 Let me, let me welcome all of you to come this afternoon to CSIS. When we have major events like this, we always begin with a little safety discussion because I am your responsible safety officer this afternoon. So if anything happens, you're going to listen to me and we're going to all be safe. We have our exits are right here in the front and we will go out and there's an emergency stairs on the side. We're going to go across the street to the Beacon Hotel and I'll buy drinks for everybody so just follow me and everybody will be just fine. Let me say a very hearty welcome to all of you. I'm very, very honored to have Komura Sensei with us today. This is an important opportunity for a previous foreign minister. Now the vice chairman of the LDP and leading a very important discussion inside Japan at a pivotal time and we're very fortunate to have him here and I'm most grateful that he would be with us this afternoon. This is the 21st meeting of the US Japan Security Seminar. This was a program that was started back in 1994, five I guess and it was really started by my colleagues Jim Kelly and Ralph Costa out at Pacific Forum in Honolulu. For many years we held it in San Francisco and they organized it and we all flew to San Francisco, many of our colleagues here. And this year because of this momentous visit on the part of Prime Minister Abe, we felt it would be better to hold it here in Washington to provide a background for these important discussions that are going to be coming with the Prime Minister's visit. So we welcome all of you and obviously Komura Sensei being here takes it to a much higher level and we're very grateful for that. And let me also say a very sincere welcome to Ambassador, Assistant Secretary Dave Shear, who is leading Asia policy in the Department of Defense. I understand that Komura Sensei and Secretary Ash Carter had a very good meeting this morning. And I think it's all part of the preparation that we have underway as we anticipate Prime Minister Abe's visit, which will be in April. This is a very important visit and for the first time the Prime Minister of Japan is being invited to speak to a joint session of Congress. And I think it is an emblem of how important this relationship now is. This pivotal relationship is just central for us as we think about security and safety in Asia. We're going to get into that today and it's going to be a great opportunity for all of us to be able to get insider's view of people who are making policy. And I think we're privileged for that. And so at this stage I would like to proceed with the program. And I would ask you to, with your applause, warmly welcome the Vice Chairman of the LDP, Foreign Minister Komura, please come to the stage. President of CSAs, Hammering, Japan Chair Green. Thank you for your kind introduction for me to speak today at this prestigious venue. Asia is on the cusp of a major transformation. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, Asia was at the center of the world economy and was a leading region for cutting edge technology. Since the late 18th century, the European powers made strong by the Industrial Revolution have led, dominated the world and led world history. But Asia now is once again riding a huge wave of globalization and is set to once again be at the crest of world history. Japan, based on the principle of international cooperation, is setting out proactive contributions to peace. And the US is setting out its rebounds to Asia. Both of these are indispensable to Asia's peace and prosperity. Our alliance will only become more important in the 21st century. Two years ago, Prime Minister Abe here at CSAs declared that Japan is back in a resounding manner. Getting back a strong Japan and strengthening the alliance and its deterrence, which is at the heart of our diplomacy and security, are indispensable. The Abe administration is fundamentally seeking to reform our security posture and strengthen our alliance. As the joints and backbones supporting the Asia Pacific in the 21st century, strengthening this alliance is in the interest of Japan, the US, the region and the world. Today, let me first touch on what I was deeply involved in through talks with our coalition partner, the new Komei To, that is to say the new interpretation of the constitution. Why was it necessary to reinterpret Article 9? Japan's constitution was drafted by GHQ in 1946, February. Its supreme commander was that famous general MacArthur. This war had been over for barely half a year. I don't think there were many people who were able to read the signs of becoming Cold War. Japan's constitution was drafted a month before Churchill's famous Iron Curtain speech in Missouri, and two years before the opening gong sounded of the Cold War, that is to say the Berlin blockade. General MacArthur proposed the draft to the Japanese people that stipulated the renunciation of war. This line of thinking was the same as that of the UN Charter, which had been adopted in San Francisco in June of 1945 before the defeat of Japan. Neither was it an entirely novel concept to the people of Japan. Japan was a signatory in 1928 to the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war, named for the US Secretary of State and French Foreign Minister that advocated it. Japan was also a permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations, but the League of Nations was powerless. With the birth of the UN, the people of Japan thought that at last, humanity's ideal of the renunciation of war was being realized. In General MacArthur's draft, it was also stipulated that Japan would be completely and permanently disarmed. Land, sea and air forces and other war potential shall not be maintained. The right of belligency of the state is not recognized. This article 9 paragraph 2 is so radical and a very harsh measure. At the time, no one knew how well the UN would function, but Prime Minister Yoshida, in spite of this, decided to present the draft constitution to the last imperial diet. And he declared in doing so that Japan would henceforth depend on the United Nations and renounce wars even for the purpose of self-defense. In 1947, the following year, the Japanese constitution came into force. However, after the Berlin blockade, East-West confrontation became definitive, and the world entered the turbulent era of the Cold War, which became hot on the Korean Peninsula. In 1950, North Korea had a Blitzkrieg invasion of the South, temporarily scattering the occupying U.S. forces. And the UN spectacularly failed to function. General MacArthur reversed the situation with his Incheon landing, but with China's entry into the war, the situation became a stalemate. It was during this time that General MacArthur decided to rearm Japan. But the Japanese constitution was very difficult to amend, requiring two-thirds majorities in both houses of the diet and approval in a referendum. In 1952, Japan regained sovereignty, but the Korean War was still not over. The Japanese government in 1954 founded the ground, air, and maritime self-defense forces. A year after that, the LDP was formed. The LDP protected the fledgling self-defense forces, and has continued to do so, along with the U.S.-Japan alliance, to the present day. Without the decisions made by those politicians of the time, we would not have the self-defense forces, we would not have the U.S.-Japan alliance, nor do I think would we have had the post-war peace and prosperity of Japan. Japanese of today ought to be deeply grateful to the hard decisions made by the Japanese politicians of that era. But, re-arming Japan split Japanese public opinion. There were many that supported creating the self-defense forces, but many, on the other hand, feared a return to militarism and claimed the ideal of complete disarmament as their own. People that turned their back on the grim reality of the start of the Cold War began to engage in unrealistic ideals, such as complete disarmament and neutrality. This played into the interests of the Soviet Union. They began to claim that the self-defense forces and the U.S. forces of Japan were unconstitutional. It was the grand bench of the Supreme Court in the Sunakawa case of 1959 that put an end to this argument constitutionally. The court ruled that the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not unconstitutional. The court did not stop there. On Article 9, they stated it was... they made an important mention of it. The court said that it was promulgated with a sincere desire for lasting peace by the people of Japan who, as a result of the defeat of our country and reflecting upon the errors of militaristic activities committed by the government in the past, have firmly resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of the government. Then the court went on. On Article 9, paragraph 2, the court stated that certainly there is nothing in it which would deny the right of self-defense inherent in our nation as a sovereign power. The pacifism advocated in our constitution was never intended to mean defenselessness or non-resistance. In view of this, it is only natural for our country in the exercise of power's inherent in a state to maintain peace and security to take whatever measures may be necessary for self-defense and to preserve its very existence. Further, the court wisely stated that regarding highly political issues, having an extremely serious bearing upon the existence of the state, such as the management of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the court would respect a high degree of political discretionary judgment on the part of the cabinet and the diet. Thus, they left it up to the cabinet and the diet to flesh out Japan's security policy. It was only the Supreme Court that could bring the argument back to the basic point of constitutionalism, that is to say protecting the sovereign people and protecting the existence of the state and to set out an interpretation that would in the end allow for the exercise of the right to self-defense. Only the court had the authority to establish such an interpretation. As a consequence, the cabinet and the diet have shaped Japan's security policy. Since my youth, I have wondered about the limit of this Supreme Court interpretation. Is it limited to individual self-defense, ISD, or does it include collective self-defense, CSD? Answering that question requires one to constantly bear in mind that the legal principles of the Constitution actually protect the people of Japan and the state. It also has to be treated as a real security problem. Answering the question also requires deep insight into security policy in both its military and diplomatic aspects, deep insight into international law and deep insight into the Constitution. If one is obsessed with constitutional theory, one runs the risk of empty talk that neglects the security of the people. On the other hand, if one focuses only on security policy, one runs the risk of sliding the Constitution. As a practical matter, the government of Japan has few human resources that are amply versed in all of these specialized fields. As for myself, I am one of the few in Japanese politics to be an expert in the law. I have twice been Foreign Minister, once Defense Minister. Also, I was responsible for deliberations on the diet for the Sayasu J. Law, the law on situations in areas surrounding Japan as Foreign Minister. Thus, whether I liked it or not, I have gained a lot of experience treating serious issues at the intersection of military affairs, diplomacy, security, international law, and the Constitution. For a long time, I have constantly had to think about how to harmonize the need for effective policy protecting Japan's peace and security with the limits of Japan's Constitution. The Constitution says that sovereign power resides in the people. The Constitution is a basic contract between the people and the government to ensure their own survival. An interpretation of the Constitution that harms the survival of the people is inadmissible. Prime Minister Abe shares this strong conviction, which is what led to our recent interpretation. Article 9 is designed to protect the people from the horrors of war. The theological debate that neglects the security of the people is inadmissible. First of all, one has to come face-to-face with the tough security, strategic environment that Japan faces. For many years, North Korea has pursued the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. A half-century ago, during the Korean War, Japan was not exposed to the threat of the North Korean army. But now, it's said that more than 200 Nodong missiles have nearly all of Japan's territory within their range. North Korea continues to seek the possession of chemical and biological weapons and the miniaturization of nuclear weapons. Japan started missile defense in earnest in the late 90s, but missile defense alone does not provide for the complete defense of defense. If there were a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. would use Japanese bases to fight on the peninsula, and North Korea would fire missiles at Japan. If there were another crisis in North Korea, there could be tremendous damage to Japan. Our deterrence must be so strong that they are dissuaded from firing even a single Nodong missile. As I mentioned earlier, the re-arming Japan in the 1950s split public opinion. However, the verdict of history is clearly on the side of those who gave importance to deterrence. The current strategic environment shows clearly that the U.S.-Japan alliance must be further strengthened and also its deterrence. In considering Japan's peace and security, one has to touch on relations with neighboring countries. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the normalization of relations with the ROK. Improvement in relations is desirable. For Japan, the ROK is an important neighbor. It has developed its way to be one of the 15 top economies in the world. It has a top-size army for Northeast Asia and is a trusted ally of the United States. The times call for a new relationship between Japan and the ROK that gives due importance to the strategic significance of the relationship. Japan will persistently work toward this goal. Next on China, its rise is a historical inevitability. I am the president of the Japan-China Parliamentary Friendship League and I'm always thinking about how to build friendly relations with China. Recently, relations have soured and American friends often voiced their concern. But from normalization in 1972 until the 1990s, Japan and China were very close and voices of concern from America were rather concerned that Japan and China were too close. Even after the 1989 Tiananmen incident, Japan was the only country at the Houston G7 summit to oppose placing sanctions on China. No country cooperated more than Japan in terms of breaking the post-Chiananmen international isolation of China and getting China back on the right road to development. In 1992, His Majesty the Emperor visited China for the first time in history soon after enthronement. This represented a peak in Japan-China relations. After Tiananmen, the Cold War ended, the Communist world imploded and the CCP began to seek legitimacy for its rule in economic and social development. However, along with the growth of national power, nationalism grew in China. It was about this time that history issues began to become a constant problem in East Asia. In spite of this, during the Hu Jintao era, it was agreed with the first Abe government to build a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic objectives. This was about not just bilateral cooperation and friendship between the two peoples, but joint contribution to Asia and the world in a way that would expand mutual interests. Last year, President Xi Jinping affirmed that he would continue with the mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, which was inherited from the Hu Jintao era. Despite difficulties, Japan intends to go about building a mature relationship with China based on mutual strategic interests. I would like to see China become a country that follows the rules of free trade and that respects the rule of law as does Japan and be a partner with us in upholding the peace and prosperity of Asia. On the other hand, there are worrisome developments. China's opaque military buildup, its maritime advancement in the East and South China seas. For example, in 27 years, military spending in China has increased 40-fold. It's quadrupled over the past decade. In the South China Sea, they continue with land reclamation and runway construction, increasing tensions with the nations of ASEAN, such that these Chinese moves do not upset Asia's balance. The U.S.'s rebalance and friends of the U.S.'s rebalance are necessary. Candidate number one for this is no doubt your ally, Japan. Japan on its part must be prepared to support the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region along with the United States. There are many new challenges that confront us. Cyberspace and outer space are creating threats that didn't exist in the Cold War era. In today's world, where every problem is international, no one country can assure its own peace alone. We are sure our peace, our security and enjoy peace for the first time when we join hands with like-minded countries in terms of values and interests. This brings me back to the interpretation of the Constitution. The Japanese government founded the self-defense forces and said that ISD was constitutional, but until last year, somehow, interpreted CSD as being unconstitutional. If no one country can... If a single country could protect its own peace by itself, then one wouldn't need CSD. But no such country exists on the world. Even the US, a superpower, has built many friendships and alliances. For a country without the strength to protect its own peace, to renounce CSD, would mean that it might have to cast aside the security of its own people where an enemy stronger than itself to emerge. Now, I do not think that the Japanese Constitution, which is there to protect the people, calls on us to protect pacifism at the expense of the people. The Constitution is there to protect... It calls on us to protect the peace, not to protect pacifism at the expense of the people. If for the purpose of protecting the people and the existence of the state, then it is certainly right to exercise the right to CSD. If countries can only protect themselves by protecting one another, then certainly it's right for them to protect one another. Now, if we don't protect a certain foreign country, then let's say that the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of our own people might be fundamentally overturned. In such a case, even if we were not attacked ourselves, it would be permissible to use force to protect the foreign country. For example, let's say that there were a war that happened near Japan, and the sparks of war were about to fall on Japan, and if we did not protect U.S. naval vessels, along with the U.S., then the innovator might eventually invade Japan. In such a case, it is certainly right to try to put out the fire before the sparks fall on the main house. In 1972, the Japanese government outlined a constitutional interpretation based on the legal reasoning of the Sunakawa case. It was a simple argument that said that under complete disarmament, one could not protect the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of the people. Article 13 of the Constitution says that the right of the people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall be the supreme consideration of governmental affairs. Complete disarmament and the safety of the people are incompatible. The government said that it was permissible to use minimum necessary use of force to remove an imminent, unlawful violation tending to fundamentally overturn the right of the people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. However, the government said something that the Supreme Court did not say, and that is that CSD was unconstitutional. I always found that to be very odd and was bothered by it. It's not a logical conclusion. After all, in today's tough northeast Asia security environment, Japan, there's no way that it can protect itself alone. If Japan's security cannot be assured without exercising the right to CSD, then to that extent, the right to exercise CSD must be allowed. It was last year that we reinterpreted the Constitution to make it clear that the Constitution allows for this. It took 70 years to state the obvious. Japan is now proceeding with a major reform of security legislation based on this interpretation. First, though limited, it will be possible to exercise the right to CSD. Legislative reform to make this possible is proceeding under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe. Second, to protect the peace and security of Japan and of the world in the area of non-COP operations, the logistical support that we can provide to the U.S. and other forces will be greatly expanded. The possible situations will be greatly expanded. Third, for PKOs, we will create a system of modern PKOs expanding the allowable activities to include nation-building support and demilitarization. Basically, it comes down to creating the legislative framework necessary for the self-defense forces to be able to amply contribute to the peace of Japan and of the world. This will go through deliberations in the diet. That is to say, a democratic process. If the legislation is in place, Japan will be in a position to more proactively contribute to the stability of the region. The U.S.-Japan defense guidelines are being revised and they will lay out the cooperation that will happen between Japan and the United States. Sooner or later, the results should be announced and are concluded. The future guidelines will be based on existing alliance cooperation but expand the potential of cooperation globally, I believe. The U.S.-Japan security treaty provides for the U.S. assuring for Japan's security in exchange for the provision of bases by Japan. The U.S. will use Japanese bases to protect the areas around Japan. In the 1990s the World War ended. The Soviet Union disappeared as a threat but after this there were the crises of the North Korean missile development and nuclear weapon development. Japan enacted the law on situations in areas surrounding Japan and therefore when there is a contingency near Japan we can not merely provide bases to Japan but we can also fight with U.S. forces in non-combat operation. That is what the current guidelines stipulate. After that we entered the 21st century, we had 9-11, the first contingency in the history of the U.S.-Japan alliance was al-Qaeda's attack on the United States. Thousands of victims including Japanese nationals lost their lives. NATO invoked its CSD clause. Japan sent 5 escort vessels to the Indian Ocean to refuel the U.S.-led international fleet. It's not very well known but among the various nations sending ships to the Indian Ocean the maritime self-defense force fleet was second in size only to that of the United States surpassing the size even of the British fleet. After that the second Iraq war broke out and Iraq sent the ground self-defense forces to engage in humanitarian reconstruction institution reconstruction assistance. It was the first time since the Second World War for ground self-defense troops to set foot on the ground of third country without wearing a UN blue helmet. They cooperated with the U.S., British, Australian and Dutch militaries. There were all enemies during the World War. Going past the loves and hatreds of the past, the self-defense forces worked so that Iraqis could return to normal daily lives in cooperation with former enemies. What better proof of Japan's post-war walk of peace for more than half a century. The U.S.-Japan alliance now has a range that's not limited to the areas around Japan. Our alliance will globally sustain the peace and prosperity of the international community. 21st century Japan is being reborn as a responsible nation that will sustain the peace and prosperity of the international community. Prime Minister Abe's proactive contributions to peace are promoting this. The young people of Japan who will shoulder the responsibility of the nation, I hope they will renew their pride and move into the future with confidence. Along with the guidelines for vision, the TPP negotiations are at a critical stage. It will place the trading economies of Asia on a huge pan-Pacific free trading framework. We are about to witness the economic integration of Asia and a 21st century style, a truly liberated free trading system. The TPP will no doubt be one of the most important wings of the 21st century world trade system along with the Japan, EU, EPA and TTIP. I sincerely hope for successful revision of the guidelines, successful TPP negotiations and the success of Prime Minister Abe's visit here that will show that our alliance has reached a new dimension. Thank you. Thank you. I'm Michael Green from CSIS Minister Kumara. You've given us an excellent and a compelling explanation of the history and the logic and the history of Japan's decision to move forward and exercise the right of collective self-defense. With your permission, we will put the text of your speech on the CSIS website for anyone interested. We'll now have some time for questions and answers. There will be people with microphones. Please keep your questions brief and make sure they're questions. Let me start by asking Kumara-san my understanding is that you are in a key position to win public support in Japan and move forward from the July decision to recognize collective self-defense to legislation in the coming months. What I wanted to ask you is how do you view the public support for this legislation the political landscape ahead and the prospects for passing as I understand it more than 20 pieces of legislation to make this decision on collective self-defense the law and then policy of Japan. The people of Japan, there are those who support CSD and those who oppose it. We have a few more that oppose it than support it but it's not a question of completely approving CSD just the minimum necessary amount to protect the existence of the state. If you put it that way then there's a slight majority in favor I believe. As you just said in your question the government will draft a law and in mid April the LDP and the new Komeito will reopen talks and then the draft legislation will have to be affirmed up and it will be submitted to the diet in mid May. The current session of the diet is set to end in June. Therefore I think we'll have to extend the session by June. But I certainly hope to gain the understanding of the public and to have the law pass the diet. But of course it depends on deliberations in the we would like it to pass certainly and we hope that we can have it pass that is our feeling but in the actual deliberation of the legislation when it comes to exercising collective self-defense the UN Charter allows for CSD we wouldn't have a wholesale approval of this right but the public would understand that we're only talking about the limited exercise of this right and I believe that this will greatly contribute to the understanding of the Japanese people and when the diet deliberate this I believe that the public will come to understand this more and more. It's important for our alliance and for stability in Asia so the floor is open we have about eight minutes or so Mr. Nelson. Thank you so much Mr. Cumber very important speech and explanation of so many things and thank you Mike I'm getting bounce back from myself here which is terrifying now that you're here in the US are there things that you would like to hear from us the government rather with Dave Shearer sitting right here about how to talk to our Chinese friends about Senkaku's for example that you're not hearing are there some things that you think we need to do perhaps a better job of talking about it or supporting you that's been some concern over the years that maybe we need to do more say things differently are there some things that you would like to hear that you're urging us to say thank you. The US government and the Senkaku Islands has stated clearly that they fall under the mutual security treaty that's enough for now for now that's enough we'll go about creating good relations with China without causing trouble for the United States I think that we'll be able to protect the Senkaku's about three times a month China is sending government ships into the territorial waters of Japan around the Senkaku Islands they're trying to do their best to demonstrate that Japan is not necessarily exercising effective control I don't think that they will go on a tremendous adventure and the US government has said that the Senkaku Islands fall under the US Japan security treaties specifically Article 5 I think that's enough for now thank you floor is open for questions including students who need not be shy about asking questions thank you sir I'm a reporter from inside US trade you mentioned the TPP in your speech I just wanted to see if you believe that a bilateral deal between the US and Japan on agricultural goods and automobiles is possible before Prime Minister Abe comes in April and is that what Japan is seeking would you like to see a deal before Prime Minister Abe's visit thank you Prime Minister Abe's visit to the United States I don't think it's necessarily the case that we'll have bilateral agreement by that time but if sufficient flexibility is shown I think that an agreement will definitely be reached the US Congress will provide TPA more negotiating flexibility to the US administration when I speak to representatives of the US government they say things like once discussions go well with Japan then we'll have a better chance getting TPA but from the Japanese point of view seeing TPA first would basically allow for bilateral negotiations to go more smoothly without fear of having to rehash things so it's important for us to proceed on both in parallel quickly thank you very much my name is Mina Poman and I'm a student at Georgetown University I was wondering if you could speak more about how collective self-defense may be applied to other countries that Japan shares close security relationship with such as Australia thank you collective self-defense exercising that right to protect the existence of the state of Japan exercising the right to CSD in a minimum necessary manner and also protecting the right of the people to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness when there's a clear threat tending to overturn that right that's what CSD is designed to protect against minimum necessary collective self-defense it's not limited to the US forces, the scope of it it depends on what effect there might be on Japan is it a minimum necessary thing in order to protect the existence of the state or to protect the right of the Japanese people to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness that's the those are the criteria for exercising the right to CSD Minister Komar you've had a short and very busy trip to Washington I understand you had excellent meetings with Secretary of Defense Carter and with the Deputy Secretary of State and you've given us a very clear very compelling explanation of collective self-defense and defense policy reforms in Japan so we want to wish you good luck and safe travels home and thank you very much for joining us today take it from me they'll leave the NSC guy behind it's now my great pleasure to introduce a good friend to me and to many of us here to give the perspective of the US Defense Department and the Administration Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and Pacific Affairs Dave has a more than three decade resume of service in the State Department as a Foreign Service Officer my daisempai from SICE my daisempai teaching at Georgetown a veteran of the Defense Guidelines first round in the 1990s of the Korea and China desks and Ambassador to Vietnam one of the increasingly interesting and important states as Asia becomes more interconnected and more fraught with complications and rivalry and so today Dave is going to speak to us and we'll have some time I think for two and a before we let him get back to his day job at three o'clock thanks Dave thank you very much Mike, CSIS President Hamri LDP Vice President Komura Ladies and Gentlemen, it's a great honor but also a great challenge to follow a great statesman like LDP Vice President Komura who's also a former Foreign Minister but I'll try as I prepared my speech last night I realized that in a 32 or 33 year career as a diplomat I've spent 11 years working directly on US-Japan relations nine of those years I spent in Japan I wish I had the Japanese language to show for it I realized last night that while I got to be Ambassador to Vietnam I didn't get to be the Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo but that may have been just a matter of timing I realized as I look out over this audience that I learned so much of what I know about Japan and so much of what I know about diplomacy in general from many of the people who are in this audience today or maybe we'll be watching on after the conference like ambassadors Kato Fujisaki, Sasai and Vice Minister Nishi and on the American side Jim Kelly Bill Brear Tom Hubbard, Russ Deming Jim Foster I owe so much of what I have done to go to you all in this room and I want to express my greatest appreciation for that if I recall correctly I attended the very first Pacific Forum CSIS US-Japan security seminar at the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco which took place in 1995 and I've participated in a number of them since we've come a long way since that first seminar but still this event remains an important mechanism for dialogue on the US-Japan alliance and I'm hopeful for another 20 years of further success and I very much hope that we can do another meeting in San Francisco sometime 2015 is a very important year for US-Japan relations and among our most important agenda items is the revision of the US-Japan defense guidelines this is the document that establishes the roles and missions for US and Japanese forces I remember serving as a Paul Mill Officer at the US Embassy in Tokyo when we revised the guidelines back in 1997 and I'm delighted to be back working on the revised guidelines in my new capacity as assistant secretary of defense this alliance is strong and deep but it's also very flexible as Japan's role in the world has evolved and as the region has changed our alliance has also developed and strengthened and this evolution is captured by the excessive versions of the guidelines the 1978 guidelines reflected Japan's new ability increased ability to defend itself and allowed our forces to cooperate more closely in the face of the Soviet threat the 1997 guidelines reflected the end of the Cold War in Japan's growing regional roles and interests the new revised guidelines or these revised guidelines made it possible for us to plan for contingency operations in the well-known situations in areas surrounding Japan or CISJ our alliance has developed significantly since the drafting of the first 1978 guidelines and even since the 1997 revision today our bilateral military engagement is robust the capabilities of our two forces are incredibly strong and increasingly interoperable the revised guidelines the new revised guidelines will help us to respond flexibly to the challenges we face in the region as well as to further expand cooperation on global issues a lot has changed since 1997 there are new capabilities to take stock of new threats to consider in even new domains like cyberspace and space the guidelines will clearly lay out how our governments will cooperate to continue ensuring Japan's peace and security our armed forces and the self-defense forces of Japan will be able to swiftly respond to situations in any phase from peace time to contingencies that might have an important impact on Japan to accomplish this our governments will also significantly strengthen the bilateral framework for coordination beyond Japan we will cooperate in various areas to generate a more peaceful and stable international security environment the guidelines will lay out how we will partner together to promote security and defense cooperation based on international law and internationally accepted norms our governments will continue to promote trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with regional allies and partners in space and cyberspace our governments are committed to strengthening stability in these emerging domains by addressing security challenges seamlessly and effectively in particular we will work with Japan to ensure the resiliency of our systems this is a whole of government effort with the ultimate aim to secure the safe and stable use of space and the improvement of cyber security for critical infrastructure taken together these enhancements based on Japan's new security legislation including on collective self defense will allow us to achieve our vision as outlined in the 2013 2 plus 2 statement of building a more balanced and effective alliance that increases deterrence and maintains regional peace and stability as everyone knows Prime Minister Abe is visiting the U.S. at the end of April and we hope to complete the guidelines as close to that visit as possible defense guidelines revision fits squarely within our overall rebalance toward the Asia Pacific here I want to stress as Secretary Carter noted yesterday in his remarks at the State Department that the rebalance is not limited to the military tools of statecraft but it encompasses all aspects of strategy including diplomacy and trade it's very much a whole of government approach look at what we're doing in the South China Sea as an example we're coordinating closely with ASEAN within the multilateral arena to ensure that the South China Sea remains a paramount item on the regional agenda we're working closely with our allies and partners in Southeast Asia to help build their capacity while we encourage them to work together bilaterally as well as multilaterally we're watching events on the water in the South China Sea while vigorously making our views and concerns known to the claimants we're also positioning the forces we'll need to bolster stability in the region and I note in this connection that we will have four rotationally deployed littoral combat ships in Singapore by 2018 and this will be the first time that we've had naval vessels permanently in the South China Sea since the 1970s if I'm not mistaken as we do this as we implement the rebalance we stay in very close touch with our Japanese colleagues who have vital interests not only in the East China Sea but in the South China Sea as well and these are interests the United States shares with Japan at a fundamental level a consideration of the military element of the rebalance leads us to a discussion of U.S. force posture in the region if you need a metric for this you need look no further than the capabilities we're basing in Japan the DOD is placing its best equipment in Japan first and I'd like to point out here that that approach was developed by now Defense Secretary Carter when he was last in DOD and here's a partial list of the capabilities we're placing in Japan MV-22 Ospreys P-8 Maritime Patrol aircraft Global Hawk UAVs two TPY-2 missile defense radars the second of which at Kyogama Misaki was just turned on in December of last year and from 2017 the Joint Strike Fighter the F-35B in addition we'll soon have eight ballistic missile defense capable destroyers forward deployed in Japan and of course our only forward deployed aircraft carrier will remain based in Yokosuka the U.S. enjoys robust ballistic missile defense cooperation with Japan Japan's 2014 revision of its three principles on arms exports removed barriers between our respective defense industries that will allow us to increase efficiency, reduce costs and enable the development of advanced capabilities in joint development projects currently we're jointly developing next generation SM-3 Block IIA ballistic missile interceptors for deployment on U.S. and Japanese Aegis BMD ships what this means is that we place a premium on Japan's defense by ensuring that our best most capable platforms are in Japan as soon as possible one thing I've learned in my 30 plus year career is that you can't talk about U.S.-Japan alliance relations without talking about the realignment of our facilities while we're looking to update the software of the alliance through upgrades to the guidelines our efforts at placing our hardware in the region is another major bilateral effort a key part but not the only part of this realignment of U.S. is the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan from our perspective realignment is a good story I'll share a fact with you in this regard four of our largest overseas peacetime military construction projects since World War II are in the Asia Pacific region Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni Futenma Replacement Facility Guam and Northern Australia these facilities will help us maintain an operationally resilient geographically dispersed and politically sustainable regional posture posture all of these projects are also related to our desire to reduce our footprint significantly on Okinawa to address the impact of our presence on local communities we also have a plan with Japan to return almost 2,500 acres of land in Okinawa once we've finished consolidating our forces we are looking forward to ensuring that the consolidation plan for our forces on Okinawa is implemented in a timely manner a word on Guam of course Guam is a focal point of this effort at realignment and with the passage of our 2015 defense bill all legislative restrictions on our ability to construct new facilities and areas on Guam have been removed we've worked hard to gain support of Congress so that we can move forward with this necessary realignment of our forces Japan is contributing about 3.1 billion dollars to the projects on Guam but the total project also requires significant U.S. funding and will continue to work with Congress to maintain support for our efforts to build Guam into a strategic hub in the western Pacific of course there are other challenges that affect our realignment progress but nevertheless we've made some good progress to include movement to the KC-130 refueling squadron from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Iwakuni last summer and the planned return of the west Futenma housing area was the first of this year this is a significant return of 128 acres of land to Japan it's the largest return in almost a decade and it demonstrates our continuing commitment to our bilateral plan to make our footprint in Okinawa more sustainable as you all know in recent days the construction of the Futenma replacement facility has been in the news again despite the recent headlines we are heartened by Prime Minister Abe's statements as well as those of Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga recognizing that the FRF at Camp Schwab in Henoko is the only solution to replace our current facility at Futenma we have good partners at the defense and foreign ministries in Tokyo and they are committed to seeing the FRF through lastly I'd like to provide my thoughts on our alliance as it relates to regional cooperation the US commitment to Japan is unwavering as Vice President Komura noted during President Obama's visit to Japan last year the President reiterated our commitment to Japan and affirmed that Article 5 of our security treaty covers all territories under Japan's administration including the Senkaku Islands this sent a strong unambiguous message to Japan and to the region as we move forward regional cooperation will be of utmost important to our growing alliance it's imperative that Japan and our regional allies and partners work together I'm pleased with the relationship between Japan and the ASEAN countries we also have good trilateral programs with Australia and with India both of those will continue to grow that said it is most important that the trilateral partnership among the US Japan and the Republic of Korea continues to show progress I was delighted that Deputy Secretary work was able to sign a trilateral information sharing MOU with his Japan and ROK counterparts late last year this is a good first step but I hope that both Japan and the Republic of Korea will make even more strides on historical issues and build a vibrant future oriented partnership with all of the changes due to what happened this critical year I look forward to working with our Japanese counterparts on all of these issues and hope that the audience stays tuned on future I hope you all stay tuned on future developments our work on strengthening the alliance reaffirms that the US Japan alliance continues to remain the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific thank you very much thank you very interesting very robust agenda and you know in 1995-6 when the nine issue was underway I wonder if you foresaw how busy you would make yourself two decades later I want to ask first a question then we'll open it up I'm especially interested in the bilateral coordination mechanism because all of the defense guidelines of you were the collective self-defense movement in Japan that assets were deploying all of it is going to make this alliance more agile and more interoperable but it's still not like the US ROK alliance or NATO we don't have a joint combined command so our ability to make decisions quickly together at a strategic but also at an operational level is going to be more and more important because the margin for error in the east China sea or with North Korea or elsewhere is going to be narrower so can you tell us a little bit more about the bilateral coordination mechanism and how you see that piece of this whole strategy unfolding you're absolutely right Mike we don't have a combined forces command in Japan as we do in Korea so on devising other creative and systematic ways of coordinating our planning our exercising and implementing those plans and we established the first establish a bilateral coordination mechanism in the 1998 guidelines this was meant to be a whole of government approach to conducting operations we'd like to make that bilateral coordination more effective in the new guidelines we continue to recognize the need for a whole of government approach I think that was demonstrated in our combined efforts to address the tragedies associated with the earthquake four years ago and I think our experiences both in that earthquake in the 1995 earthquake in the vicinity of Kobe will all feed into the way in which we will renovate the bilateral coordination mechanism in the new revised guidelines again we have microphones here and in that column and here so raise your hand Jim please hi Jim hi Jim Foster from KO University thank you very much David very very nice and comprehensive I'd like though perhaps if you could comment a little bit on cybersecurity cooperation between Japan and the United States and in that context too how we can promote greater cyber threat sharing between Korea and Japan you know there's a lot of difficulties in that area so few comments on that would be appreciated thank you cyber security will be an increasingly important effort both bilaterally with Japan and with Korea as well and we've seen in recent events like the cyber attack on Sony pictures how important it is for us not only to adopt a whole of government approach ourselves but to coordinate our efforts with other allies in like-minded countries in this regard because cyber criminals and cyber attackers don't don't respect international borders and they don't respect alliances so we are committed now and we will be even more committed to coordinating very closely with our Japanese ally on cyber security this is a very complicated extremely complicated field we expect that the new guidelines will allow us to sort through the many problems we face both individually and as an alliance in facing the cyber threat thank you Ben Self with the Mansfield Foundation thank you so much for your remarks and I wanted to ask you to stretch your mandate obviously your assistant secretary of Asia and the Pacific but we're talking about a globalized US-Japan defense partnership and one of the transformations in the new guidelines is supposedly removing the areas surrounding Japan concept and enabling us to go beyond Asia and the Pacific to do global cooperation Japan since the Mozambique PKO has continually contributed to global security well beyond the East Asian region and direct form through the self-defense forces in disaster relief in Haiti and in contributions to piracy in the Gulf of Aden what role do you see in this new guidelines for strengthening US-Japan cooperation beyond Asia and the Pacific particularly in areas like Sub-Taharan Africa conflict regions like that thank you well our cooperation outside of the region is already very strong and Japan has already been very forward leaning in its activities outside of the region including in PKO including in its contributions to the effort against ISIL in Iraq and we deeply appreciate Japan's efforts in that regard as do the regional victims of ISIL's terror Japan of course has operated warships in the Gulf of Aden and has worked with us in our vassals in the Gulf of Aden so we already have a strong basis on which to build closer bilateral activities outside the region and in addition to addressing the issue of SIAJ I expect the new guidelines will put in place not only the bilateral coordination mechanism but the mechanisms by which we will more effectively more seamlessly be able to plan, train and operate together outside of the region in a variety of circumstances Patrick? Michael, thank you Dave, thank you for those comments especially clarifying the many partnership capacity building activities in say Southeast Asia and I really want to ask you a question about the role of the alliance in the South China Sea I had a discussion as early as as recently as this morning with Chinese interlocutors warning me against allowing Japan to have any security role in the South China Sea when I compare what Japan is doing in building say Coast Guards in the region versus China building artificial islands in a 9-dash line which one of those two seems to be more stabilizing does the alliance and does Japan have a role to play in security in the South China Sea? I believe the US-Japan alliance and I have always said the US-Japan alliance is critical to peace and stability in the region and that doesn't just mean Northeast Asia that doesn't just mean Northeast Asia it means Southeast Asia and the South China Sea as well as part of that effort partner capacity building is critical and I think that's going to be a fundamental part of both the US and Japanese efforts in the South China Sea as ambassador to Vietnam I work quite closely with my Japanese colleagues in the Japanese Embassy in coordinating our efforts in Vietnam I think that coordination is also taking place regionally and I think you're going to see not only stronger US and Japanese partner capacity building in the area surrounding the South China Sea but you're going to see stronger US-Japan coordination in this area. Peter? Thank you sir looking ahead to the Prime Minister's upcoming speech to the Congress do you anticipate that the speech will enhance or and contribute to trilateral cooperation between the ROK Japan and the US or might it in some way cause problems for that relationship and in particular do you expect that the Prime Minister will speak to will use specific language that might enhance the relationship or might omit certain language that might cause some problems? I can't predict what the Prime Minister will say in his speech I don't have that kind of foresight but Prime Minister Abe has shown himself to be a man of great vision and a man of peace in the past public remarks and I have no doubt that he will again demonstrate that in his public remarks in the United States he has been very forward leaning and future oriented in previous remarks and I would imagine that he will be so in his remarks in the US For those of you who haven't seen it there's a really interesting column by David Ignatius in this morning's post about this based on his discussions with the Prime Minister and I would encourage you to look at it Noboru Yamaguchi David, good to see you and thank you very much for your service again for the next guidelines thank you very much for that on the guidelines there are expectations among Japanese to see better cooperation between two countries in case of so-called Grey Zone issues and I as far as I understand the Japan Japan-sized problem is to make laws Grey Zone means beyond the police capability and below army to military conflict there is a lack of legal basis for law enforcement organizations as well as self-defense forces to deal with that range of issues so for the Japanese it's a legal problem we have to as many steps as possible to deal with to avoid too much deep in case of escalation my question is what are the challenges for the U.S. side when we we mean the Japanese side we need to deal with Grey Zone in our U.S.-Japan defense guidelines interim report Japan and the U.S. issued last year you probably used the words seamless and efficient coordination a lot and what we mean by seamless and efficient coordination we apply that to all aspects of the alliance we want seamless and efficient coordination between Japan and the U.S. as allies we want seamless and efficient coordination among our various agencies as we organize ourselves in government fashion and we want seamless and efficient coordination not just in war but across the spectrum of situations from peace to crisis to war including in those situations our Japanese friends term Grey Zone situations so seamless and efficient coordination is a key phrase in our approach to the new guidelines and as it applies to Grey Zones it means seamless coordination across all kinds of contingencies from peace to war from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to full-scale defense of Japan in case of war specific defense or contingency cooperation that we don't have but that you feel we should I just want to make sure could everyone hear that? I'm not sure the microphone was on well as I mentioned in my remarks we strongly welcomed the conclusion of the trilateral information sharing agreement among Korea, Japan and the U.S and I think there are opportunities for further such arrangements I think we have to be realistic and patient in how we approach this given the sensitivities but we've seen as we work through the information sharing agreement that trilateral cooperation is quite possible and I'd be happy to I think you'll find us looking for further opportunities not yet defined to cooperate trilaterally my name is Kunio Kikuchi and I'm with Washington Research and analysis about Okinawa 70 years ago almost to the day and the month Okinawa was facing this largest armada of American forces and in the following months or so the U.S. Marines would have killed more than 100,000 civilians plus 100,000 or more military on that small island and to this day the U.S. Marines occupy 20% of the island now the Okinawans first of all in the Japanese in the Japanese government that sacrificed them as it were for the ground war but now when you talk about Futemba and how the Japanese government is trying everything to make sure that the relocation would go through this flies in the face of the recent election of the governor who won on the basis of not permitting the relocation of Futemba on yet another site within Okinawa the only gracious exit for this crisis or this impediment would be for the U.S. government to say look the relocation of Futemba to Henoko is already more than 19 years old and it might be time to reconsider is there such a possibility? Thank you Thank you very much I first visited Okinawa in February 1974 when I was a student in Japan I have visited Okinawa many times since also in my capacity as a political military officer in the State Department and in U.S. Embassy Tokyo I've worked closely with the people and the government of Okinawa to realign our facilities and to mitigate the effects of our operations on the people who live in Okinawa and I was engaged in the 1990s in the joint effort to devise the SAKO process which was a significant effort to realign our facilities and bases in Okinawa and I continue to be very, very engaged in that process Let's remember that the Futemba replacement facility is an effort by the U.S. and Japanese governments to close Futemba airfield marine assets out of Futemba airfield to a replacement facility so that we can return the Futemba facility and so that we can by building the replacement facility reduce the impact of continued operations marine air operations in Okinawa on the people of Okinawa and we work with the Japanese central government in this issue we appreciate the efforts of the central government in providing us facilities in Okinawa and in helping us to build the Futemba replacement facility we've looked at lots of alternatives and we've decided with great care that replacement facility in Camp Schwab is the best place for us to be both operationally and in terms of the extent to which it reduces the negative effects of our presence on the people of Okinawa One more question We'll have to be brief, please so yes ma'am, keep it very brief Thank you Jane from China Sina Corp As you mentioned this is a critical year for U.S. and Japan relation and on matters such as anniversary of the World War II China, South Korea or Russia tend to be historical focus and are not quite dismissive of past transgression at the same time Japan tend to focus more on the future so which way do you think the U.S. leans and or should leans significance? Thank you Well the 70th anniversary of the end of the war is certainly an important event not only in Northeast Asia but globally The U.S. recalls the tragedies of World War II but we also since 1945 have made a strong point in looking forward we are oriented in one direction more than another it's certainly in the forward-looking direction that certainly has strengthened our relations with our allies it has strengthened peace and stability in the region and I think that forward-looking approach has also helped China prosper so I hope that the Chinese and the Koreans and the Japanese along with us can all turn forward and look to the future as we recall the tragedies of World War II Dave has to get back to his day job you have a lot of Senpai in the audience you have a lot of Kohai in the audience we're all grateful for what you're doing and we should let you get back to your job Thank you very much We have coffee in the back and we're going to resume at 3.15