 Okay, I think we can start, okay? Somebody else is coming then, we will be late. So, my name is Tibor 6A, just I would like everybody to call me Tibor, because it's easier for you and easier for me. Because usually I have problem with my family name, especially if somebody wants to spell it. But I guess many of you have the same problem, so first name is always easier. Okay, the topics I will cover are the site characteristics. This is the first one today, and tomorrow we'll have a long day with me. I hope you will not be bored with me, but the program is such that I will be occupying the whole day. With four presentations on Humor Liability Analysis, which is an interesting topic, though it is a bit aside from the deterministic analysis, but what can we do? It has to be included. Then Human Factors, which is somewhat related to the Humor Liability Analysis, or more precisely, the Humor Liability Analysis is related to the Human Factors and Human Factors Engineering. Then in the afternoon, we'll have two presentations on the safety assessment during the lifetime of the plant, more precisely, we'll have the details on the periodic safety reviews, and at the end, it is here. You cannot hear me? Not really. I was hoping I hear myself. Okay. Can you hear me? Yeah, if I speak up. So the last presentation tomorrow will be the aging management and aging problems to be handled, which Alek today just mentioned with some of the slides. So let's start with the site characteristics. Why the site characteristics are important. First, when we are selecting a site for a new nuclear power plant, the most important issues with the site selection are those issues which can influence the plant's safety. Also, the other question is how the plant can influence the environment where we locate the site. There is also one more important thing, which is the design requirements towards the site. So what kind of characteristics are needed for the site for the nuclear power plant operation and the design? It includes the grid connections, the necessary transport lines, and all the infrastructure which is needed for the construction and later for the operation of the plant. Now, I will have an introductory part where this kind of things will be discussed what I started with. Then site evaluation, general requirements. These are the general requirements regardless on whether we are assessing what the plant can have impact on the environment or what the environment can have impact on the plant. Then comes the requirements for the evaluation of external events, the requirements for evaluation of the potential impacts of the nuclear installation to the environment, and monitoring of the hazards and the potential impacts. Now, just if you look at the flow of this presentation, we can understand that we have general requirements, we have the specific requirements to some specific topics, and those topics are to be investigated in more details for helping the designer to design a plant for us as needed. Now, the basis for this presentation will be this safety requirement document, which is the site evaluation for nuclear installations, which has under this document some more detailed guidance on the methodological and hydrological hazards in the site evaluation or geotechnical aspects of the site evaluation, and the external human-induced events in the site evaluation. There could be some more guidance, of course, which covers the methodological aspects of these evaluations. However, we can understand that the evaluation of these topics, or the evaluation of these items, needs lots of research and lots of efforts. We'll see what I'm talking about. So, the important questions I already started to discuss, what site properties are needed for the installation, or what should the facility withstand. This is an important question in the design basis. What facility should withstand? What kind of impacts should it withstand? And what are the potential impacts of the facility on the environment and human life? So, if we put a site, a nuclear power plant site to a location, we first try to understand whether we have the necessary infrastructure in the environment or we have to spend a lot of money to establish that infrastructure. Second, how dangerous is that site? Of course, there are locations which are not dangerous at all, though it may be a problem with the population around, with other aspects, which is the next topic. What are the potential impacts of the facility on the environment and the human life? So, if we consider these three items to be taken into account when selecting a site, then we can see that this will need a lot of investigations, a lot of possible or potential sites, and with some optimization will end up with a final decision. The site selection plays an important role in answering these questions, definitely, because the environmental impacts on the facility are highly dependent on the site selection. And, of course, the potential impacts of the facility on the environment and the human life is also highly dependent on the site selection. If we select a site close to a highly dense population area, then definitely the societal risk will be high due to the distance, short distance from the high density population area. So the design basis of the plant should be site-specific. Once the suppliers offer to a country or to a company a nuclear power plant, they will have some characteristics, some design characteristics, which are already in the design, in the standard design. But that standard design has to be adopted to the specific location, to the specific site, which is selected for the nuclear power plant. In the United States for the new nuclear power plants, the USMRC decided to ask from each nuclear power plant vendor so-called plant parameter envelope, which is a document telling all the plant characteristics. And based on the plant characteristics, the owner or the future owner or the future applicant for the license can submit so-called site license, site license can apply for a site license, where the USMRC would decide or would accept, based on the plant parameter envelope document, one or several reactor types. And later, when the licensing process goes on, the USMRC would issue so-called simplified, or it is a simplified construction and operation license, which is already once the site is approved for a plant design. After that, it includes the construction, commissioning, and operation license. This is an easy way to do that, though the plant vendor has to develop his plant parameter envelope, and also the site characteristics should be presented by the future owner. The site-specific design should be based on the site characteristics. As the design basis should be site-specific, it means that the site-specific design should be based on the site characteristics, considering only the technical aspects or technical questions. In principle, any site could be suitable for a nuclear power plant. The nuclear power plant can be designed to be suitable to any site. However, depending on the site characteristics, the cost of the nuclear power plant establishment can vary. So there are other aspects also to be considered, like the political or financial questions, which will definitely decide whether a specific design can fit on a specific site or not. The site characteristics should be specified for the design in the design specification. So how we proceed? Once we want to build a new nuclear power plant, we select a site. We have to characterize the site. The characteristics of the site goes to the design specification. And then the designer will take into account those characteristics. And those characteristics will then determine the design basis for the resistance of the plant to the environmental impact. So this requires a complete and comprehensive characterization of the site. And it is clear that that process may be a long process. So before the construction starts, at least two, three years of such investigation activity will be performed before the construction can start. What is the document which is containing the potential impacts of the nuclear power plant to the environment, which is then submitted to the regulatory body for site licensing? This is the environmental impact assessment and environmental impact statement by the licensee. This environmental impact assessment study, in many cases, goes to the neighbors countries for public hearings and for approval. Because we know that the impact, especially in Europe, the impact of an accident in a nuclear power plant can have impact to the neighbors countries as well. So unfortunately, these impacts are going across the border. Therefore, the potential risks and potential impact has to be presented to the neighbors countries. So we have environmental impact assessment. This is one part of the story. And there is another part of the story, which is the site characteristics in terms of potential impact of the environment. So there must be a national regulatory requirements defining the extent of information on a proposed site to be presented by the licensee. So one story is the environmental impact assessment. The other story is the site evaluation, which then goes to the regulator for issuing the site license. This is a difficult process. And it includes all kinds of analysis and investigations regarding the seismic characteristics of the area, regarding the hydrological characteristics of the area, and so on, and so on. And these are not necessarily technical areas which belong to the nuclear engineering. These are more general sciences which are to be included or to be called for performing the site characteristics evaluation. So the proposed site should be evaluated to ensure that the site-related phenomena and characteristics are adequately taken into account. We'll go into specific details, and we'll see what are those characteristics which will deny or which will require to declare the site not suitable for the nuclear power plant. When the site is selected and the site evaluation has been done, all the characteristics should be presented that they are such which the plant design includes and considers. So the characteristics of the population of the region and the capability of implementing emergency plans over the projected lifetime of the plant should be analyzed. There are some difficulties with this, because especially in countries where with high population density, the emergency plans may create lots of difficulties. Just because there are lots of people for the evacuation of lots of people, it may be difficult and time-consuming. So it may not be timely or adequate. On the other hand, what the other difficulty is that we are planning, we are designing a plant for 60 years, 50, 60, I don't know. And it may happen that there will be a lifetime extension for 20 years more. At the end, we'll have something like 80 years of time period to be covered by this analysis. And we have to predict the population. We have to predict the changes of the characteristics. And who knows? Today, we are talking about climate changes. What we have now, rather quiet climate, maybe tomorrow full with storms and full with extreme meteorological phenomena. And we have to consider these changes, these potential changes when we are selecting the site. The site-related hazards should be identified and characterized. First of all, we'll have human-induced hazards. And second, the naturally-induced hazards. Human-induced hazards are those which are coming from something like any activity of the human in the environment, in the neighborhood. So it can be dangerous industrial facilities. It can be traffic, say traffic on the river. It can be traffic in the air. And we have to take into account also the changes in the traffic in the air when we are designing the plant against aircraft crashing. And sometimes the new nuclear power plant is built near the location of the old nuclear power plant. Because that site was licensed some time ago, it may be easier to justify that this site is suitable for a new nuclear power plant. Therefore, in many cases, the new nuclear power plant is built relatively close to the old one. Now comes a question. If the activity in the old nuclear power plant belongs to these hazards or not, definitely yes. And the difficulty here is that for the old nuclear power plant, we have different licensing requirements than for the new one. So the danger from the old nuclear power plant is considerably higher than the danger of the new nuclear power plant for the environment. Therefore, any radiological accident or accident with radiological consequences from the old nuclear power plant should be taken into account in the new nuclear power plant as well. The nature-induced hazards are those very, how to say, we all know what are those, earthquake, then flooding, then extreme meteorological effects, and so on and so on. We will go through all of them. So what has happened? So the main objective of the evaluation of the site for a nuclear installation in terms of nuclear safety is to protect the public and the environment from the radiological consequences of radioactive releases due to normal operation of the facility and due to accidents. So somewhere we have to stop, definitely. Somewhere we have to draw the line where we say we don't go further. And this is basically the design basis requirements and design extension requirements which you will hear during the, maybe at the end of this week or during the next week, some more information. So the design should be such that protects the people from internal events, from the internal hazards, and from the external hazards from the consequences of these events. And these three categories should somehow treat it together on the same level. So we cannot allow that the earthquake consequences, we don't want to allow the earthquake consequences to be more dangerous than anything which is coming from technological failures. So the design should be such that the frequency of such earthquakes which can endanger the plant operation does not cause radiological consequences. So the characteristics of the natural environment in the region that may be affected by potential radiological impact in the operational states and accident conditions shall be investigated. These characteristics should be monitored through the lifetime of the installation. Of course, we have to know what are the changes if there is any change. During the lifetime of the plant, the air traffic may change. I don't know. In Pocs, for instance, at the beginning of the lifetime of the plant, when we built up the plant, there was a government decision to forbid the air traffic in some distance from the plant. So 50 kilometers or so, so there was some channel which was forbidden for the air traffic. Today, this is not valid anymore. So there are lots of airplanes going there and back. So we can say that there is a drastic change in the number of airplanes flying over the nuclear power plant, which of course increases the risk of the airplane crashing to the site. And as the airplane crashing to the site increases, we also have to justify that due to that increase, we will not have an increase in the risk significant, so significant, which would require some safety upgrading at the plant. So there are also other questions like traffic on the Danube River, where not big cruisers, but large ships are transporting different materials. It can be explosive, it can be anything. So the plant operation should not be endangered by the increase of this traffic. But these conditions, of course, are handled in the periodic safety review assessment of the plant. And in each 10 years, this data should be updated and submitted to the regulatory body for consideration. The site for the nuclear installation shall be examined with regard to the frequency and severity of the external natural and the human-induced events and phenomena that could affect the safety of the installation. Definitely, the frequency and the severity is very important. And some natural hazards have such behavior that the severity of the consequences or the severity of the phenomena has a time function. So it depends from the frequency. So fortunately, what we can observe, the more dangerous or the more severe events, natural events, are less frequent than the less dangerous cases. And the foreseeable evolution of the natural and human-made factors in the region shall be evaluated for the duration of the projected lifetime of the nuclear installation. That's clear. This is what I already told. However, we also have to acknowledge the difficulties with this evaluation. These factors, particularly the population growth and the population distribution, shall be monitored over the lifetime of the installation. So again, tomorrow I will talk about the periodic safety review in which the population growth is, of course, declared. And depending on the growth, it may happen that the plant lifetime will be affected. It depends on the area where the plant is located. So this should be definitely considered already in the design or during the design. If necessary, appropriate measures shall be taken to ensure that the overall risk remains acceptably low. And this is what I'm talking about, that the increase of the river traffic or increase of the air traffic should not be so dangerous, I mean, it should not be so dangerous, which would require the shutdown of the plant due to increased risk. So we have to apply or we have to analyze the design features. We have to not only analyze, but we have to implement some new design features in case something is changing to a dangerous level. We may implement measures for the site protection, like dykes for flood control on the river if the behavior of the river is changing. I'm talking about the river because we have the river. But of course, in many other sites, it can be the sea side or it can be something different. And also administrative procedures. Definitely these administrative procedures are not applicable to natural hazards. So we cannot forbid the earthquake to happen. And we cannot forbid the storm to come. Therefore, the design features and protective measures are the preferred means to elevate the plant protection or the plant resistance against this phenomena. On the other hand, we can apply administrative measures for bidding or to minimize the effect of the human-induced hazards. Like I told you, it was forbidden to fly over the nuclear power plant at the time. This is one administrative measure which definitely lowers the risk of the aircraft crash. On the other hand, the establishment of a dangerous facility in the neighborhood will also be a question. So the specific authorities will decide whether the establishment of such dangerous facility will have a dangerous effect on the nuclear power plant operation or not. We can see such cases even for the establishment of non-dangerous facilities, which are not dangerous. But the traffic would increase so much towards those facilities which already are dangerous, the safe plant operation. So during the establishment of a new nuclear power plant, also the intentions and also the activities around the selected site should be controlled and should be, how to say, administratively controlled. For external event or combination of events, the parameters and the parameter values used to characterize the hazard should be chosen so that they can be used easily in the design of the installation. That's interesting that the earthquake is characterized on so many ways. We can use the MSK scale 1 to 10 or something. Then we are using the big ground acceleration as a characteristic. We are having some other characteristics which simply tells us what is the earthquake intensity. Now for the seismic design, there are some specific values and specific characteristics which are needed. So we have to transfer this information to the suitable information for the designer. And this is such a topic which sometimes creates conflicts between the designer and the potential owner because the potential owner gives the characteristics in one set of values, but then the designer says they cannot do anything with these values. They have to transfer it to other. And this is a typical issue is the MSK scale to big ground acceleration, how to transfer one to the other. In Russia, the designers are using the MSK scale. In Europe and elsewhere in the world, the big ground acceleration is used. Now these two are interchangeable somehow, but there must be some method, agreed method between parties to have a common platform for the same information. In the derivation of the hazards associated with external events, consideration should be given to the effects of combination of these hazards with the ambient conditions, hydrological, geological, and meteorological conditions. Earlier, we had one external hazard analyzed. Today, we have external hazards and external hazard combinations. So let's say low river level, low water level in the river, and long, hot summer, which will cause interesting consequences. First of all, the long, hot summer heats up the buildings of the nuclear power plant. Sometimes the heat, I mean, the temperature can increase to such level, which is already a limitation for the continued operation. And on the top of it, due to hot summer, we have a very low water level. And a very low water level will jeopardize the safe cooling of the plant. So these are just two interesting phenomena, which are very commonly appearing together. There is another one, which is the earthquake on the sea side, which is followed or accompanied, mostly followed by a tsunami, which is earthquake and flooding. So these are things which we have to take into account. Also, the combination of the airplane crash with the kerosene fire. So this is an external fire, which will definitely occur during the crashing of the plant. So both the resistance of the building, the structure, should be such that survives the impact. And second, the systems should be located such that will not be reached by the kerosene fire. So that the plant could be safely shut down for inspection and so on and so on. And of course, consideration shall be given to the storage and transport of the fresh and spent fuel and radioactive waste. These are the things which usually we forget, especially the spent fuel. The spent fuel pool, location of the spent fuel pool in the different nuclear power plants is in a different place. So one is inside the containment, one is outside the containment, and the irradiated fuel is treated differently from the fuel in reactor. So we have to understand that the damage of the spent fuel is at least as dangerous as the damage of the fuel in the reactor, if not more dangerous. And if the spent fuel pool is outside the containment, then it has less protection against some environmental effects than in the case when it is inside the containment. OK. We are still about the general requirements. A possible non-rhetoric impact of the installation due to chemical or thermal releases and potential for explosion and dispassion of chemical products shall be taken into account in the site evaluation process. Well, we are always concentrating on the radiological consequences. However, in the nuclear power plant, we have lots of other dangerous material stored. So we also have to take into consideration those in the environmental impact. And the potential impact for interactions between the nuclear and non-nuclear effluents like the combination of heat or chemicals with radiative material in liquid effluents should be considered. So fire, air moving upwards, and then fire in a radioactive storage facility, it will simply distribute the radioactive material with the air. So it is not just the potential of spreading on the surface. It will be spread by the hot air. On the other hand, there are also such cases when liquid effluents are simply leaving the site. So if anything remains on the site, it is not that important because it is the plant's responsibility. But as soon as it leaves the site, the radioactive material leaves the site in an uncontrolled way. It is already pollution. It is pollution of the environment. And not only the plant will be involved in the elimination of the consequences, but other authorities. And it can be the local civil protection agency to many other authorities. So these things should be taken into account. Well, I'm skipping it because I'm starting feeling that I'm talking too much on something which is less important. Now, requirements for evaluation of external events. Possible natural phenomenon and human-induced situations and activities in the region of the proposed site shall be identified and evaluated according to their significance for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. So this evaluation should be used to identify the important natural phenomena or human-induced situations and activities in association with its potential hazards to be investigated. What it wants to say is that we cannot take into account all everything. We have to screen the hazards. We have to screen the hazards to have in the design basis meaningful set of hazards to be protected against. Of course, if 100 kilometers from the plant, there is a facility which may have some effect on the plant. But very rarely or just under very specific environmental conditions, we may say that the distance helps us to screen this out from the investigation. On the other hand, those hazards which will directly affect the plant's safety in terms of disabling the plant response capabilities to the hazard, say earthquake disabling all my high pressure injection systems and causing a pipe break in somewhere in the primary circuit. It is already something which I have to seriously consider. So if I'm losing all my high pressure injection system, then at least the low pressure system and the depressurization system should be alive after the earthquake or during the earthquake. Because otherwise, I'm losing all my capabilities to cope with the small break caused by the earthquake. The foreseeable significant changes in the land use shall be considered like expansion of existing installations and human activities or the construction of high-risk installations, the land usage. Of course, the nuclear power plant should not, how to say, should not be a problem for the environment to continue their everyday life. So once we are putting somewhere a nuclear facility, nuclear power plant, it should not mean that we are forbidding the other activities in the environment. But we have to know what is the behavior of the changes of these activities. And as I said, we have to, how to say, make a prognose of the changes. And then comes another question. Where are we taking the data for the evaluation? We may need prehistorical and instrumentally recorded information and records as applicable of the occurrences and severity of the important nature of phenomena. In Japan, there are so-called tsunami stones. Do you know what tsunami stones are? So they simply, in the past, they put some column-like stones to the places which were affected by the tsunamis. And they indicated the level that the tsunami was. So these tsunami stones could have shown what was the highest tsunami around the site of the Fukushima plant. There are some presentations, other presentations shown by some AI experts which shows the picture of these tsunami stones. We also may have records from the old literature, or we may have evidence by investigating the structure of the soil and structure of the land to see what kind of methodological or seismic effects have been occurring in the region. And these shall be carefully analyzed for reliability, accuracy, and completeness. Sometimes it is difficult because the information which seems to be an evidence, it may be uncertain. So the uncertainty of this information should be investigated for the reliability of the conclusions we are deriving. There are some locations where the seismic activity is very low. And for these locations, one could say that in the last 25 million years, there was no earthquake. So I'm not expecting earthquake in the next 25 million years. But it may happen that, yes, the effect is due to that strong basalt plate which was created by some times ago by a volcanic activity. And if it was created by volcanic activity, it can create also problems later, because it was active vulcanically. Appropriate national shall be adopted for establishing the hazards that are associated with major external phenomena. So we are producing so-called hazard curves. I will show you some examples of hazard curves, curves which shows me the frequency versus the severity of the different phenomena. And the major and human induced phenomena shall be expressed in terms that can be used as input for deriving the hazard associated with the nuclear installation. And it is mostly important for the designer to be able to incorporate the effects into their design. Now the earthquake. This is one of the seismic design. Definitely will depend very much on the seismic activity in the region the nuclear power plant wants to be installed. So the hazard due to the earthquake induced ground motions shall be assessed for the side with account taken of the seismotic characteristics of the region and specific site conditions. A sort of uncertainty analysis shall be performed as part of the evaluation of the seismic hazards. This is something which always a question in the hazard assessment how, what is the point value and what is the uncertainty of what we are using. So I will show you one curve here where this is the hazard curve at one site where we have the mean value, the weighted mean value, the 50% percentile and the 85% percentile, the 15% percentile value, and some best estimate by one company. So as you can see, the range is quite wide for this. So if we look at the acceleration in Gs, it may happen that with the 10 to the minus 6 per year frequency, the uncertainty of that information is something like half G. So now the question is what should be the value taken into account for the seismic hazard, I mean the seismic design. If we come back here, there is a requirement to determine the operation-based earthquake and the design-based earthquake. Where the operation-based earthquake is an earthquake that could be expected to affect the site of the unit, but for which the power production equipment of the unit is designed to remain functional. So basically, this would be the design basis for the operation. So the plant can operate further, but there must be a limit when we have to shut down the plant. And this is where the design-based earthquake is taken into account. A suit of vibratory ground motions, which have been chosen on the basis of the likely seismicity and geology that at and around probably a nuclear power plant site. So this is the DBA. It can be defined on different ways. Just I give you one example. The DBA is defined as an event with five times 10 to minus 3 non-excidents probability for the total lifetime of the plant, where the total lifetime has to be taken as 100 years. Just a quick question. Then what would be the frequency of this earthquake? If for the full lifetime, it is 0.005, the probability. And the lifetime is 100 years. Five times 10 to minus 5, yes? Something like five times 10 to minus 5 per year. So we have to define the DBA. DBE is the design-based earthquake. And under the design-based earthquake, the plant should be able to shut down safely and remain safe after the accident. So there must be equipment which can survive such an earthquake. Now why we are talking about the non-excidents probability during the lifetime? Because if the earthquake with an intensity has such non-excidents probability for the lifetime, is, say, I don't know, seven balls of the MSK scale, then the plant design basis will be for this earthquake. However, if the location is on a territory which is seismically more active, and with this probability, stronger earthquake occurs, then the design should take into account that particular earthquake which occurs with this probability. So we are not talking about what is the strongest earthquake. The plant can survive. But we are talking about the design basis which says that the plant will survive such an earthquake which will occur with that non-excidents probability. Is it clear? Then we are putting all the plants on the same platform, I mean the same safety level. If it is a more active area where I'm putting the plant, then the seismic design will be stronger. And if it is on a territory which is seismically not active, then I can relax this requirements and I can have less strong seismic design. Now, surface footing. This is different from earthquake. So the potential for surface footing shall be assessed for the site. The methods to be used and investigations to be made shall be sufficiently detailed that a reasonable decision can be reached using the definition of the fault capability. The fault shall be considered capable if on the basis of the geological, geophysical, and geolithic and seismological data, one or more of the following condition applies. And this is important. It shows evidence of past movements or movements of a recurring nature with such period that it is reasonable to infer that the further movements or near the surface or at or near the surface could occur. So which means we have to show the evidence of using the past information. In highly active areas. And how funny it is, this seems to be a little contradiction that in highly active areas where both earthquake data and the geological data will be in the order of tens of thousands of years, maybe appropriate for the assessment. But in other cases where in the less active areas, it is likely that much longer periods has to be investigated. So in principle, the question is, if nothing has happened in the past, then we are in trouble to analyze it. Because to analyze the zero event is difficult. But it is easy to analyze the everyday movement. Because on statistical data, we can determine what is needed for the seismic design or what is needed for this kind of design. But when nothing has happened, and we have evidence that nothing has happened, there are some geological formations which can show this evidence that the last 30 million years, nothing has happened. Because the growth of some stone column, we can easily identify how old it was. And what would have happened if there was an earthquake? So it would have collapsed. So there was no earthquake in the last 30 million years. What can I do? I have to go and investigate a larger time period. And that's why, though it may be an excellent place for a nuclear power plant, I may have to invest much more in the investigation of the longer period. And on the opposite, when every day we have some movement, we have lots of statistical data. We know very well the seismic behavior. The seismic design can be fed with this data. So it's easier to justify the adequacy of the seismic design. OK. The structure relationship with the non-capable fault has been demonstrated such that the movement of the one may cause movement of the other at or near the surface, and the maximum potential of earthquake associated with the seismogenic structure is sufficiently large. And such a depth that is reasonable to infer in the geodynamic setting of the site movement at or near the surface of it would occur. Where reliable evidence shows the existence of a capable fault that has the potential to affect the safety of the nuclear installations, an alternative site shall be considered. Which means in any of these criteria applies, we have to choose another site. Which means the site is not suitable. Now, meteorological events. What are those meteorological events? We have lots of them. We have lots of them. We have the wind, the precipitation, snow, temperature, storm surges. There are some rare meteorological events like lightning tornadoes, tropical cyclones, which are coming more and more frequent by the climate change. So again, the extreme values of these events should be considered. Now, the European utility requirements for the heavy rain require the design basis to withstand a rain with 400 millimeters per day and with 100 millimeters per hour. And some cases, 100 millimeters per hour is not a rare event. So it can happen quite often on some locations. Now, if it is on the site, then the site should be, I mean, the plant should survive this according to the European utility requirements. On the other hand, there are some other designs, new designs, new nuclear power plant designs, which are applying different design values for these extreme, so-called extreme rain situations. And the question is whether those will be good enough for the European utility requirements or not. So I'm telling you the European utility requirements because this is a set of requirements which is established or collected by the European utilities. And it has already the revision E. Revision D is the valid one, revision E. So it is continuously evolving. And it specifies lots of interesting requirements for new nuclear power plants. Now, maximum wind gusts, as an example, hazard curve. So we have the return period in years from 1 to 10 million. And you can see, for a specific site, we have to build up such curve for the designer to know what are the wind gusts which are characterizing the plant site. Then the 60-minute extreme rainfall for the same site. You can see that what I was talking about, what is return value, this is wrong, sorry. So it should be millimeters per hour. So this 100 millimeters per hour rain can occur at this site once in a million years, according to the investigation results. OK, so external flooding, we are talking about external flooding, not the internal flooding. External flooding is an interesting question because we could see one severe accident from the external flooding. There was almost at the same time in the US a danger of another flooding by the river where the river just simply flooded all the environment of the plant. So the plant was in an island in the river for a couple of weeks. So these are things which we have to take into account. We have to understand and we have to know how the flooding will behave. So it can be due to precipitation. It can be due to snow melt. Just imagine one meter of snow in the environment and then on the next day 10 degrees and sun. It starts melting and then slowly it becomes a flooding water. Or high tide or storm surge or seachar and wind. These are all which can cause flooding. And of course the possible combination should also be taken into account. And of course the water waves induced by the earthquakes is a hot topic after the Fukushima accident. So this should not be forgotten. However, the potential tsunami after an earthquake on the sea side is an interesting investigation. So some models show that if the fort was somewhat one meter from the actual location, the tsunami may have not been occurring. So the tsunami is very much sensitive to the location of the fort causing the earthquake. So therefore if there is a danger of a light tsunami after any earthquake, even a smaller earthquake can cause a rather light tsunami. Therefore this investigation should go on and it should reach such a level when we can certainly say that this earthquake at that fort location will cause this kind of tsunami. The frequency of occurrence, the magnitude, and height of regional tsunamis or seachars shall be estimated and shall be used in determining the hazards associated with the tsunamis or seachars. The potential of tsunamis or seachars to be generated by a region of short seismic events shall be evaluated on the basis of known seismic records and seismotic characteristics. So we are using simply all kind of information to gather this data and to produce the necessary results. So just the flooding further, the hazards associated with the tsunamis shall be derived from known seismic records and seismotechnical characteristics as well as from physical and analytical modeling. We have to model, we have to analyze the statistical data. Unfortunately, in just a couple of months before the Fukushima accident there was a training in Vietnam, IAEA training in Vietnam where a Japanese specialist showed how to calculate the frequency of the tsunami higher than the design-based tsunami at the Fukushima site. And he showed something like the actual tsunami which has occurred with the frequency of 10 to minus 6 per year or something like that. If you are interested, I can show you the presentation or the results of this presentation, which is funny enough, but very sad that right after this presentation the investigative event has happened. OK, so let's jump further. Yes, information relating to upstream water control structures shall be analyzed to determine whether the nuclear installation should be able to withstand the effects of resulting from the failure of one or more of the upstream structures. What are those? Those are dams, those are there might be water storage lakes and so on and so on upstream to the plant. One interesting topic, one interesting example is the Kurskow plant in Slovenia where maybe 100 kilometers away upstream to the plant there is a water storage facility which they investigated the effects of the damage of the dams and they showed that it will not directly affect the plant though it may cause an island operation of the plant because it will be surrounded by water. On the internet you can find the results of their investigation and there is a nice animation showing how the water propagates towards the plant in case of the damage of this facility. Then the possibility of storage or water as a result of the temporary blockage of the rivers, upstream or downstream that can cause flooding and associated phenomena at the proposed site shall be examined. Yes, so again if even it can be due to an accident, a traffic boat or not boat but a ship accident on the river which can block the river flow and accumulate water which then comes down at the same time. So it can be, how to say, dangerous. Now I will accelerate because I should come closer to the end of my presentation though I still have something like 10 slides or more. The geotechnic hazards, the slope instability should be investigated then the collapse or subsidence or uplift of the site surface. There are so many interesting phenomena which are geotechnical hazards that simply all of them has to be investigated and if the potential is not excluded for the lifetime, practically excluded or we cannot show that the frequency of such hazards is low enough then we have to choose another site. So soil liquefaction is an interesting question again to be considered then the behavior of foundation materials. How the foundation and the foundation structure can be built or should be built up on the specific site. Also the groundwater, there are two aspects to investigate with the groundwater. One is if the groundwater can elevate to a level which can break into the plant structures. This is one question, this is one kind of flooding. In some new nuclear power plant sites which I've seen they show that the only flooding source is the groundwater because there is no river in the environment at all so the plant is an innovation which cannot be reached by water but the groundwater can reach the zero level. And they investigated that at the zero level everything is flooded, we are still alive because we have some systems which save our safety. But this is one part of the story. So flooding by groundwater, the second is that groundwater can transfer, the radioactive materials. Just simply it is a transport of the radioactive materials therefore we have to understand what are the chemical properties, what are the ways of breaking into dangerous places and what are the possible ways or possible transport ways to the groundwater of the radioactive material. Now human induced events, aircraft crashes. So today we say that 400 ton civil aircraft crash should be the design basis for a modern nuclear power plant. Yes, it is easy to say that it is 400 tons but imagine the structure of the airplane. So the body of the airplane is a soft body. So whatever we say, with quite a big mass but it is a soft body. The hard body is the engines and the front wheel structure. The engines are about five, six tons hard bodies which are like a messiahs. So this is what the plant structure has to survive because the soft body will simply not affect the plant building structures. So it is relatively easy to model an airplane crash to the containment and usually it is done by the designers and based on these evaluations they can define the size which the containment can still survive. So the hazards associated with the aircraft crash to be considered shall include the impact of fires and explosions. Of course the kerosene fire or the kerosene explosion is by itself is a dangerous thing and if it is accompanied with a mechanical impact then we understand why the containment structure is so solid. Then chemical explosions in the environment should be considered. So I don't want to stop here. The only thing is that the site shall be considered unsuitable if such activities take place in its vicinity and there is no practical solution available to avoid such chemical explosions. Then other important human induced events. These are the flammable explosive, toxic, corrosive, and radioactive materials in the environment and what I already told the ordinary plant which is on the site. So this also should be taken into account in the design. So imagine if there is an earthquake or seismic design for the old nuclear power plant and there is another seismic design for the new nuclear power plant there are different requirements. The old requirements are more relaxed than the new ones. So for the new ones let's say 10 to the minus 5 per year will be the design basis earthquake and for the old one it is 10 to the minus 4 per year. So at 10 to the minus 5 per year definitely the old nuclear power plant by definition will be damaged. So for the new nuclear power plant the design against the earthquake should also consider that this earthquake will be accompanied with release of radioactive material from the old nuclear power plant. So the personnel of the new nuclear power plant has to be protected against the radioactive releases. So these kind of combinations of hazards are interesting because usually we say that we are combining different naturally induced hazards. Now here we are combining the naturally induced hazards with the human induced hazards because it was induced by the human because they built the nuclear power plant. If the nuclear power plant was not there or would not be there then this problem wouldn't exist. OK, potential effects of electromagnetic interference, eddy currents in the ground, and clogging of air or water inlets by debris shall also be evaluated. Just one interesting story. In China we reviewed the probabilistic safety analysis of a plant which was on the seaside. And we said that, OK, just imagine one storm outside and the storm just bringing some of these water plants, argas, and so on to the intake screens, clogging the intake screen. What would you do? And they said, OK, it is not a problem. We have so many people, we send out people and they will clean it. But we are saying that, yes, but this is a storm. So it is not that easy because huge waves and wind and so on and so on. No, it is not a problem. So we will solve. So these kind of things which, if not taken into account in the design, can cause problems. And many of these problems cannot be solved just by saying that we have enough people to do that. Because the conditions will not allow to use the people. Other important considerations, again, temperature and humidity, air temperature, the water temperatures, available flow of water, minimum water level, and the period of time for which the safety-related sources of cooling water are at the minimum level. This is something which, unfortunately, very weakly treated even in the new designs. We had lots of problems with the low water in the Danube. And there were some plans to build a canal to the other river to have some spare water from the other river. On the other hand, this year, the water temperature went up to 27 degrees was the river water temperature during summer, 27. And then comes the limitation from the plan that after the plant, the temperature should not be higher than, let's say, 30 degrees. So it was almost reached. Therefore, the plant should have been shut down just because of these conditions. And it can affect the safety, definitely, because that hot water will not be sufficient to cool some of the components in the service water system. It may not be sufficiently cold. So these kind of considerations in the design should solve these potential problems. OK, I'm jumping. Now, the potential impacts. There are very few slides on it and we'll stop. So the atmospheric dispersion of the radioactive material, it is already at the design phase, should be known. If there is a system, what are the meteorological characteristics of the site, which will transport the radioactive material in the environment? How far it will go? Will it go from Pax to Vienna or so? Because then the Austrians will complain. So of course, I don't want to exaggerate, but these are really the questions when the environmental impact is assessed. So this passion, we have to have a program for meteorological measurements, which is investigating all kinds of meteorological characteristics of the plant, which can transport the radioactive material. On the other hand, on this basis, we have to assume the largest release and produce the so-called transport cloud of the radioactive material and demonstrate what is the area which it can pollute. And of course, this model shall include all significant site specific and regional topographic features and characteristics of the installation that may affect the atmospheric dispersion. And let me tell you that this investigation is one of the most difficult out of all kind of deterministic considerations, because it has so many and so big uncertainties that it is very difficult to derive any conclusions from this investigation. The surface water dispersion of the surface water is also important. So if we release to the river, then the river will bring it to wherever. So very tense. That's the end of the radioactive material that would go. And of course, again, here we have to understand the potential impact, and so on, and so on. Now, basically, the groundwater, I have already talked about the groundwater and the population distribution. The distribution of the population within the region shall be determined. Why it is interesting? Because when we are analyzing the risk, it is not just due to the risk analysis, but for the analysis of the risk, we determine the risk of the individual in the environment and the societal risk. The societal risk will determine the number of injuries in the region and the frequency and the number of injuries. And in many countries, this is controlled and this is limited. Special attention shall be paid to population living in the immediate vicinity of the installation to densely populated areas as population centers in the region, and so on, and so on. So the population distribution is important. Now, the uses of land and water in the region, it should be characterized. So people are using the water, where they are taking water from the depth of somewhere. And then if we pollute this water, then, of course, this is a transport which can cause doses to the people. And also, investigation should cover land and water bodies that may be used by the population or may serve as a habitat for organisms in the food chain. There are some experiments which demonstrate how the radioactive material can be transferred from the disposed radioactive material then eaten by the animals and then taken by people as food. Also, the same with the fishes in the region of Fukushima, this problem exists. OK, so the ambient radioactivity before the commissioning should be determined in order to know what are the effects of the operation. So I'm not talking about the accident about the operation. So if the operation represents an extra load to the people, it may be determined by knowing the original ambient radioactivity. And we have to monitor the hazards and the potential impacts. So basically, this is what I wanted to talk about. So this was the end of my presentation. I have to say I tried my best to finish in time, not successfully, though I admit there was almost 50 slides, which is awful lot for my presentations. So sorry about it. And if you have any questions, please go ahead with them. What I say is that if there are no questions, it can mean two things. Everything was understood or nothing was understood. So please go ahead. Page 10. Yeah, here is it. Yes? No? Yeah, then OK. So we have to produce parameters during the evaluation, which can be easily used during the design. So the designer needs specific parameters. So I cannot say that it is usually we have big storm. It is not enough for the designer. He needs specific parameters of the storms, like speed of the wind, like precipitation, and so on and so on. So all those parameters has to be correctly specified for them to know what to design against. So they cannot design against big storm. This is what it wants to say. Yes? Yeah, that's correct. What you are saying is about the recorded experience of the human beings, yes? But we may have also other evidence. So we can investigate the soil with drilling to the depth and then take samples and look at the structure on different places. Or we also can make micro explosions on some locations and measure the vibrance and so on and so on. This is for the seismic characteristics. For the meteorological behavior, it is more difficult. There are some extrapolation techniques and there are also some evidences which may help us, not evidence, but some information which may help us to estimate the frequency or the return probabilities. So I'm not saying it is, let's say, easy. And let me say that in our case in Hungary, we are now deep in this process. And many, many institutes are involved with their research results and so on and so on to help us to produce those design values which are needed. As I say, I consumed the time for the discussion with Alek. So probably you may have some questions to Alek as well after having his presentations. Thank you very much. And see you tomorrow. So I don't know what is the weather like now. It seemed to rain in the afternoon and the weather seemed to be very unstable. So probably it is not that pity that I consumed, let's say, 20 minutes of yours per time. OK, so enjoy your evening and see you tomorrow.