 Welcome back to Global Connections. I'm Jay Fidel. This is Think Tech. Our special guest this morning is an emeritus in political science, UH Minoa, a treasure, a treasure of UH Minoa, and a treasure of Think Tech, Manfred Heddington. Manfred, welcome to the show. Thank you very much. You're just back from Europe and you had a chance to observe. And you spent, you were raised in Europe, so it's through your eyes. It's gonna be different and more in depth, I think. So I'd like to discuss with you from a political science point of view exactly how it seemed to you on this trip because things are changing in this world of ours. And that's clearly one of the changes in the US of A and it must likewise be a change in various countries in Europe. Am I right? Yes, and especially in Germany. In some respect, you could say Germany today is the only stable Western political society. More stable than the US, more stable than the United Kingdom, more stable than France or Italy. It's quite remarkable because you have the soft change of power from Angela Merkel's 16 years to Schultz, but it's not that alone, which is so fascinating about contemporary Germany. It is a transition from traditional party politics to the green movement because what you have today in Germany is that the major coalition partner of Schultz's social democrats are the greens. And when you look at recent polls of politicians in Germany, you have Steinmeier, the president on top, and then come three green members of Schultz's cabinet before Schultz himself. So what you have is that the greens that started as a social movement in the early 70s have become today a stable political party. There are no tensions within this green party as there were in the 70s between realists and fundamentalists. What you have are three very fascinating characters, pragmatic and visionary at the same time. The energy and treasury minister Habek, then the foreign secretary, Annalena Baerbock, and then the minister of agriculture, Erstemir, who is of Turkish background, these three have become, how should I say, the trio of stability, but stability with a vision. I mean, if you want to use an American example, you should, one could say, well, imagine that the civil rights movement would have become the major political party in the United States and would run the country. That is what is happening in Germany, that the social movement, which really attacked the system, for all kinds of reasons, that you have many progressives in this country attack the political system, but they have embraced it. They are part of the system. They run the system. Now, whether that will continue, that is a big question because what Germany is facing maybe more so than other countries is this energy crisis. When even if Putin does not completely cut off gas delivery to Germany, you will have a very, very difficult time, not only for households, but for the German economy to find resources, to substitute for what had been for decades, the Russian supply line. I mean, today people talk about not only Gerhard Scheuter, the former social democratic chancellor, you know, buddy, a bosom friend of Putin, but also Angela Merkel, that they have both in a way relied too much on Putin's promises, even though they know, well, Scheuter maybe not so because he made a lot of money as a result of that. Your connection, you know, when he left office in 2005 and Angela Merkel took over, but what you have, what people recognize now that this dependency, which was interpreted at the time, you know, when it started as the best way of somehow not only domesticating Putin, somehow it bring Russia into the Western hemisphere, you know. Well, that was a good noble idea for sure. It was, it was, yes. But it was a flawed idea because they could have, they could have, should have known Putin better than that. Well, it's very interesting, you know, I watched a few, a week ago or so in interview with a former president of Germany, Gauck, Joachim Gauck, he was the predecessor of Steinmeier. And he, you know, he was an Aussie. He was born in a GDR, he was a pastor there and he met Putin a few times. And he said, I, Gauck and Angela Merkel, whenever we met Putin and talked with him, we knew he was lying. We could not trust him, but we couldn't say that openly, you know, that he was lying because, you know, you do not do that in diplomatic political circles. You had to be very careful what you said. But we knew, we knew, he said, I talked with Angela Merkel after meetings she had with Putin that he was lying. You couldn't trust him. Now, what we didn't know, at least he said, I didn't know. And I think Angela Merkel didn't know that either, that he has this grandiose vision of restoring, you know, this Russian Soviet empire. There we were, I mean, this surprised him tremendously. But I mean, it was very fascinating also. And I think it has to do with the changes that are happening in Germany today. He was asked by the interviewer, if something like that should happen to Germany today, if, you know, you have this kind of attack, would you as a pastor, former pastor, would you use weapons? And he said, yes, you cannot let aggression like this, you know, continue without a response. I'm against this milieu pacifism. He said that had characterized Germany, you know, after World War II for over 70 years. And in a way you could say, that is an atmospheric change in Germany in general, you know, that this pacifism is gone. And interesting is also that there is a generational divide and this generational divide is between the 18 to 30 years and then the people above. The people above are very careful and very hesitant, you know, in being very critical of Putin, even though they are critical, but they're to being very critical. The young people for them, it is not any longer possible to live in peace with Putin. So the people from 18 to 30 are absolutely in support of giving the Ukrainians the weapons they want. They need these weapons and they should be handed over to them, not only from the Americans but in other Western powers, but especially also from Germany. So there you have a very fascinating transformation of the political self-understanding of contemporary Germany. And I think it is very, very important that people understand it is not the social democrats or the driving force, it's the Greens. The former social movement, anti, I mean, pacifist movement, environmental movement. So what you have there is that when you compare that with what the chaos in Great Britain, all the possibilities, you know, that France was confronted with when you will have the elections. Now Macron won against Marine Le Pen in the presidential election, but in the parliamentary elections, you have the strong left under Melanchon and on the right under the pen. When you're looking at the left and the right in Germany today, they destroy themselves. They cannibalize each other. It's quite extraordinary, you know, how irrelevant the radical left and the radical right, the AFD, people were scared of, you know, for some time, how irrelevant they have become politically. Now, look, I say all of this reflecting on this talks and discussions and observations that I made during the last four weeks, I don't know what will happen once the energy crisis will hit Germany. I mean, that is, and it will hit it more than it will hit the United States or will hit France because of that dependency on Russian gas. Now- But if you have a Green Party, if you have the moral strength that Angela Merkel brought to Germany in her time, my view, you can agree or not, my view is that she found a moral strength in Germany and caused it to emerge politically and Germany changed under her leadership. Well, I'm a little bit, I have a different opinion of that. I think Angela Merkel, Angela Merkel has come under attack because of her trust in Putin. Now, it was a critical trust, but she, as much as Schröder, the former chancellor, is making, is called response, I mean, they feel in the political debate that Merkel was also responsible for the dependency, whatever her reasons were. I mean, she had no illusions about Putin and Russia, but you have to remember, they didn't do anything in 2004, 2008, 2014, when this violence, this brutal behavior of Russia under Putin became quite clear. She was critical, but she did not do what people thought she should have done at that time. So- Let me just go to my point though. Somewhere along the line, somehow, whether it was Merkel or some other process, some other phenomenon working in Germany, Germany has become liberal, it has become enlightened. It has taken off a lot of the kind of right-wing sensibility that it had during the war. And we have seen people in Germany would like to return to the Nazism, but the country in general seems to be liberal now. And that's a moral issue. Oh no, absolutely. And so what I'm asking you really is, doesn't the strength of that morality, doesn't that prevail against, say, cold weather, against, say, vectors that would undermine the German economy? That's what we have to see. In the U.S., we don't have that kind of cross-the-board morality, but if we have that in Germany, then they can resist the cold weather and they can carry on, no? You're an optimist. I hope that's true. But I don't know when the cold begins to hit the fan and the fan is as cold as it's outside. I don't know what the responses will be, but you have also to remember, you're not only speaking about people not liking the freeze, you're speaking about the German economy. And if branches of the economy close down and you get unemployment on a grand scale, then I think the situation will become politically less stable than it is today. But do you think that the average German, from your travels in Germany, just a few days ago really, understands that it falls to Germany who be a leader, if not the leader of Western Europe? France is not strong. The UK is not strong. Germany, at least for the moment, is strong. Does the average German care to perpetuate that? Look, the average German begins to recognize that. But in a way, you could also say that they refused to accept this identity. They didn't want to become, I mean, even though it's demographically the biggest country in Europe, 82 million, and it's economically the strongest country within the European Union. But there has always been, I think, a lack of understanding what that really means. They didn't want to become the dominant power within the European Union. And that's what many European countries ask today. Poland, for example, but others as well. You have to take over this role because that's who you are. And Germans are, you know, because of this, 70 years of pacifism, reluctant. I mean, the political class, I think the Greens especially, telling their audiences, we have to change. And they make the point that you are making. But it's, you have then the left, how should I say, the left over admiration for Russia within the Social Democratic Party to which Schultz belongs. They are still grateful, you know, for what Willy Brandt then he became Chancellor in 69 was able of accomplishing with his host politics and then Khrushchev, you know, and Gorbachev, especially Gorbachev, you know, they are grateful for him. And initially also to Putin. I mean, Putin gave in 2000, I think it was a speech in perfect German in front of the German parliament. And that was considered to be a milestone. Now the interesting thing is Putin learned German in Dresden when he was there in charge of the KGB. I mean, there's this very famous scene when in October of 89 members of the East German dissident movement, the civil society movement wanted to storm the KGB headquarter in Dresden. And while Putin was still burning documents inside, he became aware of the threat. And so he went out and talked to them in Germany and talk them out of doing that. And they went away. But that moment has traumatized Putin because he suddenly realized, you know, what social movements in a society can do. And in a way you could say it's the anticipation of his fear of what happened in Ukraine. I think the major reason for him to move in there, he was afraid, you know, that Ukraine would become the model for Russia. And, you know, his most important opponent among the dissidents in Russia was actually Navalny. Now Navalny is in prison, but they cannot kill him. And if he dies, natural death, that will also become a signal, you know, he's afraid of, Putin is afraid of. And Navalny in the movie, you know, I don't know if they have seen it or not, but if you have not seen it, watch it. It's a fascinating movie because he answers the question, what do we do if you die? And he simply said to the people who interviewed him, continue. And I think that's what Putin is really scared of. Putin is really scared of. He is scared of this kind of civil society uprising, you know, that brought down the Soviet Union in 1991, that brought down state socialism in all of Eastern European countries, including East Germany. And then he has this idiotic, you know, notion of Russia, and he feels Ukraine does not have an identity, it doesn't exist. And now, you know, for five months, the Ukrainians demonstrate to him that they exist, and they don't give in. The problem with that in the US, and I think it must also be something that you can see in Europe, is that you get tired of it. You know, we call it news fatigue. Before, you know, these atrocities were, you know, high news, Bukha and all that. Now, and Putin knows this, he knows this, and keep on going, you keep on doubling down, you're persistent, you never back up, you never back off. And so, you know, I think Germany is, you know, in the same place as many people in this country. They're tired of hearing about it, no? And when you take, they're not, good, good, good. I do not think that Germany has reached that point. And I think the Greens are really the people who remind them of this issue. It is not simply, you know, this violent invasion, but it's a moral issue. And it's quite remarkable, you know, how they constantly make this issue. Habeck, the vice chancellor, and Birbach, the foreign minister, wherever they go, they emphasize that. And for that reason, you know, you have, the fatigue has not set in. So I, and I don't know when it will, whether it will set in any way, well, at some point, but the interesting thing is the young people do not compromise. And that is something new. And that I think could only have come from the Green Party. Because the other parties, even though the Christian Democrats, you know, Angela Merkel parties, Angela Merkel's party certainly support also the strong military support and financial support of the Ukraine. So in that sense, we... Well, can we look at the future together for a moment, Manfred? Just in case, for example, for whatever reason whatever process, social, political process, the economic process, Germany softens on Putin. And thus softened on helping the Ukrainians. And thus softened on being a leader, the leader of Europe, especially in view of the decline of leadership or political power in France and Italy and the UK. What happened? And the US, thank you. What happens then? What happens to Germany? What happens to France and Italy and the UK and for that matter, the US? What happens to the world if Germany softens in its resolve? Yes, in a way you could say the invasion on the 24th of February was the best that would have happened to the European Union. Not only to NATO, but to the European Union. It brought them stronger together and this division between the Eastern part, the Western part, the Southern part within the 27 entity has become not that important. You still have Orban in Hungary, but I think at this point, I mean when you think of Finland and Sweden applying and becoming member of NATO, I mean, both of them are member of the European Union, then in Denmark, the attitude toward the military intervention by EU countries has also changed. They are in favor of it now. So what you have is, I think Macron's idea of a military dimension of the European Union has got much more accepted as a result of the invasion. Everybody knows what Putin is capable of continuing to do concerns everyone. So he will not stop with the Baltic states and maybe Georgia and Moldova, but now then there's the possibility of a nuclear war. But look, before the 24th of February, I says Putin will not be so stupid to invade. And well, he was so stupid to do that. Now, saying he will not be that stupid to use nuclear weapons. I don't know whether he will be smart, whether he has learned from what happened in the Ukraine. I mean, you have to understand that the resources that he has at hand are limited. I mean, he wants now to have a draft for all of the Russian Federation and that will create a lot of hostility and opposition. I mean, in addition to the body bags that have already arrived, I mean, even if they don't admit how many people have been killed, I mean, estimates say that there are more Russians that have been killed than Ukrainians. Whether that's true or not, maybe it's even, but it goes into 10,000s. And then you have this problem of publishing the military support system. I mean, now they try to get 300 drones from Iran and that is an indication how really miserable the military equipment part of the Russian military really is. But then the other long range issues with Russia that will affect the survival of the system, global warming has an impact of the permafrost environment in Russia and the more the permafrost soil, not only in Siberia, but in other parts begins to thaw, the more problems it will be for the infrastructure, buildings begin to collapse. So railway systems break down as a result of that. So you have really tremendous future problems that Putin is confronted with. And now when you are talking about the energy problem in Germany and other Western countries, I mean, Germany is more exposed than for example, France, because France has close to 60 nuclear power plants is still operating, Germany has three, but they will be closing down very soon. That was Angela Merkel's decision after the catastrophe in Japan, when she was standing next to Abe and telling him, we will close now all nuclear plants because of what happened here. Whether that was a mistake or not, but I mean, she was a chancellor and she was a physicist degree in physics. And so she made a lot of sense at that point. But you have in Germany, you know, really a major attempt to get energy, alternative energy, you know, when you are driving through Germany, you see everywhere the huge solar fields and the windmills and all kinds of other projects are underway, supported naturally by the grains. You know, they are really the driving force behind. What about gas, liquid natural gas? You know, there was some discussion early on in this war where the US was gonna help Germany because it is trying to export LNG from the US mainland to Europe. But the response to that was it'll take years to build the receiving infrastructure to take the gas and, you know, deploy the gas around the country. What's the status of that? Well, they are building one at the Baltic Sea to connect with Norway and then near Bremerhaven, you know, so it's beginning and takes less time than people have assumed. So now you have the possibility of fracking in Germany also. You know, there's a lot of gas underneath but that is a no-no for the greens. So you have this as a problem in the future. I mean, they have made compromises, the greens, but it will be very interesting to see how far they go. I mean, the guy who is really, I think the next chancellor in Germany is now the vice chancellor. His name is Habek, Robert Habek. He's an incredible character. When you watch him speak, when you see him in discussions with people, he has all the stuff, you know, that you need in order to get the problem solved. You know, Manfred, we're out of time, but I do want to invite you back for a continuation of this discussion because there's implications, not only for Germany. We need to discuss other countries in Europe. We need to discuss the implications for countries outside of Europe, like the US as a result of what is happening there. Well, there's one other thing, you know, that one has also to talk about and that is how is the United States seen today in not only Germany, but in Europe. I mean, when you're thinking of the Supreme Court, Germany has since 1948, when West Germany got its constitution, they have a Supreme Court that was built after the model of the American Supreme Court. But the German Supreme Court does not have these idiotic notion of lifetime appointments of judges. And they have two senates, you know, two chambers. So judges, the German Supreme Court are 10 years. They can become reappointed. And then what is, I think, very important, it's not the chancellor or the president who appoints the judges. No, you have a commission, the parliamentary commission set up by the strengths of parties in the Bundestag that make these choices. That's why we have to learn, we have to learn what happens in Europe. We have to learn what happens in Germany. Germany has turned into a global leader and a fulcrum on maintaining the liberal world order. As a result, as a result, don't forget that. As a result of being occupied from 1945 until 1990 by hundreds of thousands of American, British, French and Soviet troops. So in a way you could say, Germany has to think these occupation forces that were there for 75 years, that it became pacified. But today, you could say, well, these pacifying victors of World War II can learn from. Yeah, interesting how the tables have turned, Manfred. Yeah, no, no, no. It's all the other way now. We gotta go, we gotta, we gotta, we gotta get off. But Manfred Henningson, an emeritus political science professor at UH Minoa, joins us from time to time. And this has been really enlightening. Thank you so much. Thank you very much. Thank you so much for watching Think Tech Hawaii. 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