 It gives me inordinate pleasure to be able to deputize for Professor Webley, our director and principal, at this inaugural lecture. To deputize for the first time at an inaugural lecture by the first Nigerian to be made professor here at SOAS is of particular significance for me because Nigeria is my own field of study and my own career path has crossed with that of Moshud Baderin. Not only do I have colleagues and ex-students at Usman Amfudio University in Sokoto, Nigeria where Moshud gained a first-class degree in law but his prior training at the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Meduguri, also in Nigeria, was on the same corridor in block two of the main campus where I was a lecturer in the adjacent Department of Languages and Linguistics back in 1979. So I join with all of you in celebrating his trajectory from Northern Nigeria to the Nigerian Bar to the University of Nottingham and to here at SOAS. I will say no more about Moshud because it is his erstwhile colleague from the University of Nottingham, Professor David Harris, whom I will invite in a moment to come up here to speak to you about Moshud. Professor Harris is a professor emeritus in the School of Law and co-director of the Human Rights Law Center of the University of Nottingham. He was formerly the Professor of Public International Law and one-time head of school at the University of Nottingham. He specializes in Public International Law, International Human Rights Law and UK Civil Liberties Law and has published several books in these areas including the Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Cases and Materials on Public International Law, the Inter-American Human Rights System, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in UK Law and Civil Liberties in UK Law, Cases and Materials. The closing remarks will be made by Professor Lynn Welchman who is the head of the School of Law here at SOAS and whose own research interests have coincided to a considerable extent with those of Moshud Badarian having published on Islamic Family Law and through her book on Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States. I'm going to ask you all if I may first to check that you have turned off your mobile phones then I'm also asked to point out to you the fire exits should they be required and at the conclusion of the formal proceedings you are all invited to retire to the vestibule to celebrate over a glass of wine this great day for Moshud Badarian for the School of Law and for SOAS as a whole. Thank you. Well thank you. Ladies and gentlemen it's a really great privilege for me to be here to introduce Moshud Badarian to give his inaugural lecture. He was a student of mine for a number of years some time ago now as his career has progressed in the School of Law at the University of Nottingham and I remember his time there very fondly. I will say one or two things about his career introducing him to you. I will not repeat what has been said so far but once Moshud graduated in law in Nigeria he qualified as a legal practitioner and practiced law initially and then he took one of those momentous decisions that most of us take at some stage in our life. He decided to come to this country to study law at a graduate level and fortunately for us at the University of Nottingham he applied to us and we took the decision to admit him. We offered him a scholarship. We have limited funds and it was one of the wisest decisions I think we ever took to offer Moshud Badarian a scholarship to read for the LLM. He then progressed and did his PhD and I had the very good fortune to supervise him in that connection and I think in our many dialogues I learned as much from him as possibly he learned something from me. It was a very valuable period in my educational career to learn something about Islamic law. That indeed has become the area where he has become most well known indeed well known around the world. Moshud has since completing his PhD had his thesis published as a PhD. It is a leading work in the area in the area in which it covers international law of human rights and Islamic law and since that time Moshud has become someone whose services have been in great demand around the world in respect of his special subject to do with religion and international human rights law. The British Foreign Office called upon him regularly for his assistance and advice and he has given lectures and delivered papers in many countries and advised governments around the world. We invite Moshud back to Nottingham to lecture as much as we can and I remember one graduate student listening to Moshud, a man from Nigeria, I think a partner man from Saudi Arabia saying it was quite remarkable that he had to come to Nottingham in England from Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to learn really what Islamic law was all about. So it does indeed give me great pleasure to introduce Moshud to come and give his inaugural lecture which as you will see from this title on the platform is Religion and International Law Friends or Fos, a very intriguing title. Moshud. Pro director, Professor Graham Furnace, chairman of this occasion from Sir David Harris, the head of School of Law Professor Lynn Welshman, colleagues at Suez and colleagues from other institutions, students, friends and family members present, ladies and gentlemen. I feel highly honored by your presence and I thank you all for finding time out of your busy schedules to attend my inaugural lecture this evening. inaugural lectures are a well academic tradition in Western universities whereby a newly appointed professor inaugurates his appointment by giving a notable lecture in his or her area of expertise reflecting on relevant developments in the field and his or her contributions in that regard. It is however less known that this tradition can be traced back to the early Islamic religious colleges, madrasas, in the Muslim world. In chapter three of his seminal work, The Rise of Colleges, George MacDissie recorded that professorial inaugural lectures were instituted in the Islamic religious colleges, madrasas, in Baghdad and other parts of the Muslim world in the eleventh century whereby a new appointee to a professorial chair will be roped and his appointment heralded with an inaugural lecture by him attended by government officials, scholars, other dignitaries as well as students. He then listed some renowned Muslim religious scholars and thinkers such as Al-Ghazali and Ibn Aqid who had given inaugural lectures on their appointment as professors in the eleventh century in Baghdad. The historical connection between this tradition in modern Western universities and that tradition in early Islamic religious madrasas provide a reflective starter for the topic of my inaugural lecture this evening, which is religion and international law, friends or fools. I have chosen to examine the relationship between religion and international law in my inaugural for two main reasons. Firstly, it relates to the general aspect of my research specialism which focuses specifically on interaction between Islamic law and international human rights law. As Islamic law is based on religion and human rights law is an aspect of general international law, it helps to understand that specific aspect better by engaging with this general aspect. Secondly, I consider the topic to be very relevant to the debate on global peace and security especially at these times. In his fourth and third Hobhouse Memorial Lecture titled, The Return of the Secret, The Argument on the Future of Religion, published in the British Journal of Sociology in 1977, the renowned Harvard professor of sociology, Daniel Bell, observed as follows, and I quote, at the end of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, almost every enlightened thinker expected religion to disappear in the twentieth century. And from the end of the nineteenth century to the middle twentieth century, almost every sociological thinker expected religion to disappear by the onset of the twenty-first century. In his paper, Daniel Bell however predicted, perhaps controversially then, a future resurgence of religion despite the powerful trend of secularization at the time. Since then, there have been many scholarly contributions examining the increased interaction of religion with different aspects of public life globally. One of the recent additions to such scholarship is a volume edited by Graham Ward and Michael Hoso titled, The New Visibility of Religion. On the back cover of which the editors observed, and I quote, since the late nineteen eighties, sociologists have been drawing our attention to an international surge in the public visibility of religion. This has increasingly challenged two central aspects of modern Western European culture. First, the assumption that as we became more modern, we will become more secularized and religion will disappear. And secondly, that religion and politics should occupy radically differentiated spheres in which private conviction did not exert itself within the public realm. The new visibility of religion is not simply a matter of what Kepel famously called the revenge of God, that is, the resurgence of Christian, Islamic and Jewish fundamentalism. Rather, religion is permitting Western culture in many different forms from contemporary continental philosophy, the arts, and the media to the rhetoric of international politicians. This international surge in the public visibility of religion is conceptualized by Hoso and Ward with reference to two models, namely the re-emergence model and the new visibility model. The re-emergence model represents the surge in terms of religion re-manifesting itself after a period of decline. While the new visibility model represents the surge in terms of a new visibility of religion, that is far more complex and nuanced than a simple re-emergence of something that has been in decline in the past. Thus, a relevant preliminary question will be, through which of these two models can we possibly represent the current relationship between religion and international law? Are we experiencing a re-emergence of religion in international law or a new visibility of religion in international law? Or is it a combination of both or none of the above? In my view, religion has never really been completely exiled from international law but has always locked around as part of the international law venture. Indeed, religion has played and continues to play a significant role in the evolution of international law, even though the relationship is often perceived to be complex and controversial for different reasons. On the one hand, the controversy surrounding the relationship may be attributed to the apparent differences in the nature of religion, which is sacred, and the nature of international law, which is secular. On the other hand, religion and international law are identical in other ways. Generally, both religion and law are important social phenomena that relate respectively to fundamental social issues in human society. Both can be seen as systems of social ordering as ethical or normative regimes or semi-autonomous social fields. Also, both religion and international law can be politicized and manipulated by the elite to achieve particular intended objectives, which also add to the complexity and controversy in their relationship. All into its complexity, the relationship between religion and international law can be analyzed from different perspectives, depending on the objective of the one presenting. In this lecture, I aim to examine the relationship from four main perspectives, historical, theoretical, empirical, and doctrinal. These four perspectives, I must say, are not strictly exclusive of one another, but they are very interrelated. For example, the theoretical perspective must, as a matter of necessity, not only be historically aware, but empirically meaningful and also doctrinally relevant. I'm using religion here, the term religion, in a general sense, but I'll give references to specific religions to illustrate my points as I go on. I'll start with the historical perspective. Francis Boyle has noted that the truth of international relations, and to me, to international law as well, could be found only in the details of history. The history of international law is usually delineated by the peace of Westphalia, which is often depicted as the beginnings of modern international law and international relations, and thus conventionally divided into the pre-Westphalian and post-Westphalian periods. That traditional division is essentially Euro-Christian in nature, and has been described as being to a certain degree old fashioned. The important point, however, is that the religion has played a significant role in both divides. Both pre-Westphalian period and post-Westphalian period, historically, religion has played significant role. Before the peace of Westphalia in 1648, religion constituted a fundamental basis for the normative rules regarding the relationship between political powers of that period in different parts of the world. For example, why the early international law jurists in Europe were relying heavily on Judeo-Christian religious writings? Early judicial writers on international law in the Muslim world, for example, were also relying heavily on Islamic religious sources. Although we find out that some 19th century international law jurists, such as James Lorimer and Harry Whitting, hold the view that earlier practices of non-European and non-Christian civilizations did not form part of the heritage of international law. I am of the view with other scholars that the universal history of international law is definitely short-served without reference to earlier relevant practices of other civilizations other than the Euro-Christian civilization. After Westphalia, international law materialized as an essentially secular European construct, but it remained very much influenced by Christian religious dictates. Thus, Henard Steger indicates that the epoch of international law from the 13th to the 18th century was an epoch of international law of Christianity. Christianity formed the major intellectual foundation of legal order for the entire epoch, which entirely brought Europe together, not only into an intellectual religious unit, but also under the political idea of rest-Republican Christianity, a term still used in treaties as late as the 18th century. Hamidullah, a Muslim writer who was also writing in 1941, made the same references, indicating that international law's foundation was so much influenced by Christian doctrines. Over time, after Westphalia, emphasis on the substantive role and influence of religion in international law declined gradually in Europe until modern international law became perceived strictly as a secular positivist legal system. Now, it must be indicated that the intention post-Westphalia was not actually a secularist system. That is, the piece of Westphalia really constituted the triumph of denominationalism against the dominance of the Holy Roman Empire. That is, the emergence of the pluralist state order was premised upon the idea that each dominion will have its own creed. It just happened that pro-Stentatism was particularly well suited to the advancement of a secular public order. So the argument is, actually, the order post-Westphalian was not actually intended to establish a secular order. It was an order which was aimed at a pluralist system. Now, the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945 can be described as the climax in the former substantive secularization and positivization of modern international law. But Christian Tom notes that this strict secularization of international law under the UN system creates a source of potential conflict in the relationship between secularized legal cultures which are customary labeled Western and other legal cultures that wish to uphold their religious roots. This refers particularly to Muslim states. Thus, we are able to appreciate that the 20th century down, religion has become much more relevant within international law, particularly from the perspective of Muslim states. We see also that recently, in the face of diverse contemporary international challenges, especially in respect of issues relating to international peace and security, some international law scholars and jurists have proposed a general request to relevant principles of natural law, as well as religious and cultural values to find ways of expanding the scope of modern international law principles to meet those challenges. Many Islamic or Muslim commentators have also specifically challenged what they consider to be the continued Euro-Christian underpinnings and influences on modern international law and called for an appreciation of the necessary inputs that other religions, especially Islam, can offer to the development of modern international law. Thus, while Christianity is perceived to have played an almost unilateral role, at least from the European perspective, in the historical development of modern international law, other religions now tend to be asserting their respective values as relevant factors to be considered in its continued evolution. This brings us to the examination of the different theoretical perspectives around which the debates regarding this relationship are being diversely framed. Now, the main theoretical question regarding the relationship between international law and religion evolves around whether or not religion ought to have a normative rule in modern international law at all. The complex aspect of the debate is that there are diverse perspectives based on different world views and theoretical arguments. Current literature generally reflects three main theoretical perspectives on the subject, which are classified as the separationist theory, the accommodationist theory, and the double-edged theory. Now, if you look through literature regarding whether religion should have a role in international law at all, one could conveniently classify literature into these three perspectives. Now, I will look at each one of them individually briefly. Now, what do we mean by the separationist theory? The separationist theoretical perspective reflects a circular, positivist view of international law, which advances a strict separation between religion and law and argues that religion should have no normative role in international law at all. It draws mainly from the western particularly American liberal concept of the separation of the church and state, which asserts that religion should be a personal matter restricted to the private sphere of individuals. Scott Thomas, among others, have described this as a Westphalian presumption in international relations. Today, most scholars of international law, particularly from the West, adopt the separationist theory and advocate a circular, positivist international law that is separated from any religious persuasion. For example, in his critique of the arbitration tribunal's reference to Islamic law in the Eritrea versus Yemen case, Professor Michael Resman argued entirely that the essential function of general international law as a circular corpus juris is to provide a common standard and to play a mediating role between states and different cultures and legal systems and belief systems. And thus, international tribunals, according to him, will be well advised to stick to international law in that circular form. A similar point, but in a different context, was made by Antonio Casesi while commenting on the Sabra and Shaterila inquiry of 1982. He argues that the inquiry in this case shone international law in the process and relied completely on religious norms. Also, in his comment on the case concerning the United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran, the court in here argued that the ICJ here mentioned that the tradition of Islam have made substantive contribution to the principle of inviolability of the persons of diplomatic agents and premises. Ilias Banteca argued that there was no need for the court to have made a reference to Islam on this point as there were sufficient substantive principles of international law that the court could have relied on that issue. I submit to the contrary by arguing that such complementary references to religious law by international tribunals in relevant cases reflect an accommodationist approach which can contribute positively to the development of customary international law. I must emphasize that this should, however, not extend to the not extend to the total jettition of international law as appeared to have been the approach taken by the Israeli commission in the Sabra and Shaterila inquiry as analyzed by Cassisi. The separationist theory is essentially based, it's hinged on the concept of neutrality, that is the neutrality argument. It argues that if international law must be neutral in relation to cultures and religions, then the separationist theory is the right way to adopt. The neutrality argument has, however, been challenged both in its national and international context on the contention that the argument is itself based on certain presumptions that are not neutral in themselves. The problem with the neutrality argument is that there is always the need for establishing an appropriate baseline from which deviations from neutrality can be assessed. The choice of which especially in relation to the separationist theory is itself not absolutely neutral. Thus, Professor Erzbeck has indicated, he says, separationism cannot stand outside of the political and religious milieu from which it emerged and honestly claimed to be neutral concerning the nature and contemporary value of religion or the purposes of modern government. The same must be said of its primary competitor, the neutrality theory. Indeed, to demand that any theory of church and state relations transcend its pedigree or its presuppositions and be substantively neutral is to ask for the impossible. The point is the historical awareness of the separationist perspective of international law is generally motivated by a post reformative and post-westphalian interpretation of international relations, which is informed by the European historical experience of the long years of religious wars in Europe between the 16th and the 17th century. I argue that this historical awareness is not universal in the sense that that experience might not have been experienced, might not have been seen by other civilizations. Actually, Scott Thomas has noted that the experience has led to the general impression in modern international relations that when religion is brought into domestic or international public life, it inherently causes war, intolerance, devastation, political upheaval, and may even cause the collapse of the international system. He describes this interpretation of the wars of religion in Europe as both a political mythology of liberalism and the myth of the modern secular state, which continues to affect the way cultural and religion are interpreted in international relations today. And he thereby proposed a new approach to international order which overcomes this Westphalian presumption. Thus, why the separationist theory is historical, as I said, its historical awareness is not necessarily universal but based on an European experience. Caroline Evans, as also mentioned, he said, even if religion is often distinguished from law in Western legal and political philosophy and largely ignored in legal writing, no such division can be neatly maintained in the real world. This is particularly the case in many parts of the world where the law and religion are often deeply intertwined and religion may play a more meaningful and significant role in influencing behavior than thus law. Therefore, the separationist theory does not yet have a universal reception, as religion still plays a significant public role in many states today, and the world still remains divided into secular and non-secular states. This brings me to the second theoretical perspective, the accommodationist theory. Contrary to the separationist theory, the accommodationist theoretical perspectives advances the view that religion can play a positive and important normative role in international law and must therefore be accommodated in that regard. This perception is based generally on a naturalist view of international law, which was traditionally underpinned by religion as earlier analyzed in the historical perspective. Proponents of this view assert that religious considerations are too important for the majority of the world's population to be considered irrelevant or problematic for accommodation in the public sphere of law generally and international law particularly. The main argument of this theory is that since many aspects of international law, such as human rights, humanitarian law, environmental law, disarmament and maintenance of international peace and security, are all underpinned by humanness, considerations of morality and human dignity. Religious traditions and norms can make positive contributions in that regard and must therefore be normatively accommodated within the principles of international law. For example, Christopher Wehramantry, a former judge of the ICJ, is a foremost advocate of this view. He observes that given the strength in the modern world of religious traditions, such as the Buddhist, Christian, Hindu and Islamic, and that they command the allegiance of over three billion of the world's population, there cannot be any doubt that future thinking on international law can benefit deeply from the teachings contained in these traditions. There have been many similar views in that regard. For example, Professor Janis has also indicated that at least religion can contribute in three different ways for the enhancement of international law. Now, with specific reference to international humanitarian law, Karola Nivas has equally argued that religion can have persuasive value to those who are or who consider themselves to be outside the scope of traditional international law, particularly the ever more important non-state actor. It can add an important moral or emotional dimension to reasons for compliance with international law. Even a pragmatic circular advocate of international humanitarian law may see strategic advantages to the selective use of aspects of religious traditions to poster compliance and commitment to the law of war. This accommodationist theory has been found useful by other religious advocates who seek to challenge the Euro-Christian foundations of modern international law and its perceived continue influence on many aspects of modern global order, despite its formal post-U.N. secularization. Now, let Ibrahim Shihata, that is a former Secretary General of the International Center for Assertion of International Disputes, in one of his earlier writings, using the accommodationist approach, pointed to the possible contribution that Islamic law could bring to the development of modern international law. And he noted in that regard, and I quote him, in order to eliminate a major excuse for the violation of international law, there should be greater participation by other legal systems in the formation and development of international law. For, by reflecting to a greater extent on the principles of non-European legal systems in the rules of international law, the validity and fairness of international law will be more widely recognized and more strongly supported. Through this approach, contemporary international law will probably prove to be a more readily accepted system to the vast part of the international community vaguely referred to as the Muslim world. However, the accommodationist theory also has its own limitation. The main weakness and challenge to this theory is that it is usually presented simplistically, with most of its advocates not often acknowledging that there are also traditional provisions within all religions that could be contrary to some principles of modern international law in one way or another. There are mainly contemporary examples of violations of some fundamental principles of international law by states and non-state actors alike who invoke traditional religious principles and viewpoints to justify their actions. Thus, as Maggenis mentioned that religion can bring some positive influence into international law, he also argues that religion also has the potential to complicate the work of international lawyers and scholars, which in essence brings us to the examination of the third theoretical perspective, which is the double edge theory. The double edge theoretical perspective lies between the separationist and the accommodationist theories. It generally reflects a realist view of the relationship between religion and international law, and argues primarily that religion is like a double edge sword that could be utilized either positively or negatively in its relationship with international law and vice versa. The double edge theory advocates on the one hand the important need to recognize that there are religious traditions and norms that are international law friendly and can be utilized positively to promote compliance with international law, but on the other hand it emphasizes the need to also acknowledge that there are traditional religious principles that are apparently conflicting with some international law norms. In addressing the relevance of religion to modern global governance, Richard Falk not only acknowledges the double edge theory, but also points out the effect of each of these two edges and proposed how to deal with it, he said. All great religions have two broad tendencies within their traditions. The first is to be universalistic and tolerant toward those who hold other convictions and identities. The second is to be exclusivist and insist that there is only one true path to salvation, which if not taken result in evil. From such a standpoint, the first orientation of religion is constructive, useful and essential if the world is to find its way to human global governance in the decades ahead. Why the second is regressive and carries with it a genuine danger of a new cycle of religious warfare carried out on a civilizational scale. The hope of the future is to give prominence and support to this universalizing influence of religion and at the same time to marginalize religious extremism based on an alleged dualism between good and evil. While Falk's proposition for dealing with each of the two edges of this theory is logical and admirable, the problematic aspect is with the latter part and that is how to marginalize religious extremism. Realistically, it will be extremely difficult to achieve such marginalization of religious extremism at the grassroots level in many religious societies, so long as the principles and application of secular international law are continued to be seen by the grassroots population, especially in the developing world, as being politically manipulated by the political elite in the developed world and consequently regarded as incapable of doing equity or resolving international crisis impartially, particularly long-running international crisis such as the Israeli-Palestinian crisis in the Middle East. There's no doubt that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis continues to influence the political and religious attitude of many Muslim states, organizations, and individuals in ways that have impacted negatively on the relationship between religion and international law. Mark Goping has emphasized the need for the international community to appreciate the fact that religion has an important role to play in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. He argued that international law's failure so far in resolving the crisis, unquote, stems in large part from its complete neglect of cultural and religious factors, and thus called for greater integration of the religious communities of the religion of the region into the peace-building efforts, are certain that only by including religion in the peace process can we move past fragile and superficial agreements and toward a deep and lasting solution to the crisis. Thus, it is important to note that similar to religion in its relationship with international law, international law can equally have a double-edged effect in its relationship with the religion. On the one hand, international law can positively facilitate the flourishing of religion through its guarantee of international religious freedom and prohibition of international religious discrimination, but could, on the other hand, also be negatively applied to restrict religious beliefs and norms by indiscriminately considering them incompatible with relevant principles of international law. A strict and indiscriminate secular interpretation of international law may sometimes have negative impact on personal religious beliefs and practices of individuals and groups which could diminish their confidence in a strictly secular system of international law. This is apparent, for example, in the current jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, with sanctions deprohibition by some states, the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women in public places, for example, in the Layla Shaheen case, against their belief that such a practice is required by their religion. And also, the Court's view, in another case there, that democracy and human rights could not be respected within a system based on Islamic Sharia. These positions, though, have been well critiqued by human rights scholars and commentators. The possible negative impacts of an indiscriminate international secularism on the relationship between religion and international law are well reflected in Elizabeth Hart's observation that in an interdependent world in which individuals draw from different sources of morality and indiscriminate secularism leads to three risks. There is the potential of a backlash from proponents of non-secular alternatives who are shot out of deliberations on the contours of public order. There is a risk of shutting down new approaches to the negotiation between religion and politics, in particular those drawn from non-western perspectives. Finally, there is a risk of remaining blind to the limitations of secularism itself. Now, Richard Falk also says, calls this secular, rather than indiscriminate secularism, calls it secular intolerance. And he argues that secular views that hold the line against their perception of religion also can adopt fundamentalist canons of belief and view those who seek to center their identity on religious affiliation as intrinsically evil. Such secular intolerance is as unwelcome with respect to informed patterns of global governance as its religious counterpart. Both religionists and secularists can only contribute to the emergence of human forms of global governance if they adhere to an ethos of tolerance. The double-edged theory thus provides us with an important perspective tool for a critical evaluation of the relationship between religion and international law. It serves as a realist and objective analytical process for understanding and managing that relationship in a manner that can lead to a mutually beneficial interaction between the two systems and thereby facilitate the realization of a more human and universal international law. This is where the importance of human agency comes into play comes into play in the relationship between religion and international law. How the relationship turns out in the end would largely depend on the deliberate choices made by human beings that is both religious and secularist. Our choices in that regard determines how our global order turns out to be peaceful or violent. Thus the double-edged theory calls for good faith, humanness, pragmatism, as well as political and legal dynamism on the path of both religious and secular advocates of international law. This brings us to the examination of the empirical and doctrinal perspectives quickly. Now empirical perspectives, practically we find out that religion can interact with human rights at four levels. The first level is the interaction of religion and international law at the state level. And this usually comes into focus in states that has religion playing a significant public role. For example, Muslim states. Many Muslim states have Islam indicated consistently provided for as the religion of their states and also Islamic law as part of state law. In such instances you find out that the relationship between religion and international law becomes very dominant. But the formal interaction between religion and international law at this level is relatively it is relatively limited in states where religion has no direct formal role in the domestic law. Bantechus has noted for example that while Christianity as the dominant religion does inevitably influence a variety of policies in some western countries, the policy of those countries remain essentially and formally based on secular principles in international relations. The second level is at the regional level and this is the interaction between religion with international law in relation to intergovernmental regional organizations which are called RIGOS, regional intergovernmental organizations in which religion plays a formal role. And the example I have cited is the OIC. Now we find out that the importance of RIGOS that is regional international governmental organizations in international law is well reflected in chapter 8 of the UN Charter. Thus where religion plays a formal role in the objectives of a RIGO that can inevitably create possible interaction between such religion and international law at regional level. Similar to the example about states which I gave earlier, the organization of Islamic conference is a distinctive example in that regard. The OIC Charter for example provides that the organization is to promote Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and economic values among the member states as an important means of achieving progress for humanity. The OIC has adopted many instruments that make reference to Islam as a relevant factor in relation to international law in the Muslim world. However, it has also consistently expressed its commitment to international law and cooperation with the UN but often emphasized the role of Islam in that regard. For example in 2004 the organization made a submission to the UN General Assembly in respect of proposed reforms to the UN Security Council and stated that I quote, any reform proposal which neglects the adequate representation of the Islamic umma in any category of members in an expanded security council will not be acceptable to the Islamic countries. End of quote. This obviously reflects an accommodationist approach as earlier analyzed. Formal interaction between religion and international law at this level is also relatively limited in the case of Rigos where religion does not play a formal role in the system. For example, a proposal by European churches for a formal recognition and reference to Christianity in the constitution of the European Union during the drafting and consultation stages of the constitution was discarded in the end which was obviously a reflection of the separationist theory as earlier analyzed. The third level is the interaction at individual and group levels. Now I argue that as international law has today moved beyond its traditional state centric nature it applies not only strictly to states but may impact directly or indirectly on the lives and activities of individuals groups and other non-state actors respectively. Thus the interaction between religion and international law occurs not only in relation to the state practices and intergovernmental organization but also in relation to the religious beliefs and practices of individuals and groups. Relevant aspect of international law set as human rights environmental law refugee law and humanitarian law brings international law into direct contact with the religious beliefs and practices of individuals and groups in different parts of the world today. As earlier noted, international human rights law acknowledges the importance of religion in human society by providing for the right to freedom of religion which includes the right to collective practice and public manifestation of religion by individuals and groups so long as this does not violate public order or the fundamental rights of others. It also prohibits religious discrimination against individuals and groups which apparently facilitates the flourishing of religion and enables individuals and groups to plead the right to religious freedom in defense of their religious beliefs and values which augurs for a harmonious relationship. On the other hand international law does challenge religious norms in different ways which equally raises the possibility of a conflicting relationship between the two in relation to individuals and groups. A common example is the possibility of conflict between the limits of freedom of expression and freedom of religion under international human rights law. A typical example of this was the Salman Rushdie affair in 1988-89 and the Dutch cartoon incident of 2006 in relation to Islam and Muslims. The fourth level is the interaction of religion and international law with non-governmental organizations, the NGO levels. Now there are many NGOs motivated mainly by religious principles and values into participating actively and positively in different areas of international law. The need for interaction between religion and international law at the level of NGOs and other religious institutions was demonstrated in the hosting of a conference on interfaith cooperation to promote world peace within the context of international law at the UN headquarters in June 2005 at the end of which the conference recommended quotes an expansion and deepening of the relationship between the United Nations and civil society including religious organizations end of quote. The relationship at this level is also demonstrated by the active involvement and influence of religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church on issues such as abortion, death penalty, use of force, human rights and other important issues of international law. The consequential question from this empirical analysis is whether these different practical levels of interaction between religion and international law establish any legal basis for religion as a possible normative source of obligation or right under international law which brings us to the doctrinal perspective. As Ellie stated the UN Charter makes no direct reference to religion as a source of international law. However the Charter does not also contain any provision prohibiting relationship or interaction between religion and international law. Article 38 of the ICJ statute provides that the main sources of international law are international treaties, customer international law and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Certainly where state parties to an international treaty consent to the inclusion of religious principle as a religious principle or norm as part of a treat as a provision of a treaty this will be binding on the parties as long as such religious principle or norm does not violate a preemptive norm of use against under international law. A good example of this is the provision in article 20 paragraph three of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which includes the concept of kafala of Islamic law as a recognized means of alternative care for a child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or a family environment. This inclusion of a relevant norm of Islamic law in a substantive provision of an international treaty under international law demonstrates the practicality of the accommodationist theoretical perspective earlier analyzed. Now with regard to customary international law I earlier argued that the approach of the international tribunal in the Eritrea case and the United States diplomatic consular case each of which refer to relevant religious principles in their respective cases can contribute positively to develop and customer international law especially in relation to the identification of local custom among a group of states that follow particular local practices accepted as law between them. For example in the Eritrea case the tribunal had referred entirely to Islamic principles to establish that on quote the traditional fishing regime around the Harnish and Zucar islands and the islands of Jabaltair and Zubei group is one of free access and enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen which must preserve for their benefit. That approach was in my view a relevant and valid means of establishing the local custom that in that context between the parties based on the facts before the tribunal. Similarly in the Saudi Arabia and Aramco case the international arbitrator referred to relevant principles of Islamic law and even a quotation from the Quran to support the customary nature of the universal recognition of the principle of Pactosan-Sevander international law by observing that Islamic law recognizes that agreement and pact must be fulfilled in good faith as expressed in the Quran and it quoted the verse of Quran which says be faithful to your pledge when you enter into a pact. Another significant example can be cited of George Weiramantri as he then was dissenting opinion in the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons case in 1996. Now Weiramantri argued he says in that dissenting opinion which is quite I mean a very useful document if we can find it out and read he says it greatly strengthens the concept of humanitarian loss of war to note that this is not a recent invention nor the product of any one culture the concept is of ancient origin with a lineage stretching back at least three millennia as already observed it is deep rooted in many cultures Hindu, Buddhist, Chinese, Christian, Islamic and traditional African. These cultures have all given expression to a variety of limitations on the extent to which any means can be used for the purpose of fighting one's enemy. The problem under consideration is a universal problem that is the problem about nuclear weapons in the court and this court is a universal court whose composition is required by its statute to reflect the world's principal cultural traditions. The multicultural traditions that exist on this important matter cannot be ignored in the course consideration of this question for to do so would be to deprive its conclusions of that plenitude of universal authority which is available to give it added strength, the strength resulting from the death of the traditions historical roots and the width of its historical spread. The right judge as then was then went on to provide detailed analysis of the relevant principles of the different religions to accumulate religious universal support for his view or for his opinion that the use of threats of use of nuclear weapons must be seen as illegal in all consequences under international law although the majority decision of the court said no but he using religious principles indicated that I mean all religious principles including international knowledge perception pointed to the fact that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. Other cases in which the ICD has referred to religious principles include the Western Sahara case in which the court observed into earlier on the question of sovereignty in international law that and I quote the court stated I quote even the Darul Islam under classical Islamic political theory recognized separate states within the common religious bond of Islam to establish its finding that Western Sahara was a state of a special character at the time of the Spanish colonization and also in the legal consequences of the construction of the world occupied Palestinian territory the court also to complement its reference to the general guarantees of freedom of movement under article 12 of the international covenant on civil and political rights noted and I quote account must also be taken of specific guarantees of access to the Christian Jewish and Islamic holy places and that the status of the Christian holy places in the Ottoman Empire dates far back in time. The above cases and references by the international tribunals established that while religion may not serve directly as a normative source of the population and international law it could nevertheless serve as a valid complementary means of establishing customer international law or establishing state practice in relevant cases are confirmed by the tribunal in the Eritrea versus Yemen case again in relation to Islamic law that I quote in today's world it remains true that the fundamental moralistic general principles of the Quran and the Sunnah this what the court was saying may validly be invoked for the consolidation and support of positive international law rules in their progressive development towards the goal of achieving justice and promoting the human dignity of mankind the same is true of relevant moralistic general principles of all other religions as was eruditely reflected by George Williamantry in his dissenting opinion in the nuclear weapons case they have also been representation by state representatives and scholars of international law for possible reference to religious principles through article 38 of the ICJ statute on the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations as well as through article nine which provides that in electing the judges of the ICJ the election shall be in mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be assured in a memorandum presented by delegates of muslim states to the league of nations in september 1939 and to the UN conference in san francisco in april 1945 it was submitted that islam constituted one of the main forms of civilization and islamic law one of the principal legal systems of the world referred to in article 38 of the statute of the permanent court of international justice under the league of nations which was subsequently adopted as article 38 of the ICJ statute a survey of different statements by muslim states and the OIC reflect that this perception still hold is still held by many muslim states today a similar assertion has been made by sharp tyrosine in the context of judaheism and the development of international law to the effect that the provisions of article nine of the ICJ statute is a positive acknowledgement of the need for international law to draw upon the general legal experience of mankind and other religions which he argued draws attention to setting features of what might be termed the intellectual components of public international law and as such as it's been increasingly recognized it has wider implications thus even within the conventional doctrines of modern international law it is possible to find both direct and indirect legal basis for a complementary and harmonistic use of religious traditions and norms for the enhancement of international law rules in relevant instances for further enhancement of the universal legitimacy of international law this brings me to my conclusion the primary question of my lecture as depicted by the title was religion and international law friends of four that is whether religion and international law are friends or foes one of the points that comes out clearly I hope from my analysis is that there is a that as a matter of fact there is an old and ongoing romance between religion and international law which would be very difficult if in if not impossible to to dissolve the strings of that romance are however in the hands of people as human agents for both religion and international law to pool for better or for worse on the strength of my overall analysis hearing my perception is that neither the separationist theory nor the accommodationist theory can exclusively bring the best out of this relationship between religion and international law for the benefit of our common humanity a strict adherence to the separationist theory portrays or actually encourages an adversarial relationship between religion and international law and closes our eyes to the positive contributions that religion has made and who still made for the enhancement of enhancement and legitimacy of modern international law universally while the accommodationist theory portrays a harmonistic picture between religion and international law we need also to be cautious of its idealist tendency that may also lead us to naively disregard possible areas of tension needing careful consideration and resolution for the benefit of our common humanity that then leads me to submit that the relationship between religion and international law must be objectively understood as a double edge relationship that can either be a friendly or adversarial one depending on what we the human agents of the relationship that is both religionist and secularist deliberately want or frame it to be abdulla and naeem has noted relatedly in that regard that quote reference to states countries or international organization that like the united nations is really to people who control the state apparatus in habitat country or walk through international institutions and that whether institutions and organizations are religious political or diplomatic the question about their relationship to international law is always about how people negotiate power justice and pragmatic self-interest at home and abroad on the one hand the importance of international law will continue to be felt as the world becomes globally smaller and nation states and peoples become more interdependent on one another on the other hand the fact that there are people and societies that still have strong religious convictions in every part of the world means that religion will continue to have significant impact on international law in each of their identified levels of interaction into the future evidently the growing interest and wave of scholarship on the subject is a strong indication in that regard even though this as observed by jonathan fox is often overlooked by the mainstream literature on international law and international relations i strongly believe believe however that if international law must achieve its aim of developing a legal framework that emphasizes our common humanity and dignity in today's world then international lawyers and scholars can no longer afford to ignore the importance that religion plays for many individuals and many societies today and predictably will continue to play in the future i argue that it will definitely be for the benefit of both religion and international law and for the enhancement of our common humanity if we all as human agents of both systems strive to promote a friendly and humanistic relationship between the two systems rather than a belligerent or adversarial one we can achieve this by not downplaying the areas of common ground between the two systems but rather are centuating those areas of common ground we must also be committed to resolving the problem areas of tension with good faith and with the principal aim of promoting global peace and stability this is not impossible if we adopt the principle i'll call everything can be discussed i picked up this phrase everything can be discussed you know from a friend that is one of my hosts in a recent visit to malaysia that friend in trying to resolve an argument he said don't fight everything can be discussed it struck me immediately that this was the best principle for resolving tensions between religion potential differences including tensions between religion and international law this becomes even easier where we first acknowledge and accentuate the many areas of common ground between the two systems that is where my main contribution in this field has been with my research outputs promoting and emphasizing the possibility of a harmonistic relationship between international law international human rights law and islamic law particularly in muslim states an approach which i am pleased to say is increasingly being appreciated by other scholars on the subject as well as policymakers and other relevant institutions once again i'm highly honored by your presence and i thank you greatly for your audience and attention thank you very much