 Good morning. Happy New Year. Happy Year of the Sheep. I'm Mike Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair here at CSIS. Thank you all for coming on what is probably the first day of work for a lot of people, including I think most of us. Tomorrow Congress comes into session and we face a new world in Washington, a Republican Congress, Democratic President, and so far on issues from immigration to Cuba policy, there are signs that the new Congress and the White House are going to be colliding with each other politically and over policy. What we wanted to do today, and in this short report we've produced, is spotlight one area where bipartisan cooperation, forming an agenda to move forward is not only possible but necessary and that's in the area of policy towards the Asia-Pacific region, which in Washington a very partisan town these days is probably one of the most bipartisan areas of foreign policy unless it becomes corrupted by the disagreements over other areas. So we wanted in this report to try to spotlight issues and actions the administration and Congress can take together to keep moving forward what President Obama has called the pivot and others call the rebalance. A majority of Americans in polls now consider Asia to be the most important region in the world to U.S. interests. We've done surveys of elites in the U.S. and in Asia here at CSIS and support for the rebalance to Asia has over 90 percent favorable ratings among American experts, which means a lot of Republicans are behind the idea of focusing more on the Asia-Pacific as well. Our surveys also showed, however, that within the region while there's pretty robust support for the rebalance outside of China where there's more suspicion, there are real questions about whether it can be sustained. That showed up in our survey last spring and you hear it increasingly because of the divided government in this town because the President is constrained by budget sequestration and pulled into crises from Ukraine to Iraq and Iran. So we think it's critical and practical that the White House and the leadership in the Congress begin charting a common course on policy towards Asia. We've done a series of nonpartisan, bipartisan dinners and roundtables as we thought about this agenda, and it seems clear to us that there is a lot of room to move forward together. The report outlines specific actions on China, defense policy in Asia, the Korean Peninsula, India and Southeast Asia. This was internally funded and generated. We did it on our own research budgets. And due on the Asia expertise we have here at CSIS, which runs the gamut in terms of regional functional expertise and policy background. On my far left, on your far right, you decide which, is our Freeman Chair, Chris Johnson. Scott Miller leads our work on business diplomacy here as the Skoll Chair. Victor Cha is the Korea Chair. Matt Goodman is the Simon Chair in the international political economy. Johnny Glazer is Senior Advisor on Asia and a fellow at the Freeman Chair on China. Rick Rosso, our Wadwani Chair on India, and Ernie Bauer, the Southeast Asia Chair. Now we also want to introduce and welcome one new member of the team who just arrived and is starting this week, Scott Kennedy, who will be joining us starting this week to work on the Chinese economy, which is a terrific addition for us and we're delighted to have him here. I'm going to summarize the points from the report for you, and then in the questions I'll let my colleagues elaborate on the different portions that they wrote. Let me begin with trade, because I think most of us would agree over the coming two years perhaps the most important thing the United States can do to cement our long-term engagement in the Asia Pacific region is to complete negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and pass trade promotion authority, which is constitutionally critical, and then TPP itself. Our report recommends that the President follow up on statements he made in December to the Business Roundtable, stating that he was ready to move forward with TPP in spite of opposition from some of his own political base. But that's got to continue and it's got to broaden. All of the history of trade agreements in Washington suggests that unless you have a high level sustained case being made to the American public and to the Congress, you can't get these things done, and that has to include TPA and TPP. The window is narrow. Most people think that an agreement has to be reached, primarily with Japan. I think with Japan right now, we're talking economically insignificant areas of liberalization, the tariff on auto parts in the U.S., pork and things like that in Japan, but politically charged. And with Japan, we can break through and move forward with the other participants in the negotiations. In fact, with Japan, 90% of the TPP chapters, we have the common view that we're trying to establish 21st century views between Tokyo and Washington. So this is critical and to do that some movement on trade promotion authority reports we've done recently about the Pentagon and for the Pentagon. First, we've argued for some time it's important for the administration to produce an East Asia strategic report. This was done by Secretary Cheney in 90 and 92. It was done by Secretary Perry and Secretary Cohen in 95 and 98, I believe. The idea being that at a time of shifting geo-strategic dynamics questions about U.S. resources, it's critical to lay out for the Congress, for the public and for the region, the objectives, the ends, the ways and means of U.S. security strategy. The President's given speeches, the Secretary's of Defense have given speeches. We've done a piece, Zach and I, which is in the Washington Quarterly in the current issue, which analyzes those speeches. In every speech, the priorities listed for the rebalance change. They're inconsistent. And Congress is a bit confused. And so it's going to be important, we think, and members of Congress, leading members have asked for this, that there be a strategic report clarifying the priorities. In exchange, Congress has its work to do, and in particular, critical part of the military aspect of the rebalances is realigning U.S. forces, reducing the pressure on Okinawa, dispersing forces so they're better able to engage, not just in Northeast Asia, but in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean, utilizing access to Darwin arrangements with the Philippines, new facilities in Guam, much of the cost of this realignment is being borne by our friends and allies. But the U.S. has to pay for some new facilities as well, particularly in Guam. Congress hasn't fully funded those, and we think it's time to move forward to demonstrate our intent. And finally, and this is the hardest one on defense, we're coming down to crunch time over the next few years. We will, at the current rate of defense cuts and operational demands on the U.S. military, start facing choices. Do we invest in new capabilities, what the Pentagon calls ACDP, Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Program, do we invest in new capabilities to counter missile threats and cyber threats, especially in the western Pacific, or do we sustain our traditional platforms like aircraft carrier battle groups that demonstrate American commitment and presence? The answer, the right answer is we do both, but we're getting to the point where we're going to have to choose. And that's not a choice that will be missed by our allies, and sequestration is a large part of the problem. One way out of sequestration we recommended with respect to defense would be for the Congress to pass a non-binding budget resolution sometime in the spring that sets defense spending above sequestration caps. And the President would probably, or might veto this, but it would lay the groundwork for increasing defense spending in the reconciliation process, which could be justified based on increased revenue and by the demands on U.S. forces in the Pacific, and the danger that capabilities in the Pacific will be drawn down to deal with increasing demands unanticipated in the Middle East. On Korea, you'll all want to know about the interview and hacking against Sony. Victor Chah did not do it. He has written quite a bit about it, though. The Korea piece of this argues that we have to continue enhancing cyber capabilities, particularly between the U.S. and ROK, as well as missile defense capabilities, which is a sensitive subject in Korea, but one we have to move forward on. We argue that given the movement on condemning North Korean human rights violations, finally, in the U.N., human rights should be a more central part of U.S. policy towards North Korea, an area where the Congress is likely to be quite supportive. And this one is hard, but it is strategically imperative for the United States in the next two years to work on improving Japan-Korea relations, which are strained for reasons that are complex and have more to do with identity and politics than geostrategy, but that definitely complicate Korea's foreign policy, our foreign policy, and Japan's foreign policy. The administration has signaled there will be a trilateral information sharing agreement among the U.S. and Japan and Korea, but Korea has Jisomiya information sharing agreements with 25 countries, but not Japan. So this is an area that Congress can play a role and the administration needs to keep moving forward. On India, India is part of the overall fabric of the strategic equilibrium in the Asia-Pacific region. Under Prime Minister Modi, there's potential for change, but it is India, so how much change and how quickly is always going to be an issue, and Rick Rasa will tell us. Defense is one of the most promising areas of cooperation with the new Modi government, and Rick recommended ensuring that the new defense framework agreement with India moves forward, that Ash Carter be confirmed quickly, I think across the region. All of us are strong supporters of Secretary Desnick Carter, who knows all these issues very well. Congress can do its part. The India caucus is very active, but more broadly, congressional leadership should be engaging with India. On the economy, more economic reforms are probably coming. Bilateral investment treaty negotiations with India need to be energized to keep a disciplined focus. And we've had coordination and strategic dialogue with the Indian government on Afghanistan and on East Asia that's been sort of on again, off again. We need to energize that, given the changes in the region. Finally, Southeast Asia, an area where the administration has been very engaged, very active, but some challenges are ahead, possibly the 2015 elections coming up in Myanmar or Burma. More needs to be done with the new leader in Jakarta, Mr. Jokowi, to institutionalize the US Indonesia comprehensive partnership. It's time for President Obama to go to Vietnam. An important, increasingly important relationship for the US strategically and economically in that region. Not easy because of human rights concerns, TPP negotiations, but absolutely critical. It is possible to walk and chew gum at the same time. It is possible to engage strategically and address concerns the Congress in particular will have with respect to human rights. And we need to support countries like the Philippines that are pursuing legal means through the arbitral tribunal to address China's claim that the nine dash line defines Chinese territorial rights in the South China Sea. So these are some of the areas there are certainly more and my colleagues can elaborate where we think it's practical. It's consistent with what Republican leaders and the White House has said they wanna do and where the American public wants clearly bipartisan efforts to advance our interests in the region. Let me open it up now for questions. My colleagues will wanna weigh in and answer specifics or elaborate on some of these outlines. Stretching sequestration to add more money for defense. I hope you also support keeping the 50-50 relation in the BCA budget control act between domestic and defense. Do you have a position on that? I'll speak only for myself and that is to say towards between investing in capabilities to sustain deterrence in the future and engagement as well. And that's critical and it's critical enough that the Congress ought to table it. President and the Congress ought to debate it. If the answer is a 50-50 split, I don't think anybody on this panel would object to that. Nadia Chow with Liberty Time. Thank you for doing this. I have a two question. First is about Korea. I wonder do the panelists feel like China is changing its view on Korea? There are more preparation on China's side if there's a collapse of North Korea and they will be more willing to accommodate a possible unification future for the Korean people. And the second question with the election just concluded last November in Taiwan. There's many uncertainty developing in Taiwan. Do you feel like cross-strait issues will be a new concern for the US? And what do you think about, you know, the medical parole of a former president, do you think it will be an implication for the domestic politics? Thanks. Thank you Nadia for the question. I do think that there is a potential that cross-strait relations reemerge on the agenda for a number of countries including the United States. I think 2015 will be a year mostly of stagnation in cross-strait relations. The potential I think for reignited tensions comes really potentially after the elections in January of 2016. I think that the United States will be in close consultations and should be with both of the parties in Taiwan and particularly with the DPP. But there's still a lot more that can be done in this period to bolster US-Taiwan relations, which I think is especially important as we deal with this coming period of uncertainty. So more arm sales, which of course Congress would be involved in as well. The Taiwan, as you know, is extremely interested in and as recently announced, it will be building its own submarines and the United States could have a role to play in that. And I think that the United States should be bolstering Taiwan's continued participation in the international community. But in the run-up to this election in Taiwan, I think it's important for the United States, as I said, to maintain consultations, to be talking with Beijing so that China does not overreact to the potential election of a DPP president. And at the same time, I would say that the United States should remain neutral. On the Korea-China question, let me just say something. I'm sure Chris will want to say something as well. So my sense is that, so that Chinese have a lot of indigestion when it comes to North Korea. It's not an ulcer yet, but it's certainly a very sour stomach. And I don't think that has changed over the past quarter and I don't think it's gonna change over the next quarter. I think the South Koreans have been quite aggressive in trying to develop a strategic understanding with Beijing, with the Xi Jinping government, on North Korea. It's one of the reasons that I think Park Ge-nae has been so enthusiastic about holding as many meetings, creating as many ties, NSC, NSC ties, defense exchanges to try to deepen that understanding. At APEC, we saw that they announced the plans for a free trade agreement, the two leaders, which again, I think is another sign that Korea is trying to step into a space that they see opening up between China and DPRK. Contrary to some perceptions, I don't think that the South Koreans are doing this hard push on China because of Japan, in the sense that they're angry with Japan so they're trying to draw closer to China. That doesn't mean the Chinese don't see it that way. I'm sure the Chinese see it as an opportunity to try to pull the South Koreans out of the three-way alliance. And so in that sense, I think both Seoul and Beijing feel like they're winning at the game that they're playing. Whereas the reality is probably neither of them are winning but either of them are inching a little closer to their desired objective. Thanks, Victor. Yeah, I would agree with that. I think as we've talked about and written about collectively with regard to China's approach to North Korea under Xi Jinping, my own view is a lot of ink has been spilled about the issue of have they changed their policy. I think we would all agree that at the fundamental level, they haven't. There's still the lifeline that keeps the North Koreans going and so on. As Victor said, there's substantial indigestion. I think it's actually edging more toward an ulcer at this stage, and I think we're gonna continue to see the same Chinese approach, which is to deny Kim Jong-un a visit to Beijing, which is obviously very significant. I don't foresee any senior Chinese leader going to North Korea either. And so the issue for me really isn't about change. It's about the normalization of the relationship. Xi Jinping has clearly sent a signal that the Sino-DPRK relations will not be a special relationship that they've been since the Korean War but rather a normal state-to-state relationship under which China takes clearly the very senior role and the message, I think, has been from the Chinese side. We are the senior partner in this relationship. You North Korea should, in a perfect world, should align with our interests or at least don't make trouble for us. And Kim has clearly been uncomfortable with that sort of view, and so I think we're gonna continue to see this low boil. On Taiwan, absolutely agree with everything Bonnie said. I think it's a downrange problem but one that the US government in particular better start focusing on because my sense is that this cross-strait issue will be back on the agenda. I agree that we should be doing everything we can to calm concerns about a possible DPP victory but at some level I don't think the Chinese are gonna be able to help themselves in that regard should that result come. What will be interesting is to look historically, I think it's fair to say that during the Chen Shui-bian period, the Chinese made a deliberate decision to kind of forego their interests in the South China Sea or at least put it on the back burner while they focused exclusively on managing the cross-strait problem. And then when President Ma came in they were able to kind of put their head up again and look and we've seen what they've been doing down there. Should we have another turn in cross-strait relations it'll be interesting to see what impact that has on the South China Sea, East China Sea issues as well. Add my purely personal view Nadia on President Chen. I spent many, many hours with him. He is a man who suffered and his family suffered a lot in the process of democratization. And I think speaking for myself, he's a man who suffered enough for what he did wrong during his time in the presidency. And in the interest of democracy in Taiwan, I think it's important for a new era where changes of government through the democratic process are not followed by vindictive actions. And the president was found guilty under due process. I'm not saying there wasn't due process but I think there's something useful in a magnanimous or forgiving view after a certain period of paying the debt back to society for Taiwan's long-term democracy. That's my own view. On the election, I think it will be important for the administration to be very disciplined. I personally was disappointed to read the financial time story during the last presidential election which appeared to be an administration hit against Tsai Ing-wen. It may not have been, but I think it will be very important going forward to put as a first and foremost priority for US policy respect for Taiwan's democratic process. And there are ways to signal expectations with respect to cross-strait relations and relations between Washington and Taipei. Some private, maybe some public, but I think the administration has to be more careful and more disciplined than it was last time. That's not easy. Taiwan's democratic politics are not for the faint of heart. There's lots of, well, I was gonna say there's lots of stuff flying in the air and literally there's lots of stuff flying in the air in the L.O.I. And in the Congress, there are strong views about Taiwan and different quarters, but I think the administration's gotta be really very, very disciplined this time. It's important for our overall stance in the region where our microphone experts. Andrew, there we go. Hi, Russ Deming at SICE. First of all, thank you very much for this report. Very useful to try to maintain a bipartisan approach to Asia. My question is on Japan. There's no really detailed treatment of the US-Japan relationship. Abe now has a three-year mandate which raises risks and opportunities. We have the basing issues in Okinawa become more complicated with Okinawan politics. We're now in the 70th anniversary year of the Second World War which raises history issues as a problematic thing. I wonder what your thoughts are on managing US-Japan relations over the next few years. Thanks. Matt has graciously asked me to do the history question and he'll address things that involve numbers. Although history does involve numbers, of course, because as you said, it's the 70th anniversary. It's an anniversary of many other things, the 21 demands and so on. I took some encouragement from Prime Minister Abe's New Year's address on this issue where he said what I believe was the case all along, that he will keep the previous apologies by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono, former Prime Minister Muriyama and at his own statement of remorse. The model that I hear about you probably to as well, Rusty, is the Canberra speech, which everyone should read if you're interested in Japan because it was a really very emotional and forthcoming disposition by Prime Minister Abe before the Australian Parliament on what Japan did to Australia and the Dakota Trail and elsewhere. Very emotional, very important for US Australia, excuse me, for Japan, Australia, diplomatic and strategic ties. And I think a lesson that people around the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister himself are taking away as they think about the 70th anniversary. Okinawa is going to be harder after the gubernatorial election. I'm personally not convinced the new governor wants this to be the defining issue for a prefecture that has some economic challenges, but it's going to be harder. That is one of the reasons why I think it's important for the US Congress to begin funding some of the military construction in Guam and elsewhere to show we're serious about lightening the burden on the Okinawan people and aligning our forces more geographically and politically in a sustainable way. Well, obviously this is a report with recommendations for the US side of this story. But as the economics guy, it's hard not to say from a Japanese perspective, I think the most important thing they could do. I mean, the thing which Abe could do that would have the greatest return on investment would be to get the Trans-Pacific Partnership done. And that means agreeing to, as Mike said, we're very close in the substance. The US and Japan need to reach an agreement on these final details. This would, I think, more than any other thing Abe is trying to do, certainly in the economic sphere, would have a very powerful impact on Japan's economic prospects, on its strategic position. And I think on US-Japan relations, which brings it back here, I think that this is the thing the US should be in the near term most focused on because it's the iron that is hottest in the fire right now that we could strike a deal very quickly. I think the negotiators are gonna reengage later this month and I very much hope and don't see why they shouldn't be able to reach an agreement. And if Abe is serious about economics being at the center of his agenda and if President Obama is serious about TPP being a critical part of his legacy, then I would very much hope and even expect that they will reach agreement in the first part of this year. Just to add on what Matt said briefly, I think the magic bullet, so to speak, will be when, you know, until now, every free trade agreement we've done, as Scott has explained, has been preceded by trade promotion authority. And with one small exception with Jordan right after 9-11, which is really not a unique case. The administrations decided this time to sort of move TPA and TPP more or less in parallel, presumably with TPA at some point coming first. It's asking a lot of our trade partners to trust us on TPA and give their best deals. It's asking an awful lot. There aren't many big issues left, frankly, in the U.S.-Japan relations, but the ones that are there are stuck over this issue in a way, politically in Japan. My sense of the magic bullet would be that the President's initial volley in early December with the business roundtable about his commitment to getting TPA done is followed up with more engagement. And in Tokyo they hear this, not just from the administration, they start hearing it from the Republican leadership in Congress. And when they start hearing from the Republican Congress, we can get this done, then I think the negotiations, bilaterally, will be much, much easier. So that's why Scott and Matt emphasized in this report how important it is for a sustained, high-level campaign, not just a one-off speech, but a real sustained campaign on TPP and TPA with the American public, with key interest groups, and especially with the leadership in Congress. In the way back with the red dress, yeah. Thank you, reporter, from The Voice of America. And I have two questions concerning China. I'm reading an article which states that China is having a big diplomacy shift. China also giving priority to its neighboring countries. So my question is, how it's going to affect U.S. pivot to Asia because people say that when China, China is now also pivot to Asia. The second question is about Chinese Vice Premier Wang Yang's recent comment. He's saying that China, I couldn't remember the exact words, but it's like to the effect that U.S. is the leader, still the leader of the world. So what's your interpretation here? Thank you. Yeah, sure. Thank you for the question. Yeah, the big diplomatic shift in Chinese foreign policy I think was really evident in President Xi Jinping's recent speech to the so-called Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference that took place a couple of weeks back now. And in that speech, and I think the subsequent things we've seen, it really is a reaffirmation of this notion that under his leadership, China has decided to take a much more forward-leaning approach to its foreign policy, a much more multi-directional foreign policy. And it was interesting in the speech that in terms of the batting order of prioritization, he did choose to put what they call peripheral diplomacy or neighbor diplomacy ahead of major country relations, thus being U.S.-China relations. We've spoken to both Bonnie and I, I've spoken to a lot of Chinese interlocutors who all say, no, it's not a shift and so on, but these things get done deliberately generally and inside their system. So I think what it means, and we mentioned this in the report, for our own administration and Congress, is that this is a very dedicated effort that's being undertaken. Xi in the speech talks a lot about building Chinese soft power, talks a lot about using their economic leverage in the region. And we need to be aware that this is happening. I think that the administration has been slow to acknowledge this shift and to see that it is a major change really in the way they approach things. And so we I think collectively would like to see them acknowledge that more strongly and think about how we're going to respond. And it doesn't mean that we have to respond in some kind of zero summer tit for tat manner. In fact, we would argue that's not what we wanna see and that's why we so strongly recommend in the report pursuing things like the bilateral investment treaty, trying to deepen our relationships with these people who are advising Xi Jinping on these major issues. He has substantially changed the method of advisory inside the system as well now. Those formal organs like the foreign ministry and so on don't play the role that they did under the previous administration. So thinking full scope about how we take this into account in our own policy is going to be critical. On Wang Yong's comments, I saw it didn't see anything particularly new there. I mean, they've frequently reaffirmed this sort of position. It is interesting that someone at his level chose to do so, but I didn't find it surprising. Let me just add a couple of things to Chris's remarks. I think that the recent central work conference on Chinese foreign policy is very important because it does signal a number of things. Certainly more proactive Chinese foreign policy and the Xi Jinping claiming of course that now China is going to have a great power or the major country is the same characters, but really means great power foreign policy with special characteristics. But the question remains, I think as to whether putting the periphery at the top really means a recognition of deterioration of China's relations with the neighborhood and therefore leading to an adjustment in Chinese foreign policy going forward. If that is the case, then what is that adjustment? What we're seeing so far is China's emphasis on economic integration and trying to give the neighbors economic incentives to connect them through the 21st century maritime Silk Road and the economic, the traditional economic Silk Road. To try to bind them more to China's own development and in turn to assist China's development. This is not just about giving, it's about getting. This is what China means by a win-win approach. So I think the jury's still out as to whether or not we are going to see a reduction in some of China's more provocative policies, particularly in the territorial disputes. And I think that's really the nub. That's what the United States, I think, is particularly concerned about. We certainly don't want to see continued intimidation of China's neighbors. And on Wang Yang's point, I would agree with Chris that it has been said before that China doesn't want to push the United States out of the region. But it is important, I think, at this particular juncture for a leader at that level to be saying not only that the U.S. remains the main superpower in the world, but that China wants to integrate itself into the prevailing international system. Now, the devil is in the details. As Mike talked about earlier, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is going to be a critical test of whether or not China really is going to adopt the rules and norms that have been developed over the course of many years by major international donors. But I think that the statement itself is important and we should be watching China's behavior. Right here. Bernard Gordon University of New Hampshire. I want to return to TPP, both on the Japan side and with regard to China. You, Matt and Mike are very optimistic in terms of what is needed for the United States. But there is some talk in Tokyo that the Prime Minister can't go forward until the upper house elections later this spring. Is your view that that is realistic or is that more of a block than is realistic to be thinking about? Secondly, in terms of China, a year ago at this time, there was much consideration in Beijing about possibly joining TPP. Governor Huntsman has resurrected that issue as have others. Could both of you speak to that point? The China side and on the whether in Japan there is as much concern on TPP as we say there needs to be. Thanks. Well, I can start and I'm sure others will have views, Scott and Chris. So there's always another election in Japan. And I don't think that that should be and I don't think it is an obstacle to Japan and Prime Minister Abe moving forward. As they say, they're close. They could with a little bit of political capital on his side. And I do think in the scheme of things, it's not a huge amount of political capital that Prime Minister Abe has to invest in this decision in the scheme of things. He could get this done. And yeah, there'll be another election. But remember he made the decision to join TPP ahead of an upper house election and against the odds. And that required quite a bit of political capital. So I actually think with this new mandate and with his having focused on economics as the right course, the only course for Japan, I think that the iron is hot and it's time to strike. And by the way, just since I now have a chance to say just to affirm what Mike said, I certainly on this end we need to do more and the president personally needs to do more to show, to continue to show that we're willing to move forward on trade promotion authority and get our end of the bargain done. But Abe holds a lot of the cards there. And on China I'll just offer my two cents, which is that eventually the TPP strategy is to pull China into the rules-based system in Asia. And TPP is the vehicle for doing that. I think when Japan joined TPP last year, sorry, now the year before, it really sent a message to Beijing that you saw the conversation in Beijing change, whether they're ready to join TPP, Quad TPP in the short term, not clear to me, but I think they certainly got their attention and I think they understand and probably agree that they need to be part of this system of rules that's being negotiated in TPP. So I would expect eventually they will join something in the region that is a, I think based on a TPP agreement going forward it may be called something different. I would agree with Matt that in a 12-party negotiation like TPP, somebody's always holding an election. So these things happen. More importantly, I think we have our own work to do here. Everyone, since the election, all the leaders, the president, incoming Majority Leader McConnell, Speaker Boehner, New Chairman Hatch, all the leaders have said the right things. What matters now is what they do, all right? And it's a fairly tricky process, particularly the president will need to manage his own party's politics of trade which are complicated and difficult. It certainly can be done. I would look, the model is the Trade Act of 1988 which took about five months, start to finish, and once again there you had the divided government, you had Republican president in the last year of his term and Democratic Congress. So these things can be done. It's gonna take time and we really need to see that action happen and the behaviors to change. The second question about China joining TPP, like Matt, I don't know whether they will join TPP as it exists or whether it will be something else, but I noticed that APEC meetings and interesting conversation began at the Chinese initiative of discussing what is the future of Asia-Pacific trade after the completion of the RCEP agreement which China is a party and the United States is not and the completion of TPP where the US is a party and China is not. So constructive discussions that's certainly from a commercial standpoint pretty obvious, but I would note the genuine interest on the part of the Chinese. I'd appear in front. Thank you. I'm Paul Caderio from the University of Toronto. I'd be interested in the team's reflections or reactions to the question of wildcards, things you haven't thought of might come from outside the region or not in the United States. Let me just suggest three. The president will need to decide on Keystone. If he decides no, then that creates energy issues for Canada and where they might export to which might suit the Chinese very nicely, but in a year of election in Canada that creates an issue for the United Americas closest to Ally. Second issue and then of course the climate talks relate to energy, where does China get its energy? Paris, US and China making a deal that might put some pressure on India, for example, in Australia. Second issue is a broad area of cyber. In a situation where there was something a little more important from an intellectual property point of view, the movie scripts and indiscreet emails or even created a physical attack traceable somewhere. What happens? Because clearly there are various people and there are discussions about how the internet should be governed, which India and China seem to be sort of redefining multi-stakeholderism. Third issue is problems outside the region, like from the Middle East and Europe where there are issues about Asia's energy supply if there's further turbulence in the Middle East. Or if Russia starts to get aggressive and creates problems where the world is sort of figuring out what to do with Russia and China and India might not agree. I'm just suggesting those three. There may be others that you thought of or you're gonna write about. Thank you. While my colleagues think about this, let me use your question to make a shameless plug. We, every January, the last few January's, we've all gathered here to do an exercise we call Asia Forecasting. And we're scheduling that for January 29th. You're all welcome to join us. The way we do it is we arm the audience with clickers and it's basically the panel versus the audience predicting what will happen in 2015. Nobody wins or loses because it's only January. And this year we'll have two groups. We'll split ourselves into two groups. One group will look at geo-strategy but especially alignments. What will happen to the Sino-Russian alignment? What will happen to Japan, Korea, US, India and so forth. And we'll start making predictions for 2015 about the chess board in Asia. And then a second panel we'll start predicting or handicapping the prospects for economic reform in Modi's India in Japan and so forth and in China of course. And you're all welcome to join and we put the questions up. We ask the audience, we debate what we think. You gave me a good idea. We may wanna add a wild card session. I'm not sure. We'll have to find a technological way for people to put their wild cards up so we can comment on them. But please join us on the 29th. Now in terms of wild cards, North Korea is always a big one, especially since they're probably prepared for another nuclear test and don't let crises go without a chance to escalate them. I think you're right to mention the Middle East which will exacerbate the problem I mentioned about resources in the Asia Pacific. It's not just about investing in platforms and new technologies. It's about where the carrier battle group and the Marines spend their time because the Pacific Command's area of responsibility stretches to Southwest Asia. So these could all affect Asia. And then historically, the last two years of administrations on Asia are not often very good. George Herbert Walker Bush, some of you will recall had a pretty unfortunate visit to Japan. And his, there's some people may have been on the trip. Accommodated him in vomiting, when him vomiting on the Japanese Prime Minister. Bill Clinton, Bill Clinton in his last two years had the famous Japan passing, where he traveled to China, really unsettled US-Japan relations. And frankly, the George W. Bush administration had a groping for a deal with North Korea that completely fell apart and left real questions among many in the region. In all three cases, the problem was political bandwidth at home. You know, when you're in your final years, it's pretty tired. A lot of the strategic heavy weights who started the administration are gone. Some talented people come in, but you spend a lot more time dealing with the race to succeed you. So these wildcards could have an even bigger impact in the last two years of an administration and are worth pointing to. I feel a bit astrophysicist enough so that we can hear a few more. Yeah, I'll touch on a couple that some of which weren't talked about in the report, but South Asia-related. So you mentioned about energy and oil prices spiraling down for the US-India relationship could play in a couple of ways. For one, if India's import bill drops dramatically, as would be expected, the import bill is part of the reason they put up a lot of trade measures that have actually impaired US-India trade relations in the last couple of years. So there might be reduced pressure in Delhi to actually put up some of the trade barriers to slow down their import bill. So that'd be good for US-India relations. But on the downside, it also means that the impetus behind economic reforms in India, which Modi partially was elected on, could be reduced somewhat if that helps to repair the economy. For South Asia, of course, you got two others which are closely related. One is the US changing presence in Afghanistan. And if not even as a result of that, but if you see an increase in terror attacks on India, the perception in Delhi right now is that America reduced presence in Afghanistan will free up the hand of terrorist organizations to play a bigger role, including cross-border to India. So whether it's directly related or not, there's gonna be a perception that America's reduced role in Afghanistan contributed to that. So we did talk about, you know, we need to collaborate more closely with India on Afghanistan. We've got a trilateral, but it hasn't been meeting as often as it should. The last wall card I'll say in South Asia is Pakistan, which, you know, the Pakistan military, and I just did a lecture tour across India. And they continue to press on, you know, why does America continue to support the government of Pakistan? And to point out that, you know, stating back six months or longer, you know, the Pakistan military has had a successful sustained military campaign against insurgents on its own territory. And that has only escalated since the horrific attack recently in Pakistan against the school children. So in U.S.-India relations, it's a strange lens, right? If Pakistan continues and is successful in its own domestic war on terror, the United States would certainly want to help to support that, which by its nature would actually push us a little bit away from India. So Afghanistan and Pakistan are a couple of wild, I mean, Afghanistan, I don't think anybody would call it a wild card, since it's clearly one of the biggest issues in American foreign policy this year, but Pakistan's another one. So a few on my plate. Ernie, since there are never any wild cards in Southeast Asia. Every day is just boring, and we, you know, we always know exactly what to expect, exactly. I think Southeast Asia will surprise us this year. I would look to Thailand. Thailand is a powder keg, I think, politically. The Ku government, the military government has said that they can't do elections this year as they had hoped to do, and they probably will do them in 2016. I personally believe they won't do those until other events that we could talk about and probably not on TV happen. But I think the ties are getting the fat up. The economy is not performing at the level it should, and when the business community turns against the government or starts to have worries about it, I think we should be watching for some political developments in Thailand. The other thing that will surprise us in Southeast Asia is Jokowi and the new president of Indonesia, I think is gonna assert himself much more seriously in foreign affairs and in security issues than we thought, and I think that will have an impact on Southeast Asia and Ossian. And the last one is the arbitration tribunal, the decision will probably come out, it could come out this year, maybe early 2016, and I think the way China reacts to that decision and the way the Ossian countries respond to it will be something that we should try not to be surprised by, and that's why we flagged this in the report. It's something the American foreign policy should be all over and we should be working the traps in capitals throughout the Indo-Pacific, getting prepared for that, so we're not surprised by the decision. I'd ask you, I need to also say something about Burma policy, which historically has been not partisan, but highly divisive, and when Dal Anson-Suchi came here, she had good meetings with the president, good meetings with Senator McConnell, who's been committed on democracy and human rights in Burma. Is that bipartisanship and sort of cross governmental consensus that's held around the new approach to Myanmar? Is that in jeopardy this year? The answer is I don't know. As you mentioned, the most interested guy on the Hill is now the leader of the Senate, Senator McConnell. He's been a close follower of developments in Myanmar and he has a very firm point of view. We've also noticed over the last, I guess the last six months of last year, that as Myanmar, sort of, and this isn't surprising if we watch Southeast Asian history when reform movements get announced and start to move forward. They also, the governing body can also start to pull back. This is the one step forward, two steps back dance that we've seen in many places. I think we've seen that in Myanmar and Republicans in particular, but I'd say it's bipartisan on the Hill, have expressed real concerns about this, particularly around the 2015 elections. And I think there's been sort of an accelerating expectation that we're concerned about on the Hill, that if these elections take place without Aung San Suu Kyi being able to run in them, that we might have to take action against Myanmar. That really puts a lot of risk on the table in terms of the Obama administration's foreign policy plans because part of what I think the Obama administration would probably say they felt good about it in accomplishing is moving forward with engagement with ASEAN. And one of the key ingredients of that being able to move forward was being able to sit down with all 10 ASEAN leaders, all 10 foreign ministers, et cetera. And that was predicated on normalizing, or not normalizing, but opening relations with Myanmar. So, Mike, I think, I'm not sure it's bipartisan. I think the administration actually has played a very responsible role here. Our ambassador in Rangoon is a former CSIS-er, so he's obviously got his back together, Derek Mitchell. Hey, Derek. But I think the administration really needs to work hard on the Hill to make sure that there are not sort of unrealistic expectations but that we do have a very nuanced and effective advocacy for human rights and democracy in Myanmar because if we don't lead with those points, we'll lose a lot of ground in Asia. And I'll just make one point here that I think is important. If you look at trends that I think are really important in Asia, across Asia, Southeast Asia is a leading trend for the assertion of a growing middle class, a middle class that's gonna grow from about 500 million people today to 3.2 billion across the Indo-Pacific by 2025. And that middle class, we can see them sort of putting their issues forward in Southeast Asia. And they're doing that through elections, which is very positive. But they are challenging incumbents and they're challenging the role of traditional sort of centrally controlled governments. They're asking for a more transparency, more involvement in governance. And I think this is a trend that will affect all of Asia over time. But thank you all for coming. We're looking at two years where relations across the Pacific are hitting some really critical turning points on TPP, on the Korean Peninsula, with our allies, with China. Precisely when Washington is entering into what will probably be one of the most divisive and contested periods in our recent political history. So we're making an appeal, we hope you all agree. And if not with every piece of this report with the idea that we should be working together to try to keep our interests in Asia our success over several administrations moving forward. If you look at all the elements we're talking about in these policies, very few began with President Obama, very few began with President Bush. A lot of them go back to Clinton. There's an awful lot of continuity here and a lot of investment by both parties. And we're hoping that people will keep that history in mind and our interests moving forward together. Thank you all, have a happy new year and we hope we'll see you on the 29th. Thanks.