 It is my great pleasure now to introduce Frans Timmemens, who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Netherlands. He is here in Washington, in addition to coming here to speak with us, to meet with administration officials and congressional officials to talk about Ukraine and the developing crisis in the eastern part of Europe. And he just is coming to us from the Baltic state, so he is fresh from that experience. His bio is in front of all of you, and if you look at it, you will see that he began his career with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He worked for much of his career on European integration. He served in the Dutch embassy in Moscow. You will see that he speaks seven languages, and his English is better than mine. He has been a member of parliament since 1998, serving with the Labour Party. And throughout that period, he has focused heavily on Dutch foreign and defense policy, and he has served for three years as the Minister of European Affairs. But what you won't find in his biographic material are some of the following things. First, yesterday he went to Arlington National Cemetery, and there he paid homage to a young Jewish soldier from Brooklyn named Leo Lichten, who during the Second World War died just several miles from his home, liberating Europe. And he yesterday paid homage to him. He has been working on Leo Lichten's life for about eight years. He's written a short book about this. He tends to his grave site. And I believe this is sort of symbolic of the bond that you feel between the United States and Europe. He is also a strong believer in social equality and equal opportunity. One of his favorite musicians is Bruce Springsteen, so I have another bond with you and the boss. His favorite American presidents include Harry Truman and Teddy Roosevelt. And so it's a bipartisan approach, but you find in that a great deal about you that reflects on you. He is an avid reader. I gave him a copy of our book two days ago, and I have no doubt that he's read it cover to cover, and he is prepared to address it. Mr. Minister. Thank you very much for this introduction, which is way too kind, I have to say. And thank you to the Center for Strategic and International Studies for having me here today. And I'm looking forward to talking to you about current issues, about the pivot to Asia, about what binds us, the European Union, the Netherlands, and the United States. And after being here, I'll leave for Ottawa. But the ambassador has agreed to take me to The Wall, the Vietnam War Memorial. Hans referred to Bruce Springsteen on his penultimate album. There is this wonderful song called The Wall about one of his friends, or somebody he admired from New Jersey, who was drafted into the army or into the Marines and was killed in Vietnam, and whose name is on The Wall. And I think this song that sort of expresses Bruce Springsteen's feelings of guilt that he was not drafted and his friend was, I think symbolizes sometimes also our attitude towards violent conflict, towards the need to be involved or disengage. And I think it's important to reflect upon this because we are faced with a huge challenge in this day and age because I believe we need to convince our sovereigns, our people, our electorates, that geopolitics is back, that we need to act upon geopolitics, that this might entail sacrifice, or this might entail steps that we are no longer used to. I'll try and elaborate on this because I think it is important that we convince our electorates of the importance of being engaged, of the importance of the transatlantic ties and of the importance to look at the world through the eyes of people who have to rekindle their understanding of geopolitical developments. The first time I went to Moscow after having left as a diplomat was as an official with the European Commission. The then commissioner for foreign relations was a Dutchman, Hans van der Broek, and he went to Moscow to visit President Yeltsin. We were received by President Yeltsin and his then Foreign Minister, Kozirev, who I had known when I was still stationed in Moscow. President Yeltsin turned to Kozirev and asked him, who is this man? And Kozirev said that is a European commissioner. Well, commissioner sounds familiar to a Russian, but doesn't necessarily have the same meaning. So President Yeltsin was intrigued, and then he said, the commissioner of what? And Kozirev said, well, of the European communities. And then the president said of what? The European Union, Mr. President. And he said, ah, Andriyosha, tell me, are we members of the European Union? Just to tell you how confused relations on the European continent were during those years. How confused a country like Russia was in trying to determine its position in this new state of play on this continent. How confused all of us have been for many years on this issue. How confused even a great thinker like Professor Francis Fukuyama was when he announced the end of history. Boy, was he off the mark. But we did see in Europe an end of something, and I think we need to be brutally honest about this. We forgot in Europe to look at our continent and our surroundings in geopolitical terms. We thought that in these new relations, old ghosts would belong to the past and would not return. We thought that power relations would become less important and that economic relations would dictate the way the continent would be run. We thought that, and this was perhaps the biggest mistake, that all countries on the European continent were in a phase of transition into becoming like us, including Russia. And I think this is something we need to focus on. Russia is indeed changing constantly, but it's not in the same sort of transition as Poland or the Czech Republic or Slovakia or Hungary or other countries have been. And it took us a long time to see this. And to accept and also analyse the full consequences of the situation. I believe that today we do see the consequences of this and we're waking up to it, but we have not invested in public support for the need to react to those developments. Thank you for the support. In Asia, in our relationship with Asia, I would like to start by referring to Bob Kaplan's excellent book, Monsoon, where he raises a number of issues I think are very important for our analysis of the situation. By the way, I fundamentally disagree with Bob Kaplan when he says that Europe is a thing of the past and should be simply ignored. And I'll come to that later on. But I think he's got a number of strong points. For instance, when he says, if there is a confrontation with Asia, it's not going to be on ideology. And that is an important thing to keep in mind when we devise our policies. Secondly, he also says that China will be a reluctant power in terms of geopolitics because China will want to concentrate on its internal development and will be hesitant when drawn into international affairs with the exception of those affairs relating to the immediate surroundings of China. I think this is a very important point to keep in mind and I would fully agree with Bob Kaplan on this. Thirdly, and there I think we start to disagree, he points to trade routes and trade routes determining geopolitical developments. I think there is a new element that has come into play and that will be consistently more important in the future and that is energy patterns. Energy patterns are quickly changing because of shale gas discovery, because of continued discovery of new sources of especially natural gas worldwide, but also because obviously of the crisis in Europe, between Russia and the rest of Europe. And I think we would be greatly helped if we were to look at the relations between the transatlantic world and the rest of the world if we would look at that through the prism of developing energy patterns, of developing energy interdependence or changing energy patterns. I think this is a work that needs to be done in the next couple of years and we as a pivotal country in the energy field are certainly going to try and develop some thoughts on that. Fourth element, which I think is important before we go into the conclusions that we could draw from this, are demographic patterns. We tend to underestimate the influence of demographic changes worldwide. I think if you look at a country like Russia and you look at its demographic challenges, boy are they challenged. One million less people every year and a very low rate of birth and surrounded by countries where the rates are very much higher. The implications for that I think fundamental and also have everything to do with a relationship with Asia. Where does this leave Europe and where does this leave the United States and our transatlantic bond? First of all, I think that the transatlantic ties are today stronger than ever before. They are stronger not just because we have this current issue we need to deal with and Europe cannot deal with it alone. The United States cannot deal with it without Europe so we're actually in this together. But also because I believe that changing patterns are more equal world that is now emerging. We have underestimated the element of geopolitics in that new world that is now coming about and those of us with experience in geopolitics are probably better placed than those in the world like China who are actually very reluctant to become involved in geopolitics. So I think this is an asset we should develop, we should be aware of and we should use jointly. The weakness we face is not a weakness from outside, it's a weakness from inside. I think it is important that both in the United States and in Europe we rekindle the understanding of our populations that for our prosperity, our security, our future development, engagement in international affairs matters and is of the essence. I think that this feeling has been lost for several reasons and I'll be brutally honest about this. Some of the things we have done in the transatlantic world in the last 15 years are not perceived as very successful by the people in our countries, are not perceived as being in line with our own moral values and our own principles. If you look at situations like Iraq or you can look at Abu Ghraib or Antanamal Bay or you can look at the failure of providing immediate solutions in Libya by the Europeans or you can look at the failure to actually be effective in acting in Egypt or in Syria, there's a strong feeling that first of all do we respect our own values when we act externally? Do we respect our own values in our relations transatlantically? Sometimes I think in the United States people underestimate the profound psychological effect on America's best ally which is Germany of coming to the realization that the German Chancellor cannot talk on our telephone without being listened to by the NSA. I think this has a huge profound effect on public opinion far more important than people sometimes think. So we need to fix that. It's important that we fix that. Support of our public will have to come by showing that what we do is in line with our values and that we will not act if we breach our fundamental values. If we want to be believed we need to practice what we preach otherwise we will not be believed. You should have seen the public reaction recently when John Kerry said and I fully agreed with him when he said it is unacceptable to invade a foreign country and take away part of that country. For many Europeans, I have to be honest about this, the reaction was well what has the United States been doing in Iraq? They can't see the differences. So in that sense, I think being brutally honest about having to stick to your own values if you want to convince your own public that these values matter when you act internationally is of the essence. And sometimes, you know, like the Obama administration is to no fault of the Obama administration is left with a legacy of a previous administration and is confronted with that legacy by its own population and by its international partners. And we all have to face in democracies this reality. So my first point here is our values are of the essence and abiding by our values is essential to be able to formulate a geopolitical stance that will be supported also in the long run. That's my first point. My second point is people will support us if they understand why. And the why hasn't been part of public debate and education and the media in the last, less and less in the last 25 years because of the end of the European divide. And I believe that we live in a day and age where foreign policy can no longer be based on the trust me attitude of politicians. I know you don't understand it, dear public, but trust me, I know what I'm doing, support me. That doesn't work anymore. That used to be the way foreign policy worked. Let's be honest about this, but it doesn't work anymore. So we need to go to a show me situation where we can show to the public that what we do is based on our values, it is in our interest and it is third point effective. So when we formulate our action, geopolitical action, on a transatlantic basis, has to be in conformity with our values, people need to understand why it is in our interest. And thirdly, it has to matter, it has to be effective. It has to be effective. I think this is a great approach of our transatlantic bond in tackling global issues. Ukraine today, certain issues perhaps in Asia or Africa, tomorrow, certain relations with our partners worldwide. In the case of Asia, this means that especially Europe needs to step up to the plate and not just see Asian relations as economic relations. We have neglected the geopolitical side of our relationship with Asia. We all fly to China on a daily basis to do business and then we fly to Japan and to Korea and other places. We don't talk enough with our Japanese friends or Korean friends or Chinese friends about the challenges they face in their bilateral or trilateral relationship. We leave that entirely to the United States. I think that is highly unfair and is not sustainable in the long run given the economic ties between these countries in Europe. Europe needs to take more responsibility also in trying to create more stability and less tension in Southeast Asia by being engaged and not just leaving that up to the United States. The engagement can start by being supportive of the United States, but at some stage this role needs to be complemented by a role that Europe needs to devise on its own. Another very important element in our relationship with Asia is that Europe needs to use its excellent relations with individual ASEAN countries to create more stability in the region. It is something those ASEAN countries are asking for and we should provide an answer to that request. Some of us have better relations with individual countries in ASEAN but collectively we as European Union should be doing more in helping ASEAN, for instance, increase the position of the rule of law and human rights, the values in those countries and there is a willingness to act upon this in ASEAN countries. I think Indonesia has provided leadership here but also Thailand and other countries although they are struggling with social unrest sometimes want to move in this direction. Transatlantic partners should understand that this will not be at a pace we would like to see but it will be in the right direction and we need to cooperate with them. For instance, in something we have developed on a national basis in trilateral programs to try and enhance human rights. My country wants to be active in promoting human rights in Burma, Myanmar but it's very difficult for us as Europeans to be seen as active there. Indonesia has developed a number of programs to strengthen the rule of law, to look at human rights, to look at interracial relations within that country. It is not seen as intrusive if Indonesia does it. We have some background and knowledge in that area. We have some funds we could put to this and in a trilateral program we can be far more effective than in two bilateral separate programs and this is the sort of thing we want to develop more and more in Asian countries. Now I hope you will forgive me that I want to turn back to challenges we have on the European continent. I think it is of the essence that we do not react with tactics to tactics. What I'm trying to say is this, what the Russian President Putin has been doing in the last couple of months is I think a series of tactical moves because he is great at that but without a real strategic concept because he's not very good at that and this is a constant thing I have seen in the last 30 years in Russia. Tactical moves that have unintended but sometimes far-reaching strategic consequences. There is no doubt in my mind that President Garbachev, when he started with Glasnost and Perestroika did not have the intention to end communism or to end the Communist Party of the Soviet Union but he thought in tactical terms if I remove alcoholism, if I remove inertia by creating more openness people will be so grateful they will reward me by accepting the Communist Party forever as ruling party. They did not have the capability or it was just beyond their imagination that if you give people freedom they would perhaps also act upon it with freedom. So that was also I think a series of tactical moves with far-reaching and unintended strategic consequences. Likewise after the August 91 revolution when President Garbachev came back and of course Yeltsin saved the day he's the one that prevented this backlash from actually happening. I was in Moscow at the time, I have vivid memories of that but then the tactical move by Yeltsin was to remove a layer of Soviet rule and take that position with his friends Kravchuk with his friends in Ukraine and Belarus the unintended strategic consequence was the end of the Soviet Union but it wasn't part of the strategy it was a consequence of tactical steps and now again the tactic undertaken by Russia is to bring a government in Ukraine to heel. I think it is unpredictable what these long-term strategic consequences of these tactics are but I do believe we have a strong responsibility first of all as Europeans but especially also in our relation with our transatlantic ally to beware of possible long-term strategic consequences of these tactical moves does this mean that we will have a fundamental change of geopolitical rules of the game? I don't know but it might and we need to prepare for that possibility better safe than sorry so even though because we never know what the strategic consequences of these tactical moves might be I think we need to prepare for a number of scenarios including the possibility of longer-term confrontation on the European continent I hope we can avoid this from happening but we need to rid ourselves of the possibility of wishful thinking here that because we don't want it to happen that it might not happen we don't want it to happen my country jointly with Germany and other European nations and the United States because I really really admire John Kerry's leadership in this we should try and do everything we can to avoid this from happening but if it happens anyway we need to be prepared and we could only be prepared if the transatlantic bond is strong modernized if we step up to the plate as Europeans if we do much more in creating synergies between European armed forces we are wasting so much money we're wasting billions of taxpayers' money because we still have these individual armed forces that do not cooperate enough and we will have to look all of us at NATO into our defence spending especially in the longer period of time I'm not saying this as a warmonger on the contrary I'm saying this because I believe we need to be prepared for various possibilities of scenarios that might develop Ukraine itself is going to be a big challenge because we also treated that country for 20 years with what I would call benign neglect I think the United States if I'm not mistaken invested at least $5 billion in that country and the European Union collectively probably even more than that but we were never very strict with them in terms of their development of the rule of law in terms of the way they treated the political class etc etc and President Putin can is able to stir up unrest in Ukraine the Ukrainian government is unable to steer everyone in their armed forces and police forces in Ukraine because the political class in Ukraine has been discredited completely in the eyes of the Ukrainian population because their action was primarily geared at lining their pockets at the expense of the Ukrainian people instead of using the best forces they have to create prosperity for a country that could be so much more prosperous than it is today so also here we need to increase our efforts collectively in creating fundamental rules of a rule of law based state respect for human rights etc etc democracy everything we have done in Central and Eastern European countries over the last 25 years extremely successfully needs to be applied also I think to Ukraine if we are to create stability in that country in the long run let me finish on this we have taken each other for granted for too long the Americans and the Europeans we will be able to set the course for the future of this world if we stick together it is very simple if we are able to see TTIP for what it is not a free trade agreement TTIP is a geostrategic agreement it is a political agreement it should not be left up to people who know everything about the way you kill chickens it should be something our political leaders should take up and decide upon soon because if we have TTIP in place it will change the nature of the game globally because then the United States and Europe will have set the rules of the game and the others will follow suit including China Japan and others I say this with the experience also of the internal market of the European Union because I remember we were on the severe criticism when we came up with this idea of high standards people were saying you are going to lose global competition if you set high standards but if you set high standards in the biggest market of the world if you set high standards with consumers who have the biggest spending power in the world the rest of the world who want to sell you their goods will adopt your standards and will not impose their lower standards on you and I believe if TTIP is set in place based on our common values human rights, equity, the rule of law, treaties not power dictate how we act this will change the nature of the game and other countries will follow suit including Russia sooner or later thank you very much