 Yeah, welcome back to think tech. I'm Jay Fidel. It's Tuesday noon and we have global connections and the question before the house is how the US can break Putin's hold on Ukraine. With guest Carl Baker, senior advisor Pacific Forum. Thank you for coming down Carl appreciate you being here. Thanks for having me Jay it's it's Ukraine is sort of the topic of the day for part of the world anyway. Now I think it's an important topic because it's something that has been festering for a while and it still hasn't been resolved. Well let's, let's get the environment down let's look at a map and you can describe, you know the significant elements of geography we're talking about here. I mean, as you can see, you know your crane borders Russia is sort of that that in between land between your Western yes central Europe, and, and Russia is part of course part of the old Soviet Union, in some cases. There's a lot of Russians that feel that it's really the homeland of Russia of the Russian Empire. And so you know there's a lot of a lot of emotion attached to that particular piece of land and there's a lot of a lot of history associated with that piece of land of course on the bottom there you see Crimea, which was a next, or taken back by Russia, depending on your perspective I guess. And that was done in 2014, which which led to the Minsk Accord, which involved trying to resolve the rest of the disputes between Russia and Ukraine which is in the Donbas which is on the eastern side of Ukraine and that's that's areas still contested. And that's of course where the Russian troops upwards of 125,000 or so troops have been stationed, and have been massing for the last couple months. And of course, there's some dispute about what's really going on in the Donbas on from the Russian side. They're saying that that the Ukraine hasn't kept its, it's part of the bargain in the Minsk agreement in that they haven't had elections. And of course that that's contested also because Ukraine says we can't have elections as long as there's interference from the Russians and the Russians say well we can't allow. We can't allow you to to have a free reign. So we're going to maintain forces in that area, until you have the election so so that's part of the contestation right now between Ukraine and Russian. So I had to guess I would guess that that argument is poppycock. Who's what's which side is poppycock I mean I think I think both sides see the other sides argument as as poppycock. You know it's a little bit like if you go back to to thinking about what we have in Asia. You know it's the old debate between South Korea and North Korea about independent means for achieving autonomy. And North Koreans say we can't do it as long as the Americans are there, and the Americans say well we can't do it as long as North Korea is a threat. So in some ways it's the same the same principle applies here that, you know, neither side trusts the other side and so to say, one side is poppycock and the other is is not is is just not looking at it from both sides. I guess I'm just letting my feelings about boot and slip out. So, you know, we had we had this whole experience with Trump and the $400 million of military aid that was going to go to Ukraine and it got us into she got us into an impeachment didn't it. Whatever happened with that what's the upshot of all of that four years ago. In fact, you know we have delivered that $450 million worth of equipment. And so it was it was completed the transaction was ultimately completed. But of course, yeah, it caused a lot of consternation because everyone was concerned that Trump was was really siding with the Russians for his own political benefit and and you know that's a problem in in American politics more than it was in in Europe I mean in some respects Ukraine was was the recipient of American politics or the or the recipient but the, the, the, the casualty of American politics over what was happening between Russia and Ukraine at the time. Russia, you know, the economy is the size of Texas it's really not that strong an economy. Having 125,000 troops on the border must be somewhat intimidating to Zelensky, and I wonder how strong he is I wonder how well equipped he is I wonder how committed his army and his military forces are and whether he is really prepared to deal with them. You know, to me it sounds like the elephant and the fly. Well, yes, I think he could. I think I think that Ukraine ultimately is is, you know, it's, it's not it's not going to go toe to toe with the Russians to maintain its territorial integrity, but I think what it will do is if if Russia would invade Ukraine. There would be a lot of resistance and it would become, you know, a real quagmire for the Russians to try to control all of Ukraine. Certainly, again, you know, but again, this is mostly about the Donbass it's mostly about that that eastern part of Ukraine, that that there's that the Russians feel that that this is an opportunity to kind of poke at Ukraine, and Ukraine is really concerned about the separatists in in that particular region because you know that that's and that's why the elections haven't been haven't been held because there is concern about the separatists. And yes, the Russians are, you know, they've talked about the little green men in that region. And you know, and clearly there's there's Russian support for those separatists in the Donbass because, you know, Putin, it is in Putin's interest to see Ukraine fail to the extent that he can make that happen. And so, you know, and that's where that's where it becomes complicated, because, you know, the United States has has in some ways two choices. You know, I mean, if you want to talk a little bit about the article that Alexander Vindman Vindman wrote in the New York Times, his argument was the United States needs to act independently and move forcefully on on Ukraine and leave NATO aside because NATO is not committed. And he somewhat was critical of Biden's approach to stay within the confines of NATO and he kind of misquotes Biden's intent because what what Biden had said is look we need to work this through NATO. And and Vindman said that Biden while what Biden meant was to stop at the end of NATO's commitment, but that's really not what he said he said we really need to work through NATO. You know, and if you remember back in 2014, there was a particular person, the Victorian Newland who is now deputy assistant deputy secretary for policy, who made a rather vulgar comment about the Europeans. I think that that Vindman sort of falls in that same category that he's being a little bit dismissive of what the European countries, both through NATO and through the European Union can do to prevent Putin from taking those steps. You know, I think, and I think the in the last in the last week, since that Vindman article I think that actually NATO and the European Union have stepped up, especially in the case of Germany, which has said, look, if you if you really don't back off from this threat of aggression, then we are going to cancel Nordstrom to we're not going to accept the gas through that pipeline, and, and you're going to suffer economically and I think that that is where Putin is vulnerable. It's viewed because they spent the Russian spent a fortune building the pipeline. It's already done as I understand cost them billions to do it, and they were relying on sales of gas to Western Europe to Germany. So if they can't realize that they've lost the investment at least for a while, and they've lost the income from selling the gas, and they need that. They do because because Russia is vulnerable Russia does depend on that on that export of natural resources as you know they're they're not they're they're not the empire that Putin would like him to be. And so that that does make them vulnerable and of course the other thing it does is it makes Putin vulnerable to dissatisfaction with the oligarchs that run those other companies. You know, and that's that's ultimately his source of power is being able to satisfy the oligarchs. So I think you know what what what the Biden administration has done I think is correct, because they have focused on the economic aspects. You know, Venman Venman said all that we need to deploy a division of military army division, you know out of cycle into the region. And I think that that just sends the wrong segment because the other thing that that would love to do in this context is is get some separation between the European countries and the United States, because as much as he would like to see the Ukraine fail, he would even more like to see NATO fail. And I think by by getting a little bit too far ahead in your skis for the Americans in this case, and not not work through the Europeans and with the Europeans. I think you have a real risk of doing that. You know, and so that's, you know that ultimately is is where I think the more mature American approach is, look, we aren't, we aren't the power we were back in the 90s where we could actually dictate the terms in cases a long ways away from the United States, we really have to depend on the Europeans, because if you start imposing unilateral sanctions on you on on the Russians without without commitment from from the Europeans, it's going to be very difficult. In fact, you know, it really sort of sort of puts us in a very vulnerable position because then there's there's people in the European Union that will take advantage of the year of the American sanctions and promote European interests in that context. Yeah, they won't back us up and our relationship will be strained. They won't back us up on this or other things too. So that's a real problem. But let you know let me let me unpack on two sides of that. One is women maybe you know frustrated with Biden's lack of aggressiveness. He wants him to do stuff. He doesn't like Russia much. You can tell that from his testimony back when he doesn't like the relationship that Trump and Trump's friends had with Russia. He wants to cut that off. And he doesn't like Russia's interference in our affairs and our voting. He doesn't like that off so he's angry at Russia, and he wants Biden to take a more aggressive posture. But as you say there's risk attached to that and the risk I want to ask you about is war. I mean, it seems to me that you know the world is very antsy and anxious these days, and the possibility the thought of war seems to be a little more ubiquitous than it was in various places in the world. But listen, how how much risk do we have of offending that may be the wrong term but offending the Russians to the point where we actually get into a shooting war with Russia. And I think I think taking taking aggressive actions that that are seen as as contradicting what the European Union and what NATO are doing would would certainly push us in that direction, because then, then the argument becomes this Putin's going to take up of the lack of cooperation between the Americans and Europeans, and and take advantage and move move troops into the dumb bus. So I think you know I think that that's really where the risk lies, I think if, if the United States and Europe can put together a package of threats which which we've done with economic threats Nord Stream to cut off from from the swift the the financial messaging system that allows you to do international banking and allows the oligarch to transfer money in and out of the United States, taking those things away from Russia puts them in a very difficult spot, and then suddenly they're having to deal with with the inflated ruble and and inability to sell natural resources into into Europe. I think that that the real risk is is just trying to get a little too far ahead of this, you know, and Putin is always is always watching, I mean he's, he's very much a person who, who is always seeking the advantage in that relationship. And so, you know, yes, he's concerned about about NATO expansion into into the Ukraine. That was the basis for him saying that he wanted to have some kind of guarantee. I don't think we need to give that guarantee. But what we do need to do is we need to encourage number one we need to encourage the Europeans to stand by their commitments to the economic threats. And second, we really need the Ukrainians to step up and take some responsibility for for at least thinking about what to do with the Mexico courts, because right now, you know, Ukraine isn't really doing very much and the United States could also get involved more involved and more encouraging about trying to move the Mexico court forward. And if they can't work that then maybe we need to think about how do we improve that how do we do something so that we can actually implement those those agreements and if they can't be, then we probably need to start thinking about maybe participating in some dialogue to allow that to move forward. I keep thinking that, you know, Putin with all his intelligence background and with all his intelligence apparatus that he has. And the fact that we live in a, you know, a transparent country in large part. He knows much more about us than we know about what goes on in the inside of the Kremlin. I'm sure we know something but I'm sure he can see clearly, not only into the way our government works but it's the way our public opinion works. That's all we wear it on our sleeve every day. And he knows that there's no appetite for getting, you know, involved militarily in somebody else's problem. I mean, even talking about the fact that Ukraine hasn't stepped up as much as we want. It sounds like Afghanistan maybe at a lesser level but it sounds like Afghanistan, and I would suggest that there's really no public opinion appetite in this country and I know appetite in Congress either to the extent that appetite still exists in Congress. But to have a war or a situation called a, you know, a foreign relation situation where we put more money, more time, more, may I say, boots on the ground into somebody's foreign entanglement. And I think that people would oppose that and he knows that. So to the extent that Vindman is suggesting any of that, it sounds to me like a dead end because Congress and the people will not go along with it. And aside from what NATO has in mind or what how it would react to this, the circumstance. Don't you agree we are we are totally transparent and therefore, you know, we are not going to be involved in a foreign entanglement right now. We were totally transparent, but we're certainly more transparent than the Russians are on this. And so yeah, I think that's right. I think, and that's why I'm, that's why I think, you know, the real the wise choice is, is to be very careful that it's the Europeans upfront in this situation and it's not us trying to get ahead of the Europeans because that's that was part of what happened in 2014 when when they did in fact the next Crimea is that is that the Americans and the and the Europeans simply weren't on the same page and there wasn't any that we couldn't come to an agreement on how to deal with the situation and so it simply took advantage of it and and put boots on the ground and said now deal with the fate of complete. Yeah, that was impressive what he did. And it was you know it was also impressive what we didn't do. And I'm sure he's looking for another opportunity just like that again. Exactly. And that's why I think we need to be very very careful that we don't, we don't try to get out of step with with the Europeans here. And that's, you know, and that's, that's always the, always the tendency on the part of the Americans who want to be aggressive and demonstrate, you know, to the to the world that the United States is going to stand up to, to the autarchs and all this kind of stuff. And another thing you know that bin man tried to bring out that that that Ukraine has become the fulcrum of American credibility alongside Taipei or Taiwan in in Asia, you know, and I think that that's just an overstatement of the importance of Ukraine. We support a free Ukraine and yes we're going to work through NATO to defend Ukraine's interests but not to the point where we're sending sending a division out of cycle, which you know, yes it's a it demonstrates a significant cost, but it's a cost that is probably lost in the in the real time drama that's unfolding in the Donbass region so you know I think it's, it sounds attractive to the Americans that want to, you know, demonstrate power, but I think in this case, the real power is the ability to cooperate and move forward in a multilateral fashion. And one thing that occurs to me is that in recent years, not without a lot of skill. Putin has been doing cyber cyber attacks on Ukraine, and probably a bunch of other places but he's focused those attacks on Ukraine brought their power down and government buildings and the like in Kiev over a period of time. I think he has the capability of doing that. And I suggested if he was really going to go in, if he's really going to have those boots walk into the Donbass, he would soften them all up. I mean it's good military strategy by by by stepping up his cyber attacks don't you think, and he could get a long way with that. He could do half the job without ever stepping across the border. Yeah, well yeah and that's and clearly that's what he's doing now is is trying to maintain that that vagueness in that particular region of are these people really going to support Selensky are they going to, you know, call for for a better association with the Russians. You know so that's why that's why it all kind of focuses on that particular on the Donbass, because that's where that's where the real uncertainty for Ukraine lies is the ability to maintain control in that part of the country. Yeah, and they speak Russian in that part of the country there you know ethnically they are large part Russian. Yeah, yeah, there's that's right and so yes they do tend to look to look to Moscow. And so and I think and Putin knows that and I mean my personal opinion is that that's really the area that that Putin is focused on he really understands that that the risk for him is too great to try to take on Ukraine, because just like the United States, I don't think has a stomach. The United States general population doesn't have a stomach for engaging in war. So the Russian population doesn't really have the stomach for engaging in a foot soldier war in Ukraine, because because the rest of the country is not going to fold just because Russian troops come yet they would then have a fight on their hand, hands, you know, similar to what I think Richard Haas compared to when the Russians tried to invade Afghanistan. You know at some point. The Russian population is going to become weary of that also. And so I think that that it works. It works on both sides of the reluctance by the leaders to get involved in a war that is not going to be popular at home. I wonder what would happen in Western Europe. If he did physically attack with weapons and troops and, you know, tanks and mortars and, you know, fighter planes and all that stuff reminiscent of World War two and, and the Blitzkrieg. That's what it sounds like. And he comes west, just like the Britain, when the Blitzkrieg was going east, but whatever. And he makes war on the people of Ukraine. Will Germany stand by? Will it think about sanctions or more? Will there be a join of issues, so to speak, by the Western European NATO countries, simply because they really can't stand to have a war on their border. Yeah, I mean, I think, I think that that both sides, ultimately, I think both sides are fairly comfortable with this sort of vagueness that surrounds Belarus and Ukraine. You know, you've got you've got the Baltics that have have moved into NATO. And, you know, and I think that that there's this sort of vague comfortableness on both sides of having Ukraine and Belarus as somewhat somewhat less defined on where where the loyalties lie. It's almost like a DMZ in some respects, you know, between NATO and Russia. And so I think that that that ultimately both sides are comfortable to the extent that that's sort of, I mean, comfortable. They're willing to live with the status quo in this interest. Yeah, because Putin is the aggressor here. I mean, I, let me ask you this question. There's no real interest by NATO, in terms of moving closer to the Russian border is there. Well, it doesn't really suit their style. Yes, and that's why there's been resistance to accept Ukraine into into NATO. You know that that's that's that's why they're in the situation they are because there's been a reluctance. You know, ever since ever since the Clinton administration to number one for the Americans to support that notion. And number two, NATO recognizes that there are legitimate Russian interests in in maintaining a less western country between them and NATO. Suppose NATO at this point, you know, as one of the various tools in the toolkit decided to include Ukraine in NATO or at least to step up the discussions in that direction. I guess Putin would see that as a very aggressive threatening move. What would the effect be you think. Yeah, I mean, I think that would that would somewhat force Putin's hand is is he would he would feel that that then he has to move now, because he can't, he can't wait for for a later date because it's not going to get any better. And so I think that it would be, it would, it would really force Russia into into a difficult position. And I don't see that that's really in anybody's interest at this point. So we talked about Alexander Venman and his very interesting article, maybe overstated in some ways in the New York Times, about a week ago. And let's let's let's take that off the shelf for a moment, Carl. Let's let's talk about, you know, what would happen if if Biden is too soft on this that he makes a mistake of being faint hearted and not aggressive enough. I'm not saying he should be as aggressive as Alexander Venman wants him to be, but he has to be at least some has to be somewhat tough. And he has to show that he runs this country, which is very questionable these days. Well, suppose he goes in there too soft, and he doesn't demonstrate the kind of will the kind of power you need to achieve, you know, sanctions that work leadership among the NATO countries in the EU that works. What happens if he makes a mistake in that direction. I mean, I, I don't know. I mean, I, it's a little bit hard to say I mean certainly I think Putin, if Putin sense that that was the case he would try to take advantage of it. And then the real, the real wild card is what does what does NATO or what does the European Union do. I mean, because ultimately the economic sanctions are dependent on successful implementation by the European Union. And I think that that's, you know, something that that there's a little bit of uncertainty in the United States anyway of how how the European can the European Union really put together a coherent strategy that would would effectively stop Putin from moving forward. And that's that's kind of where the unknown wise and and certainly it would hurt America American credibility, if it was viewed as as failing to, to take off a hard enough line. But I mean again it's your, you know your hypothetical is a little bit hard to envision, because I mean what I've seen from the from the Biden administration is that they recognize that they, they can't soft sell this thing that they can't. And really, it engaged in, in, you know, going too far to to appease the Russians, you know, I mean I hesitate to use the word appease because you know that there's always this tendency didn't go well in 1938. Well, that's the problem, I mean, my problem with that is that, you know, everybody always wants to go back to say there's only two choices, you know attack or appease, you know, and and the remembering Chamberlain. You know, and in this case, you know, it's not, it's not that black and white. It's not, it's not either either you know defend defend Ukraine or you're appeasing Russia. You know, it's more complicated than that there has to be a multilateral agreement there has to be a sense of of multilateral action here. And so, you know, I don't I don't like the idea of trying to reduce it to either either attack or appease, because it's just not that it's not that straightforward. No, it's complicated. You know, we've talked to you have a few minutes more like to ask you about one other area logically. We've talked about Putin's opportunistic style, and you got to give him credit I mean he's, he sees options. It's a good politician and international politician, he sees options he evaluates options. He's always waiting he's playing the long game. He looks for opportunities and, you know, Xi Jinping is not that different. You know, it seems to me that it's worthwhile just talking about the kinds of opportunities that may come Putin's way. For example, you know in the in the last Southern Adventure. He saw as an opportunity that the US and the EU were not on the same page and Crimea. And so he saw that as a as a time and opportunity to move. Okay, there are a lot of opportunities that could happen. I just name a few and I'd be interested in your thoughts about this. For example, China does something aggressive maybe on Taiwan, and it steals the headlines. It sucks up all the oxygen in terms of global opinion. I guess that might be an opportunity that Putin would move into. Likewise, if there was some kind of extraordinary event in the United States, another insurrection would have you with some kind of remarkable thing that happens politically or in terms of, you know, social contention in the United States, where that sucks up all the oxygen done the headlines around the world on a tremendous increase in COVID under Omicron. And it's more dangerous than we thought, you know, and we have infections going skyrocket around the world and everybody's in a tizzy, or perhaps natural catastrophe of the kind of scientists telling us we better watch out for in any part of the world of who knows wildfire extreme weather, something out of climate change that steals the headlines and sucks up the oxygen. Am I right to think that these kinds of things, even though they're distant from Ukraine, distant from, you know, Russia. They could, they could present opportunities, maybe a combination of them could present opportunities that would move into and use the same kind of strategy they used in Crimea. Sure. I mean, he, he, you know, he did it in, he did it in in Georgia in 2008. And so, yeah, I mean, I think that that's always a risk, but I will say that I think the risk is much greater when the perturbation occurs nearby. In other words, you know, the real concern has to be stability in in the Ukraine, you know, Zelensky has to has to be strong. And he can't be seen as as being weak, because that's, that's where I think somebody like Putin would take immediate advantage when he sees when he sees a weakness there. If he sees if he sees any any level of uncertainty of NATO support, or the European Union support for for maintaining Ukraine as an independent economy or an independent state. That's, that's where the greater risk is. Sure. There's, it is the case that if you know if there's some something that happens in the United States where the United States is is unlikely to to provide the support that it has provided provided to NATO or, or to Ukraine separately, then I think I think Putin would look at that as a potential opportunity. And that's why I think it's important to to maintain a sense of unity with with NATO in the context of the European continent, and that that's that's where the least likely chance of some other extra personality, influencing in Europe to occur, that if you if you can maintain a solid foundation in Europe, then then other other things that happen around other parts of the world become less likely to be seen as an opportunity. Yeah, depending on just how catastrophic they may be. Yeah. Let me ask you one other thing, you know, it is suggested by Putin, Putin's nature and his background as a KGB and all that. And what we've seen with Navalny with the poisoning of the valley and there was another retired Soviet, I should say Soviet Russian intelligence officer who was poisoned with radioactive poison in Britain. A few years ago, I mean this is all coming from the Kremlin and Putin. So he doesn't mind going offshore. He doesn't mind creating disturbances offshore. And as I mentioned before, he's fully capable with you know his, his internet skill to bring down utilities and, you know, infrastructure and the like, and he could and has done that in Ukraine. So, suppose we have an event that is closer just as you suggest that is right across the border, such as disturbance in the government in Ukraine, which is really a provocation by Putin assassination of Zelensky or somebody else in the government in Ukraine. That would be very disturbing. And it would be the kind of thing that tumultuous thing that might set up an opportunity for him. It seems to me that has to be on his list of options. And he's, he's demonstrated in the past when he's fully capable of crossing the border and creating that kind of disturbance. What do you think about the possibility. Yes, it's an it's always a possibility and you know that's why that's that's why I mean I will go back and say that's why there was so much concern when Trump appeared ready to bolt from NATO. You know, because because that's really the mechanism that that has has sustained that stability that prevents people like Putin from doing those kinds of things. NATO is is the core to the defense of Europe, and any sort of unified response in Europe. You know absent absent NATO, the European Union has has fiddled a bit with with some sort of independent military force, but it certainly doesn't have the credibility and the potency. It's a military force that includes the United States. So, you know, so that's why I think, you know, it's important to recognize that while, while, you know, territorial wars are becoming less important because of all these other threats that are out there. And that is that territory does still matter that it is still a factor in international relations, and that you still need these these old fashioned military forces like NATO to to maintain some level of peace, especially in an area like Central Europe where there's a lot of a lot of uncertainty and a lot of contested areas. Last, last point of discussion and maybe this calls for some things that you've already covered but what would your advice to the administration be right now all these things considered all these risks and events and, you know, arguments and and power points what what what would your advice to Biden be to navigate through the channel on risk. Well, yeah, I mean it's a lot of basically a reiteration is that you have to work the multilateral angle, you have to work through NATO, and you have to work with the European Union to ensure that there's no daylight between the United States and the European countries, both economically and militarily on this issue on on any issue in that region, whether it be Belarus whether it be Ukraine, whether it be, you know, supporting supporting the Baltics, you know you have to you have to maintain a very strong multilateral unified front to to protect everybody's interest. I think that that would be the preferred approach. And it might always have been the preferred approach, except something you said earlier in the program, you know, back a few years ago, when we were perhaps stronger more influential in Europe had greater, greater cloud there. It might not have been the same. Your answer might be different if we were talking say 20 years ago, am I right. That's exactly right. I mean and so what I'm suggesting is, is part of what I think has to become the accepted reality on the part of the Americans is that the unipolar moment is gone. And we really need to think about how we, how we cooperate with the rest of the world to achieve the goals that we're after. Much more sophisticated. It's on it's on the soft side of soft power for sure. Thank you, Carl, Carl Baker, senior advisor to Pacific Forum and a wonderful guest for our show. Thank you so much, Carl, and happy Christmas. Thank you.