 Good morning, good afternoon, or good evening depending on where you're joining us from. My name is Scott Worden and I'm the Director of the Afghanistan and Central Asia Program for the U.S. Institute of Peace. It's my great pleasure to welcome everybody, both in person and online, to this discussion about the challenging situation in Afghanistan and looking into fundamental questions about whether the Taliban, who took over Afghanistan on August 15th, are able to govern the country. We invite everybody to take part in today's discussion by participating online. You can use the chat box function that is on the USIP homepage to type questions. We'll have a discussion for about 45 minutes and then we'll turn to audience questions. So type them in there and we will choose from those. We ask that you use your name and also specify where you are participating from. And I also encourage everybody to follow on Twitter. The hashtag is hashtag Afghanistan USIP, all one word. It's been nearly two and a half months since the Taliban did take over Afghanistan and the situation there is becoming desperate. The UN estimates that half of the population will suffer severe food shortages and hunger in the coming winter. There's a currency crisis. There's a run on the banks. There's a liquidity crisis and the Taliban have been rolling back rights, women's rights and others since they took over. So our distinguished panelists today who come from Afghanistan and have a lot of experience on Afghanistan will help us understand what is the current situation, but also hopefully what can the US, what can other international partners and what can Afghans do to try to mitigate the crisis that is unfolding. We have a great list of panelists. So let me start on my immediate left by introducing Lepfulan Jafizata. He is the director of TOLO News in Afghanistan. That's the largest watched TV network and the largest news network in the country. Also we have Nahid Fareed. She is an elected member of parliament from Harat province and she is also the chairwoman of the women's commission of the parliament. And then finally we have Steve Brooking who has recently left as a special advisor at UNAMA, the UN assistance mission in Afghanistan, where he was in particular following the Doha peace talks. The way that we'll work it today is that I will conduct an interview with the panelists as I said for about 45 minutes and then we welcome audience participation. So I want to start off with you, Lepfula. You have a unique position as the news director. You've been able to track the security, the political, the social conditions in Afghanistan over many years across the country. I want to start by asking you how has the situation changed not just recently but since if we go back to April when the U.S. announced that all U.S. troops would be gone by September 11th. And then take us through to now. What is the contrast that you see between the conditions then and now and what you see as the most urgent priorities? Thank you, Scott. Good to be here. I think when Biden made that announcement, that was in my view the end of the peace process and the Taliban literally waited for that moment to take over Afghanistan militarily, which happened on August 15th as we all watched and went through. But a lot has changed since then, right? I think the current power structure in Kabul looks like the Taliban feel that they had a military takeover instead of a political win. And the Hekhanis are way more powerful than the rest. That means that they are thinking that this was such a big success for them. And it does not necessarily, I think, send good signals about a more moderate Taliban governance in the future, which needs to be seen. But also I think the Taliban should think whether they are better off now with the whole government, which lacks legitimacy, support, funding, compared to where they were on August 14th, where they were everywhere, I think. A lot of people were asking them to come back and be part of the government. And some negotiated settlement probably would have served them better as well, which didn't happen. I don't know if we're interested to go into the details of what happened. But I think the political situation at this stage, I don't think, is very promising. And some of the bad decisions the Taliban have made, which the paling, like girls are not allowed to go to school, and it's more than a month, I can't believe that there isn't enough outcry about that in the international community. On the economic front, I think we are on the verge of an economic catastrophe. I think more than half of the Afghans have no food security at this stage. I think five million kids are facing acute malnutrition. And there are, from what I see, that more than, I think, 60% of Afghans have no food reserves for winter, which is just across the corner. On security, I think Daesh is apparently becoming more and more dominant. They have conducted some quite strong attacks, high-profile attacks since the Taliban took over. The attacks on Shia targets in Kunduz and Kabul and Kandahar. And they attacked the other day on the military hospital. I think that's pretty alarming too. So I mean, Daesh is a whole, I think, different discussion also from a U.S. national security point of view, as they are pretty much interested on how to deal with it from a counterterrorism point of view. But I think one should ask at least a couple of questions on Daesh at this stage, that where Daesh is going? Is it a split group of the Taliban? And how Daesh's resurgence is really helping other groups, other international terrorist groups, to find space for them to operate in Afghanistan and threaten international security. We hear that crime is very much underreported in the country, if we still talk about security. So that's, we hear that a lot of kidnappings are happening throughout Afghanistan, in Kabul and in Herat as well. So I would say, but I mean, you said, you know, what has changed? I can't just be an analyst on Afghanistan. I mean, we're emotional about it, right? We have lost our country. I think lost the values that we believed in. Things like press freedom, for instance, that we're going to talk about. And I think we're quite sentimental about what has changed. I think it has changed our life for probably forever. Thanks for that. I want to get back to the legitimacy question in the discussion later. But let me ask a follow-up about press freedom. So Tolo being one of the largest news networks, the largest. What have the Taliban allowed or restricted in terms of Tolo's own reporting, but then more generally, there have been reports since the takeover of journalists being beaten. I think that's one of the freedoms that is most under threat. How would you characterize this state of play in terms of journalism and a free press right now? Well, the fact that we're able to operate, so that's a good thing. But it doesn't mean we're not under tremendous pressure. Music is largely banned. Liberal drama series are no longer on air. Objective reporting is almost not there or isn't there as much as we wanted to be. There were some instructions given to the media in the early days by the Taliban, but a lot of self-censorship happened in the early days of Taliban takeover, which they did not provide further clarity on what their positions are. But they're certainly enjoying and appreciating the fact that they are not getting enough criticism. Let's say, to give you an example, Rani appointed this interior minister who was not a very successful governor in so many provinces, I think, last year. And then there was so much scrutiny on this almost unknown guy. But look at the interior minister of today. How much reporting we see on him. So when you talk about objective journalism and reporting, I would say there is in space to do much. But we shouldn't forget that media is still there. There are hundreds of journalists who have bravely chosen to stay behind and continue their work. We should be grateful to them and for their work. And we are getting a lot of information out of Afghanistan, Scott. If you look at Taliban's governance and behavior, there has been way more reporting and documentation in the past 80 days compared to their five years when they were last time around. And that is because of social media. That is because of so many journalists who are not just in Kabul, but throughout the country. Thanks. And I want to also turn back to what effect does that scrutiny have. But let me hear from the other panelists. You're an elected member of parliament. You have thousands of constituents in Herat. What are you hearing from them about the conditions they're facing? Thank you so much. Thank you, Yusip, for holding this event. And I'm so glad I'm sharing the panel with the distinguished panelists. So I'm speaking here before you and before everyone. It's still in the shock that Afghanistan has fallen under Taliban control. And Al Qaeda and Haqqani network are really active in Afghanistan. And when I see back to my 20 years of political endeavor, I see a complete erosion of whatever I have done and so many of us done in Afghanistan. And when I see back to my constituency to Afghanistan and to Herat, I see the core of civilization of Afghanistan, which is Herat, is ruling by barbarism, ruling by savagery. And this is very unfortunate. I want to start by giving an introduction of the situation then through that we can understand what happened and we can conclude our findings. You know, with Taliban takeover Afghanistan and entered Kabul, they said all the right things. They said that they have no problem with girls' education. Women can resume their jobs. In terms of women right, they had no objection. They also said that they will give general amnesty to everyone, anyone who opposed them. And that was a very good thing, a very right thing. They also said that they will start consultation to form an inclusive government based on consultation and also consensus and have everyone reflect themselves in the government. But it took just a few days that they took back their words. In terms of women right, today is 48 days that women and girls of Afghanistan cannot participate in secondary and high school. Afghanistan is the only country that the government is behaving like that against their girls and their education system. In terms of women right and jobs, women could not resume their jobs and they cannot work. In terms of inclusivity of the government, you see a highly fragmented, de facto structure, very loose group of all Taliban, all male-dominated structure that does not reflect diversity at all, even among Taliban themselves. In terms of amnesty, you see extra judiciary killings. You see public execution in my city. You see forced displacement. You see so many atrocities against women. I call the situation against women a gender appetite that is going on against women of Afghanistan. And in terms of human rights and values for the democratic values of Afghanistan, you see media outlets, most of media outlets are shut down or they cannot operate freely, freedom of speech, freedom of idea are shut down and there are a lot of restriction against that. And I think Taliban were smart at the beginning because they knew that the world is watching them, but they changed their world because they wanted to keep their soldiers and food soldiers in line and united and to make them integrated into this Taliban circle because the Taliban's food soldier would question their leaders that what was the reason we fought for 20 years that women have all this freedom, then they would join other terrorist groups like ISIS and the Taliban would lose all those food soldiers. That would be one of the reasons. But there are other reasons as well. I don't want to go to the details. And what people are thinking, what women are thinking, how they are reacting to the situation, I would say that women of Afghanistan and people of Afghanistan and people of my constituency feel abandoned, feel betrayed by their politicians, they feel that they have a devastated situation, miserable situation, economically, politically. And you know what? Majority of the people I know, they want to fill Afghanistan. They want to get out. They don't want to live because they don't see a clear future for themselves and their families and their children in that country. And that's really unfortunate. You know, when we talk about the Taliban and other terrorist groups, Afghan people have a picture that portrayed by the war to them that these are terrorists. And now all of them are ruling the country. How would you feel living under that kind of government? Not good. Thank you. Steve, let me ask you a question from the international perspective, having served with the UN. The region, on the one hand, I think was generally uncomfortable with the US troop presence there, the immediate neighbors and some regional powers. On the other hand, now we have a situation that's been described that's quite dire for inside the country. And they're facing pressures of economic collapse, refugee flows, terrorist flows, narcotics. It's not a pretty picture for the region. What's your assessment of their attitude generally toward the takeover? And what is the region prepared to do to mitigate some of the risks that have been described here? Thanks, Scott. Thank you, Yusip, and thank you for wanting to do fellow panelists. I think the region perhaps made some strategic miscalculations in the course of the last 12 months or so. I think that the United States, President Trump, and then President Biden, the administrations had made it quite clear that it was the US intention to leave, and efforts were made by Ambassador Khalzad to try and get some form of regional consensus and regional support for the future of Afghanistan. And various fora were held, the Troika, the Troika Plus, Moscow meetings, meetings in Tehran. There were various attempts to get some form of regional unity. The United Nations Secretary General appointed his personal envoy, John R. No, to try and see if the region would come together. And I think the Americans had tried to make it quite clear that basically a burden would fall upon the region and that this was not America's backyard and was going to become a regional problem. But I fear that the region did not believe that the Americans would actually leave and that they misjudged that Afghanistan was of such key strategic interest to the United States, having bases near Iran, near China, near the Central Asian Republics was very important for America, so they would never actually leave. So I think Biden's announcement that they were going in quite a short time did cause problems. And as you alluded to, some of the neighbors or perhaps some organizations among some of the neighbors and some of the near region had been actively working to promote the Taliban and to put the Americans under pressure. And now they are perhaps worried that they are going to sort of reap what they have sown. And the Russians in particular have always been very concerned about the flow of narcotics and terrorism through the Central Asian states and into Russia. And Pakistan in Iran, who have nobly hosted millions of Afghan refugees, unfortunately for them, for the last 40 years, are worried that the refugee flows will start coming back into their countries as opposed to when there was hope in the country. As you mentioned, I think the big problem is that people have no hope now, so people will want to leave. So the refugee flows are likely to go out again to Iran and to Pakistan. So I think it is a problem. The Moscow meeting tried to lay the blame, if you like, on the United States and the Western contributing powers and said, you must pay for all this still going forward, which is clearly not going to be the case. But there is a chance for some multilateralism. Perhaps there should be a chance for concerned countries to come together to work together. It's difficult for Iran and the United States, obviously, for other reasons. But one would hope that people can come together to provide more of a multilateral approach to the issues around Afghanistan. I'm not optimistic. There are lots of other issues that divide the various key players, Pakistan, India, United States, Russia, United States, China, Iran, United States. So there's various problems that will make that less than comfortable for countries and less than easy. But I do think that the region and the rest of the world need to come together to try and help solve the problems. I think that the Taliban also miscalculated the regional response. They had been emboldened by the outreach from neighbors, other countries, to them. And I think they felt that China, in particular, was the economic superpower, would be stepping in with aid when the West stepped out. China so far has given some humanitarian aid, but it hasn't shown any real interest in major infrastructure investment. They're worried about the stability. They're worried about the links to the Uighur terrorist movement as they would see it. And so I think that the region has also been cautious. And the Taliban were expecting more engagement from the region, more recognition, perhaps, maybe even official recognition. But the recent visits and the comments out of Moscow and other places, Tehran, have been quite clear that the region also wants to see some form of inclusive government and an end to terrorism and are concerned about narcotics and refugee flows. So I think that the Taliban will need to do more with the region, and the region will need to do more with the Taliban, and the world will need to do more with the Taliban to try and nudge them to behave in a better way and govern in a better way in a more inclusive way. It seems like there's a pretty big math problem between roughly $7 billion in assistance that were given militarily civilian aid by the US and the West. And then you have that matched with very low regional promises of humanitarian aid and no military development support. Yes, I mean, there's a lot of humanitarian aid has been pledged, as you mentioned. There is a big conference run by United Nations, Ocha, on 13 September, and over a billion dollars was pledged for humanitarian aid. But I think we need to remember, even at the start of the year, there was a humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan. It's not been caused by, in a sense, the Taliban, but it has been exacerbated by events during the course of this year. At the start of the year, all the fighting was causing problems with food insecurity, displacement, and such like. Now there's perhaps better security, so there's more access for humanitarians to go around the country. But there is still huge issues. The economy is collapsing, as people have said. So livelihoods, lives, the ability to plant crops, people returning to power has been a big problem. So Food and Agriculture Organization were bringing in crops and bringing seeds desperately as soon as they could in order to people to plant before winter. But there is a big humanitarian crisis coming, definitely. And then, as you say, the economy. There is economic activity. The Taliban are still able to raise revenue from the customs, the border posts, but it's significantly down on what there was previously. And I think because, as Lot Fuller alluded to, there was no proper handover, and it was always, we know, chaotic. The Taliban, there's no plan. What's the plan? How will the Taliban be using the revenues they do get? Is there a plan? Is there a budget that they can put together? I think they need outside help on that. They asked for help from Pakistan, or Pakistan's very offered help for public financial management, which the Taliban turned down. But it does strike me that they could do with some help. They're not quite there with governing. Had there been a proper handover, and not this chaos of evacuation and such like, then they would have come in perhaps and been the ministers and deputy ministers, and underneath them, there may have been a functioning civil service. When I went around the various ministries in the last few months, there were a lot of them were quite deserted. And a lot of civil servants were not there. Some had fled. Some weren't coming to work because they weren't sure they were going to be paid. Some were worried about retribution. So some of the ministers are functioning better than others, but I think they need some help with governing, but are they prepared to accept that help? Or are they concerned it will come with too many conditions, particularly on the financial side? The constant call is for the unfreezing of assets that are currently frozen and things, but this is not going to be unconditional, I feel, from particularly Western governments, on things like women's education, representative government. There's not really any sheers in the government. There's very few tactics, very few turquoise and such like. So I think people will have expectations in the Taliban about how their government is formed and how it operates in order for them to release more money to help stimulate the economic situation. Thanks, let me ask each of you, Nahid. I think you mentioned factionalism within the Taliban. They're not monolithic. I wonder if you can elaborate a little bit on the divisions you see within the Taliban, maybe on a spectrum of conservatism to reform. And I'm interested in the other panelists after that. Yeah, in terms of Taliban themselves, you know, they could not come to a consensus yet. As we know, there are different fragmentation among Taliban that have different ideas. And you know, the withdrawal announcement and also the escape of President Ali from Afghanistan through a hot potato in hand of Taliban. And they don't know how to deal with that. And therefore they were not ready for that. So the political situation and the crisis that we have and the lack of direct cash payment and the economic problem and the humanitarian crisis, all of them are factors that affect the political fragmentation in Afghanistan, especially in terms of Taliban. As I told you, they wanna leave the government, sorry, they wanna form the government in a very loose way to keep their status quo, you know, to keep everyone integrated, to keep the picture. But there are a lot of killings among themselves. As you see that they kill each other because there was no structure how to manage this country. Taliban can be defined through gangs, through violence, through fear, but they cannot be defined through delivering basic needs, delivering governance by proficiency and expertise. And that's why we have this situation. Lofilo, can I ask you the same question, but also maybe add the element of ISIS that you mentioned there have been these spectacular attacks. They have their own agenda, but I think there's also been discussion about them being an outlet for Taliban that don't think the Taliban government is going far enough. So not only how do you see Taliban unity, but also how do you see other terrorist groups capitalizing on any disunity? Well, when you talk about unity in Afghanistan, you always have issues no matter who run Kabul or the government, I think. But the Taliban, I think, the Taliban probably did not predict or they were not ready to be the sole player in the field and probably in a ghost field. They were thinking that there might be Americans paying for this, Norwegians paying for that, Germans doing this. And like the previous governments, they would just sit and enjoy. I think now their biggest difference is on how to survive and what governance model will help them survive. I think there are some significant differences among the Taliban leadership. It started from the very early days, even with flags, but other was meeting people, he was keeping both flags. When others were meeting officials, they were removing the Republic flag. And then we realized as we moved forward after August 15, that the security establishment of the Taliban or the military wing to be in particular, I think they were pretty dominant in what they wanted. And apparently the message is from the very top leadership coming from Hebatullah. It's not very reconciliatory as we hear. On Daesh, I think Daesh is a threat. Is it threat to the Taliban? Is it threat to the Afghan people, to minorities? Is it threat to the world? I wonder how the United States will find a way to work with the Taliban or at least have a counter-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan either from over the horizon or through other partners to deal with the threat of Daesh because as officials here have analyzed that they might be in a position to do something or at least plan to actually think about it in a matter of six months. Thanks, Steve. I'm curious at your perspective on this, particularly having observed the Doha talks. So you must be familiar with the Doha negotiating faction. How do you see their role in now the Taliban government and what's your take on the factional differences between different groups? I think, obviously, if you like, those engaging in Doha will perhaps some of the more, you might say, moderate or use a friendly sort of members of the Taliban movement in including the members of the Haqqani group that were present in Doha. I think that, I mean, they haven't moved on from being an insurgency movement to being a government really is one of the problems. Insurgencies tend to prioritize unity over everything else and we have seen, and it's not unexpected, when the government was had to be thrown together at short notice, there were arguments and disputes between the various groupings where they want to call it the Kandahari Taliban, the Hulmandi Taliban, the Haqqanis, the Northern Taliban, non-Pashtian-type Taliban and there were various groupings vying for power or arguing over positions. I think one of the reasons they didn't move for inclusive government was they were too busy trying to sort out their own internal differences at that stage as well. And so, again, these things happen in any sort of formation of a cabinet or a government, people are after positions. But they also, that means they have not made, if you like, difficult or controversial decisions as far as the internal unity of their movement is concerned. So letting all women go to work, all girls to be educated is within their movement, seen quite controversial by some people. And some people have argued that if we make that decision, that will drive people towards Daesh, towards splinter groups, they will leave the mainstream Taliban movement. We hear, and Taliban commanders were telling me, that people were leaving the Taliban to go to Daesh because Daesh were paying people, were paying fighters, whereas the Taliban don't really have any money to pay fighters. So, they, Daesh are allegedly offering to pay fighters. Now, I'm not sure where Daesh is getting that money from, if it's true, it could be like the early days of Daesh where they promised a lot and then people went to them and they found there was nothing, so they came back to the Taliban. So it may be, we'll see the same again, that this money won't be coming forthcoming. But I think the Taliban are still very concerned about that split in the movement. And therefore, are being cautious in their decisions. Haibatullah came out with a, comments overnight or whatever on his things, to be aware of infiltrators into the movement. I mean, clearly unity remains a key issue for them. And that limits their, perhaps they're some of their decision-making and their ability to govern at the moment, because they haven't taken that step away from unity against the Kabul administration, as they would call it in President Ghani, into actually governing themselves. I want to come back to the legitimacy question. So, Taliban took over by force. There wasn't a negotiated settlement. Right. He, as mentioned, you're actually elected. You have a constituency. Democracy obviously is not a priority of the Taliban. But how do you see them gaining legitimacy? How big is the legitimacy problem for their ability to govern? And I say that also noting, technically they've said this is an interim government that they formed. Is there any plan for a permanent one? And does that involve the Afghan people? Well, regarding the interim government, the Taliban in 90s, the whole time, they had interim government. They didn't change it to a permanent government, because as I told you, they want to keep this as a transition for a long time, as they want to keep this status quo. And on terms of legitimacy, yes, parliament got the vote from the people of Afghanistan. People of Afghanistan deserve our representation at this greatest time of need. Although the Taliban shut down the parliament building, that doesn't mean that our representation is over. That's why I think this is the time that we have to represent other people's concern and pains and problems. And regarding the legitimacy of Taliban, Taliban are begging for legitimacy. And I think that's a very big leverage that the world can use as a catalyst against Taliban to set benchmarks, to set criterias, to safeguard the inclusivity, and to form the government that the people of Afghanistan deserve, not the government that has been taken by force or by violence or by conspiracy. That's the issue that we have to keep in mind that the world will decide what the prospect of Afghanistan, the future, the way that they engage with Taliban is very, very, very vital and important. If the world just look away, the situation in terms of human rights and democracy will be deteriorated. If the world wanna help people of Afghanistan, women of Afghanistan, minorities, different ethnicities of Afghanistan, they should set terms and conditions and conditionalities, even in aid delivery to Afghan people. There has to be terms. One of the terms should be that, I hate the term that they use women of Afghanistan as victims and use women of Afghanistan as beneficiaries only. Women of Afghanistan should be part of this aid delivery. They should be a condition by the word that if Taliban want those aid and want those engagement, not the legitimacy, engagement with them, they have to accept that women should be part of any humanitarian delivery, planning, designing, implementation of all this aid that goes to Afghanistan. I'm so upset when I see even international community, when they start engaging with Taliban, they don't have women in their delegation. That means you're giving up to Taliban. Taliban do not recognize women, but women are the leaders. We prove to the world that we are capable of so many activities and we could become agents of change for that country. And when the world recognized Taliban's belief against women, just imagine how women are feeling. What's your view on this? I don't think the world is rushing to recognize the Taliban. I think some of the early steps taken by the Taliban basically distance them from the international community. What I see in places like Washington DC, I don't think that there is enough appetite to even directly engage with the Taliban on anything but evacuation and counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance. Even there are a lot of questions around how to deliver those aids, which dollars should not end up in Taliban's pockets. I think even the region, I would say, I was in the early days, I was expecting at least China and Pakistan, probably, and Qatar, maybe. And then in second stage Russia to recognize the Taliban or at least have probably Turkey too. But now it seems to be, and the Taliban seems to be quite far from that. So they are no embassy, no Afghan embassy, anywhere in the world, even in Pakistan, I would say, even in Qatar have not established meaningful contact with the Taliban, with the Taliban's foreign ministry. So they are cut from the rest of the world, they're cut off. It's an isolated state. And I think they are suffering and most importantly, the people are suffering. So let me ask one other round of questions and then we'll go to audience questions. Still with you, LaFoula. So we've heard about the lack of legitimacy domestically. The Asia Foundation had a long running survey that always put Taliban approval ratings or popularity at around 5%. Right. They are in charge now. What do you see as the consequence of dissatisfaction by Afghans with Taliban rule, which include a failed economy as well as rollback of rights? Is there a domestic, sources of domestic pressure that can cause the Taliban to change their policies to reform? And also, in addition to the Afghan people, where do you see other opportunities to have the Taliban reform its more conservative policies? I think we're talking about future scenarios. I would say how the Taliban would change, I don't know. But if there are pressures, it wouldn't decide, yes. Look at these women groups who go out and protest. They might be small in numbers, but it has a lot of meaning. In a country where your president is flat, there are girls who go out and protest in the face of the Taliban and express their views and demand their rights. That means that the women empowerment in the past 20 years was something in the country. That was meaningful. And they still do that. We are probably, they're the only group in Afghanistan who are challenging the Taliban in their own small way. But I think that means a lot. We shouldn't just look into numbers of those people who go to the streets, their messages and the determination. The approval rating for the Taliban was never more than 10, 15% for any pro-Taliban study that we've ever seen in the past 20 years. Even I think around April, May that we were looking into studies, 70%, 80% of Afghans wanted democracy and republic system. So there is that will. The question is how to turn that will into a force. I think that will take time. I don't think the Taliban will go anywhere in the near future. At least not in a matter of months, if not years. So the will for change is there in the public. But don't forget, Scott, that this country is going through conflict for, you know, three, four decades, five decades now. And people are tired, especially how they feel about the Taliban, and the Taliban was never this powerful. Probably militarily Taliban are way more powerful than some of our neighbors, in terms of, you know, their access to ammunition and military equipment and all. So then if the Taliban don't change, I think the question is if the Taliban don't change for better in the coming year or two, what will happen? Well, either they become more heart-liner, which we see signs of it. And then that will raise the question of international terrorism, and that will raise the questions of international engagement again, in one way or another. Or the Taliban fail to govern where then you will start seeing pockets of, I think, I hate the word resistance, because it's very politically loaded, but some uprising, it doesn't have to be, you know, through the same, you know, I think, old vault guards. But, you know, there might be more uprising in the coming months or so. And then how that will lead into a full-scale civil war is another question of time. How big of a factor do you think ethnic exclusion of the Taliban is in these movements that might arise? The Taliban have, what, one or two ethnic minorities in a cabinet of almost 30. Right. I think that they have been very honest with the Afghan people about who they are, which is pretty good. And the rest of the Afghan people, I would say, along ethnic lines and also, you know, ideological lines, they have, they are excluded, you know, even, I mean, as you said, forget about other ethnicities, I don't think the Taliban or even Taliban inclusive, you know, the current structure that they have. So, I don't think that, you know, you will, because any sorts of uprising or armed resistance, you know, might need some sort of regional understanding and help. Probably a lot of people are, you know, giving Taliban a few more months to see how they would change. Thanks. What opportunities do you see for particularly domestic pressure on the Taliban? How can the worst of their behaviors be moderated? So, you know, the day that Taliban entered Kabul and Afghanistan fell under the Taliban control completely, I lost my hope completely. But the day I saw women and young generation holding the flag of Afghanistan, opened their chest to the bullets of Taliban and shouting in the streets of Kabul and Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, I regained my hope. I regained my hope and I'm so hopeful. And I'm sure the people of Afghanistan will retake their freedom, but they need the solidarity of the world with them. And this is very crucial. We are at the greatest time of the need of the people of Afghanistan in terms of establishing the government we want and we deserve the dignity we want and we deserve the freedom, the prosperity the people of Afghanistan deserve. And no matter how many other terrorist group will build their safe haven in Afghanistan, and people of Afghanistan don't want to be defined as a nation of terrorists. And therefore, they will continue this resistance as Lutfullah mentioned. A small group of women come to the street, but that is so meaningful, so meaningful, because they were being beaten. There is no media outlet to report. But no matter if they come out and they shout and they want to take their freedom. In terms of Taliban's way of controlling Afghanistan, I would translate it into hostage. They hostage 30 millions of people of Afghanistan. And this hostage operation will finish one day. Thank you. Steve, let me ask you a version of that. And particularly I'm interested in where you see opportunities for international pressure. And how do you see U.S. leverage in all of this now that troops are gone? You know, significantly diminished. But I mean, I think it partly comes back to the legitimacy question rather than recognition per se, because I agree with Lutfullah that recognition is probably somewhere away. But I mean, there's different types of legitimacy. I think, firstly, they need to be, they feel they're legitimate within their own organization almost. The Taliban, you know, is the government legitimate? Is it representative of the Taliban? Do its own supporters, if you like, support it? In which case there is then contrast, because obviously a number of them feel that it should be a much more religious society, organization, the only people who are entitled to vote or, you know, are people with sufficient age and religious qualifications, which rules out 90% of the population, certainly, you know, all the women. And so, you know, they've got their own internal legitimacy, which they are very concerned about as part of the unity idea. And then there's the domestic unity. And I know former President Karzai, who I saw a couple of times recently, was quite strong on this, that, you know, people expect things. Now, the people of Afghanistan, it's a lot like the 90s, where there was a great relief when the Taliban took over, because they established some sort of security, stopped the warlord squabbling. But now, in the last 20 years, as people have talked about, you know, the Afghan people have come to expect to service delivery, human rights, press freedoms, various things, civil society, flourishing. And, you know, the Taliban somehow need to listen to the people. So what would hope is they grow more confident, if you like, as the longer they're in power, perhaps, then they will find a way of reaching out to the people, you know, certainly not through elections, but maybe through some forms of Jirga's consultative process. I know some MPs who are still in the country have been talking about trying to form some sort of parliament again, you know, using existing MPs as some sort of expression of the will of the people, you know, President Karzai's talked about the need to hold some form of lawyer Jirga to get some blessing. And I think without that, legitimacy of some expression of the wishes of the people, then the international recognition and the international legitimacy will be severely lacking. And even if they do that, a lot of the international legitimacy won't exist until girls are back at school, women are back at work, the press remains reasonably free and such like. So I think they're going to continue to struggle on that. I don't think they're going anywhere fast. I think that my concern is the situation just continues to spiral down. There's no real appetite for fighting from most people, you know, there's been enough fighting and I don't see, you know, resistance movements in that sense coming in militarily for a civil war instantly. I worry that as the economic situation deteriorates, the competition for resources, scarce resources will get more and more. We've already, I've already referred to kidnapping. I mean, money is scarce, so people are kidnapping for ransom. You know, if they see a rich businessman still around, they'll kidnap his family or whatever. You can see fragmentation on that ground that communities that are near customs posts, near border crossings, near mines, near forests, et cetera, will try to take control of the resources in their area of their region. And I can say that that's a threat. I see that the Taliban will have to deal with it. And that could lead to renewed tensions and fighting. Thanks. Let's turn to the audience questions. Again, you can type your questions into the chat feature that's on the USIP broadcast on their homepage. And let me take the next question. Doug Brooks asks, can the participants discuss the factions inside the Taliban? We talked about that a little bit. Maybe I don't know who would be best to give a bit more detail. How do you see that playing out over the coming months and will amount to a crisis or will the Taliban self-repair? Nahid? I just want to refer to the cabinet that the Taliban announced. The majority is dominant by Haqqani network. Most important ministers like interior minister of virtue are under Haqqani network. And I think that's the dominant group on network that is dealing with the governance in Afghanistan. And that means what they want to do in Afghanistan. They don't want to deliver. They don't want to bring basic services to the people. They want to establish their network and safe haven in Afghanistan. Yeah, I mean, I think I've touched upon it, but briefly. So what is this personality differences, right? We know that some, probably some of the Helmandi Taliban, you know, they don't feel empowered enough. I don't know if they really took their positions that they were given to them. So that's one. But the second is, I agree with Steve, he said that the Taliban have, I think the biggest disagreement is how to transition from a military organization from an insurgency into a government. So I think probably they haven't found that solution. So that's why they have announced something as permanent temporary. Which God knows how long it's gonna take. Is it better for Afghans for the Taliban to be united or divided? Well, we need unity as a concept in the country. But I think we need, I mean, I don't think that really matters. I think what matters here is that we need the Taliban to come up with a governance model that the people can see the end of the road. I think that clarity is very much needed at this stage. Thanks. I'm gonna go through another one. Kate from Virginia is asking, what kind of direct engagement, if any, should the U.S. have with the Taliban government? And what is the likelihood that the U.S. can get from the Taliban government cooperation on any of the immediate objectives like security, humanitarian aid, counter-terrorism? We have no American representatives here. Steve, why don't I start with you for your perspective on that and welcome other views? So in, I think that the United States will struggle on most of those issues. I think on the humanitarian access and a cooperation on humanitarian issues, that's not a problem. The Taliban have offered and carried it through on their promises that they are very keen to see humanitarian access. They are keen to see all this money that was pledged in Geneva. The point they made very strongly to the United Nations was that they wanted to see this money reach the ordinary people of Afghanistan for humanitarian relief. They didn't expect it to come to the government. They didn't expect it to come to them. They didn't want it to be spent on expensive foreign salaries, headquarters of NGOs around the world or in Kabul. They wanted it to reach the ordinary people of Afghanistan. And certainly the lack of fighting, generally, has improved the ability of humanitarian organizations to reach parts of Afghanistan. Winter will be a different problem as always, but I think on the humanitarian access, that will be quite easy. I think on counter-terrorism, there's a real problem. The idea of doing over the horizon counter-terrorism, I mean, it's not effective. It's going to be so far over the horizon that it's gonna be even less effective. I think it was naive of the United States to think that the region would cooperate on counter-terrorism. We haven't seen any real splits between various factions of the Taliban and international terrorists, Al Qaeda. There was some meetings yesterday, I understand, between the Pakistani military and the TTP brokered by the Taliban, but that's an issue. ETIM, Islamic State, these various groupings continue to exist, coexist, Islamic movement with Pakistan. That's gonna be a problem, and I can't see constructive counter-terrorism cooperation between the United States and the Taliban happening. And human rights monitoring, the Taliban will say, there will be no human rights abuses because it's all gonna be very peaceful under the Islamic Emirate. And again, I see that as something that the Taliban will be reluctant to let the international community, not just the United States, but the United Nations. We've had a very strong, in the past, human rights presence in the United Nations. Whether that will be renewed in the next mandate of the United Nations remains to be seen. Certain powerful countries are against that. Humanitarian rights monitoring anyway, and points of principle. So I think that is going to be an issue. So I think on the humanitarian access side, lots of room for positive engagement on the rest of it, much less so. And this can happen without recognition, formal recognition, do you think? Yes, yes, yes, certainly. Any other views on the US-Selban relationship? Just wanted to add, to what Steve mentioned about the, can this happen without recognition of Taliban? The world recognized Afghanistan state with its 30 million of population. That's the reality. We have to keep this in mind. We have to remind the Taliban if the world wanna help Afghanistan, is that? Because of the people of Afghanistan. And we recognize, yes, we recognize Afghanistan, we recognize this geography, we recognize all the diversity inside of this geography as a country, as a nation, and that's why we are helping. When we are helping, no matter if Taliban are under sanction or the sanction is going to be expanded, people of Afghanistan have to have the world attention in this dire humanitarian crisis that we are facing. Before the fall of Kabul, an average Afghan was living in $1.90 per day. For the 7% of the population were living under the poverty line before the fall of Kabul. Half of the country was food insecure before the fall of Kabul. Imagine, how is the situation right now? We're after lack of direct cash payment, unprecedented unemployment, exiting, all the freezing of the banking system of Afghanistan. How is the situation right now? The sanction should not be a reason to freeze the humanitarian aid. There has to be a corridor, a trusted corridor that has to be established and by women and men of Afghanistan, civil society that they can't feel the gap, they can't feel the vacuum that Taliban in the abnormal government of Taliban created to deliver the basic needs to the people of Afghanistan. Any comments, sir? I think the U.S.-Taliban relationship, at least in some states, was pretty deep. And the U.S. didn't ask anyone if they wanted to talk to the Taliban. And they did that for four years. But I think the relationship should not be very addict-centric. It was a mistake that it was addict-centric during the previous administration here in Washington, D.C., as well as in Afghanistan. And it shouldn't be, I agree with Nahid, who said that we shouldn't focus only, we shouldn't see Taliban, Afghanistan, from the prism of Taliban only. There are millions of Afghans and others that the United States or the country, as a nation, should engage with. Thanks. Take another question. Jack from D.C. is asking, LaFoula and Nahid, do you have any insights on the changes in rural Afghanistan where the population is no longer facing indiscriminate air bombs, the rule of warlords, and for the first time in decades are able to travel freely? How has the situation changed for them? I'm not sure if that is entirely accurate, but to be very honest with you, I think it's good that probably there is less fighting because the Taliban are not fighting, but it doesn't mean that rural Afghanistan is this paradise all of a sudden. I think there is so much happening in rural Afghanistan and I can give you tons of examples, including security incidents, including killings. You want to talk about, it's been bulldack? That's rural Afghanistan, right? You want to talk about, well, villages around Mazar-e-Sharif? That's rural Afghanistan. So a lot is happening, but it's very good that less Afghans are dying, of course, but there are still a certain number of Afghans being killed. In terms of, we talked enough about, the economic situation and how people are facing, so it's not just the urbanites. I think the rural population is probably suffering, suffering even more. There is no money in the cities to buy their products. And I wonder, I mean, I've lived and grown up in rural Afghanistan, it's way more difficult. Yeah, I mean, we were kind of free when the Taliban were ruling in the 90s, going from one village to another, but we didn't have food. So Jack was right on the issue of suffering of people of Afghanistan before the fall of Afghanistan entirely under Taliban. Yes, people were suffering of insecurity and many other problems, but even right now, that very speaking, people are suffering from security, from economy shortage, from humanitarian crisis. And even if we have security, if that's the case that we have the security, we should distinguish between security and stability. Okay, even if we have ability to travel all over the country, that's not security. When you're not a stable, when you're a minority, when you're a woman, when you're not able to get out of Afghanistan, out of home without a main counterpart, that's not security, okay? And I'm talking on behalf of 55% of the population of Afghanistan and the majority that are women that are kept behind and the war should not look away. Let me go to Ann Tagdel. For how much longer do you think the Taliban can continue operating with this caretaker government? We talked about that a bit before. What possible consequences do you anticipate if they hold to the structure for too long? Do you see the Taliban inviting collaboration with experts from the Ghani government addressing the immediate and long-term concerns that they're not familiar with? So I think we talked a bit about the caretaker issue, but not as much about the capacity issue, so I welcome responses on both of those. Rahid, do you want to go? Well, I think I was on the second part of the question that whether you should join Ghani's team, I would probably not advise that. But I think, yeah, I mean, the Taliban can try to, again, I think I'm repeating myself. They are, their clarity about future governance will determine how long they will survive, how effective their government is gonna be. They have reached out to people, and there are, I think, some people from the previous government who are helping, let's say, in the Ministry of Finance, for instance, Deputy Minister, I see he's still around and helping the Taliban. But that's not enough. I think there is a severe capacity issue in governance, especially when you don't have a vision as an administration, as a government, then technocrats and technical capability cannot take you far. Right. Beside of the issue of expertise, there's also issue of morality. Many experts do not want to collaborate with a group of terrorists and decay. That's rural country by force and killed their loved ones for 20 years. Okay, that's also very important. We know a lot of people who are expertise, who resigned from the government and also the minister is like minister of higher education because a terrorist is the minister. Okay, as simple as that. That's also one of the issue that many may not work with Taliban because of the morality. See, I would agree with both those comments. A number of Afghans said to me they were prepared to work with the government or the new government, the new de facto authorities, not for them, but they were prepared to work with them for the benefit of the Afghan people. If you go to the ministries, it varies how many civil servants are working. Some are better than others in terms of ministry of finance, ministry of foreign affairs and such like we're all quite well staffed when we were there with many of the former civil servants working. The Taliban have some brighter, younger members who've studied in universities around the Middle East and the region. So they have a limited capacity but I think they have insufficient capacity and defining their vision, as Lafouda said, and defining their policy, their plan for the way forward is something that I think they need help on, whether they want to acknowledge the fact that they need help, how bad the situation has to become before they are prepared to make some concessions and agree to some help and maybe even agree to change the policies. I think he's gonna be critical as to how long they will be able to govern without the country really being a disaster. I wonder just as a slight follow up, how much of a role can Afghan NGOs and civil society play? I mean, the health sector, even under the Ghani government, was implemented in rural areas largely by NGOs. There's now discussions about how to either pay teachers or pay health care workers directly rather than through the government. Is that a model? Do you see the Taliban allowing? Is that a way to avoid some of the capacity issues at the center? Okay. I'll go. So I think in the immediate short term, yes, the Taliban are prepared to allow that because they see the need to get money into the economy, to get health system operating, the education system operating and people to get paid. So I think in the short term, in the longer term, obviously any government wants to govern and wants the money to be coming through them and they will have the ability to hand out the resources as they see fit. The problem being that the donors and the Taliban government would have different views on what counts as priorities and such like. So for foreign donors, money for education is likely to be predicated upon goals going to school and university and such like. And in a number of areas, it's likely to be predicated upon women being able to work in those particular sectors. So there's going to be clashes. I think one of the problems with the chaotic evacuation process was that some of these top civil servants and effective NGOs have lost a good number of their excellent staff. So again, the NGOs and international NGOs have suffered capacity loss because of the events over the summer. But again, back to the initial point, had there been a smooth transfer of power available as hoping and an inclusive government, a lot of these problems might not have been happening. So I think they've been in trouble. In Afghanistan, last 10 years that I was representing in Afghanistan Parliament, there was always a debate of on-budget, off-budget budgets that has to be allocated for different projects. And most of the donor countries wanted to have this through off-budget because they wanted to have their own criteria to be imposed and implemented. So we have the system of off-budget that already is in place. Just there is one problem. I wanna ask from donor countries, will you fund education system that is only for boys? If you wanna do that, then you have to answer the taxpayers. The question, that's very fundamental issue. Let me go to Molly from Virginia who has a question for Steve. Reflecting on your interactions with the Taliban were good faith negotiations between the Taliban and the former government leading to a power sharing. Was that ever feasible? Were those talks going to bear fruit? If so, what could the U.S. and international community have done differently to facilitate more sustainable talks? How long have I got? No. I mean, so this is a subject of much debate. The Taliban, of course, as any good negotiators would do, said all the right things at the negotiating table and implied they were ready to make a deal, that they were not looking for monopoly of government and that they were, you know, prepared to share power and reach a peaceful handover. Now, of course, if you look at what actually happened, subsequently, with the benefit of hindsight, even when they took over, if they didn't want monopoly of power, they did have the ability still to appoint, you know, other people as ministers and such like. So that caused into question whether they were ever actually genuine about sharing power, perhaps. And also, at the same time, from our conversations over the last three or four years with non-negotiating team members of the Taliban, commanders and such like, it was quite clear that there was... The line was, we will achieve complete military victory. We will not share power. We will get rid of this government and we will take over. Now, that, of course, could have just been the propaganda for the military guys to keep encouraging them to fight. In the same way, you know, former President Ghani has come under criticism for not giving up anything, not being willing to form an inclusive government. Now, publicly, he was very hard-line and strong and said, the Taliban must join my government. I'm not giving up my government. Privately, he had said to a number of people, if it takes me stepping down for the Taliban to join the government and having any leader, that's fine, I'm prepared to do it. But again, his private line was different from his public line. I think the real thing that destroyed any chance of a successful conclusion to the intra-Afghan negotiations was when the two sets of negotiations were delinked, if you like, when the American Taliban negotiations ended up being completely delinked from progress in the intra-Afghan negotiations. If you remember, originally, you know, Marcel Khalilzad was talking about nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. And then, quite clearly, it became about the American withdrawal and that was time-bound, not then conditional upon anything to do with progress in the intra-Afghan negotiations. And that handed a great, you know, ability to the Taliban just to wait out. You know, there was that period of uncertainty after Biden was elected and Trump was no longer there as to whether, you know, President Biden would then extend the deadline in any way. But immediately, the announcement came, as Al-Fudda said, that Americans are going by a certain date. That was it, really, I think, for the negotiations. So a lot of things could have been done differently at various points, but that wasn't what either of the two American administrations really wanted, they wanted out. And that sort of rather sealed the fate of the negotiations, I felt. So, Fila, you wanted to, you were hinting in your introductory remarks some what-ifs. Do you have any thoughts on this as well? Well, I think the Taliban were, well, some people say that the peace process was dead in Doha after the U.S. Taliban deal. And some people say, I might argue that the Taliban were still interested until Americans made that decision, you know, that we're gonna leave no matter what. But the Taliban were certainly given a lot of leverage, not just by the United States, but I think by the region as well. So they were empowered in the sense that they did not believe much in the inter-Afghan talks. We didn't talk much about, you know, although Steve touched upon the willingness in Kabul about a negotiated settlement. Kabul certainly, you know, could have played a much, much helpful role. I think that was very tragic to see, you know, what had happened. And particularly the last episode basically killed any last hope for an inclusive, a relatively inclusive or more inclusive than today's government. And we know that, you know, there were discussions in Doha about 13 ministries going to the Republic and, you know, some others going to the Taliban. And after two weeks of negotiations, well, probably not negotiations, but, you know, going through a checklist of, you know, transfer of power that President Karzai and Chief Executive Abdullah were planning to go. I think I was on the phone with Dr. Abdullah one day, I think on the 14th, that they were planning to leave the next day. So that last episode that Ghani decided to leave somehow, you know, gave the Taliban this space and resulted in anything, which, you know, we went through for the next two weeks. Thanks. We have time for one more question and I'll go to Talan who asks, what is the Taliban's capacity and will to protect vulnerable populations from ISK attacks? Furthermore, what is the nature of the risk of mass atrocities either by the Taliban or ISK specifically for ethnic minority groups? Nahid, do you want to answer that first? The Taliban showed that they don't have the capability to protect the people of Afghanistan and to protect the minorities, to protect mosques, to protect hospitals. You saw the attack yesterday in Jarsat-Bestar Hospital in Kabul that 25 people killed and that's the reality that is on the ground that the Taliban showed they cannot protect the people of Afghanistan from any threat, including ISK. I think we've always had, you know, accountability issues but now it's probably even worse. So when things happen, like journalists beaten and incidents happen, I don't think there is much of follow-up and explanation to why it happened, how it happened and what the Taliban are going to do to deal with it. So there isn't much of sort of a communication, you know, with the Taliban. Might be, you know, with those from the international community who meet with them, but I don't see much of that happening with the Afghan people. I'm less worried about the Taliban carrying out sort of ethnic atrocities in the sense but the fact that they do not include so many of the other ethnic groups in their government comes back to the accountability. You know, there's odd representatives, particularly of the Hazaras or the sheers in senior positions in government. There's a couple of respects, but there's very few Tajiks, Turkmens, you know, and other groups aren't well represented. Therefore, you know, there's a risk that such groups could be incredibly badly treated. There was a feeling among some of the Taliban in Doha that, for example, who commented privately that over the last 20 years, you know, the Hazaras have had far too much power and influence and done far too well under the Karzai and Ghani regimes and it was time they were sort of put back in their place. Now, that's not a positive, you know, sort of attitude to be holding and you see that, you know, we have one Hazara deputy minister of health who's a doctor, a technocratic sort of person. So unless you have a representative government, the underrepresented or non-representative groups are under more threat and more risk because they don't have a say in government and they're not seen to be part of the government. So I think there is a risk on that point of view. Islamic State is obviously, genuine Islamic State is clearly, you know, a law unto itself and completely barbaric and obviously has sectarian issues that it wishes to, you know, promote and so that is a definite risk, I think, to the Yashia population and, you know, the Sufis and others, you know, it's a problem. Thanks, I do see one more and it has the word hope in it. So let me rather end on that note and Jill Baggerman has a question for both Latfila and Nahid. From where do you see hope for the population to push for a more inclusive government, whether locally or nationally? I think, I think, I mean, I see hope in the society because that country has changed. I can't say Afghanistan, you know, is rolled back to 2001. I don't think that's a fair assessment. The country has changed. There are, you know, millions of Afghans who would like to see a more open democratic government and society, they may have a, you know, they may go through a bad chapter, but it doesn't mean that's, you know, that's going to be stuck with them for the rest of their lives. So I think the Afghan people, I mean, I have seen so many ups and downs and revolutions in my life for the past 30, 35 years. So God knows what's going to happen in the next five years, 10 years, you know, 20 years. So I think it's very important for the Afghan people not to give up hope. The society is way more engaging, way more vibrant than ever before. And I think that's the source of hope that I get from people I talk to on a daily basis. Tahir, you have the last word. One of the matters that keep the people of Afghanistan hopeful is the leverages that the world has against Taliban. The conditions that the world can put on an engagement with Taliban. Another issue is that I think that's also a hope of women of Afghanistan that engaging with Taliban is against international law. It's against international universal values. Okay, it's against women peace and security 1325. And the values that free world is practicing, that Taliban have to follow those values in order to get normal recognition from the world. Okay, that's another hope. And the third hope is, as I already mentioned and touched upon, women of Afghanistan are majority. Okay, they can change because they are the majority and they prove that they are capable of. Mute of Afghanistan are also majority. 70% of Afghan people are under the age of 35. They are all a majority. When the word asked that what is the alternative of Taliban, I would say the people of Afghanistan, the majority, okay, just they need some sort of help and solidarity to establish the government that they deserve. Thank you. Thank you all very much for a great discussion. Thank you for watching both the people here and those that are watching online. We hope to have more events soon talking about the Afghanistan situation.