 Good morning, Chairman McCall, Ranking Member Meeks, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the DOD Office of the Inspector General's ongoing, robust oversight of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, together with our colleagues from the Department of State, OIG, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, OIG, and the other members of the 20-agency Strong Oversight Working Group. We are actively engaged in a whole-of-government approach to ensure a comprehensive, independent oversight across the full range of U.S. assistance to Ukraine. In January, as has been mentioned, we published our Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Ukraine, and just yesterday, we publicly released a congressionally mandated report updating the status of our joint oversight efforts. As IGs, our office has conducted oversight through two basic means, programmatic audits, evaluations and other reviews, and investigations into allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and other criminal conduct. Since the 2022 invasion, the DOD-OIG has issued five programmatic reports related to U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, including two management advisories that identified areas of concern that we found could impact the DOD's ability to transparently track and report the supplemental funds appropriated for Ukraine, and our most recent report in which we made recommendations to assist the Army with its maintenance inventory and other processes for prepositioned equipment in the region. We currently have some 21 ongoing and planned projects that cover the full spectrum of what is essentially a train and supply mission for the DOD, focusing on, among other things, ensuring that tax dollars are used properly, that there's appropriate accountability for weapons and other material, and that U.S. stocks are appropriately replenished so they're available should they be needed elsewhere. Our ongoing and planned projects suggest critical issues, like security and accountability controls for the transport of weapons and equipment, intelligence sharing, the replenishment of U.S. weapons stockpiles, controls for validating and responding to requests for support, the maintenance and sustainment of weapons provided, the training of Ukrainian soldiers to use those weapons, awards of non-competitive contracts, and the DOD's execution of funds appropriated to assist Ukraine. As our work is authoritative because we follow rigorous established standards and processes, I can't release the results of our oversight projects prior to their completion, but I want to assure you that we at the DOD-OIG are committed to being as agile as possible in bringing our oversight to fruition and as transparent as possible in making the results of that work available to the Congress and the public. One area in which my office has been and will continue to be laser-focused is NUS monitoring known as EUM and enhanced NUS monitoring or EEUM, which is the DOD's tracking of military assistance and sensitive equipment after those assets are transferred to other countries. As an independent overseer of the DOD, the OIG does not conduct EUM or EEUM, but as early as 2020, we issued a report on how the DOD was conducting EEUM of military assistance to Ukraine. Last October, with the fighting ongoing, we issued a classified report in which we determined at a high level that the DOD was unable to provide such monitoring in accordance with the then existing policy because of the limited U.S. presence in Ukraine, and we outlined the actions the DOD was taking to account for the U.S. equipment provided in such circumstances. As the situation has continued to evolve, we are not actively engaged in our third evaluation of EUM, EEUM and Ukraine, and we will continue to focus on this important area looking for opportunities to use agile reporting to release our findings and recommendations in a timely and transparent manner. In addition to this robust slate of programmatic reviews, the DOD-OIG's Defense Criminal Investigative Service is actively engaged in conducting fraud prevention and investigative activities, leveraging its existing relationships and experience conducting investigations in combat environments around the world to ensure the integrity of U.S. assistance to Ukraine. While I cannot, of course, comment on any ongoing investigations, based on our completed work, we have not substantiated any instances of the diversion of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine. The DOD-OIG has more than 90 professionals engaged in oversight of security assistance to Ukraine, including some 20 positions forward deployed in the region, and we are seeking to establish a persistent presence at the MSC in Kyiv to further our future oversight work. Working hand in glove with our oversight partners, my office will continue to make robust, independent oversight of U.S. assistance to Ukraine a matter of the highest priority for as long as the conflict and the need for oversight continue. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to your questions.