 Intellectual humility is extremely important. All too often when faced with difficult questions, people are prone to dismiss and marginalize dissent. And around the world, politics is incredibly polarizing, and in some parts of the world, even extremely dangerous. And whether it's Christian fundamentalism, Islamic extremism, or Milton atheism, religious dialogue remains tinted by a terrifying, a truly terrifying and dehumanizing arrogance, dogma, and ignorance. So on the face of it, the world needs more people who are appropriately sensitive to their intellectual frailty. The world needs more people who are more likely to consider the possibility that their political, religious, or moral beliefs just might be mistaken. The world needs more people who are appropriately sensitive to the reasons both for and against their beliefs. The world needs more intellectual humility. But what is intellectual humility? That's the question we're going to be considering in this lecture. In the first half, I will explore a rough, philosophical account of intellectual humility. And in the second half, Dr. Peter Samuelson will explore how psychology and cognitive science may help us further answer that important question. Now, at first blush, we might think that humility is the virtuous mean between something like arrogance on the one hand and self-deprecation or servility on the other. The humble person, to put it roughly, doesn't value herself too much, which would be arrogance, nor does she value herself too little, which would be diffidence, servility, or self-deprecation. Instead, she thinks of herself, her value, her status amongst her peers, her abilities as she ought. Building off of this extremely simple and basic view of humility, I think an intuitive account of intellectual humility might seem to follow. We might imagine that intellectual humility is the virtuous mean between something like intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. The intellectually humble person, then, doesn't overly value her beliefs, which would be intellectual arrogance, nor does she undervalue them, which would be intellectual servility. Instead, she values her beliefs, their epistemic status, her intellectual abilities as she ought. Given its focus on beliefs, this rough approximation of intellectual humility is what I'll be calling the doxastic that is relating to beliefs' account of intellectual humility. What I want to do in the first half of this talk is try to develop this account of intellectual humility a bit further. Think about the process of throwing a pot on a potter's wheel. So far, we only have a rough piece of clay before us. But in this talk, I want to try to see if we can shape that clay a bit further and see where we end up. But before we get started, however, I want to briefly consider a few other accounts of intellectual humility, a few other definitions that philosophers have put forward and highlight a few worries we might have against them. All of this, I hope, will help motivate us to consider an alternative account of intellectual humility in the third video.