 which is the coalition of over 70 organizations around the world that are all committed to improving nuclear security. The panelists today are all members of this group and we convene this panel to discuss the Nuclear Security Summit that occurred in the Hague last week. It's really a central event in nuclear security today and we just wanted to focus a little bit on the key questions and results that came out of that summit. So Sarah Williams will speak first. She's going to talk about what the Nuclear Security Summit process is and some of those specific results. Sharon Squisone is going to discuss the FISAL material related accomplishments and also what gaps there are in the current agenda. Finally, Kenneth Lawongo is going to discuss the future of the summit process and where it needs to go in the next couple of years to really accomplish the goal of preventing nuclear terrorism. Just to let you know a little more about the panelists, Sarah Williams is a nuclear policy analyst at the Partnership for Global Security and she's actually back in an old stomping ground here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She was previously a program coordinator and research associate here. Sharon is our wonderful host here, the director and senior fellow at the proliferation prevention program. She's also on the FMWG steering committee. She previously worked at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and advised Congress as a senior specialist in weapons of mass destruction at the Congressional Research Service. And for that she had some experience in the executive branch in the Department of State. And Ken is the president and founder of the Partnership for Global Security. He's also a co-chair of the FMWG. Before founding the Partnership for Global Security, he was with Princeton University's program on science and global security. He also held several senior positions at the Department of Energy including as a senior advisor to the Secretary of Energy. And prior to these positions, he served as professional staff for representatives on the House Armed Services Committee. And I just wanted to give everyone a quick reminder this is all on record and it's being webcast. And also please turn off your cell phones and make sure they're on silent. Sarah, would you start us off? Yes. Thank you, Leslie, for that lovely introduction. As Leslie said, I'm just going to give an overview of the summit process, how it came to be and sort of what's been accomplished to date and go into a little more detail about what happened just last month in The Hague. So the nuclear security summit process really began in 2009 with President Obama's now famous Prague speech in which he declared that he was committed to cooperating with the global community to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years and this became known as the four-year goal. The first summit was held here in Washington in 2010, the second in Seoul, South Korea in 2012, and the third just last month in The Hague, Netherlands. The likely final summit will take place somewhere in the United States in 2016. The summit itself is narrowly focused on nuclear security. It doesn't address broader disarmament challenges and ongoing arms control discussions. In 2010, the summit really focused on fissile material and in 2012, that agenda expanded to include radiological material and also the safety and security interface, which was very important in the aftermath of the accident at Fukushima. In 2014, countries really started to discuss what the legacy of the summit process would be, what we could do to sustain the progress that had been made so far and sort of what the future would look like after the final summit in 2016. One of the really important characteristics about the NSS has been the way countries commit to additional action and the way they report on these activities. A really important thing to note is coming out of the Washington summit in 2010, we really had three documents to look at. Following the 2014 NSS, just last month, there were dozens of documents on the NSS website and I would highly recommend checking out. The Dutch have done a really good job of cataloging all of that information. There's really a whole lot of information coming out that's public now. To give an overview, each summit has produced a consensus communique. That's what the countries can agree to together at the end and it's announced at the final press conference. In 2010, there was a Washington work plan which remained relevant and been updated throughout the process. In both 2012 and 2014, countries produced national progress reports in which they specifically accounted for different activities they had taken to further the goal of preventing the clear terrorism. Some countries make their national statements readily available but not all of those are always accessible and countries have made in different ways unilateral and multilateral commitments that support the overall summit goals and the multilateral commitments are what I'm going to focus on primarily. These commitments can be vague and they don't always have specific timelines or details about what specific action is going to be taken and the reporting mechanisms have not been uniform and the reporting isn't required but I think it's really important to remember that the fact that countries are taking the time and making statements beyond the consensus communique is really important and makes this summit process unique. It's allowed for outside groups like ours to evaluate progress that's taken place and also in some ways more reluctant countries have essentially been peer pressured into doing a bit more and joining into some of these multilateral statements. In 2010, at the beginning of the summit process, countries arrived to the Washington summit with lists of accomplishments that they had done within their national borders that they presented to the group. These became known as house gifts. Countries also at that summit made statements outlining what they would do in the future to further the summit goals. By 2012, almost 90% of the commitments that were made in 2012 had been accomplished and that was something that we found the first in the PGS ACA commitment report series judged that and that was the number that we found. Also in Seoul, a new type of commitment came out of that summit. 42 out of the 53 participants in the Seoul summit signed on to at least one of 13 joint statements. These joint statements were multilateral statements that laid out specific actions in priority areas to improve nuclear security. These became known as gift baskets. We had the house gifts which are the unilateral national commitments, gift baskets which are self-selected groups of states committing to further action in a specific area. These gift baskets covered a wide variety of nuclear security areas including transport security, national legislation implementation, and information security. Last month in the Hague, this model was built upon. Six of the statements from 2012 were updated and five of them had new signatories. So these are countries that previously did not join these statements, put their names to them in 2014. The transport security gift basket to provide an example. This was one that our most recent ACA PGS report which you can get outside which goes into detail about the 13 joint statements. This was one we identified as having that structure, having a timeline, and sort of laying out specific deliverables. And those were the types of gift baskets that we found to be of the most value. The transport security one was updated in 2014 and the countries that signed on to it committed to continuing their cooperation through the 2016 summit. There were six entirely new gift baskets in 2014, and the radiological security gift basket which was presented by the German government in 2012 was sort of revamped and re-presented in a different format by the United States in the Hague. Six of the statements from 2012 weren't updated, but many of the countries that signed on to those in Seoul presented their progress in their national progress reports that they submitted in the Hague. Three of the new statements were essentially proclamations. One highlighted the achievement of removing HEU from 12 summit participant countries. One called for the nuclear security agenda to be better integrated with the broader non-proliferation and arms control goals, and one reaffirmed country's support for the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. The other new statements really did have some specific goals, which is wonderful. The Dutch presented work that they have done to improve communication, best practices, and training in the area of nuclear forensics. One of the outputs from this was a mobile app, which you can download, and it's great, I have it now. It's called the Nuclear Lexicon, and it's basically a dictionary that is meant to facilitate communication between experts around the world that are working on nuclear forensics investigations so that everybody is using the same language. The statement on maritime security committed the countries to participating in a workshop that will discuss ways to improve security for material outside of regulatory control, and that will take place before the 2016 NSS. The US-led Radiological Security Gift Basket commits those 23 signers to securing all Category 1 radioactive material according to IAEA guidelines. Finally, a gift basket that got quite a lot of attention is the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation, which is also known as the Trilateral Initiative. It was presented by the three summit hosts and commits 35 of the summit participants who signed it to implementing existing nuclear security recommendations, encourages peer review, and it actually lists more than a dozen specific actions that countries can take to demonstrate their responsibility in this area. It was the most popular ever to have been presented, and it really will likely be the foundation on which we build sort of between the 2014 and 2016 summit and start to think about what the nuclear security regime will look like beyond 2016, and I'll let Ken speak a little bit more to that when his turn. Thank you. Well, welcome everyone. It's nice to see so many people interested in nuclear security in the outcome of the summit. I am, as Leslie mentioned, going to talk a little bit about the fissile material accomplishments. Also, I'm going to talk a little bit about the industry summit and gaps. So Sarah made an important point when she said, you know, with these national progress reports, that this is really the first time that we in the civil sector, civilian, what do we call ourselves? Civil society. Civil society, that's what we are. Have an opportunity to really assess what's happening. You know, when you look at the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, all of these things designed to combat nuclear terrorism, there's a tendency, almost a knee-jerk tendency, to be secretive about it, right? Because you don't want to reveal too much information lest you give terrorists the upper hand. And so I don't want to... I'm going to say a few critical things about the scope of what's out there, the magnitude of what we haven't covered. But I think we have to bear in mind that there have been some real accomplishments since 2010. And part of that is getting governments to open up about what they're doing and getting them to focus, spend money and effort on strengthening nuclear security. And Ken will go into sort of, we'll take the picture, the view from 30,000 feet and where we go forward, I'm going to focus right now on, okay, what's been going out and what's been going on in physical material. Also, I just wanted one more caveat. There's a lot of stuff that happened in the summit, right? When you go through each and every national progress report, it has a lot more than just, you know, to do with just nuclear material, right? There's a lot of training going on. There are, you know, centers of excellence. There are university programs that are being established to help train people. So bear that in mind. And I also want to just give the URL. I think it's at nss2014.com, which is the Dutch official website. So definitely go through all the documents on there. Worldwide, there's still a lot of material out there. There's 1,390 tons of HEU. By the way, about 1,300 of those tons are in the U.S. and Russia. And there's 230 tons in military plutonium and 260 tons. This is separated plutonium, right? Not plutonium and spent fuel in the civilian sector. So that's the magnitude of the problem. I think it's pretty safe to say that we have a lot more work to do. And one of the key takeaways is, you know, did we meet the four-year goal? No. But do we have a better consensus about the fact that we need to focus attention on this? Yes. And so as we move forward to 2016 and beyond, we're really going to have to think hard about where do we want to go and what are the best avenues for leverage? So from this summit, clearly I think the biggest accomplishment of fissile material is Japan. Japan relinquished 500 kilograms of weapons-usable material from its Tokai fast critical assembly facility. 300 kilograms, more or less, were plutonium. The rest were in highly enriched uranium. This was material that, you know, some of it was U.S. and U.K. origin. There was a joint statement which you can look at on the website between the U.S. and Japan about how to handle that material. The material hasn't gone, right? You know, but it's a commitment to take care of that. But Japan is also doing other things. And if you read its national statement closely, you'll see that it's exploring the conversion of fuel at the Kyoto University Research Reactors, looking at the downblending of highly enriched uranium from the University of Tokyo reactor and from the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, and also shipping highly enriched uranium from the Japan materials testing reactor critical assembly. So they don't get, they might not have got as much media play as this 500 kilograms of material, but there's still more going on there. Now, you could sit back and say, well, Japan has nine tons of separated plutonium. There are a lot of issues there, and I'm going to talk about them a little bit after I get done with a sort of country assessment. There was less material. The two other countries that gave up material were Belgium and Italy. In Belgium's progress report, they say they transferred to the U.S. the significant quantities of H.E.U. and separated plutonium. I don't personally know how much that is, and the national report didn't say. Italy apparently transferred 20 kilograms of H.E.U. and plutonium. You can expect to see less and less of this material, you know, as this process goes on, because we're actually making progress. So I don't want you to think that the assessment should just be on, okay, each summit is giving up less and less material. You need to think about it a little more broadly. I also wanted to bring your attention to two other countries. One is the U.K. and the other is China. The U.K. is working on defueling and decommissioning its last remaining civil H.E.U. reactor in 2014. Their national report did not mention over 21 tons of H.E.U. They have 3.5 tons of military plutonium and 91.2 tons of civilians separated plutonium. So even though these national progress reports, you have to look at this as a work in progress, right? I think the national progress reports are a good step. They are not consistent across the board, and this has been a discussion that we've been having for years. You know, how much do states... States gets to choose what they say in these reports so far. They're not mandatory. China has done some good things. They decommissioned two research reactors that are fueled with H.E.U. They're converting another. They didn't mention their civilian or military stockpiles of H.E.U. or plutonium. They are a party, as is the U.K. and Japan and several other countries, to these international plutonium management guidelines. But even there, when you look at those reports, it is very uneven in the consistency in the quality of the reporting. So I think China could do a lot more in terms of sharing information and assurances, whatever you want to call it. We shouldn't call it transparency because that word is anathema, but in terms of providing assurances on the amount of material that they have. I want to mention briefly the Nuclear Industry Summit. And here, you know, I attended the first Nuclear Industry Summit in 2010. And it's been a learning process, I think, for them. This is not really something that industry does. As one industry official said to me, you know, we have meetings to get together and do real things to make real decisions. So they're coming along. They are. I looked at their communique and they reiterated their commitments to minimizing HEU. Of course, with the caveat where technically and economically feasible, which is a big enough gap to drive a truck through. The government sectors haven't done better than that. That's the official summit language. They did also say they would expand the use. They committed to expanding the use of LEU targets for radioisotope production. There was also another caveat with that. But there were some new commitments. And I counted three. One was fostering the development of high density fuels. This would be to replace these HEU fuels. Another was ensuring the diverse supply of its 19.75% enriched uranium. So it's just under that HEU threshold. This is what a lot of research reactors use. So they're trying to diversify the supply of that and also have a viable disposition route for low enriched spent fuels from research and test reactors. I think that's a very positive development. And then lastly, and I think this is really interesting, because this is where industry can really help out. They're committed to accepting the return of, now they call it disused sources, spent sources, radiological sources, that they supply. So these are the suppliers saying, we're going to take these back. And they're also going to assist the holders of those sources with the logistics and financial arrangements. So that's good. So if a country says or a hospital says, I have the source, I don't know how to dispose of it, industry is actually going to take an active role in helping out with that. And where they can't take it back, they're going to engage with states on creating central facilities for managing those disused sources. So this is the other side. We were talking about fissile material. Now we're talking about the radiological sources. These are spread all over the globe. There have been some very high, highly visible incidents like in Guyana many years ago where children died because they were playing with these radioactive sources. It's a big problem and I'm glad to see that they're getting involved in it. Okay, so where are the gaps moving forward? Obviously military material. There's a lot of military material out there. And as I said, much of it is in the Russian and U.S. stockpiles. It's not clear to me that this process is going to be able to address that. But we in the civil society can come up with recommendations. If it's not going to be the nuclear security process, we need to come up with another process that can make some progress. We've been talking about for 20, 30, 40 years a fissile material production cutoff treaty. That's languishing behind everything else in the disarmament and nonproliferation agenda. But maybe we need to focus on this because if you care about climate change and you think nuclear energy is a way of helping mitigate or combat climate change, then you need to get really serious about safety and security across the whole spectrum. On targeting outstanding material, so the summit, so we're talking about gaps here, there are a couple of countries that have material that we need to address. Belarus was not part of the summit. One question is, should they be part of the next summit? South Africa, if you read its national report, it mentions conversion of the safari reactor, makes no mention of its HEU stockpile. Other countries, if you read these reports carefully, you'll see, and I'm not picking on Switzerland, I'm just giving it as an example. Their statement says, we recognize that these materials require special precautions and therefore we're committed to reducing their stocks to a minimum level consistent with national requirements, in particular for R&D and training. Is that a bad statement? No. Does it create a lot of flexibility? I would argue yes. And if you look at all these country statements, you'll see similar things there. Looking forward, we focused a lot on capturing HEU, not so much on plutonium. And so I mentioned earlier Japan. Well, Japan has a policy of not possessing excess plutonium. But when you start to look more closely at how that is being implemented, there are a lot of questions that can be raised. You know, the plutonium utilization plans are done by the utilities. They're assessed by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. That Japan Atomic Energy Commission you may know has been recently downsized. There used to be five commissioners, now there will be three. And the question is, all right, this is a national sovereign issue, but it's a big one. And a lot of countries will be looking at how Japan does. The Fissile Materials Working Group had, we posted recommendations on plutonium policy. I'm kind of... I haven't been keeping track, but I'm sure I'm over my time limit. Basically, I'll just say, you know, we looked at, okay, what would be our recommendations on production and on military stockpiles? Some of these are, you know, I would say, need more specificity going forward. I think we're all, as a community, going to have to address this more directly. It's not a topic since the 1970s. It's not a topic that governments feel comfortable addressing. But I think we need to have more input there. And then lastly, my one last point on the gaps would be security culture. You know, in the Seoul Summit, there was a full paragraph in the communique on security culture. In this Dutch communique, it was kind of relegated to a statement, you know, saying, we support the development of security culture. I know this is not a materials issue, but ultimately, all of that stuff, training, centers of excellence, you know, it boils down to, for people aware, engaged, and, you know, committed to making this a high priority. So I'm sure this was just a minor omission, or it sort of went along in the negotiations on the broader issues in the communique. But that's my report. Thank you. Ken? Thanks, Leslie, and thanks, Sharon, for hosting us. This is one of the nicest places we've ever been hosted outside of the Netherlands a week ago. So we're becoming classier, I think, as time goes on. So my take on the Hague Summit is that it was a useful and important pivot point for the future in several ways. And I think that outcomes were positive. And I think it was a useful event. First, there was a significant focus on the regime, or what is called, in the documents, the architecture. But basically, it was, there were both in the communique and in this thing called the trilateral initiative that Sarah referenced. A lot of discussion about the regime or the architecture for nuclear security and what we ought to do about it. And I'm going to talk about that in more detail in a minute. The second major pivot is that it was clear from what I read that this process is going to shift, I don't say downgrade, but it's going to shift to a more, quote, unquote, sustainable model. I think this is something that Obama said. And the heads of state will still be involved some way, but it's going to be, I think, more of a ministerial and technical level interaction from here on out. It also seems in that regard that it will remain a political process that's parallel to the IAEA activities, which I think is a positive development. Third, I was really interested to see that President Obama said, we need to finish strong. I mean, I could not agree more that we need to finish strong. The question is, will we finish strong? What he's talking about, as I understand it, is identifying actionable items for 2016 and then, in his words, marshalling the political will to achieve them. So I think that if he can play a role in that, we might actually make some progress. And then finally, the fourth pivot is, I think there's going to be more of a focus on demonstrating accountability. The Trilateral Initiative had 35 sponsors, as Sarah said, and they agreed to do a number of useful things. What they have to do now, though, is demonstrate between now and 2016 or by 2016 summit the implementation of what it is that they've agreed to. Not everybody's statement is online, and I don't think the Australian statement is online, but we were given some information about the Australian Prime Minister's statement, and he made four points that I think are actually very, very relevant as goals for 2016. High standards of security for all material. A strong nuclear security architecture with no gaps. Build up an international confidence in nuclear security and cooperation among key stakeholders, government, industry and NGOs. I think those four points are really important because if you look at the communique, as usual, there's a shout out to the industry summit, but poor civil society is left unmentioned after all of our hard work. So in my view, between a communique and a trilateral initiative, I think the summit actually covered a number of key nuclear security governance issues, and it covered a lot of the issues that we in the expert community had been promoting over the last couple of years, and I think it's a positive development. So let me just outline four, I would say, key issues that generally most experts on the outside agreed needed to be addressed and then try to assess how the summit did on each one of these things. So the universalization of the current regime is one of the key ones. Second, building confidence through information sharing. Third, employing voluntary actions to improve the system. And fourth, using peer review and best practices as a tool for improving overall nuclear security. You know, there are other ideas like framework convention that we're promoting and that our group in nuclear security is governance, experts group is promoting, but let's leave that aside for the moment and let me just go through these four. I think on universalization, both the trilateral initiative and the communique made attempts to move this issue forward. So the communique made reference as usual to all the legal instruments and the IAEA recommendations and guidance. But the trilateral initiative is specifically focused on the commitment to meet the intent of these IAEA recommendations. Now, meeting the intent of the IAEA recommendations is always, I guess, a little difficult. It's not exactly clear what the intent is, but I think the idea is to implement them as fully as possible. And I think that you've got 35 or 53 countries that signed up to this, and so that, to me, is the beginning of something more concrete. Because previously, all we did is say IAEA guidance in the communique. We haven't had anything this specific that calls out the specific IAEA recommendation documents. Second, building confidence in information sharing. It also was referenced in both of these documents. So there's a new paragraph in the communique that was called paragraph 20, infamous paragraph 20, on voluntary measures, and it offered a range of specific ideas for countries to undertake, including sharing nonsensitive information. It also stated, I thought interestingly, that showcasing nuclear security efforts, IE, making information public, can also build regional and international confidence. The trilateral initiative doesn't specifically talk about confidence building, but it does specifically talk about voluntary information exchanges while protecting confidentiality of information. So I would say overall, the summit introduced the relationship between information and confidence, which I think is positive, but it remains to be seen exactly how this is going to be implemented. Third, employing voluntary actions to enhance the summit clearly, paragraph 20 in the communique, specifically on voluntary actions, completely new, very useful, if implemented. In addition, the trilateral initiative identified additional voluntary actions beyond the IAEA recommendations that other states, that the states that signed up to that, could take. So I think this idea of voluntary actions is something that got off the ground at the summit, but again, we have to see how it's implemented. There's nothing in either of these documents that requires specific demonstration of performance, so we're going to have to watch this closely. And fourth, peer review and best practices, that's been in the communique from the beginning, and it was in the trilateral initiative as well. However, I want to make two points about the peer review part of this. First is what is being talked about in peer review is what's called I-PASS, which is a physical protection assessment by the IAEA, and a particular state that is confidential and can be released, or parts of the information can't be released, but it's not necessary. It is not what is done in nuclear safety, which is a requirement for countries to provide documentation on their safety and then submit it to their peers for actual review, which also is confidential but also can be made public. So it's not the same. There's a difference still between safety and security in this regard. Secondly, the best practices for all of the reference of best practices are, again, undefined what specifically these best practices are, and there's no one size fits all, I think, in this area, and we have to really tailor them to individual countries. So I think we ended up at the end of this summit with a good, with something that's worthwhile, but something which is really just the foundation of what needs to be done. So I think that, A, the summit took the need to improve the regime seriously as an issue. It is something that was, I would say, the seed was planted at the Seoul Summit. It was completely not referenced in as an issue in the Washington Summit. The seed was planted in Seoul and I think the seed has grown in the Hague. I'm very happy about that. But second, it began the process. I would say, if you signed up to this trilateral initiative and you actually fully implement it, you have the beginnings of what are international standards for nuclear security. So I think the implementation of this particular initiative is actually quite important. Then I just want to talk about other terms that are in these documents in the communique and in this trilateral initiative that are interesting to me and I think useful and new. So there are references to demonstrating implementation. I think that's going to be a very key thing. Taking regional actions. I think obviously on a regional basis there's much more that can be done than just through the summit process. Very important in a trilateral initiative. Nuclear security is an international responsibility. In addition to a national responsibility, up to this point the focus has all been on the national responsibility and in this initiative there's focus on the international responsibility which I think is very, very significant. There is an endorsement of the concept of continuous improvement. Also something which hadn't been talked about in detail before. The call for excellent and transparent behavior that can you believe it? The word transparency is in there. Excellent and transparent behavior. And also what I consider to be one of the key things in the trilateral initiative, a call for the assessment of new ideas to improve the regime overall. So I think all of those are positive developments. In addition, I think what the trilateral initiative did is that it separated the Nuclear Security Summit states into two categories. 35 signed on, 18 did not. In the 18 that did not sign on were Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. So two declared nuclear weapons states, two undeclared nuclear weapons states and two new members of the nuclear club in coming years. And I'm not quite sure what the rationale was for not signing on because all this initiative really did was require you to say yes we agree with what the IAEA is recommending and we will implement it. So how this issue plays out in the future whether states decide that they want to join after the fact I think is something that we'll be looking at. But I think what it does do is it kind of separates the countries into those that are more serious about this issue and those that either have to explain why they didn't sign or you have to assume that maybe they're not as serious as the ones that did. And so what we've been trying to do through this summit process is not point fingers at countries but in a subtle way what the trilateral initiative did is it gave you kind of a photo negative of those that are seriously committed and those that seem to be somewhat less seriously committed. And of course we don't have the national statement so we don't know why. But all of this in my opinion raises expectations for something more in 2016. And this is really the key issue. I think that there has to be a concrete connection between this summit and the next one and especially on this issue of governance and I think that what the Hague Summit did is it built a platform that's very stable and that can be built upon to try and eliminate the gaps in the weak links that exist in the system. What the summit didn't do is eliminate the gaps and the weak links in the system. What it did do is set up those issues for progress coming into 2016. And I think that that if the president is serious about achieving and moving ahead rapidly that's where I would focus a significant amount of attention. In my opinion I think that if that's the way the summit in 2016 goes I think that Obama will have a legacy worthy of the cost and the effort and the expense of this summit process. Thank you. Thank you very much all. I wanted to remind everybody to please we're going to start the question and answer period. Please introduce yourself say where you work and are there any questions for our panelists? I can start us off if nobody has anything to ask. I was interested so can you talk a little bit about this idea of a political versus a technical process and how it seems like they're going to try to maintain some of the political momentum can you and perhaps our other panelists talk about why that's important what each of those brings to the process? Yeah I mean you know the summit was started because there was a obvious need to try and do more than what was being done through the existing channel which is the IEA channel which is actually quite important and as both Sarah and Sharon laid out I mean a lot has been accomplished that otherwise wouldn't have been accomplished if there wasn't a summit process so having a political process I think makes a difference because you need people at the top to tell people further down the chain what it is that they want for their next meeting these are forcing events you have to deliver something that's the benefit of summits. Another review of it. I'll be right back. Wait for the mic. Jennifer McPhee. So I was wondering as Sharon mentioned the whole goal has not been accomplished within four years maybe by 2016 so what might be the plans afterwards I've heard various possibilities either in the IAEA or Ken just mentioned at a ministerial level and who is focusing on that. Thank you. Well you know that phrase beauty is in the eyes of the beholder that even though the four year goal I thought was really articulated some in the administration say no no no there never was any four year goal and besides which what did that refer to the most vulnerable material and so the question what's the most vulnerable material is also up for debate is it HEU, is it plutonium I mean even when we started this whole process it was difficult to remember that really the Europeans found radiological sources a much bigger concern because if a terrorist was going to would a terrorist make a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb so there are still a lot of differences of opinion I think those gaps have closed somewhat but I don't think you can say it's this amount of material and you know the IEA should work on that I'm a little probably less confident in the I mean let me back up for a second the IAEA must be involved absolutely and they have a lot of expertise but they are not a leadership organization they typically implement the policies that their member states want to pursue so for an example on centers of excellence I have suggested and many other people have suggested that these centers of excellence should cooperate well the IEA says yeah we think that's a great idea and when they ask us to cooperate we will certainly help them but they're not a leadership organization and so that's why these summits that's exactly what these summits have provided and the question is when you go forward what takes the place of that you're a little luckier in for example the convention on nuclear safety because there's a review process that is built into the convention this is one particular item that the nuclear security architecture regime whatever you're talking about is lacking if you don't have a review process whether you do it at a summit or you do it state's parties or something like that how do you know what's going on how do you know where the gaps are did I answer your question or did I go off on a tangent I'd like to add just about the role that the joint statements might play in this it's a much more micro level than the sort of macro architecture what is this entire system going to do going forward but these joint statements have provided a little bit of an opportunity for individual states to show leadership in particular areas and as we've seen that they were some were updated in 2014 and had new sign-ons those might be part of what you know it's probable or at least possible that some of those activities will continue beyond the 2016 summit regardless of what whatever sort of high level political you know processes maintained the summit has provided a little bit of a laboratory environment for some new cooperation and some new cooperative activities that have different states cooperating on particular things Jennifer let me just make one point we now have I think with the end of the Hague Summit the full scope of nuclear security finally inside the envelope it took six years to get it there but I think we basically have almost virtually all of it in there 2010 to focus just on physical material 2012 because of Fukushima you got the focus on safety security interface and the focus on facilities and radiological in this one I would say that besides the Japan announcement the number one thing is on the regime and so I think now you have inside the envelope everything that you need so whatever the administration's view or the president's view was of this thing in the beginning is OBE because it's much bigger than what it was in 2010 and so the responsibility and the obligation and the leadership challenge is also much bigger and that's what needs to be risen to at this point we're only going to get one more at that before all the heads of states devolved this down to who knows which minister will end up probably the secretary of energy or the energy minister or somebody like that so I think they've got this is teed up perfectly for this administration to do something significant in this area now that the entire scope of the issue is inside the envelope of the summit thank you two questions who was it there that you might like to have been there, you mentioned for example Belarus and also was there a discussion of the fact that the Ukraine had given up their materials and the British and Americans witnessed the agreement with Russia on that what were the discussions like surrounding that so that's the first question on forensics which was emphasized in one of the earlier summits no one except for the Dutch app seemed to be talking about that and I know this summer there's going to be an IAEA conference on that so what discussion was there surrounding nuclear forensics and attribution thank you I'll just say a word about Ukraine Ukraine dominated the event I mean there was no question about it and the good news was that everybody was able to say well it's a tragic situation but at the very least there's no nuclear material, no physical material left in the country, no warheads left in the country and that's a very positive thing I do think however that the Ukrainians themselves are a little bit nervous about their nuclear power reactors in an environment where you know there's threatening part of their territory has been occupied and there's a threat on the border to the eastern part of the country so I would say that what the Ukraine did is A, it made clear the value of prescience in politics by taking action when you can when the opportunity arises seizing it to get rid of all those warheads missiles and the physical material that was in that country and secondly it raised also the question of are your threat scenarios for all of your nuclear assets as relevant as they could be or are they just designed for peacetime, should they be designed for potential hostile environment as well I'll just say on the forensics the Dutch gift basket was really a culmination of three years of activity the first time that my understanding is the first time that the idea for this activity and the cooperation came out of the March 2011 Sherpa meeting so this has been an ongoing activity and there are there are four priority areas and I can't list them for you off the top of my head right now but that the countries that have signed on to that are continuing to cooperate in training there's a curriculum that was developed so there is certainly ongoing activity it is a relatively technical topic so it's I'm not quite sure all of the channels that it's being sort of fed into but there is a continuing level of cooperation in that area that started actually back in 2011 do you want to say something about who else should be there? let's do the follow up Ken on the Ukraine I was listening yesterday to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee hearing on that disgusting emerging threat were you sleeping? well actually it was really interesting one of the things that came out was like what country is going to give up their nuclear material and potential after the Ukrainians did and hey wouldn't Russia have been thinking differently about them if they might still have had material so that was what one of the senators asked and Kenny Myers refused that's not my thing, go ask policy the policy shop said can I give you a written answer on that this is your tax dollars at work yes please let me pass the buck I don't agree with that I think it's good that it's not there I certainly don't think you want to encourage countries to have a nuclear deterrent because of it wouldn't have what would they have done, fired a Russian nuclear missile at their own country I mean I don't think that I sincerely doubt that what happened in Crimea would have been different if there was physical material in Ukraine I'm happy it's not there during an unstable political situation because that is what worries me more than anything is political instability and then political complacency those are the two things that worry me more than whether or not a guard has a gun in the back I'm Carlton Stoiber I'm now chairman of the nuclear security working group of the international nuclear law association so I have a sort of a legal perspective on this so I'm going to make a statement disguised as a question you talked about the architecture, the regime and it's clear to me that there are the two aspects of that, there's the national aspect and there's the international aspect on the national side you had paragraph 11 in the communique which recognized this implementation kit for national legislation that was submitted by the Indonesians with participation by verdict in London and I worked on that and I would say that one of the important things for the next summit and I hope you agree would be to adopt some kind of assessment mechanism for determining whether or not states are indeed adopting and implementing effective national legislation because regardless of what the international regime becomes the first line of defense in this area is going to be national law and national implementation the second paragraph of the communique that I'd like to point to is 16 which is talking about the IAEA and its role in continuing to assess and monitor what states are doing in the nuclear security field and the real problem I've been on many of these missions in the security area and the problem quite frankly is resources both human and technical and financial resources of the agency in order to be able to conduct these any appetite beyond this very vague statement in paragraph 16 of the communique on really beefing up the IAEA's capability to conduct these kinds of activities in the nuclear security field well I would just say this is they have received additional money in the nuclear security fund as a result of the summits it's probably not adequate they have elevated the office inside the bureaucracy and they're getting more I think out of the regular budget than they did in the past but it is related to your first question which is how many of these assessments do you want they're not mandatory they're voluntary and should it be the other way around I mean I think that's the question shouldn't there be an obligation to do this as opposed to opt out of doing it but I think Carl all of this this is a really from a kind of macro perspective this is really an interesting point because the question is at the end of this are we going to end up with essentially the same system but we have this stack of specific outcomes which are useful but hasn't really changed the psychology of the game or we're going to come out with something that says hey you know what the price of doing business is higher than it was before this all began and we ought to take that on as part of our responsibility as nuclear operating states I mean I think that is a fundamental question which is not answered at the moment I would just add to that Carl I wouldn't put all my eggs in that IEA basket particularly on this but there are other avenues so the U.S. I know does a lot of bilateral work with countries and then there's the connection to UNSC or 1540 so you know I would I think you got to promote it all right the problem is you can throw a bunch of money at it and you can have you know teams go over and draft laws I mean you've certainly been part of those for a few countries but the bottom line is when you know is the national capacity and building that national capacity even once you get the laws I mean writing the laws is one thing and then it's the question of implementing them and they go from law to rules, regulations to implementation and so I think that's an outcome of this broader you know political support yeah this is important and we're going to spend some money on it and we're going to seek out assistance where we can and whether it's through you know some countries prefer the IAEA because they feel it's more neutral or they just you know just feel more comfortable than looking to bilateral relationships so I think you got to do it all well I want to thank Sharon for mentioning the convention on nuclear safety which I wrote and that includes the review conference mechanism and I think that's one of the approaches that might be fruitful in this line of thinking is to adopt for either new instruments or the instruments that now exist a mandatory review process in which states have to come forward and really demonstrate what they're doing I could not agree more I would also add you know if you had something like a secretariat I mean we have the OPCW we have the you know a real secretariat that could provide those kinds of resources etc. it would be an improvement the microphone is coming it's coming I'm Paul Walker with the Green Cross International Fizzle Material Working Group too so thank you all for nice presentations and for being I think very fair maybe a little bit overly fair but defining the glass as half full as opposed to half empty I particularly want to reiterate I think something you brought up Ken is in three areas really the scope has expanded I think very importantly bringing in military when the majority of these weapons grade materials are military stockpiles in both the United States and Russia secondarily bringing in radiological materials when in fact all of us are very concerned and continue to be about dirty bombs and you know radiological bombs and then thirdly really the fact that we've begun actually what I sometimes use is the M word mandatory as opposed to the V word voluntary and so we've started talking about mandatory you know minimum standards of security and safety as opposed to voluntary minimum standards and I think that's one of the most enormous challenges in all of these regimes we face so two quick questions nobody has really mentioned Russia has Russia except for the Ukraine back here did Russia issue a statement and did Russia join the trilateral initiative I don't think so as far as I know but maybe not but I think that's important to note secondly two of the very important physical protection and anti-terrorist regimes the CPPNM and the ICSNT was there anything in the final communique or anything in the national statements that focused on ratification and entry in a force strengthening these two agreements which still remain in limbo because of a lack of a number of countries not joining them thank you we're still sorting through everything so Russia did not sign on to the trilateral initiative but they were they did sign the global initiative, they're part of the global initiative about nuclear terrorism and the joint statement in 2012 that statement had an update in 2014 which they did sign on to so I do think it's important to remember that a lot of those channels despite the high level attention that the Ukraine issue obviously is getting generally and got at the summit there are those channels that are remaining but they did not sign the trilateral initiative what happened on ICSNT on CPPNM I don't think there was any specific statement on that Sharon so ICSNT I don't see in this communique but I also don't have my glasses on on CPPNM I thought the statement was actually fairly positive which it said we will continue to work towards the entry into force of the 2005 amendment later this year 2014 now that would require the US among others to ratify it I didn't see the Russian statement but as Ken said Russia was not part of the what we call the trilateral initiative the strengthening nuclear security implementation and the real question is moving forward to 2016 what's going to happen coming out of Crimea and Russian cooperation on a whole host of different issues but they are clearly a key player here whose cooperation we need and a lot of the countries do and I will admit to having not read all of the progress reports yet but a lot of the countries do sort of lay out in specificity their plans for implementation for ratification of the treaties in their progress reports so you can sort of judge who's where in the process we're thinking about it there's a lot of we've done X but we need to do Y it's a little bit more to sort out actually can I ask a follow-up question to Carl Stoiber it's an international legal question so there's a state signs a convention but is awaiting ratification are they bound to abide by its provisions no because there is a statement in here that calls on the need for all contracting parties to comply fully with provisions the rule is under the Vienna convention on the law of treaties and the rule is that the signatory of an international instrument is not strictly bound by its provisions but it is bound to not take any action that would jeopardize the objects and purposes of the instrument so this does constrict the options for signatory states that have not yet ratified not to move forward with inconsistent actions and that in the arms control area can be fairly powerful actually Any more questions? Do you guys have any concluding comments that were brought up by the question and answer session? No? Well, thank you very much for your participation in the panel it was a very interesting discussion and thank you all for coming Thank you Leslie