 A key finding is that the global hunger measured with the prevalence of an enrichment, what we call POU, remained relatively unchanged from 2021 to 2022, but is still far above pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels, affecting around 9.2% of the world population in 2022, compared with 7.9% in 2019. This means that 122 million more people face hunger in 2022 than in 2019 before the pandemic. It is projected that almost 600 million people will be chronically undernourished in 2030. This is about 119 million more than in the scenario in which neither the pandemic, nor the war in Ukraine had occurred, and around 23 million more than if 2022 events have not happened. This points to a tremendous setback provoked by the pandemic as well as the immense change of achieving the SDG target to eradicate hunger. Hunger has stalled and even declined in some countries in Asia and Latin America in 2022. These are good news, and this seems to have benefited relatively more from the economic rebound after the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not observed for western Asia, the Caribbean and all subregions of Africa. Those are bad news. Just as the global economic conditions appear to be more favorable for 2022 and the prospects of the reduction in hunger and food insecurity towards pandemic levels seem possible, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine sent another chock through the global economy exacerbating the prices of food. As a result, the recovery observed in 2021 slowed further in 2022. If there was no COVID-19 and there was no war in Ukraine, chronic undernourishment would have been declining. Now what has happened? Global trends in the hunger reflected the combination of two factors interplaying in opposite directions at the household level. First, prices have been affected and it had affected hunger numbers. As noted, global food commodity prices were rising steadily before the war, but the war exacerbated the situation, creating a new surge in food prices. Given the resulting rising food import costs because of the increasing prices, countries that are highly dependent on food imports have been particularly affected. Increasing food prices and general inflation has also affected the poorest segments of the population who spend a larger share of their income on food. The second factor, which goes in the opposite direction, is the income and the income effect of the economic recovery in 2022, which likely contributed to an increase in household disposable income and improved access to food, particularly for the poorest households that have suffered heavy income loss during the pandemic, has helped this situation. Therefore, the stalled situation in global hunger observed for 2022 is the result of the interaction of these two factors, the increase in prices and the recovery of incomes. But certainly in regions who hunger declined like in Asia and Latin America, the income effect has prevailed. In other regions where hunger is still on the rise, both the lack of income recovery and rising prices have prevailed in combination. Urbanization is a mega trend. It's one of the key drivers that we are observing in the long term. That cannot be left unnoticed, and if we are to improve food security and nutrition for the old, we need to take into account this trend. Increasing urbanization, with almost 7 in 10 people projected to live in cities by 2050, is driving changes in the agri-food systems that we cannot understand if we continue to use the traditional urban and rural divide. These changes in the agri-food systems represent both challenges and opportunities to ensure everyone has access to affordable healthy diets. The challenges include a greater availability of cheaper, convenience, pre-prepare, fast foods, often energy-dense and high in fats, sugars, and salt that can contribute to malnutrition, insufficient availability of vegetables, and fruits to meet the daily requirements of healthy diets for everyone. Another problem is the exclusion of small farmers from former value chains and loss of lands and natural capital due to urban expansion. Urbanization also presents opportunities, as it is a result in longer, more formal and complex food value chains that expand income-generating activities in no-farm employment, especially for women and youth, and increase the variety of nutritious foods. Moreover, farmers often gain better access to agricultural inputs and services as urban areas grow closer to rural areas. First, we need to integrate humanitarian development and peace-building policies where there is conflict. Here, peace-building efforts must be linked to livelihood support, nutrition-sensitive social protection, and programs for development of resilient and efficient production and supply chains. Community-based approaches should be a key aspect of post-conflict policies. Second, we need to cope with the risk of climate change. We need to scale up climate resilience across the agri-food systems by reducing climate-related risks and adapting to climate change, relying on climate risk monitoring and early warning systems, and improving access and management of natural productive assets. Third, we need to strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable to economic adversities, which requires strengthening the agri-food system productivity and market linkages along the food supply chain, curbing crises in food prices, and excessive price volatility, boosting job creation and expanding social protection schemes. None of these transformation pathways will work, of course, if poverty and structural inequalities were not tackled, which require empowering vulnerable and marginalized populations, reducing gender inequalities by supporting women's economic activities, and ensuring a more equitable distribution of resources.