 Preface of Philosophical Essays by Bertrand Russell. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Landon D.C. Elkind at the University of Iowa in Coralville, Iowa. Philosophical Essays by Bertrand Russell. Preface. The following essays, with the exception of the last, are reprints, with some alterations, of articles which have appeared in various periodicals. The first three essays are concerned with ethical subjects, while the last four are concerned with the nature of truth. I include among the ethical essays the one on the study of mathematics, because this essay is concerned rather with the value of mathematics than with an attempt to state what mathematics is. Of the four essays which are concerned with truth, two deal with pragmatism, whose chief novelty is a new definition of truth. One deals with the conception of truth advocated by those philosophers who are more or less affiliated to Hegel, while the last endeavors to set forth briefly, without technicalities, the view of truth which commends itself to the author. All the essays, with the possible exception of the one on the monistic theory of truth, are designed to appeal to those who take an interest in philosophical questions, without having had a professional training in philosophy. I have to thank the editor of the New Quarterly for permission to reprint the study of mathematics, and sections 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the essay on the elements of ethics. And for section 4 I have to thank the editor of the Hibbert Journal. My acknowledgments are also due to the editors of the Independent Review, the Edinburgh Review, the Albany Review, and the proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for permission to reprint the essays 2, 4, 5, and 6 respectively. In the 6th essay, as originally printed, there was a third section, which is now replaced by the 7th essay. Oxford, July 1910. Post Script The death of William James, which occurred when the printing of this book was already far advanced, makes me wish to express what in the course of controversial writings does not adequately appear, the profound respect and personal esteem which I felt for him, as did all who knew him, and my deep sense of the public and private laws occasioned by his death. For readers trained in philosophy, no such assurance was required, but for those unaccustomed to the tone of a subject in which agreement is necessarily rarer than esteem, it seemed desirable to record what to others would be a matter of course. October 1910. End of Preface Chapter 1 of Philosophical Essays by Bertrand Russell This LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Recording by Landon D.C. Elkind at the University of Iowa in Coralville, Iowa. The Elements of Ethics, Footnote 1. What follows is largely based on Mr. G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica, to which the reader is referred for fuller discussions. Parts 1 and 2 of the following essay are reprinted from the New Quarterly, February 1910, Part 3 from the New Quarterly, May 1910, Part 4 from the Hibbert Journal, October 1908, and Parts 5 and 6 from the New Quarterly, September 1910. End of Footnote 1. Part 1, The Subject Matter of Ethics. Section 1. The study of ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being concerned with the questions, what sort of actions ought men to perform, and what sort of actions ought men to avoid. It is conceived, that is to say, as dealing with human conduct and as deciding what is virtuous and what vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice, people are called upon to choose. Owing to this view of the province of ethics, it is sometimes regarded as the practical study to which all others may be opposed as theoretical. The good and the true are sometimes spoken of as independent kingdoms, the former belonging to ethics, while the latter belongs to the sciences. This view, however, is doubly defective. In the first place, it overlooks the fact that the object of ethics, by its own account, is to discover true propositions about virtuous and vicious conduct, and that these are just as much a part of truth as true propositions about oxygen or the multiplication table. The aim is not practice, but propositions about practice, and propositions about practice are not themselves practical, any more than propositions about gases or gaseous. One might as well maintain that botany is vegetable or zoology animal. Thus, the study of ethics is not something outside science and coordinate with it, it is merely one among sciences. Section 2 In the second place, the view in question unduly limits the province of ethics. When we are told that actions of certain kinds ought to be performed or avoided, as for example, that we ought to speak the truth, or that we ought not to steal, we may always, legitimately, ask for a reason. And this reason will always be concerned, not only with the actions themselves, but also with the goodness or badness of the actions likely to follow from such actions. We shall be told that truth speaking generates mutual confidence, cements friendships, facilitates the dispatch of business, and hence increases the wealth of the society which practices it, and so on. If we ask why we should aim at increasing mutual confidence, or cementing friendships, we may be told that obviously these things are good, or that they lead to happiness, and happiness is good. If we still ask why, the plain man will probably feel irritation, and will reply that he does not know. His irritation is due to the conflict of two feelings, the one that whatever is true must have a reason, the other that the reason he has already given is so obvious that it is merely contentious to demand a reason for the reason. In the second of these feelings, he may be right. In the first, he is certainly wrong. In ordinary life, people only ask why when they are unconvinced. If a reason is given, which they do not doubt, they are satisfied. Hence, when they do ask why, they usually have a logical right to expect an answer, and they come to think that a belief for which no reason can be given is an unreasonable belief. But in this, they are mistaken, as they would soon discover if their habit of asking why were more persistent. It is the business of the philosopher to ask for reasons as long as reasons can legitimately be demanded, and to register the propositions which give the most ultimate reasons that are attainable. Since a proposition can only be proved by means of other propositions, it is obvious that not all propositions can be proved, for proofs can only begin by assuming something. And since the consequences have no more certainty than their premises, the things that are proved are no more certain than the things that are accepted, merely because they are obvious, and are then made the basis of our proofs. Thus, in the case of ethics, we must ask why such and such actions ought to be performed, and continue our backward inquiry for reasons until we reach the kind of propositions of which proof is impossible, because it is so simple or so obvious that nothing more fundamental can be found, from which to deduce it. Section 3. Now when we ask for the reasons in favor of the actions which moralists recommend, these reasons are usually that the consequences of the actions are likely to be good, or if not wholly good, at least the best possible under the circumstances. Hence, all questions of conduct presuppose the decision as to what things other than conduct are good, and what bad. What is called good conduct is conduct which is a means to other things, which are good on their own account. And hence the study of what is good on its own account is necessary before we can decide upon rules of conduct, and the study of what is good or bad on its own account must be included in ethics, which thus ceases to be concerned only with human conduct. The first step in ethics, therefore, is to be quite clear as to what we mean by good and bad. Only then can we return to conduct, and ask how right conduct is related to the production of goods and the avoidance of evils. In this, as in all philosophical inquiries, after a preliminary analysis of complex data, we proceed again to build up complex things from their simpler constituents, starting from ideas which we understand, though we cannot define them, and from premises which we know, though we cannot prove them. The appearance of dogmatism in this procedure is deceptive, for the premises are such as ordinary reasoning unconsciously assumes, and there is less real dogmatism in believing them after a critical scrutiny than in employing them implicitly without examination. Part 2. The meaning of good and bad. Section 4. Good and bad, in the sense in which the words are here intended, which is, I believe, their usual sense, are ideas which everybody, or almost everybody, possesses. These ideas are apparently among those which form the simplest constituents of our more complex ideas, and are therefore incapable of being analyzed or built up, out of other simpler ideas. When people ask, what do you mean by good, the answer must consist not in a verbal definition, such as could be given if one were asked, what do you mean by pentagon, but in such a characterization as shall call up the appropriate idea to the mind of the questioner. This characterization may, and probably will, itself contain the idea of good, which would be a fault in a definition, but is harmless when our purpose is merely to stimulate the imagination to the production of the idea which is intended. It is in this way that children are taught the names of colors. They are shown, say, a red book, and told that this is red, and for fear that they should think red means book, they are shown also a red flower, a red ball, and so on, and told that these are all red. Thus the idea of redness is conveyed to their minds, although it is quite impossible to analyze redness, or to find constituents which compose it. In the case of good, the process is more difficult, both because goodness is not perceived by the senses, like redness, and because there is less agreement as to the things that are good, than as to the things that are red. This is perhaps one reason that has led people to think that the notion of good could be analyzed into some other notion, such as pleasure or object of desire. A second reason, probably more potent, is the common confusion that makes people think they cannot understand an idea unless they can define it. Forgetting that ideas are defined by other ideas, which must already be understood if the definition is to convey any meaning. When people begin to philosophize, they seem to make a point of forgetting everything familiar and ordinary. Otherwise their acquaintance with redness, or any other color, might show them how an idea can be intelligible where definition, in the sense of analysis, is impossible. Section 5 To explain what we mean by good and bad, we may say that a thing is good when on its own account it ought to exist, and bad when on its own account it ought not to exist. If it seems to be in our power to cause a thing to exist or not to exist, we ought to try to make it exist if it is good, and not exist if it is bad. When a thing is good, it is fitting that we should feel pleasure in its existence. When it is bad, it is fitting that we should feel pain in its existence. But all such characterizations really presuppose the notions of good and bad, and are therefore useful only as a means of calling up the right ideas, not as logical definitions. It might be thought that good could be defined as the quality of whatever we ought to try to produce. This would merely put ought in the place of good as our ultimate undefined notion, but as a matter of fact, the good is much wider than what we ought to try to produce. There is no doubt that some of the lost tragedies of Aeschylus were good, but we ought not to try to rewrite them because we should certainly fail. What we ought to do in fact is limited by our powers and opportunities, whereas the good is subject to no such limitation. And our knowledge of goods is confined to the things we have experienced or can imagine, but presumably there are many goods of which we human beings have absolutely no knowledge because they do not come within the very restricted range of our thoughts and feelings. Such goods are still goods, although human conduct can have no reference to them. Thus, the notion of good is wider and more fundamental than any notion concerned with conduct. We use the notion of good in explaining what right conduct is, but we do not use the notion of right conduct in explaining what good is. Section 6 A fairly plausible view is that good means the same as desired, so that when we say a thing is good, we mean that it is desired. Thus anything is good, which we either hope to acquire or fear to lose. Yet it is commonly admitted that there are bad desires, and when people speak of bad desires, they seem to mean desires for what is bad. For example, when one man desires another man's pain, it is obvious that what is desired is not good, but bad. But the supporter of the view that good means desired will say that nothing is good or bad in itself, but is good for one person and perhaps bad for another. This must happen, he will say, in every case of a conflict of desires. If I desire your suffering, then your suffering is good for me, though it is bad for you. But the sense of good and bad, which is needed in ethics, is not in this way personal, and it is quite essential in the study of ethics to realize that there is an impersonal sense. In this sense, when a thing is good, it ought to exist on its own account, not on account of its consequences, nor yet of who is going to enjoy it. We cannot maintain that for me a thing ought to exist on its own account, while for you it ought not. That would merely mean that one of us is mistaken, since in fact everything either ought to exist or ought not. Thus the fact that one man's desire, maybe another man's aversion, proves that good, in the sense relevant to ethics, does not mean the same as desired. Since everything is in itself either good or not good, and cannot be at once good for me and bad for you. This could only mean that its effects on me were good, and on you bad. But here good and bad are again impersonal. Section 7. There is another line of argument, more subtle, but more instructive, by which we can refute those who say that good means desired, or who propose any other idea, such as pleasure, as the actual meaning of good. This line of argument will not prove that the things that are good are not the same as the things that are desired, but it will prove that if this were the case, it could not be proved by appealing to the meaning of the word good. So far it might be thought that such an argument could only have a purely logical importance, but in fact this is not so. Many ethical theories happen based upon the contention, that good means so and so, and people have accepted consequences of this contention, which if they had relied upon inspection untrammeled by false theory, they would almost certainly have rejected. Whoever believes that good means desired will try to explain away the cases where it seems as if what is desired is bad. But if he no longer holds this theory, he will be able to allow free play to his unbiased ethical perceptions, and will thus escape errors into which he would otherwise have fallen. The argument in question is this, if anyone affirms that the good is the desired, we consider what he says, and either assent or dissent. But in any case, our assent or dissent is decided by considering what the good and the desired really are. When on the contrary, someone gives a definition of the meaning of a word, our state of mind is quite different. If we are told a pentagon is a figure which has five sides, we do not consider what we know about pentagons, and then agree or disagree. We accept this as the meaning of the word, and we know that we are getting information not about pentagons, but merely about the word pentagon. What we are told is the sort of thing that we expect dictionaries to tell us. But when we are told that the good is the desired, we feel at once that we are being told something of philosophical importance, something which has ethical consequences, something which it is quite beyond the scope of a dictionary to tell us. The reason of this is that we already know what we mean by the good, and what we mean by the desired. If these two meanings always applied to the same objects, that would not be a verbal definition, but an important truth. The analog of such a proposition is not the above definition of pentagon, but rather a pentagon defined as above is a figure which has five angles. Whenever a proposed definition sets us thinking whether it is true, in fact, and not whether that is how the word is used, there is reason to suspect that we are not dealing with a definition, but with a significant proposition, in which the word professively defined has a meaning already known to us, either as simple or as defined in some other way. By applying this test, we shall easily convince ourselves that all hitherto suggested definitions of the good are significant, not merely verbal propositions, and that therefore, though they may be true in fact, they do not give the meaning of the word good. The importance of this result is that so many ethical theories depend upon the denial of it. Some have contended that good means desired, others that good means pleasure, others again, that it means conformity to nature or obedience to the will of God. The mere fact that so many different and incompatible definitions have been proposed is evidence against any of them being really definitions. There have never been two incompatible definitions of the word pentagon. None of the above are really definitions. They are all to be understood as substantial affirmations concerning the things that are good. All of them are, in my opinion, mistaken, in fact, as well as in form. But I shall not here undertake to refute them severally. Section 8 It is important to realize that when we say a thing is good in itself and not merely as a means, we attribute to the thing a property which it either has or does not have, quite independently, of our opinion on the subject, or of our wishes or other peoples. Most men are inclined to agree with Hamlet, quote, there is nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so, end quote. It is supposed that ethical preferences are a mere matter of taste, and that if X thinks A is a good thing and Y thinks it is a bad thing, all we can say is that A is good for X and bad for Y. This view is rendered plausible by the divergence of opinion as to what is good and bad, and by the difficulty of finding arguments to persuade people who differ from us in such a question. But difficulty in discovering the truth does not prove that there is no truth to be discovered. If X says A is good and Y says A is bad, one of them must be mistaken, though it may be impossible to discover which. If this were not the case, there would be no difference of opinion between them. If in asserting that A is good, X meant merely to assert that A had a certain relation to himself, say of pleasing his taste in some way, and if Y in saying that A is not good meant merely to deny that A had a like relation to himself, then there would be no subject of debate between them. It would be absurd if X said, I am eating a pigeon pie, for Y to answer, that is false, I am eating nothing. But this is no more absurd than a dispute as to what is good if, when we say A is good, we mean merely to affirm a relation of A to ourselves. When Christians assert that God is good, they do not mean merely that the contemplation of God rouses certain emotions in them. They may admit that this contemplation rouses no such emotion in the devils who believe and tremble. But the absence of such emotions is one of the things that make devils bad. As a matter of fact, we consider some tastes better than others. We do not hold merely that some tastes are ours and other tastes are other peoples. We do not even always consider our own tastes the best. We may prefer bridge to poetry, but think it better to prefer poetry to bridge. And when Christians affirm that a world created by a good God must be a good world, they do not mean that it must be to their taste, for often it is by no means to their taste. But they use its goodness to argue that it ought to be to their taste. And they do not mean merely that it is to God's taste, for that would have been equally the case if God had not been good. Thus good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as round and square do. And when two people differ as to whether a thing is good, only one of them can be right, though it may be very hard to know which is right. Section 9 One very important consequence of the indefinability of good must be emphasized. Namely, the fact that knowledge as to what things exist, have existed, or will exist, can throw absolutely no light upon the question as to what things are good. There might, as far as mere logic goes, be some general proposition to the effect, whatever exists is good, or whatever exists is bad, or what will exist is better or worse than what does exist. But no such general proposition can be proved by considering the meaning of good. And no such general proposition can be arrived at empirically from experience, since we do not know the whole of what does exist, nor yet of what has existed or will exist. We cannot therefore arrive at such a general proposition unless it is itself self-evident, or follows from some self-evident proposition, which must, to warrant the consequence, be of the same general kind. But as a matter of fact, there is, so far as I can discover, no self-evident proposition as to the goodness or badness of all that exists or has existed or will exist. It follows that, from the fact that the existent world is of such and such a nature, nothing can be inferred as to what things are good or bad. Section 10. The belief that the world is wholly good has nevertheless been widely held, and has been held either because, as a part of revealed religion, the world has been supposed created by a good and omnipotent God, or because, on metaphysical grounds, it was thought possible to prove that the sum total of existent things must be good. With the former line of argument, we are not here concerned. The latter must be briefly dealt with. The belief that, without assuming any ethical premise, we can prove that the world is good, or indeed any other result containing the notion of good, logically involves the belief that the notion of good is complex and capable of definition. If, when we say that a thing is good, we mean, for example, that it has three other, simpler properties, then by proving that a thing has those three properties, we prove that it is good, and thus we get a conclusion involving the notion of good, although our premises did not involve it. But if good is a simple notion, no such inference will be possible. Unless our premises contain the notion of good, our conclusion cannot contain it. The case is analogous to the case of elements and compounds in chemistry. By combining elements or compounds, we can get a new compound, but no chemical operation will give an element which was not present in the beginning. So if good is simple, no propositions not containing this notion can have consequences which do contain it. As a matter of fact, those who have endeavored to prove that the world as a whole is good have usually adopted the view that all evil consists wholly in the absence of something, and that nothing positive is evil. This they have usually supported by defining good as meaning the same as real. Spinoza says, footnote one, ethics part two, definition six, end of footnote one, quote, by reality and perfection, I mean the same thing, end quote. And hence it follows with much less trouble than metaphysicians have usually taken in the proof that the real is perfect. This is the view in Abbott-Vogler, quote, the evil is null, is not, is silence implying sound, end quote. Whenever it is said that all evil is limitation, the same doctrine is involved. What is meant is that evil never consists in the existence of something which can be called bad, but only in the non-existence of something. Hence everything that does exist must be good, and the sum total of existence, since it exists most, must be the best of all. And this view is set forth as resulting from the meaning of evil. The notion that non-existence is what is meant by evil is refuted exactly as the previous definitions of good were refuted. And the belief that as a matter of fact, nothing that exists is evil is one which no one would advocate except a metaphysician defending a theory. Pain and hatred and envy and cruelty are surely things that exist and are not merely the absence of their opposites. But the theory should hold that they are indistinguishable from the blank unconsciousness of an oyster. Indeed, it would seem that this whole theory has been advanced solely because of the unconscious bias in favor of optimism, and that its opposite is, logically, just as tenable. We might urge that evil consists in existence and good in non-existence. That, therefore, the sum total of existence is the worst thing there is, and that only non-existence is good. Indeed, Buddhism does seem to maintain some such view. It is plain that this view is false, but logically, it is no more absurd than its opposite. Section 11. We cannot then infer any results as to what is good or bad from a study of the things that exist. This conclusion needs chiefly, at the present time, to be applied against evolutionary ethics. The phrase, survival of the fittest, seems to have given rise to the belief that those who survive are the fittest in some ethical sense, and that the course of evolution gives evidence that the latter type is better than the earlier. On this basis, a worship of force is easily set up, and the mitigation of struggle by civilization comes to be deprecated. It is thought that what fights most successfully is most admirable, and that what does not help in fighting is worthless. Such a view is wholly destitute of logical foundation. The course of nature, as we have seen, is irrelevant in deciding as to what is good or bad. A priori, it would be as probable that evolution should go from bad to worse as that it should go from good to better. What makes the view plausible is the fact that the lower animals existed earlier than the higher, and that among men the civilized races are able to defeat and often exterminate the uncivilized. But here the ethical preference of the higher to the lower animals and of the exterminators to the exterminated is not based upon evolution, but exists independently and unconsciously intrudes into our judgment of the evolutionary process. If evolutionary ethics were sound, we ought to be entirely indifferent as to what the course of evolution may be, since whatever it is, is thereby proved to be the best. Yet if it should turn out that the Negro or the Chinaman was able to oust the European, we should cease to have any admiration of evolution. For as a matter of fact, our preference of the European to the Negro is wholly independent of the European's greater prowess with a maximum gun. Broadly, the fact that a thing is unavoidable affords no evidence that it is not an evil, and the fact that a thing is impossible affords no evidence that it is not a good. It is doubtless foolish in practice to fret over the inevitable, but it is false in theory to let the actual world dictate our standard of good and evil. It is evident that among the things that exist, some are good, some bad, and that we know too little of the universe to have any right to an opinion as to whether the good or the bad preponderates, or as to whether either is likely in the future to gain on the other. Optimism and pessimism alike are general theories as to the universe which there is no reason whatever for accepting. What we know of the world tends to suggest that the good and the evil are fairly balanced, but it is of course possible that what we do not know is very much better or very much worse than what we do know. Complete suspense of judgment in this matter is therefore the only rational attitude. Part 3. Right and Wrong. Section 12. The ideas of right and wrong conduct are, as we have seen, those with which ethics is generally supposed to be concerned. This view, which is unduly narrow, is fostered by the use of the one word good both for the sort of conduct which is right and for the sort of things which ought to exist on account of their intrinsic value. This double use of the word good is very confusing and tends greatly to obscure the distinction of ends and means. I shall therefore speak of right actions, not of good actions, confining the word good to the sense explained in section 11. The word right is very ambiguous and it is by no means easy to distinguish the various meanings which it has in common parlance. Owing to the variety of these meanings, adherence to any one necessarily involves us in apparent paradoxes when we use it in a context which suggests one of the other meanings. This is the usual result of precision of language, but so long as the paradoxes are merely verbal, they do not give rise to more than verbal objections. In judging of conduct, we find at the outset two widely divergent methods, of which one is advocated by some moralists, the other by others, while both are practiced by those who have no ethical theory. One of these methods, which is that advocated by utilitarians, judges the rightness of an act by relation to the goodness or badness of its consequences. The other method, advocated by intuitionists, judges by the approval or disapproval of the moral sense or conscience. I believe that it is necessary to combine both theories in order to get a complete account of right and wrong. There is, I think, one sense in which a man does right when he does what will probably have the best consequences, and another in which he does right when he follows the dictates of his conscience, whatever the probable consequences may be. There are many other senses which we may give to the word right, but these two seem to be the most important. Let us begin by considering the second of these senses. Section 13. The question we have to ask ourselves is, what do we mean by the dictates of the moral sense? If these are to afford a definition of right conduct, we cannot say that they consist in judging that such and such actions are right, for that would make our definition circular. We shall have to say that the moral sense consists in a certain specific emotion of approval towards an act, and that an act is to be called right, when the agent, at the moment of action, feels this emotion of approval towards the action which he decides to perform. There is certainly a sense in which a man ought to perform any act which he approves, and to abstain from any act which he disapproves, and it seems also undeniable that there are emotions which may be called approval and disapproval. Thus this theory, whether adequate or not, must be allowed to contain a part of the truth. It is, however, fairly evident that there are other meanings of right conduct, and that, though there is an emotion of approval, there is also a judgment of approval, which may or may not be true. For we certainly hold that a man who has done an action which his conscience approved may have been mistaken, and that in some sense his conscience ought not to have approved his action. But this would be impossible if nothing were involved, except an emotion. To be mistaken implies a judgment, and thus we must admit that there is such a thing as a judgment of approval. If this were not the case, we could not reason with a man as to what is right, what he approves would be necessarily right for him to do, and there could be no argument against his approval. We do in fact hold that when one man approves of a certain act, while another disapproves, one of them is mistaken, which could not be the case with a mere emotion. If one man likes oysters, and another dislikes them, we do not say that either of them is mistaken. Thus there is a judgment of approval, footnote one. The judgment of approval does not always coincide with the emotion of approval. For example, when a man has been led by his reason to reject a moral code which he formerly held, it will commonly happen, at least for a time, that his emotion of approval follows the old code, though his judgment has abandoned it. Thus he may have been brought up, like Muhammad's first disciples, to believe it a duty to avenge the murder of relations by murdering the murderer, or his relations. And he may continue to feel approval of such vengeance after he has ceased to judge it approvingly. The emotion of approval will not be again in question in what follows, end of footnote one. And this must consist of a judgment that an act is, in a new sense, right. The judgment of approval is not merely the judgment that we feel the emotion of approval, for then another who disapproved would not necessarily hold our judgment of approval to be mistaken. Thus in order to give a meaning to the judgment of approval, it is necessary to admit a sense of right other than approved. In this sense, when we approve an act, we judge that it is right, and we may be mistaken in so judging. This new sense is objective, and in the sense that it does not depend upon the opinions and feelings of the agent. Thus a man who obeys the dictates of his conscience is not always acting rightly in the objective sense. When a man does what his conscience approves, he does what he believes to be objectively right, but not necessarily what is objectively right. We need therefore some other criterion than the moral sense for judging what is objectively right. Section 14. It is in defining objective rightness that the consequences of an action become relevant. Some moralists, it is true, deny the dependence upon consequences, but that is to be attributed, I think, to confusion with the subjective sense. When people argue as to whether such and such an action is right, they always adduce the consequences which it has, or may be expected to have. A statesman who has to decide what is the right policy, or a teacher who has to decide what is the right education, will be expected to consider what policy or what education is likely to have the best results. Whenever a question is at all complicated and cannot be settled by following some simple rule, such as thou shalt not steal or thou shalt not bear false witness, it is at once evident that the decision cannot be made except by consideration of consequences. But even when the decision can be made by a simple precept, such as not to lie or not to steal, the justification of the precept is found only by consideration of consequences. A code such as the Decalogue, it must be admitted, can hardly be true without exception if the goodness or badness of consequences is what determines the rightness or wrongness of actions. For in so complex a world, it is unlikely that obedience to the Decalogue will always produce better consequences than disobedience. Yet it is a suspicious circumstance that breaches of those of the Ten Commandments which people still hold a duty to obey do, as a matter of fact, have bad consequences in the vast majority of instances and would not be considered wrong in a case in which it was fairly certain that their consequences would be good. This latter fact is concealed by a question begging addition of moral overtones to words. Thus, for example, thou shalt do no murder would be an important precept if it were interpreted, as Tolstoy interprets it, to mean thou shalt not take human life. But it is not so interpreted. On the contrary, some taking of human life is called justifiable homicide. Thus murder comes to mean unjustifiable homicide. And it is a mere tautology to say, thou shalt do no unjustifiable homicide. That this should be announced from Sinai would be as fruitless as Hamlet's report of the Ghost's message, quote, there's narrow villain dwelling in all Denmark, but he's an errant nave, end quote. As a matter of fact, people do make a certain classification of homicides and decide that certain kinds are justifiable and certain others unjustifiable. But there are many doubtful cases, tyrannicide, capital punishment, killing in war, killing in self-defense, killing in defense of others, are some of these. And if a decision is sought, it is sought usually by considering whether the consequences of actions belonging to these classes are on the whole good or bad. Thus the importance of precepts, such as the Ten Commandments, lies in the fact that they give simple rules, obedience to which will, in almost all cases, have better consequences than disobedience. And the justification of these rules is not wholly independent of consequences. Section 15. In common language, the received code of moral rules is usually presupposed, and an action is only called immoral when it infringes one of these rules. Whatever does not infringe them is regarded as permissible, so that on most of the occasions of life, no one course of action is marked out as alone right. If a man adopts a course of action which, though not contrary to the received code, will probably have bad consequences, he is called unwise rather than immoral. Now, according to the distinction we have made between objective and subjective rightness, a man may well act in a way which is objectively wrong, without doing what is objectively wrong, that is, what his conscience disapproves. An act, roughly speaking, I shall return to this point presently, is immoral when a man's conscience disapproves it, but is judged only unwise or injudicious when his conscience approves it, although we judge that it will probably have bad consequences. Now, the usual moral code is supposed, in common language, to be admitted by every man's conscience, so that when he infringes it, his action is not merely injudicious, but immoral. On the other hand, where the code is silent, we regard an unfortunate action as objectively but not subjectively wrong, that is, as injudicious, but not immoral. The acceptance of a moral code has the great advantage that, insofar, as its rules are objectively right, it tends to harmonize objective and subjective rightness. Thus, it tends to cover all frequent cases, leaving only the rarer ones to the individual judgment of the agent. Hence, when new sorts of cases become common, the moral code soon comes to deal with them. Thus, each profession has its own code concerning cases common in the profession, though not outside it. But the moral code is never itself ultimate. It is based upon an estimate of probable consequences, and is essentially a method of leading men's judgment to approve what is objectively right and disapprove what is objectively wrong. And when once a fairly correct code is accepted, the exceptions to it become very much fewer than they would otherwise be. Because one of the consequences of admitting exceptions is to weaken the code, and this consequence is usually bad enough to outweigh the good resulting from admitting such and such an exception. This argument, however, works in the opposite direction with a grossly incorrect code. And it is to be observed that most conventional codes embody some degree of unwarrantable selfishness, individual, professional, or national, and are thus, in certain respects, worthy of detestation. Section 16. What is objectively right, then, is in some way dependent on consequences. The most natural supposition to start from would be that the objectively right act, under any circumstances, is the one which will have the best consequences. We will define this as the most fortunate act. The most fortunate act, then, is the one which will produce the greatest excess of good over evil, or the least excess of evil over good, for there may be situations in which every possible act will have consequences that are, on the whole, bad. But we cannot maintain that the most fortunate act is always the one which is objectively right, in the sense that it is what a wise man will hold that he ought to do. For it may happen that the act which will in fact prove the most fortunate is likely, according to all the evidence at our disposal, to be less fortunate than some other. In such a case it will be, at least in one sense, objectively wrong to go against the evidence in spite of the actual good result of our doing so. There have certainly been some men who have done so much harm that it would have been fortunate for the world if their nurses had killed them in infancy. But if their nurses had done so their action would not have been objectively right, because the probability was that it would not have the best effects. Hence it would seem we must take account of probability in judging of objective rightness. Let us then consider whether we can say that the objectively right act is the one which will probably be most fortunate. I shall define this as the wisest act. The wisest act, then, is the one which, when account is taken of all available data, gives us the greatest expectation of good on the balance, or the least expectation of evil on the balance. There is, of course, a difficulty as to what are to be considered available data, but broadly we can distinguish, in any given state of knowledge, things capable of being foreseen from things which are unpredictable. I suppose account to be taken of the general body of current knowledge, in fact the sort of consideration which people expect when they ask legal or medical advice. There is no doubt this brings us nearer to what is objectively right than we were when we were considering the actually most fortunate act. For one thing it justifies the unavoidable limitation to not very distant consequences, which is almost always necessary if a practical decision is to be reached. For the likelihood of error in calculating distant consequences is so great that their contribution to the probable good or evil is very small, though their contribution to the actual good or evil is likely to be much greater than that of the nearer consequences. And it seems evident that what is quite impossible to know cannot be relevant in judging as to what conduct is right. If, as is possible, a cataclysm is going to destroy life on this planet this day week, many acts otherwise useful will prove to have been wasted labor. For example, the preparation of next year's nautical almanac. But since we have no reason to expect such a cataclysm, the rightness or wrongness of acts is plainly to be estimated without regard to it. Section 17. One apparent objection at once suggests itself to the definition. Very few acts are of sufficient importance to justify such elaborate and careful consideration, as is required for forming an opinion as to whether they are the wisest. Indeed, the least important decisions are often those which it would be hardest to make on purely reasonable grounds. A man who debates on each day which of the two ways of taking exercise is likely to prove most beneficial is considered absurd. The question is at once difficult and unimportant, and is therefore not worth spending time over. But although it is true that unimportant decisions ought not to be made with excessive care, there is danger of confusion if this is regarded as an objection to our definition of objective rightness. For the act which in the case supposed is objectively wrong is the act of deliberation, not the act decided upon as the result of deliberation. And the deliberation is condemned by our definition, for it is very unlikely that there is no more beneficial way of spending time than in debating trivial points of conduct. Thus, although the wisest act is the one which after complete investigation appears likely to give the most fortunate results, yet the complete investigation required to show that it is the wisest action is only itself wise in the case of very important decisions. This is only an elaborate way of saying that a wise man will not waste time on unimportant details, hence this apparent objection can be answered. Section 18 One further addition is required for the definition of the objectively right act, namely that it must be possible. Among the acts whose consequences are to be considered, we must not include, such as are either physically impossible to perform, or impossible for the agent to think of. This last condition introduces difficulties connected with determinism, which are discussed in Part 4. Ignoring these difficulties, we may say that the objectively right act is that one which, of all that are possible, will probably have the best consequences. Section 19 We must now return to the consideration of subjective rightness, with a view to distinguishing conduct which is merely mistaken from conduct which is immoral or blame-worthy. We here require a new sense of ought, which it is by no means easy to define. In the objective sense, a man ought to do what is objectively right. But in this objective sense, which we have now to examine, he sometimes ought to do what is objectively wrong. For example, we saw that it is often objectively right to give less consideration to an unimportant question of conduct than would be required for forming a trustworthy judgment as to what is objectively right. Now, it seems plain that if we have given to such a question the amount and kind of consideration, which is objectively right, and we then do what appears to us objectively right, our action is, in some sense, subjectively right, although it may be objectively wrong. Our action could certainly not be called a sin and might even be highly virtuous in spite of its objective wrongness. It is these notions of what is sinful and what is virtuous that we have now to consider. Section 20 The first suggestion that naturally occurs is that an act is subjectively right when it is judged by the agent to be objectively right and subjectively wrong when it is judged to be objectively wrong. I do not mean that it is subjectively right when the agent judges that it is the act which, of all that are possible, will probably have the best results, for the agent may not accept the above account of objective rightness. I mean merely that it is the one towards which he has the judgment of approval. A man may judge an act to be right without judging that its consequences will be probably the best possible. I only contend that when he truly judges it to be right, then its consequences will probably be the best possible. But his judgment as to what is objectively right may air, not only by a wrong estimate of probable consequences, or by failing to think of an act which he might have thought of, but also by a wrong theory as to what constitutes objective rightness. In other words, the definition I gave of objective rightness is not meant as an analysis of the meaning of the word, but as a mark which in fact attaches to all objectively right actions and to no others. We are to consider, then, the suggestion that an act is moral when the agent approves it and immoral when he disapproves it, using moral to mean subjectively right and immoral to mean subjectively wrong. This suggestion, it is plain, will not stand without much modification. In the first place, we often hold it immoral to approve some things and disapprove others. Unless there are special circumstances to excuse such approval or disapproval. In the second place, unreflecting acts in which there is no judgment either of approval or disapproval are often moral or immoral. For both these reasons, the suggested definition must be regarded as inadequate. Section 21. The doctrine that an act is never immoral when the agent thinks it right has the drawback, or the advantage, that it excuses almost all the acts which would be commonly condemned. Very few people deliberately do what, at the moment, they believe to be wrong. Usually they first argue themselves into a belief that what they wish to do is right. They decide that it is their duty to teach so-and-so a lesson, that their rights have been so grossly infringed that if they take no revenge, there will be an encouragement to injustice. That without a moderate indulgence, in pleasure, a character cannot develop in the best way, and so on and so on. Yet we do not cease to blame them on that account. Of course, it may be said that a belief produced by a course of self-deception is not a genuine belief, and that the people who invent such excuses for themselves know all the while that the truth is the other way. Up to a point, this is no doubt true, though I doubt if it is always true. There are, however, other cases of mistaken judgment as to what is right, where the judgment is certainly genuine, and yet we blame the agent. There are cases of thoughtlessness, where a man remembers consequences to himself, but forgets consequences to others. In such a case, he may judge correctly and honestly on all the data that he remembers. Yet if he were a better man, he would remember more data. Most of the actions commonly condemned as selfish probably come under this head. Hence, we must admit that an act may be immoral, even if the agent quite genuinely judges that it is right. Unreflecting acts again in which there is no judgment as to right or wrong are often praised or blamed. Acts of generosity, for example, are more admired when they are impulsive than when they result from reflection. I cannot think of any act which is more blamed when it is impulsive than when it is deliberate. But certainly many impulsive acts are blamed, for example, such as spring from an impulse of malice or cruelty. In all these cases where reflection is absent, and also in the case of inadequate reflection, it may be said that blame does not belong properly to the act, but rather to the character revealed by the act, or if to some acts, than to those previous deliberate acts by which the character has been produced, which has resulted in the present act. The cases of self-deception would then be dismissed on the ground that the self-deceiver never really believes what he wishes to believe. We could then retain our original definition that a moral act is one which the agent judges to be right. While an immoral one is one which he judges to be wrong. But I do not think this would accord with what most people really mean. I rather think that a moral act should be defined as one which the agent would have judged to be right if he had considered the question candidly and with due care. If, that is to say, he had examined the data before him with a view to discovering what was right, and not with a view to proving such and such a course to be right. If an act is unimportant, and at the same time not obviously less right than some obvious alternative, we shall consider it neither moral nor immoral. For in such a case, the act does not deserve careful consideration. The amount of care which a decision deserves depends upon its importance and difficulty. In the case of a statesman advocating a new policy, for example, years of deliberation may sometimes be necessary to excuse him from the charge of levity. But with less important acts, it is usually right to decide even when further reflection might show the present decision to be erroneous. Thus, there is a certain amount of reflection appropriate to various acts, while some right acts are best when they spring from impulse, though these are such as reflection would approve. We may therefore say that an act is moral when it is one which the agent would judge to be right after an appropriate amount of candid thought, or in the case of acts which are best when they are unreflecting, after the amount and kind of thought requisite to form a first opinion. An act is immoral when the agent would judge it to be wrong after an appropriate amount of reflection. It is neither moral nor immoral when it is unimportant, and a small amount of reflection would not suffice to show whether it was right or wrong. Section 23 We may now sum up our discussion of right and wrong. When a man asks himself what ought I to do, he is asking what conduct is right in an objective sense. He cannot mean what ought a person to do who holds my views as to what a person ought to do for his views as to what a person ought to do are what will constitute his answer to the question, what ought I to do? But the onlooker, who thinks that the man has answered this question wrongly, may nevertheless hold that, in acting upon his answer, the man was acting rightly in a second subjective sense. This second sort of right action we call moral action. We held that an action is moral when the agent would judge it to be right after an appropriate amount of candid thought, or after a small amount, in the case of acts which are best when they are unreflecting. The appropriate amount of thought being dependent upon the difficulty and the importance of the decision. And we held that an action is right when, of all that are possible, it is the one which will probably have the best results. There are many other meanings of right, but these seem to be the meanings required for answering the questions, what ought I to do, and what acts are immoral. End of the first half of chapter one.