 Section 18 of Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Mike Overby, Midland Washington. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Section I. The president orders McGahn to deny that the president tried to fire the special counsel. Overview. In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017, the president had ordered McGahn to have the special counsel fired based on purported conflicts of interest. But McGahn had refused, saying he would quit instead. After the story broke, the president, through his special counsel and two aides, sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove the special counsel. Each time he was approached, McGahn responded that he would not refute the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the president's efforts to have the special counsel removed. The president later personally met McGahn in the Oval Office with only the chief of staff present and tried to get McGahn to say that the president never ordered him to fire the special counsel. McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the president's direction to remove the special counsel was accurate. In that same meeting, the president challenged McGahn for taking notes of his discussions with the president and asked why he had told the special counsel investigators that he had been directed to have the special counsel removed. Evidence. Subsection I. The press reports that the president tried to fire the special counsel. On January 25, 2018, The New York Times reported that in June 2017, the president had ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the special counsel. According to the article, quote, amid the first wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that disqualified him from overseeing the investigation. The article further reported that, quote, after receiving the president's order to fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel refused to ask the justice department to dismiss the special counsel, saying he would quit instead. The article stated that the president, quote, ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to resign rather than carry out the directive. After the article was published, the president dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters saying, quote, fake news folks, fake news, a typical New York Times fake story. The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same event, but added that McGahn had not told the president directly that he intended to resign rather than carry out the directive to have the special counsel terminated. In that respect, the Post's story clarified the time story, which could be read to suggest that McGahn had told the president of his attention to quit, causing the president to back down from the order to have the special counsel fired. Subsection 2, the president seeks to have McGahn dispute the press reports. On January 26th, 2018, the president's personal counsel called McGahn's attorney and said that the president wanted McGahn to put out a statement denying that he had been asked to fire the special counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest. McGahn's attorney spoke with McGahn about that request and then called the president's personal counsel to relay that McGahn would not make a statement. McGahn's attorney informed the president's personal counsel that the time story was accurate in reporting that the president wanted the special counsel removed. Accordingly, McGahn's attorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some other respects, McGahn could not comply with the president's request to dispute the story. Hicks recalled relaying to the president that one of his attorneys had spoken to McGahn's attorney about the issue. Also on January 26th, 2017, Hicks recalled that the president asked Sanders to contact McGahn about the story. McGahn told Sanders there was no need to respond and indicated that some of the article was accurate. Consistent with that position, McGahn did not correct the time story. On February 4th, 2018, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the president say that he wanted the special counsel fired. After Priebus' appearance, the president called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press. The president also told Priebus that the president had never said any of those things about the special counsel. The next day, on February 5th, 2018, the president complained about the Times article to Porter. The president told Porter that the article was, quote, bullshit, and he had not sought to terminate the special counsel. The president said that McGahn leaked to the media to make himself look good. The president then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make clear that the president never directed McGahn to fire the special counsel. Porter thought the matter should be handled by the White House Communications Office, but the president said he wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file, quote, for our records and wanted something beyond a press statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate. The president referred to McGahn as a, quote, lying bastard and said that he wanted a record from him. Porter recalled the president saying something to the effect of, quote, if he doesn't write a letter, maybe I'll have to get rid of him. Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the president's message. Porter told McGahn that he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate the special counsel. McGahn shrugged off the request, explaining that the media reports were true. McGahn told Porter that the president had been insistent on firing the special counsel and that McGahn had planned to resign rather than carry out the order, although he had not personally told the president he intended to quit. Porter told McGahn that the president suggested that McGahn would be fired if he did not write the letter. McGahn dismissed the threat, saying that the optics would be terrible if the president followed through on firing him on that basis. McGahn said he would not write the letter the president had requested. Porter said that to his knowledge, the issue of McGahn's letter never came up with the president again, but Porter did recall telling Kelly about his conversation with McGahn. The next day, on February 6, 2018, Kelly scheduled time for McGahn to meet with him and the president in the Oval Office to discuss the Times article. The morning of the meeting, the president's personal counsel called McGahn's attorney and said that the president was going to be speaking with McGahn, and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the meeting. The president began the Oval Office meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times story did not, quote, look good, and McGahn needed to correct it. McGahn recalled the president said, quote, I never said to fire Mueller. I never said fire. This story doesn't look good. You need to correct this. You're the White House counsel. In response, McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the president directly that he planned to resign, but said that the story was otherwise accurate. The president asked McGahn, quote, did I say the word fire? McGahn responded, quote, what you said is, call Rod Rosenstein, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the special counsel. The president responded, quote, I never said that. The president said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do. McGahn told the president that he did not understand the conversation that way, and instead had heard, quote, call Rod, there are conflicts. Mueller has to go. The president asked McGahn whether he would, quote, do a correction, and McGahn said no. McGahn thought the president was testing his medal to see how committed McGahn was to what happened. Kelly described the meeting as, quote, a little tense. The president also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told special counsel's office investigators that the president had told him to have the special counsel removed. McGahn responded that he had to, and that his conversations with the president were not protected by attorney-client privilege. The president then asked, quote, what about these notes? Why do you take notes? Lawyers don't take notes. I never had a lawyer who took notes. McGahn responded that he keeps notes because he is a, quote, real lawyer and explained that notes create a record and are not a bad thing. The president said, quote, I've had a lot of great lawyers like Roy Cohn. He did not take notes. After the Oval Office meeting concluded, Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn and the president, quote, did have that conversation about removing the special counsel. McGahn recalled that Kelly said that he had pointed out to the president after the Oval Office that McGahn had not backed down and would not budge. Following the Oval Office meeting, the president's personal counsel called McGahn's counsel and relayed that the president was, quote, fine with McGahn. Analysis. In analyzing the president's efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have the special counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice. A. Obstructive Act. The president's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record denying that the president had directed him to remove the special counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfully or to undermine his credibility as a potential witness if he testified consistently with his memory rather than with what the record said. There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories were published in late January, 2018, the president believed the stories were wrong and that he had never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the special counsel. The president correctly understood that McGahn had not told the president directly that he had planned to resign. In addition, the president told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the special counsel. And in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn, the president said, quote, I never said to fire, Mueller, I never said fire. That evidence could indicate that the president was not attempting to persuade McGahn to change his story, but was instead offering his own, but different, recollection of the substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn's reaction to them. Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the president's conduct. As previously described, see volume two, section two, dot E, supra. Substantial evidence supports McGahn's account that the president had directed him to have the special counsel removed, including the timing and context of the president's directive, the manner in which McGahn reacted, and the fact that the president had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department of Justice and should be raised with the president's personal counsel rather than brought to McGahn. In addition, the president's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the special counsel removed were carefully worded. When first asked about the New York Times story, the president said, fake news, folks, fake news, a typical New York Times fake story. And when the president spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had used the word fire, saying, I never said to fire, Mueller. I never said fire. And quote, did I say the word fire? The president's assertion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed McGahn to have the special counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence. In addition, even if the president sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June 17th, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the president knew by the time of the Oval Office meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views. Shortly after the story broke, the president's counsel told McGahn's counsel that the president wanted McGahn to make a statement denying that he had been asked to fire the special counsel. But McGahn responded through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply with the president's request. The president then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the president's order. Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a week later, the president brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the president thought McGahn had leaked the story and directed Porter to have McGahn creative record denying that the president had tried to fire the special counsel. At that point, the president said he might quote, have to get rid of McGahn if McGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the president's counsel that the president had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the special counsel. That evidence indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting, the president was aware that McGahn did not think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying facts that McGahn believed to be true. The president nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate. B, nexus to an official proceeding. By January 2018, the special counsel's use of a grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The president also was aware that the special counsel was investigating obstruction related events because among other things, on January 8th, 2018, the special counsel's office provided his counsel with a detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the president. The president knew that McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the special counsel was investigating and that McGahn had already been interviewed by special counsel investigators. And in the Oval Office meeting, the president indicated he knew that McGahn had told the special counsel's office about the president's efforts to remove the special counsel. The president challenged McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the president's awareness that the June 17th, 2017 events were relevant to the special counsel's investigation and any grand jury investigation that might grow out of it. To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the president's actions would have the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay, or prevent the communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to special counsel investigators before January 2018, the president could not have been seeking to influence his prior statements in those interviews. But because McGahn had repeatedly spoken to investigators and the obstruction inquiry was not complete, it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again on obstruction-related topics. If the president were focused solely on a press strategy and seeking to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further investigative interviews would not be shown. But the president's efforts to have McGahn write a letter, quote, for our records, approximately 10 days after the story came out, well past the typical time to issue a correction for a news story, indicates the president was not focused solely on a press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings arising from it. C, intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute that he was ordered to have the special counsel terminated, the president acted for the purpose of influencing McGahn's account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the president's conduct towards the investigation. Several facts support that conclusion. The president made repeated attempts to get McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt, the evidence suggests that the president had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the president had ordered him to have the special counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with the president in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his medal and see how committed he was to his memory of what had occurred. The president had already laid the groundwork for pressing McGahn to alter his account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additional evidence of the president's intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the prospect of the president's meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn's counsel and said McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The president's counsel was well aware of McGahn's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account of events despite the president's request. Finally, as noted above, the president brought up the special counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for telling the office about the June 17th, 2017 events. The president's statements reflect his understanding and his displeasure that those events will be part of an obstruction of justice inquiry. Section J, the president's conduct towards Flynn, Manafort, and redacted, harm to ongoing matter. Overview. In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the president has taken other actions directed at possible witnesses in the special counsel's investigation, including Flynn, Manafort, redacted, harm to ongoing matter, and as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement with the president, the president's personal counsel stated that Flynn's actions will be viewed as reflecting, quote, hostility toward the president. During Manafort's prosecution and while the jury was deliberating, the president repeatedly stated that Manafort was being treated unfairly and made it known that Manafort could receive a pardon, redacted, harm to ongoing matter, evidence, subsection one, conduct directed at Michael Flynn. As previously noted, see volume two, section two, dot b, supra. The president asked for Flynn's resignation on February 13th, 2017. Following Flynn's resignation, the president made positive public comments about Flynn, describing him as a, quote, wonderful man, quote, a fine person and a, quote, very good person. The president also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying that the president still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong. In late November, 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this office. On November 22nd, 2017, Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the president. Flynn's counsel told the president's personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have confidential communication with the White House or the president. Later that night, the president's personal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn's counsel that said, quote, uh, I understand the situation, but let me see if I can't state it in darker terms. It wouldn't surprise me if you've gone on to make a deal with the government. If there's information that implicates the president, then we've got a national security issue. So, you know, we need some kind of heads up just for the sake of protecting all our interests if we can. Remember what we've always said about the president and his feelings towards Flynn and that still remains. On November 23rd, 2017, Flynn's attorneys returned the call from the president's personal counsel to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail. Flynn's attorneys reiterated that they were no longer in a position to share information under any sort of privilege. According to Flynn's attorneys, the president's personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement. The president's personal counsel said that he interpreted what they said to him as a reflection of Flynn's hostility towards the president and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation. Flynn's attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position because the president's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such a message would be conveyed to the president. On December 1st, 2017, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements pursuant to a cooperation agreement. The next day, the president told the press that he was not concerned about what Flynn might tell the special counsel. In response to a question about whether the president still stood behind Flynn, the president responded, quote, we'll see what happens. Over the next several days, the president made public statements, expressing sympathy for Flynn and indicating he had not been treated fairly. On December 15th, 2017, the president reported to a press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying, quote, I don't wanna talk about pardons for Michael Flynn yet, we'll see what happens, let's see. I can say this, when you look at what's gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very angry. Subsection two, conduct directed at Paul Manafort. On October 27th, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts. And on February 22nd, 2018, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony counts. The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as 2005 and continued through 2018. In January, 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the president's personal counsel and they were, quote, going to take care of us. Manafort told Gates it was a stupid deplete, saying that he had been in touch with the president's personal counsel and repeating that they should, quote, sit tight and, quote, we'll be taken care of. Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and Manafort said no one used that word. As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court, the president told Porter that he never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign. The president discussed with AIDS, whether, and in what way, Manafort might be cooperating with the special counsel's investigation and whether Manafort knew any information that would be harmful to the president. In public, the president made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that Manafort was being treated unfairly. On June 15th, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered with witnesses while out on bail, the president told the press, quote, I feel badly about a lot of them because I think a lot of it was very unfair. I mean, I look at some of them where they go back 12 years, like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign, but I feel so, I tell you, I feel a little badly about it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago. I feel badly for some people because they've gone back 12 years to find things about somebody and I don't think it's right. In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort or other individuals involved in the special counsel's investigation, the president said, quote, I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that. But look, I do want to see people treated fairly. That's what it's all about. Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and the president tweeted, quote, wow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort, who has represented Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole, and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know Manafort was the head of the mob. What about Comey and Cook and Hillary and all the others? Very unfair. Immediately following the revocation of Manafort's bail, the president's personal lawyer, Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily News that, quote, when the whole thing is over, things might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons. Giuliani also said in an interview that although the president should not pardon anyone while the special counsel's investigation was ongoing, quote, when the investigation is concluded, he's kind of on his own, right? In a CNN interview two days later, Giuliani said, quote, I guess I should clarify this once and for all. The president has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons in this investigation when it's over. Hey, he's the president of the United States. He retains his pardon power. Nobody's taken that away from him. Giuliani rejected the suggestion that his and the president's comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a criminal prosecution because a pardon might follow, saying the comments were, quote, certainly not intended that way. Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved in the investigation would not be, quote, excluded from a pardon if in fact the president and his advisors come to the conclusion that you've been treated unfairly. Giuliani observed that pardons were not unusual in political investigations, but said, quote, that doesn't mean it's gonna happen here. Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it. Big signal is nobody has been pardoned yet. On July 31st, 2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia, generating substantial news coverage. The next day, the president tweeted, quote, this is a terrible situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this rigged witch hunt right now before it continues to stay in our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted and his 17 angry Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to the USA. Minutes later, the president tweeted, quote, Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole, and many other highly prominent and respected political leaders. He worked for me for a very short time. Why didn't government tell me that he was under investigation? These old charges have nothing to do with collusion, a hoax. Later in the day, the president tweeted, quote, looking back on history, who has been treated worse? Alphonse Capone, legendary mob boss, killer and public enemy number one, or Paul Manafort, political operative and Reagan Dole Darling, now serving solitary confinement, although convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian collusion? The president's tweets about the Manafort trial were widely covered by the press. When asked about the president's tweets, Sanders told the press, quote, certainly the president's been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort's been treated unfairly. On August 16th, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began. At that time, Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the special counsel investigation needed to be, quote, done in the next two or three weeks. And media stories reported that a Manafort acquittal would add to criticism that the special counsel investigation was not worth the time and expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature. On August 17th, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the president commented on the trial from the South Lawn of the White House in an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted approximately five minutes, the president twice called the special counsel investigation a, quote, rigged witch hunt. When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the president said, quote, I don't talk about that now. I don't talk about that. The president then added, without being asked a further question, quote, I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look at what's going on there. I think it's a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very short period of time, but you know what? He happens to be a very good person. And I think it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort. The president did not take further questions. In response to the president's statements, Manafort's attorney said, quote, Mr. Manafort really appreciates the support of President Trump. On August 21st, 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on August 21st, Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to aid offenses, including a campaign finance violation that he said had occurred, quote, in coordination with and at the direction of a candidate for federal office. The president reacted to Manafort's convictions that day by telling reporters, quote, Paul Manafort's a good man, end, quote, it's a very sad thing that happened. The president described the special council investigation as, quote, the witch hunt that ends in disgrace. The next day, the president tweeted, quote, I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. Justice took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him and unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to break makeup stories in order to get a deal. Such respect for a brave man. In a Fox News interview on August 22nd, 2018, the president said, quote, Cohen makes a better deal when he uses me like everybody else. And one of the reasons I respect Paul Manafort so much is he went through that trial, you know, they make up stories, people make up stories. This whole thing about flipping, they call it. I know all about flipping. The president said that flipping was, quote, not fair and, quote, almost ought to be outlawed. In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the president said, quote, I have great respect for what he's done in terms of what he's gone through. He worked for many, many people, many, many years and I would say what he did, some of the charges they had through against him, every consulted, every lobbyist in Washington probably does. Giuliani told journalists that the president, quote, really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated and that he and the president had discussed the political fallout if the president pardoned Manafort. The next day, Giuliani told the Washington Post that the president had asked his lawyers for advice on the possibility of a pardon for Manafort and other aides and had been counseled against considering a pardon until the investigation concluded. On September 14th, 2018, Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia that required him to cooperate with investigators. Giuliani was reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in enjoyed defense agreement with the president following Manafort's guilty plea and agreement to cooperate and that Manafort's attorneys regularly briefed the president's lawyers on the topics discussed and the information Manafort had provided in interviews with the special counsel's office. On November 26th, 2018, the special counsel's office disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breached his plea agreement by lying about multiple subjects. The next day, Giuliani said that the president had been, quote, upset for weeks about what he considered to be, quote, the un-American horrible treatment of Manafort. In an interview on November 28th, 2018, the president suggested that it was, quote, very brave that Manafort did not, quote, flip, quote. If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know, this flipping stuff is terrible. You flip and you lie and you get, the prosecutors will tell you 99% of the time they can get people to flip. It's rare that they can't. But I had three people, Manafort, Corsi, I don't know Corsi, but he refused to say what they demanded. Manafort, Corsi, redacted, harm to ongoing matters. It's actually very brave. In response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the president said, quote, it was never discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table? Section three, redacted, harm to ongoing matter. Analysis, in analyzing the president's conduct toward Flynn, Manafort, redacted, harm to ongoing matter. The following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice. A, obstructive act. The president's actions towards witnesses in the special counsel's investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular witnesses from testifying truthfully or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing, delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement. With regard to Flynn, the president sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging him to stay strong and conveying that the president still cared about him before he began to cooperate with the government. When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense agreement with the president, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the government, the president's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the president's warm feelings towards Flynn and said, quote, that still remains. But when Flynn's counsel reiterated that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement, the president's personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility towards the president. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affect Flynn's decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues, however, we could not determine whether the president was personally involved in or knew about the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn's counsel. With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the president's actions had the potential to influence Manafort's decision whether to cooperate with the government. The president and his personal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Manafort while also making it clear that the president did not want Manafort to, quote, flip and coordinate with the government. On June 15th, 2018, the day the judge presiding over Manafort's DC case was considering whether to revoke his bail, the president said that he, quote, felt badly for Manafort and stated, quote, I think a lot of it was very unfair. And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the president said, quote, I do wanna see people treated fairly. That's what it's all about. Later that day, after Manafort's bail was revoked, the president called it a, quote, tough sentence that was, quote, very unfair. Two days later, the president's personal counsel stated that individuals involved in the special counsel's investigation could receive a pardon, quote, if in fact the president and his advisors come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly using language that paralleled how the president had already described the treatment of Manafort. Those statements combined with the president's commendation of Manafort for being a, quote, brave man who, quote, refused to break, suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Manafort continued not to cooperate with the government. And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to investigators. The president's public statements during the Manafort trial, including during jury deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for example, the president called the prosecution a, quote, terrible situation and a, quote, hoax that, quote, continues to stay in our country and referred to Manafort as a, quote, Reagan-Dole Darling, who was, quote, serving solitary confinement, even though he was, quote, convicted of nothing. Those statements were widely picked up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and are presumed to follow these instructions, the president's statements during the trial generated substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements or learned about them from others. And the statements during jury deliberations that Manafort, quote, happens to be a very good person and that, quote, it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the president made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort. Redacted, harm to ongoing matter. B, nexus to an official proceeding. The president's actions towards Flynn Manafort redacted, harm to ongoing matter, appear to have been connected to pending or anticipated official proceedings involving each individual. The president's conduct towards Flynn redacted, harm to ongoing matter principally occurred when both were under criminal investigation by the special counsel's office and press reports speculated about whether they would cooperate with the special counsel's investigation. And the president's conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him. The president made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal trial. And the president's comments about the prospect of Manafort, quote, flipping, occurred when it was clear the special counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings. C, intent. Evidence concerning the president's intent related to Flynn as a potential witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues, we do not have evidence establishing whether the president knew about or was involved in his counsel's communications with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting, quote, hostility towards the president. And regardless of what the president's personal counsel communicated, the president continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation agreement, stating that Flynn had, quote, led a very strong life and the president, quote, felt very badly about what had happened to him. Evidence concerning the president's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the president intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was convicted, the president repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly. One day after Manafort was convicted on 48 felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term, the president said that Manafort was, quote, a brave man for refusing to, quote, break and that, quote, flipping, quote, almost ought to be outlawed. At the same time, although the president had privately told aides he did not like Manafort, he publicly called Manafort, quote, a good man and said he had a, quote, wonderful family. And when the president was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the president did not respond directly and then instead said he had, quote, great respect for what he's done in terms of what he's gone through. The president added that, quote, some of the charges they hate through against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does. In light of the president's counsel's previous statements that the investigations, quote, might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons and that a pardon would be possible if the president, quote, comes to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly. The evidence supports the inference that the president intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary. We also examine the evidence of the president's intent in making public statements about Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports the conclusion that the president intended, at least in part, to influence the jury. The trial generated widespread publicity and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal would add to pressure to end the special counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the second day of deliberations that Manafort, quote, happens to be a very good person and that, quote, it's very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort. Right after calling the special counsel's investigation a, quote, rigged witch hunt, the president's statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors and a fact finder could infer that the president intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the president's comments, including that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to influence public opinion. The president's comments also could have been intended to continue sending the message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above, the president made his comments about Manafort being, quote, a very good person immediately after declining to answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort. Redacted, harmed to ongoing matter. End of section 18. Section 19 of report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Lynn Jarrow. Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election by Robert Mueller. Section 19. Section K, the president's conduct involving Michael Cohen. Overview. The president's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow Project on behalf of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times, including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media began questioning Trump's connections to Russia, Cohen promoted a party line that publicly distanced Trump from Russia and asserted that he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere to that party line in 2017 when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its Russia investigation. In an attempt to minimize the president's connections to Russia, Cohen submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower Moscow Project three times, that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia, that Cohen had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government and that the project ended in January 2016 before the First Republican Caucus or primary. While working on the congressional statement, Cohen had extensive discussions with the president's personal counsel, who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the president and should keep the statement short and tight. After the FBI searched Cohen's home and office in April 2018, the president publicly asserted that Cohen would not flip and privately passed messages of support to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the president's personal counsel and believed that if he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the president would do something else to make the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018, the president publicly criticized him, called him a rat, and suggested his family members had committed crimes. Evidence one, candidate Trump's awareness of and involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow Project. The president's interactions with Cohen as a witness took place against the background of the president's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow Project. As described in detail in volume one, section 4A.1, Supra. From September 2015, until at least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow Project in Russia. With negotiations conducted by Cohen, then executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump. The Trump Organization had previously and unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow. According to Cohen, in approximately September 2015, he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed the Trump name and brand. Cohen thereafter had numerous brief conversations with Trump about the project. Cohen recalled the Trump wanted to be updated on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow and on several occasions brought the project up with Cohen to ask what was happening on it. Cohen also discussed the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka Trump. In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a letter of intent for the project that specified highly lucrative terms for the Trump Organization. In December 2015, Felix Seder, who was handling negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation, asked Cohen for a copy of his and Trump's passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with government officials and possible financing partners. Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of Trump's passport from Trump's personal secretary, Rona Graf. By January 2016, Cohen had become frustrated that Seder had not set up a meeting with Russian government officials. So Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry Peskov, who was Putin's deputy chief of staff and press secretary. On January 20th, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Polyakova, Peskov's personal assistant, and phone records confirmed that they then spoke for approximately 20 minutes, during which Cohen scribed the Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward. Cohen recalled briefing candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards. Cohen told Trump he spoke with a woman he identified as someone from the Kremlin, and Cohen reported that she was very professional and asked detailed questions about the project. Cohen recalled telling Trump he wished the Trump organization had assistance who were as competent as the woman from the Kremlin. Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project, the day after Cohen's call with Polyakova. Seder texted Cohen, asking him to call me when you have a few minutes to chat. It's about Putin they called today. Seder told Cohen that the Russian government liked the project, and on January 25th, 2016, sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow for a working visit. After the outreach from Seder, Cohen recalled telling Trump that he was waiting to hear back on moving the project forward. After January, 2016, Cohen continued to have conversations with Seder about Trump Tower Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status of the project. Cohen recalled that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and that Trump never discouraged him from working on the project because of the campaign. In March or April, 2016, Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia. Cohen also recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in the spring, a conversation that Cohen said was not idle chit chat because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal. Cohen recalled that around May, 2016, he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project. At that time, Cohen had received several texts from Seder seeking to arrange dates for such a trip. On May 4th, 2016, Seder wrote to Cohen, I had a chat with Moscow assuming the trip does happen. The question is before or after the convention. Obviously, the pre-meeting trip you only can happen anytime you want but the two big guys is the question. I said I would confirm and revert. Cohen responded, my trip before Cleveland. Trump, once he becomes the nominee after the convention. On May 5th, 2016, Seder followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably read to Trump. Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum, which is Russia's Davos. It's June 16th through 19th. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you either to Putin or Medvedev. This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss, including dates and subjects are on the table to discuss. Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be there. Cohen remembered that Trump said he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen could lock and load on the deal. In June 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum because Seder had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov. Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on again, off again, if it were revived. During the summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards, privately checked with Cohen about the status of the Trump Tower Moscow Project, which Cohen found interesting. At some point that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the Trump Tower Moscow Project was going nowhere because the Russian Development Company had not secured a piece of property for the project. Trump said that was too bad and Cohen did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that. Cohen said that at no time during the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be abandoned. Two, Cohen determines to adhere to a party line distancing candidate Trump from Russia. As previously discussed, C volume two, section two, A Supra. When questions about possible Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia, which Cohen described as the party line or message to follow for Trump and his senior advisors. After the election, the Trump organization sought to formally close out certain deals in advance of the inauguration. Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list of deals to be closed out. In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the media about Trump Tower Moscow and he recalled speaking to the president-elect when those inquiries came in. Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow project might not be consistent with the message that the president-elect had no relationship with Russia. In an effort to stay on message, Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016. Cohen recalled that this was part of a script or talking points he had developed with president-elect Trump and others to dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia. Cohen said that he discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they were untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue. Cohen thought it was important to say the deal was done in January 2016 rather than acknowledge the talks continued in May and June 2016 because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign before Trump had become the party's presumptive nominee. Cohen submits false statements to Congress minimizing the Trump Tower Moscow project in accordance with the party line. In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016 election. At that time, Cohen understood Congress's interest in him to be focused on the allegations in the steel reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials in Prague during the campaign. Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned about those allegations which he believed were provably false. On May 18th, 2017, Cohen met with the president to discuss the request from Congress and the president instructed Cohen that he should cooperate because there was nothing there. Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement, JDA, with the president and other individuals who were part of the Russia investigation. In the months leading up to his congressional testimony, Cohen frequently spoke with the president's personal counsel. Cohen said that in those conversations, the president's personal counsel would sometimes say that he had just been with the president. Cohen recalled that the president's personal counsel told him the JDA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on message, the investigations would come to an end soon. At that time, Cohen's legal bills were being paid by the Trump organization and Cohen was told not to worry because the investigations would be over by summer or fall of 2017. Cohen said the president's personal counsel also conveyed that as part of the JDA, Cohen was protected, which he would not be if he went rogue. Cohen recalled that the president's personal counsel reminded him that the president loves you and told him that if he stayed on message, the president had his back. In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit to Congress, along with his document production. The final version of the statement contained several false statements about the project. First, although the Trump organization continued to pursue the project, until at least June 2016, the statement said, the proposal was under consideration at the Trump organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By the end of January 2016, I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business reasons and should not be pursued further based on my business determinations that Trump organization abandoned the proposal. Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said, despite overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in connection with this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a definitive agreement in place. Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status of the project and had numerous conversations about it, the statement said, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015. Fourth, although Cohen's outreach to Peskov in January 2016 had resulted in a lengthy phone call with the representative from the Kremlin, the statement said that Cohen did not recall any response to my email to Peskov nor any other contact by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal. Cohen's statement was circulated in advance too and edited by members of the JDA. Before the statement was finalized, early drafts contained a sentence stating, the building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials. In the final version of the statement, that line was deleted. Cohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the JDA to take out that sentence and he did not push back on the deletion. Cohen recalled that he told the president's personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA. Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress, he spoke with the president's personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia. Cohen's efforts to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin in New York during the 2015 United Nations General Assembly. In September 2015, Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump, who told Cohen to reach out to Putin's office about it. Cohen spoke and emailed with a Russian official about a possible meeting and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on the proposed meeting with Putin. When Cohen called the Russian official a second time, she told him it would not follow proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump and Cohen relayed that message to Trump. Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump-Putin meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting on Sean Hannity's radio show. Cohen recalled explaining to the president's personal counsel the whole story of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role in it. Cohen recalled that he and the president's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump out of the narrative and the president's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and should not be included in his statement to Congress. Cohen said that his agenda in submitting the statement to Congress with false representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project and the president, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential primaries and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow with the aim of limiting the ongoing Russia investigations. Cohen said he wanted to protect the president and be loyal to him by not contradicting anything the president had said. Cohen recalled he was concerned that if he told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about travel to Russia to pursue the project, he would contradict the message that no connection existed between Trump and Russia and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because the deal never happened. He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by individuals who knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whole group. Cohen wanted the support of the president in the White House and he believed that following the party line would help put an end to the special counsel and congressional investigations. Between August 18th, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage and August 28th, 2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress, phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with the president's personal counsel almost daily. On August 27th, 2017, the day before Cohen submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the president's personal counsel had numerous contacts by phone, including calls lasting three, four, six, 11 and 18 minutes. Cohen recalled telling the president's personal counsel who did not have firsthand knowledge of the project that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement reflected. Cohen stated that the president's personal counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight and the matter would soon come to an end. Cohen recalled that the president's personal counsel said his client appreciated Cohen, that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the president, that there was no need to muddy the water and that it was time to move on. Cohen said he agreed because it was what he was expected to do. After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this office sought to speak with the president's personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen, but counsel declined, citing potential privilege concerns. At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress, he served as a source for a Washington Post story published on August 27th, 2017 that reported in depth for the first time that the Trump Organization was pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower in Moscow. At the same time, as candidate Trump was, running for president in late 2015 and early 2016, the article reported that the project was abandoned at the end of January, 2016. Just before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the proposal said. Cohen recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased in January, 2016. On August 28th, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow project to Congress. Cohen did not recall talking to the president about the specifics of what the statement said or what Cohen would later testify about Trump Tower Moscow. He recalled speaking to the president more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his testimony. On September 19th, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations in the steel material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project was terminated in January of 2016, which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first primary. Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow the same message. Cohen said his decision was meant to mirror Jared Kushner's decision to release a statement in advance of Kushner's congressional testimony, which the president's personal counsel had told Cohen the president liked. Cohen recalled that on September 20th, 2017, after Cohen's opening remarks had been printed by the media, the president's personal counsel told him that the president was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had gone out. On October 24th and 25th, 2017, Cohen testified before Congress and repeated the false statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow. Phone records show that Cohen spoke with the president's personal counsel immediately after his testimony on both days. Four, the president sends messages of support to Cohen. In January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130,000 payment during the campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had with the president before he ran for office. This office did not investigate Cohen's campaign period payments to women. However, those events as described here are potentially relevant to the president's and his personal counsel's interaction with Cohen as a witness who later began to cooperate with the government. On February 13th, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, in a private transaction in 2016, I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to the woman. Neither the Trump organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the transaction with the woman and neither reimbursed me for the payment either directly or indirectly. In congressional testimony on February 27th, 2019, Cohen testified that he had discussed what to say about the payment with the president and that the president had directed Cohen to say that the president was not knowledgeable of Cohen's actions in making the payment. On February 19th, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the president's fixer. Cohen received a text message from the president's personal counsel that stated, client says, thanks for what you do. On April 9th, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York executed search warrants on Cohen's home, hotel room, and office. That day the president spoke to reporters and said that he had just heard they broke into the office of one of my personal attorneys, a good man. The president called the searches a real disgrace and said, it's an attack on our country in a true sense. It's an attack on what we all stand for. Cohen said that after the searches, he was concerned that he was an open book, that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to come out and that his false statements to Congress were a big concern. A few days after the searches, the president called Cohen. According to Cohen, the president said he wanted to check in and asked if Cohen was okay. And the president encouraged Cohen to hang in there and stay strong. Cohen also recalled that following the searches, he heard from individuals who were in touch with the president and relayed to Cohen the president's support for him. Cohen recalled that, redacted personal privacy. A friend of the president's reached out to say that he was with the boss in Mar-a-Lago and the president had said he loves you and not to worry. Cohen recalled that, redacted personal privacy. For the Trump organization told him, the boss loves you. And Cohen said that, redacted personal privacy. A friend of the president's told him, everyone knows the boss has your back. On or about April 17th, 2018, Cohen began speaking with an attorney, Robert Costello, who had a close relationship with Rudolf Giuliani, one of the president's personal lawyers. Costello told Cohen that he had a back channel of communication to Giuliani and that Giuliani said the channel was crucial and must be maintained. On April 20th, 2018, the New York Times published an article about the president's relationship with and treatment of Cohen. The president responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not flip. The New York Times and a third rate reporter are going out of their way to destroy Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will flip. They use non-existent sources and a drunk, drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a wonderful family. Michael is a businessman for his own account, lawyer who I have always liked and respected. Most people will flip if the government lets them out of trouble, even if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don't see Michael doing that, despite the horrible witch hunt and the dishonest media. In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani. Costello told Cohen the conversation was, very, very positive, you are loved. They are in our corner. Sleep well tonight. You have friends in high places. Cohen said that following these messages, he believed he had the support of the White House if he continued to tow the party line and he determined to stay on message and be part of the team. At the time, Cohen understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump Organization, which he said was important to him. Cohen believed he needed the power of the President to take care of him, so he needed to defend the President and stay on message. Cohen also recalled speaking with the President's personal counsel about pardons after the searches of his home and office had occurred at a time when the media had reported that pardon discussions were occurring at the White House. Cohen told the President's personal counsel he had been a loyal lawyer and servant and he said that after the searches he was in an uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him. According to Cohen, the President's personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation was a witch hunt and that everything would be fine. Cohen understood based on this conversation and previous conversations about pardons with the President's personal counsel that as long as he stayed on message he would be taken care of by the President, either through a pardon or through the investigation being shut down. On April 24th, 2018, the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would consider a pardon for Cohen with. Stupid question. On June 8th, 2018, the President said he hadn't even thought about pardons for Manafort or Cohen and continued. It's far too early to be thinking about that. They haven't been convicted of anything. There's nothing to pardon. And on June 15th, 2018, the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort and Flynn in a press interview and said, I feel badly about a lot of them because I think a lot of it is very unfair. Five, the President's conduct after Cohen began cooperating with the government. On July 2nd, 2018, ABC News reported based on an exclusive interview with Cohen that Cohen strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York, even if that puts President Trump in jeopardy. That week, the media reported that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team who previously had worked as legal advisor to President Bill Clinton. Beginning on July 20th, 2018, the media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had made of a conversation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman who said she had had an affair with Trump. On July 21st, 2018, the President responded, inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer's office early in the morning almost unheard of, even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client totally unheard of and perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong. On July 27th, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald Trump Jr. told his father about the June 9th, 2016 meeting to get dirt on Hillary Clinton, the President tweeted, So the fake news doesn't waste my time with dumb questions. No, I did not know of the meeting with my son Don Jr. Sounds to me like someone is trying to make up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam. Taxicabs, maybe? He even retained Bill and crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice. On August 21st, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight felony charges, including two counts of campaign finance violations based on the payments he made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the President. During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked at the direction of the candidate in making those payments. The next day, the President contrasted Cohen's cooperation with Manafort's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. Justice took a 12-year-old tax case, among other things, applied tremendous pressure on him, and unlike Michael Cohen, he refused to break, make up stories in order to get a deal. Such respect for a brave man. On September 17th, 2018, this office submitted written questions to the President that included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow Project and attached Cohen's written statement to Congress and the letter of intent signed by the President. Among other issues, the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the President, at any time, directed or suggested that discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease, or whether the President was informed at any time that the project had been abandoned. On November 20th, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly, and did not provide any information about the timing of the candidate's discussion with Cohen about the project, or whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued. Instead, the President's answers stated, in relevant part, I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject, as I recall they were brief, and they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and I do not recall any discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Seder, and any Russian government official regarding the letter of intent. On November 29th, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project. In a plea agreement with this office, Cohen agreed to provide truthful information regarding any and all matters, as to which this office deems relevant. Later on November 29th, after Cohen's guilty plea had become public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project saying, I decided not to do the project. I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have been nothing wrong if I did do it. If I did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That was my business. It was an option that I decided not to do. I decided not to do it. The primary reason, I was focused on running for President. I was running my business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance I wouldn't have won, in which case I would have gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of opportunities? The President also said that Cohen was a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people that you watch, he is a weak person. And what he is trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about. The President also brought up Cohen's written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project. So here's the story. Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and or Senate. It talked about his position. The President added, Even if Cohen was right, it doesn't matter, because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign. In light of the President's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea, that he decided not to do the project. This office again sought information from the President about whether he participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued, including when he decided not to do the project, who he spoke with about that decision, and what motivated the decision. The office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow, and asked him to specify what period of the campaign he was involved in discussions concerning the project. In response, the President's personal counsel declined to provide additional information from the President, and stated that the President has fully answered the questions at issue. In the weeks following Cohen's plea and agreement to provide assistance to this office, the President repeatedly implied that Cohen's family members were guilty of crimes. On December 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted, Michael Cohen asked Judge for no prison time. You mean he can do all of the terrible, unrelated to Trump things having to do with fraud, big loans, taxis, etc., and not serve a long prison term? He makes up stories to get a great and already reduced deal for himself, and get his wife and father-in-law who has the money off-scot-free. He lied for this outcome and should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence. Redacted, harm to ongoing matter. On December 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment. The next day, the President sent a series of tweets that said, I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law. Those charges were just agreed to by him in order to embarrass the President and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he did, including the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook, as a lawyer, Michael has great liability to me. On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted, Remember, Michael Cohen only became a rat after the FBI did something, which was absolutely unthinkable and unheard of until the witch-hunt was illegally started. They broke into an attorney's office. Why didn't they break into the DNC to get the server or crooked's office? In January 2019, after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019, the President was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded. In order to get his sentence reduced, Cohen says, I have an idea, I'll tell, I'll give you some information on the President. Well, there is no information, but he should give information maybe on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want to look at because where does that money, that's the money in the family, and I guess he didn't want to talk about his father-in-law. He's trying to get his sentence reduced, so it's pretty sad. You know, it's weak, and it's very sad to watch a thing like that. On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, Kevin Cork at Fox News, don't forget, Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week the Wall Street Journal has suggested he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars lying to reduce his jail time. Watch father-in-law. On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against his family. The next day the President tweeted, so interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen, who sadly will not be testifying before Congress, is using the lawyer of crooked Hillary Clinton to represent him. Gee, how did that happen? Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave press interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tower Moscow Project well past January 2016. Giuliani stated that it's our understanding that discussions about the Trump Moscow Project went on throughout 2016. Weren't a lot of them, but there were conversations. Can't be sure of the exact date, but the President can remember having conversations with him about it. The President also remembers, yeah, probably up, could be up to as far as October-November. In an interview with the New York Times, Giuliani quoted the President as saying that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow Project were going on from the day I announced to the day I won. On January 21, 2019, Giuliani issued a statement that said, my recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow Project were hypothetical and not based on conversations I had with the President. Analysis. In analyzing the President's conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice. A. Obstructive Act. We gathered evidence of the President's conduct related to Cohen on two issues. One, whether the President or others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements to Congress and two, whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government. One, first, with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress, while there is evidence described below that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow Project. The evidence available to us does not establish that the President directed or aided Cohen's false testimony. Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a party line that developed within the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia. Cohen also recalled that in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear that he would stay on message, which Cohen believed they both understood would require false testimony. But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow Project would be or was false, and the President did not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the specifics of his planned testimony. During the time when his statement to Congress was being drafted and circulated to members of the JDA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about the statement, but rather communicated with the President's personal counsel, as corroborated by phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President's personal counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when he testified before Congress. Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President's personal counsel on August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen's statement was submitted to Congress, Cohen said that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen, the President's personal counsel, who did not have firsthand knowledge of the project, responded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water, that it was unnecessary to include those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen's draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JDA. For example, Cohen omitted any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of the JDA to delete the sentence, the building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials. The President's personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President was aware of the information Cohen provided to the President's personal counsel. The President's conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege, and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence of evidence about the President and his counsel's conversations about the drafting of Cohen's statement precludes us from assessing what, if any, role the President played. 2. Second, we considered whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal investigators or to Congress. Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately urged Cohen to stay on message and not flip. Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go rogue. 3. In the days and weeks that followed the April 2018 searches of Cohen's home and office, the President told reporters that Cohen was a good man, and said he was a fine person with a wonderful family who I have always liked and respected. Privately, the President told Cohen to hang in there and stay strong. People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that the President loves you, the Boss loves you, and everyone knows the Boss has your back. Through the President's personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen, thanks for what you do, after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that, according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false. At that time, the Trump Organization continued to pay Cohen's legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President's personal counsel, who told him to stay on message and everything would be fine. The President indicated in his public statements that a pardon had not been ruled out, and also stated publicly that most people will flip if the government lets him out of trouble, but that he didn't see Michael doing that. After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government, however, the President accused Cohen of making up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam, taxicabs maybe, and call Cohen a rat, and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that Cohen's family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events could support an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate and then turn to attacks and intimidation to deter the provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating. B. Nexus to an Official Proceeding The President's relevant conduct towards Cohen occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel's Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen's conduct. The President acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate with the government investigations. C. Intent In analyzing the President's intent in his actions toward Cohen as a potential witness, there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen's information would shed adverse light on the President's campaign period conduct and statements. Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow Project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations, a goal that was in the President's interest as reflected by the President's own statements. During and after the campaign, the President made repeated statements that he had no business in Russia and said that there were no deals that could happen in Russia because we've stayed away. As Cohen knew, and as he recalled communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen's pursuit of the Trump Tower Moscow Project cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements. In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow Project and that the conversations continued to at least June 2016 and that he discussed with Trump possible travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off hand according to Cohen because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from Cohen and other records further established that Cohen's efforts to advance the project did not end in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible trips to Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project. The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the time of Cohen's false statements to Congress. Cohen discussed the project with the President in early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress which said the project was terminated in January of 2016, the President's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow and after Cohen's guilty plea, the President told reporters that he had ultimately decided not to do the project which supports the inference that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the campaign in which the project was being pursued. Two, the President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump Tower Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from this office about the project and other subjects. The media had reported that Cohen was cooperating with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress. Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the project. The President then declined to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our office or answer additional questions. The content and timing of the President's provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the information that Cohen could provide as a witness. Three, the President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow. There is also some evidence that the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen, refused to break and make up stories in order to get a deal. And after Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress, the President said, what Cohen's trying to do is get a reduced sentence, so he's lying about a project that everybody knew about. But the President also appeared to defend the underlying conduct saying, even if Cohen was right, it doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign. As described above, there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President's connections to Russia during the campaign. The President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen's family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen or others. It is possible that the President believes, as he reflected in his tweets, that Cohen made up stories in order to get a deal for himself and get his wife and father-in-law off scot-free. It is also possible that the President's mention of Cohen's wife and father-in-law were not intended to affect Cohen as a witness, but rather were part of a public relations strategy aimed at discrediting Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. But the President's suggestion that Cohen's family members committed crimes happened more than once, including just before Cohen was sentenced, at the same time as the President stated that Cohen should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence, and again just before Cohen was scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inference that they were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation. L. Overarching Factual Issues Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts concerning the President's course of conduct. 1. Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction of justice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice. 2. First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate the President's constitutional authority and raises garden-variety obstruction of justice issues. Other events we investigated, however, drew upon the President's Article II authority, which raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section IIIb, in Fra. A factual analysis of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful and that his position as head of the executive branch provides him with unique and powerful means of influencing official proceedings, subordinate officers, and potential witnesses. 2. Many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper obstructive purpose see United States v. Willoughby Second Circuit, 1988, or that he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding see United States v. Binde Second Circuit, 2015, but proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense. See United States v. Greer, VI Circuit, 2017, stating in applying the obstruction sentencing guideline that obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying crime. Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area, or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same, regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong. In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range of other possible personal motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential uncertainty about whether certain events such as advance notice of WikiLeaks release of hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians could be seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family. Third, many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including the discouragement of cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons, occurred in public view. While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a corrupt intent, the President's power to influence actions, persons, and events is enhanced by his unique ability to attract attention through use of mass communications. A no-principle-of-law excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony, the justice system's integrity is equally threatened. Two. Although the events we investigated involve discrete acts, e.g., the President's statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation, his termination of Comey, and his efforts to remove the special counsel, it is important to view the President's pattern of conduct as a whole. That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President's acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. A. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exerting undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian interference and obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in which the President sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions ranged from efforts to remove the special counsel and to reverse the effect of the Attorney General's recusal, to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation, to direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example, the President's direction to McGahn to have the special counsel removed was followed almost immediately by his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia investigation to prospective election interference only, a temporal connection that suggests that both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation. The President's efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or exceed to his requests. Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the acting Attorney General that the special counsel must be removed, but was instead prepared to resign over the President's order. Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President's message to Sessions that he should confine the Russian investigation to future election meddling only, and McGahn refused to recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the special counsel removed, despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the President's aides and associates beyond those already filed. B. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the first phase, before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination letter to Comey after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful. Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were conducting an obstruction of justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked significant change in the President's conduct, and the start of a second phase of action. The President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could possess evidence adverse to the President. While in private, the President engaged in a series of targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the special counsel. He sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself, and limit the investigation. He sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between Russians and campaign officials, and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses who might offer adverse information, and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the government. Judgments about the nature of the President's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the evidence.