 By way of ending this week about seeking justice, let me turn now to one of the most controversial issues relating to immunity. That is the immunity of foreign state officials from criminal proceedings and notably when they are prosecuted abroad on the basis of treaties providing for a duty to prosecute certain grave crimes like the crime of torture. And you certainly remember the Pinochet case in English courts by which in 1999 the House of Lords finally denied immunity to the former head of state of Chile. But from the previous videos and readings in this course, you also remember the Arrest Warrant case, which is a case argued on behalf of the DRC before the ICJ, and in which the International Court of Justice affirmed that Belgium had breached the total immunity from criminal proceedings enjoyed by the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo when Belgium issued an international arrest warrant against him. And those two cases seem to be incompatible, as one case denies immunity while the other one affirms it. However, those two cases can perfectly be reconciled by distinguishing between the Immunity Rationer Personné and the Immunity Rationer Materiae of foreign officials. And let me explain this and elaborate on the regime of each of those immunities from criminal prosecution. First, let us deal with Immunity Rationer Personné. During the Arrest Warrant case, it is now settled that under international customary law, acting heads of state, heads of government or foreign affairs ministers enjoy total immunity rationé personné from foreign criminal prosecution, be it for acts performed privately or acts performed officially and indistinctively of whether those acts have been performed before or during their term of office. And the same is true for diplomats and members of special missions, but only in relation to possible criminal proceedings in the states where they are accredited or on mission. And this is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, article 31.1, and the Convention on Special Missions Convention of 69, also article 31.1. It is questionable whether other persons, than heads of states, heads of governments, foreign affairs ministers, also enjoy personal immunity by the sheer fact of the nature of their official functions. Are, for instance, vice presidents or defence ministers entitled to a personal immunity? And this question arises because the enumeration by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant judgement was clearly not exhaustive as the court referred to, I quote, to certain holders of high-ranking office, such as the head of state, head of government and ministers of foreign affairs. This is paragraph 51 of the judgement of 2002. Well this being said, there is very little practice to support a generous extension of the beneficiaries of such personal immunity. In order to assess the benefit of immunity rationally personally to other persons under customary international law, one crucial element has to be taken into account. If indeed, as the ICJ ruled, such immunity is to be reserved to, I quote, holders of high-ranking office, it is because only those persons, by virtue of their office, embody or personify the state. Some domestic courts have additionally required that the foreign official needed to be engaged on foreign affairs in order to enjoy an immunity rationally personally. And the question is debated at the International Law Commission. Immunity rationally personally is temporary because it ceases to exist when the high officials protected by it leave office or earlier if their state waives it. Such renunciation by the state to the immunity of its high-ranking officials does not entail any renunciation by the state to its sovereign immunity, as such as its act concern, as long as its act concern was Eurée Imperie. So defined, immunity rationally personally protects, as the ICJ stated, from, I quote, any act of authority of another state which would hinder the high official in the performance of his or her duties. Immunity rationally personally is total and is a shield against any prosecution even when it relates to the gravest breaches of international criminal law. However, because immunity rationally personally does not have, like any other rule on immunity, a parametry character, such immunity can be set aside between contracting parties by a specific treaty rule. And for instance, and as we called earlier in the course, immunity rationally personally does not apply between state parties to the international criminal court statute for the purpose of the ICC jurisdiction in cooperation with it. And this is Article 27, you may remember. However, due to the relativity of treaties, immunity rationally personally must be respected when a non-party high representative is concerned. And this is Article 98 of the ICC statute. Even when the ICC jurisdiction is triggered by a Security Council referral, let us turn to immunity rationally materially of foreign officials in the next video.