japan. Tok, Japan is in some ways in a fascinating position because it is in a complicated neighborhood these days, but has managed to preserve very strong investment presence, business presence, even among in countries where it has complicated relationships, China being the first of those. As you reflect on your own experience, trying to build your business, trying to preserve your presence even in those markets, what do you see as the key lessons? How have you thought about China especially? For business, I like to raise 3.1, projectability. And let's take an example of the anti-spinach law. And as you know, the more than five people were arrested last year, and we don't know why. So rules should be clear for us to develop our business. So first, second, upgrade the intelligence activity even though we are in private sector. For example, Centauri developed its intelligence capability by establishing London office, Washington DC, New York, by putting the resources to contact with the, you know, lots of think tanks and experts. Second, and third, we have to be prepared for scenarios. And we have to think about what kind of scenarios we can think about, such as Taiwan contingency. So with Centauri started to simulate what actions are needed working with the government, such as the evacuation of our employees from Taiwan. It would be very tough. So, but we have to work with the government and some other peers. And for the country, we are urging Japan with the government, first of all, strategic indispensability. What is it? Semiconductors? Maybe it's ingredients. We have to have. We have to identify together with the government. Second, I would like to say dialogue. Private sector should not give up and talk to our counterparts in China, even though they are SOEs. So that is so important. And thirdly, I'd like to mention about not only China, but in terms of stabilizing the order of the East Asia, we shook hands with South Korea. So important, working with President Biden. Basically, we have a very complicated history, but we are trying to overcome it because we need to stabilize the East Asia. So that is a core petition because, I mean, Korea was a fierce competitor for us and for them. But we have to work together to maintain the order of the East Asia. So we learned a lot, but still underway. And as you look at the growing tensions in the region, are there contingencies you're particularly focused on beyond Taiwan? Is Taiwan really at the heart of your concerns right now? Yes, it is. And I understand that the top meetings in San Francisco made a big sense and a huge less attention in the East Asia, like a far less number of the scrambles by the Japanese fire jets. That works, but I believe that that's true. So preparedness is so important for the private sector and the government. So preparation is the big, big deterrence capability. So even a private sector has to work with the government in terms of deterrence. And let me ask you one more question about how you see the US-China relationship. Japan, again, is in such an interesting position here because in many ways I think Japan was really at the forefront of trying to alert American policymakers from the challenge from China when that was not at the top of the American list of priorities. But at the same time, Japan has urged a more, in some ways, on the economic front, more engagement from the United States not pulling back, both with China and in the region. So are there things that you would like the United States to do? How do you see that competition developing and what does that mean for your businesses and other businesses in the region? Well, both are so important in terms of investment in the United States, trade with China. So how to manage the question? What would you do? We are stuck in the middle. But I'd like to ask all the business leaders and the political leaders to advance, for example, CPTPP. That is a vital weapon for us to keep the business going forward. And by the way, it's surprising that China applied the CPTPP. So I'd like to ask US friends to reconsider to join the CPTPP or TPP. Personally speaking, it's a big mistake that US walked away from the TPP. But in the meantime, Japan should play a key role to expand the CPTPP membership about what to do with China. But CPTPP should have the policy of inclusion and neutrality. So Japan and other member countries should negotiate with China. And we evaluate how ready they are. But to your mind, it would be a good thing if China joined CPTPP at this point? Well, at least they showed their posture. I don't know if they can go up to the high level of the CPTPP rules. That is a very good segue to Jane Herman. Jane was a very long time member of Congress from California, ranking member on the House Intelligence Committee and a leader leading foreign policy voice in the Democratic Party and then became president of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Jane, let me go slightly out of order and get you to pick up that trade question. Trade politics in the United States have changed dramatically since you were first in Congress, certainly. Both parties have turned against TPP, which the Obama administration led in negotiating before it was abandoned by both Trump and Biden. What has happened with trade politics and do you ever see them coming back around to creating the space for something like CPTPP? Well, let me answer that in one second after I tell you my insight into the term, co-opetition. I think it's a great word because it combines, cooperate, and compete. It also is two-dimensional. I mean, it's both sides engaging in co-opetition. And I just wanted to say that the last framing that I've always used was from Joe Nye, who I think is an absolutely wonderful man and respect and admire. However, soft power, hard power is harder to think about because it's two separate things and it's one-sided. So I just whoever invented this term, I think, was very insightful. And second word, I'm not sure we should restore trust. I don't think we can. I think we need to manage distrust. And if we think about it that way, we're more flexible. And I think we have to be very flexible. On the issue of trade, I find it heartbreaking. I describe myself as a pro-defense, pro-business, pro-trade, progressive Democrat. And there are only five of us left and we should be embalmed in a museum. My party has left me on trade. The Republican Party has left the moderates on trade. In fact, the moderates have left both parties, and that's part of the problem. The anti-trade wing of both parties is now stopping progress. And even IPEF, which was, I thought, an attempt to make up for the US pullout from TPP. This is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, right? Yes. Even IPEF now, sadly, which was going to be highlighted at the San Francisco Summit, I forget where Biden was going to push IPEF. But at the last minute, they had to pull the teeth out of it because some members, Democratic members in tough re-elections didn't want the US to do it. So we do not have a pro-trade majority in the US. I think that is extremely short-sighted. I totally agree with the comments here. And because we pulled out of TPP, we created a vacuum, which China is filling. And I think the crucial loss for the US, I'm four, are joining other organizations. But who sets the rules? TPP was designed for the West to set the rules. And the notion that there are strong economies in the Indo-Pacific, even if they're large trading partners with China, but strong economies in the Indo-Pacific is the best buffer against Chinese aggression. So let me stick with the topic of domestic politics, just given your deep experience on this. Do you want to depress everybody? Why? It's early. I'm not sure what else we can do with this topic, but we'll try to end on an optimistic note. The politics of the China relationship have also become incredibly difficult in Congress. When you think about the term co-optition, when it comes to the US-China relationship, you would imagine cooperation on climate change and public health, even those areas where the shared interest seems very clear. You don't see a lot of space for cooperation. Some of that is about the politics in the US Congress. I noted when the Biden administration started to do more proactive outreach to the Chinese government last year, Nick Burns, our ambassador there, was accused of impeachment by members of Congress. So when you look at the politics of this, how do you create the space for that kind of cooperation, given what members of Congress seem to see as the political imperatives of being tougher on China than everyone else? Well, just in my political lifetime, which is a long time, this whole relationship has evolved. In the 90s, many of us voted for most favored nation status for China. I'm from California, China, I was a huge trading partner, and that was a safe vote to make. Now I think I couldn't even come up. Nobody would go touch that. We all thought then we wanted to admit China to the WTO, we thought that China wanted to be us. Well, oops, we got distracted after 9-11 and then we discovered China's rise and China doesn't want to be us, and now we're trying to manage a distrust in a very different relationship. So what's going on with China in Congress? As I've told you, Daniel, I'll explain this. China is cheap retail, meaning if you're a politician in either party, bashing China gets you a lot of attention. That's a good thing, and the rhetoric follows that. The rhetoric is harsh and really extremely unfortunate. Do the people saying that really, really mean that? Well, some of them do. I mean, the level of information on China in Congress is like everything else in Congress these days is pretty minimal, and sound bites matter more and clicks matter more than working to solve problems because blaming the other side is more potent than working with the other side. That makes you bipartisan, that's bad, just so you know. On this, I think that many, some in Congress do get it, that it's a multi-dimensional relationship, and I commend the Biden administration for getting it. They're really trying to operate, I think on three fronts, confrontation, competition and cooperation, and different issues fall in different buckets, but the visits by everybody to Beijing and so on are great, and let me just close by this. Nick Burns is one of our most talented public servants. He's an amazing guy who has taken on the toughest assignments. I don't know how he is surviving in Beijing, getting bashed by members of Congress and being shut out of some of the meetings, but we have put our best forward, and I just hope that in the last year of the Biden administration, we don't mess it up. Let me ask you one more quick question just in hopes of ending this segment on an optimistic note so you don't accuse me of sending you into the weekend depressed. You know, I think there's another dynamic at play, certainly in the United States, and I think you see this elsewhere, which is even in the context of competition, there can be a race to the top dynamic. We can see this on certain of the investments that the U.S. is making in basic research and science. So can you get what is essentially cooperation, even if we don't call it that, it's really various actors as a way of competing, committing to doing more on some of these shared challenges. Do you see that as a possible way to think about this that doesn't require cooperation of the kind that seems very hard to achieve politically? Yes, I think everything doesn't have to be in the press with all apologies to your foreign affairs daily thing, which I learned about yesterday, which is wonderful, congratulations, Daniel, but everything doesn't need to be in the press, and I think underneath this are major signs of cooperation, especially in the medical area, and space is another place where, in defense terms, no, but in commercial terms, we need one, certainly according to me, we can't decouple our whole space systems, it's insane, but I think there are signs of progress, and I think listening to people who know a lot more than I do, that China gets it, and maybe we'll hold back this year, I'll just make one last comment, after the Iowa primaries the other night, I think some major leaders, and I don't know that she is in this group, but two who are in this group, Putin and Netanyahu are trying to wait out the Biden term, I think they think Trump is gonna win, I think it's way too early to know that, but at any rate, they think Trump is gonna win, and they think life will be easier for them when he does, and I think, what do I think about that? This is the time for Biden to be more forward-leaning, and push on the policies that are right, a two-state, you know, the pathway to a two-state solution, and more aid for Ukraine now, and on China, more co-opetition. There's a lot to impact there, but let me move on to the other member of the panel from the public sector, this is immediately to my left, Meros Zhevkovich from the European Commission, Executive Vice President for the European Green Deal, and a long-time diplomat. Meros, you are in a fascinating position because you are trying to make progress on what is perhaps the biggest or most urgent shared challenge of all, one of the, I think, questions that really goes to the heart of this topic, but also come from a world where you're keenly aware of competition and geopolitics and cannot wish them away. As you have entered this job, how have you tried to balance those two awareness of the geopolitics with the need to make progress on climate change? No, thank you very much also for setting the themes and the topics so interesting. When I saw the first time the word co-opetition, I thought it's a spelling mistake, but I agree with you the man who said after that, actually, it's a very, very good term because... Can we do a quick poll? Who in this room knew the term before seeing this panel? Okay, so it's our ignorance up here, yeah. So we have a different spell check. Yeah, I think so. It's the number of computers. No, but I think it's really, it's excellent term because when I was thinking about it, this is how to foster cooperation in the times of huge competition. And this is what we are discussing here today. And for Europe, I have to say that, I mean, we are going through the kind of painful acceptance of the fact that we are living in the tough geopolitical world where everything can be weaponized. Data, critical, raw materials, technologies, even medicines. And you know, we've been traditionally the institution, the union, which was always championing free and for trade, rules-based system, compatibility with WTO, and we've been promoters of the global trade. I can tell you that in that club, we are feeling more and more lonely. So what you have to do in this case, you have to consider how to deal, I would say, with this new situation. And in many aspects, I also agree with Jane that it's heartbreaking to see that. I mean, we had a very well-established system, but now because of this geopolitical rivalry, everything gets very, very difficult. We are somehow closing in. And when I'm talking to my American friends, I think we are now in the stage of the world development, but we should focus how to build more transatlantic bridges and less obstacles. And if you cannot go for the big free trade agreements, because always something comes in and we know how especially the debate on agriculture is very difficult, then we had our dozer of hormone-beaver, chlorine-chic debate. So I know that it's very difficult. So what I think we could consider, that's maybe one idea, which is my private idea, which I share with some of my friends, let's go for some kind of a neuro-type of the agreement. One idea which I like a lot is creation of the transatlantic clean-tech market. And of course, we can do the same with the line-minded our Asian partners, because this is where the competition is taken. This is where the economic future will be decided. Shouldn't we cooperate more on having the most performing solar panels, hydrolyzers, batteries, and so on and so forth, instead of having this subsidy war? But from one side, we are considering what kind of trade defense mechanism we might need to use, because we see the flood of cheap EVs, which are heavily subsidized, coming to Europe from China. And from outside, we had to introduce new term in our state-date policy, which we until this period have been using extremely, extremely carefully as a matching aid to make sure that the companies who got very lucrative offer of the huge state subsidies will stay in Europe and not to go to US. Shouldn't we kind of use, I would say, this public money to promote research, innovation, and all the, I would say, technological development and creating business case, I would say, for the Green Deal technologies. I think this is what such a close friends and allies should do, but we are living in, I would say, in these new worlds. And therefore, everybody is adjusting to the system. My worry only is that if this persists for a long time, that what would be left from the system, which was working pretty well, and which will not be that easy to restore. So I agree with Jane that we are not kind of rebuilding the trust before we get there. We are kind of managing the situation, and it's not easy. And it seems striking to me that even when you look at the US-European relationship, which is pretty good when it comes to global relationships, we empower is these days, the green transition, green energy has become, I think, a source of strife as much of cooperation. The European reaction to the Inflation Reduction Act and subsidies and bi-American provisions in the United States was met with consternation and similar responses on the European side. That seems quite concerning when it comes to the global picture to me. I think that when I was in the United States after the IRA was adopted, there have been, I would say, that such two parts of our reaction. The first part was very positive, because I think it was very clear, sign that US, under this administration, decided to go decisively on the green path. And of course, that was welcome, because there was always a bit of a hesitation. And I was coming to the US very proudly, sharing my experience, how to build the European battery allies. And I see that my American friends been listening to me very carefully, because they introduced many of these aspects into the IRA Act. What was surprising for me at that time, to be honest, was that when I was telling them that, look, I mean, this is putting the European companies at the huge disadvantage that they've been genuinely surprised. And I think that if you are talking about the program, which might lead, as some economists said here in Davos, into the subsidies, which would be on top of the $11 trillion, this is massive programs, which is, I would say, global repercussions. And I think that it would be very useful to use all our bodies, which we created, be the trade and technology council, all of the bodies, just to talk to your closest partners and analyze, how can we kind of synergize, how can we use it for the good development on both sides of the Atlantic, and also for our partners in Asia, because we see that all our democracies are under pressure. All of us, we have to find the solutions to autocratic regimes where transparency or the level of subsidies, it's really not a problem, and they can really use it at the whim. But it didn't happen. So therefore, now we have very intense dialogue with our American partners. We are looking for the ways how to overcome this. And therefore, I'm coming with these proposals. Let's build bridges. Let's look at how we can synergize. Because if we create the European, American, Japan, South Korean market for the Korean tech or the Glyntech, clearly it would stand the global standards. It would bring the economic to the scales, which would be enormous. It would be fantastic, not only for our economies, but we can share it with the developing world. I mean, all of us have been in COPA, I presume, and you saw what kind of thirst there is in African, Latin American countries for waterable tech panels, for digital substations, for electrifying these industries. They want to leap over our industrial fossil age, but we need to scale up in a way that we can actually share these technologies with these countries as well. And let me ask you one quick final question and ask you to put on your diplomat hat in this case. There's a reading of the US and European experience with Vladimir Putin's Russia that says, it was hopeless to ever try to cooperate to create space for cooperation when he was going in this direction that led to the war in Ukraine. Even arms control is seen as a useless form of cooperation despite the shared interests by some. As you reflect on the lessons of the European approach to Russia, what do you see as the right takeaways from that? I think that we've been probably a little bit naive. Maybe we have the same belief as you said about the China that gradually with the increased cooperation and trade and these inter-linguages, I would say, on the economic scale, that Russia will be embracing more and more, I would say, the characteristics of the Western democracies. And because we are such a big trading partner, there was a lot of, I would say, dependencies built. I mean, now we are paying enormously high price also in cash terms for being so dependent on Russian fossil supplies. Obviously, it was a mistake. Russia is a big country. The war in Ukraine is terrible. And I think we have to support Ukrainians to defend the country. We don't know how long it will last. Let's hope that the peace will be rather sooner than later. But then we would have, again, to coexist with such a big country like Russia. But I think it will take another political generation in Europe, in Russia, so we can be, let's say, on the normal speaking terms. And a lot of things would have to happen by then. And I think that we will not repeat the mistake, not to be really vigilant in what kind of dependencies you can be involved. Therefore, what we are doing right now with the critical raw materials is the global supply chains with a lot of other sensitive products. We go for diversification. We are looking at strategic autonomy. We are looking at common purchase of this product on the European scale. And what can be also manufactured in Europe and what can be stockpiled in Europe? So we would limit those dramas as we had to go through, be it in COVID-19 or then with the situations once, we suddenly had to find the total alternative to Russian fuel supplies. Next, and I should say I will leave us time for a few questions from the audience at the end. But let me go, last but not least, to Matias Miedreich, the CEO of Yumikor in Belgium. Matias, let me try to turn this around a bit. And again, in the hope of achieving some kind of optimism here, funding some kind of optimism here, you are, of course, keenly aware of the geopolitical dynamics. There's uncertainty about elections this year. Donald Trump could come back in the United States. You could see changes in Europe and in other parts of the world that could affect the international effort on the whole set of issues that you're focused on just as Maros is in the public sector. As you look at that set of threats, that turbulence, is that a kind of critical threat to your ability to do business, or are there ways for you to kind of go forward with your key priorities, even amid that turbulence? Yeah, so although I am looking forward to put a more positive feedback maybe here, let me first start with what are the negatives on that. What's clearly... I was really hoping we got up to... Yeah, I come to that. Give me a second. So first of all, it's clear. So if we have this kind of fragmented world for the business side, and we are representing the clean tech side of it, the energy transition, we are in the middle of this. First of all, it's not good because you are, in principle, decreasing your return on capital if you have to operate in specific regions differently. You have to... If you cannot trust your global supply chain, you have to fill it with goods. You need capital for that. You don't get any returns on that. You have to invest in factories in different regions rather than optimizing a global setup. So that's negative. And as Maros also said, for innovation, it's not good. If you do not have a global competition or at least a larger competition where you can exchange on good practices and challenge the different companies, it's decreasing. However, and now I come to the positive point, I think that there are also some positive elements for companies who are able to play in this new environment. First of all, and I shouldn't say that like this, but it is a fact, it's reducing competition, competitive threat. If you look to the IRA and we are active in the field of battery materials, for example, we, from one day to the other, all of the Chinese competition has been eliminated from that market. So for the companies that know how to play in certain regions, it's good for them because they have a better chance to get market share and competition is shut out. Secondly, it's also good to receive public funding because the regions that want to be independent and want to strengthen their geopolitical resilience, they give money to companies to invest. So the IRA is one example, Europe to a certain extent as well, China for sure. So if you play it well as a company, you can compensate the lack of efficient capital deployment by public funding. And let me make the last comment, which I think is the strongest one and I don't hear it at all in the debate. I think fragmented world is better for the environment because if you don't have global supply chains where you ship millions of tons of materials but you have to focus on local supply chains, you will save a lot of CO2 in the equation. And I think that's ultimately, if you want to be on the positive note, that's exactly what it will bring for the planet. It helps to reduce CO2. I want to follow up on one thing you alluded to which is kind of ingredients of clean tech and the supply chains. I think back often to an essay we ran in foreign affairs a couple of years ago by Jason Bordoff and Megan O'Sullivan called green up evil, which is about all the ways in which the clean energy transition will drive competition and turbulence and geopolitics rather than bringing people together around these shared challenges and you know the list of what that can mean. It's critical minerals, we talked about EVs flooding into Europe. When you look at the ingredients of clean energy, do you see ways to reduce competition, reduce that as a source of instability in geopolitics? For sure, and we often have to say this is, I like the word a lot, co-opetition but it's not new in the industry, right? If you look to one of the key industries in the metal mining and processing industry, at the same time companies are your customer, your supplier and your competitor, it depends on where the critical minerals are coming from, where they are processed, who is doing what with it. Also the automotive industry is very well used since decades for this, you know, sharing engine platforms in the past. Now in the electric vehicle age, battery technologies are shared between competitors. So it's a concept that is not new and now what we see in the energy transition frame, there are even new coalitions forming. You see car manufacturers that go into battery manufacturing themselves. There are joint ventures formed all over the world across these different stages of the supply chain. So I think that in principle, the industry concern is well prepared for that. Now on the same note, how could this even be better or what needs to be done to even foster that? I think there are two points. The first one is again, I come back to CO2. If the global legislators are pushing more on CO2 of electric vehicles being mandated or rewarded in a certain way, when I would say about CO2, I mean the scope three that is encompassing all the CO2 that is used while building an electric vehicle. If this and Europe is really the leading position for that from my point of view, the US not, so they should come up. I'm shocked, I'm shocked. I'm sure you are. So because think about if there's a global kind of non-negotiable standard that there should be no CO2 in electric vehicle, it has to result in cooperation because only by working together between the different steps of the supply chain you will be able to achieve that. You cannot do it alone. You have to always work with the ones going forward. That's number one, and number two from my point of view, the public reward, the grant system, the subsidies that we see all over the world, they should change and not be awarded to single companies, but I think they should reward ecosystems. They should reward a couple of companies working together across the supply chain and make this as a mandatory threshold to get those things. So I think in a nutshell, I think there is a threat for the industry, specifically in the energy transition side. I think it's not a new threat and the industry is quite well prepared in some sense to make it, but we can do it better with the things I just mentioned. Can I just make one tiny comment on that? Because it occurs to me that governments and industry are moving in opposite directions. Macron was here and he was talking about sovereignty. Right. Trump talks about America first and the rise of populism and isolationism, at least at the government level, is increasing, sadly. And I'm sure we all agree on that. But industry is figuring out that certainly for the Green Revolution, there has to be cooperation. And I don't know how these trends get reconciled. Let me ask both Taka and Matias to maybe give 30 seconds of advice to governments, to policymakers and the public sector. When it comes to this question of how you maintain some cooperation, you have diversified suppliers, you're working with competitors, without becoming so over-reliant on one market, one source of materials that it becomes a threat to you. How do you balance those two imperatives? You go first. I think such as we like to talk to the government in terms of what to do with the carbon pricing, for example. You're talking about in this area, not to step out too far away. So what to do with the rule-making? I think it's still uncertain. So that should be materialized sooner or later so that we can talk about with the predictivity. I mean, predictable, that's so important. So the government and the private sector should work together. We, private sector, should work together about the rule-making. And $80, $100, then we can change your interaction. I would even say to strengthen the message, I fully agree, and it's my same point, predictability on those things that drive and that help us to invest and have a certainty that the investments are good and not change in regulation will make them obsolete. I think that's the basic of going forward, correct? Let me go to the audience for a couple of questions. Please stand and make your questions short and Chris, we can get a couple in, we'll start in the front row. There's a microphone coming. From Mexico, you talk a lot about China all the time and there are a lot of elections going worldwide. I would like to hear the comments, what's the relations, what's your opinion about elections coming in Mexico? Thank you. Jane, do you want to take that one? Okay. Sure. I think that Mexico and the U.S. are and have to be closely lashed together. However, there has been a difference in government policy fairly recently. One of the initiatives of Trump that I strongly support was the USMCA, the U.S. Mexico-Canada Agreement. And we recognize that with respect to trade, for one thing, we can't exist without Mexico. So what do I think about the elections? I guess I can't, maybe others know more than I do. I don't know how, Amlo is an unusual politician and he has this combination of personal appeal and then his policies seem to be more different from what I would have expected. So I don't know how to predict it. I would just add on Mexico, it's hard to imagine a country that is better positioned to take advantages from some of the global dynamics that might seem challenging to others. And that to me, I think there are various ways that even under Amlo, the government has done that, but that seems to me like the key question. Talked, did you want to add anything on that? Well, definitely. I think we have production operation in states, but we'd like to go to the next one furthermore. So I don't anticipate any big change in Mexico and we have a big plan to invest in Mexico furthermore. So we count on you. Let me go to the second row here. Okay, thank you so much. And professor economics at the Seoul National University, South Korea, my question goes to Chairman Ninami. Thank you so much for emphasizing the importance of cooperation between South Korea and Japan, that's great. You mentioned about the conditional plan and predicting what could happen when China attacks Taiwan. My question is, well, your conditional plans include North Korean, say, testing nuclear weapons, okay? Or the collage between three countries, North Korea, China, Russia. I wonder whether you have conditional plans for these ones, thank you. I wonder the North Korea is a rogue, I'm sure, and I think including the collaboration with South Korea, I think that covers the definitely contingency plan about North Korea. But in terms of the, to what extent we can predict about North Korea? And we'd like to discuss with you because you, South Korea knows. So, but our main focus is Taiwan contingency because of the long-term analysis over the Kim Jong-un. I think definitely we have to have another scenario about Taiwan contingency. In addition to that, we have to be concerned about the perhaps a change of the leadership of the United States. That might give the negative impact to the trilateral alliance of your country, Japan and the U.S. It's really a bit concerned. Can I make one comment there? U.S. military doctrine right now calls China the pacing challenge. And the language around that is that China is basically the only big challenge. Russia is an active challenge. These are interesting words. But that's really not true. I mean the point about North Korea, Iran, we haven't even mentioned Iran in this unholy alliance among Iran, North Korea, China, Russia is very concerning. And U.S. policy doesn't have a broad enough lens. And that's why South Korea and Japan are very important allies and very focused on their own protection but also can enhance what the U.S. brings to the table. Let me get one more question here. We'll go into the front row. We'll do two questions in sequence and then we can have them wrap up front row and then there. Thank you. Please stand for the cameras. All right, okay. And which one should I look? I can't look anywhere. My name is Nong Kudulekon Yembezi. I come from South Africa. I'm just curious to hear your views, particularly yours, Janet. If there was somebody on this panel from China, let's say a senior Chinese government official, and they were articulating what they think about when they hear the word or the term co-operation. What do you think they might say? That's a great question. And then we'll do one more question here and then go down the panel. Thank you. Good morning, everybody. I'm Barry. I'm a farmer from Brazil. And I would like to put the food question on the table. So we have North America and South America having water and land availability. And we have Africa negative. We have the Green Deal which most probably is going to make Europe to need to import food. And we have China. I mean, if you talk about co-operation and if you talk about feeding the world, I don't see how we can work together. And I don't know how you look at it. Thank you. So two great questions. I will go down the line starting with you, Maros, and you can address either one of those to wrap up. Please, we have about three minutes left. So please, quick. I'll be telegraphic. I think if it comes to the food question, of course, we look at it also from the perspective of food security in Europe. And as you know, we are a major food exporter. We would like to keep it in that way, but we would like to produce agriculture in much more sustainable ways. So therefore, you have seen quite a few proposals in that regard. We are very proud that we have now the first in the world legally abiding nature restoration law. We put a lot of focus on sustainability. And of course, we are ready to work with our partners. You know that our also negotiations on eventual free-trade agreement also with Brazil, negotiations take a long time because the most difficult chapter is always about sustainability, agriculture, and all these issues. But hopefully, eventually, we can find a solution to that as well. Thank you. Talk, I'd love to hear your thoughts on China. Yes, I'd like to talk about China. Perhaps we can talk about the sustainability because of common interest. So if I were a Chinese representative, I'd like to talk about, you know, how to deal with the disaster situation in that area because of high temperature, flood, and water issue. We'd like to talk about the common interest first toward the cooperation. Mattias? We're not in the same industry, but we are totally aligned, it looks like, because exactly the same feedback to you. Excellent question. Sustainability. In our feed energy transition, China is ahead in many fields on electric vehicles, but they have a lot of things to learn in terms of decarbonizing the supply chain and sustainability. So fully aligned with that. Based on the comments of the Premier the other day, I would say they would embrace this term. And this is certainly a, you know, their language around attendance here and they didn't attend the whole conference. They only attended, I think, part of it, unfortunately, was very positive. And I'm certainly hopeful that cooperation becomes the relationship we all have with China. On the issue of sustainability, a couple of comments. I was in Costa Rica last week. And the global south, I know that's not a good term, but anyway, let's just say Costa Rica has a lot to teach us about sustainability. That country is in much better shape than many in the North, certainly including the United States. And I heard the comments of some others in the global south during this conference saying, we don't want a handout. We want to demonstrate what we're capable of doing. And then we would like, in fact, we can probably help you. And I think we still think of Africa and Latin America as afterthoughts. I was at a big dinner last night and the African leader was called on last. And he said, this is typical. And how embarrassing is that? And so why don't we just be a little more humble and imagine that these comments, first of all, that these problems are worldwide and that cooperation could be sent our way from the global south. That is a good note to end on. Thanks to all four of our panelists and thanks to all of you.