 Question 1 of Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour, Part 1, the Prologue and Question 1, Articles 1 through 3. This is the LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars, Trietis on the Saviour, by Saint Thomas Aquinas, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Terziapars, Third Part, Prologue, For as much as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to save His people from their sins, Matthew 1, verse 21. As the angel announced, showed unto us in His own person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again. It is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race. During this, we must consider, one, the Saviour Himself, two, the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation, three, the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection. Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs. The first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation. The second, about such things as were done and suffered by our Saviour, that is, God incarnate. Treaties on the Incarnation, Questions 1 through 59. Question 1 of the fitness of the Incarnation, in six articles. Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered. First, the fitness of the Incarnation, secondly, the mode of union of the word incarnate, thirdly, what follows this union? Under the first head, there are six points of inquiry. First, whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate, second, whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race. Third, whether if there had been no sin, God would have become incarnate. Fourth, whether he became incarnate to take away original sin rather than actual. Fifth, whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world. Sixth, whether his Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of the world. First article. Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate, Objection 1, it would seem that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness, it was best for him to be as he had been from all eternity. But from all eternity he had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Objection 2, further, it is not fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man. According to Horace in the first line of his The Art of Poetry, But God and flesh are infinitely apart, since God is most simple and flesh is most composite, especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human flesh. Objection 3, further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body. Objection 4, further, it is not becoming that he who surpassed the greatest things should be contained in the least, and he upon whom rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But God, who takes care of the whole world, the whole universe of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that he should be hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison with whom the whole universe is accounted as little, and that this prince should quit his throne for so long, and transfer the government of the whole world to so frail a body. As Volusianus writes to Augustine in his letter 135, On the contrary, it would seem most fitting that by visible things the invisible things of God should be made known. For to this end was the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle in Romans 1, verse 20. For the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. But as Damascene says in On the True Faith 3, 1, By the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of God, his goodness, for he did not despise the weakness of his own anti-work. His justice, since on man's defeat, he caused the tyrant to be overcome by none other than man, and yet he did not snatch men forcibly from death. His wisdom, for he found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt. His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater than for God to become incarnate. I answer that, to each thing, that is befitting which belongs to it by reason of its very nature. Thus, to reason befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius in On the Divine Names 1. Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius in On the Divine Names 4. Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by his so joining-created nature to himself that one person is made up of these three, the word, a soul, and flesh. As Augustine says in On the Trinity 13, Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate. Reply to Objection 1. The mystery of the incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the state in which he had been from eternity, but through his having united himself to the creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to himself. But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable should not always be in one way, and therefore as the creature began to be, although it had not been before, though likewise not having been previously united to God in person, it was afterwards united to him. Reply to Objection 2. To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting to human flesh according to its own natural endowments, since it was above its dignity. Nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of his infinite goodness, should unite it to himself for man's salvation. Reply to Objection 3. Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God's wisdom, and is ordained to God's goodness. For God, who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for his own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God's justice for God's glory. But evil of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the divine wisdom, and from the order of the divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, but it did not become him to assume the evil of fault. Reply to Objection 4. As Augustine replies to his letter to Volusianus 137, The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human flesh, as either to desert or lose, or to transfer, and, as it were, contract within this frail body the care of governing the universe. This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things. God is great, not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of his might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abiding word of God should be everywhere at once. Since nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate. Second Article. Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race, that the word of God should become incarnate, Objection 1, it would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation of the human race, that the word of God should become incarnate. For since the word of God is perfect God, as has been said in the Paras Prima, Section 4, Articles 1 and 2, no power was added to him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate word of God restored human nature, he could have also restored it without assuming flesh. Objection 2 further. For the restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for sin. Now, man can satisfy as it would seem for sin. For God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since he is more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as he lays the act of sin to man's charge, so he ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that the word of God should become incarnate. Objection 3 further. To revere God pertains especially to man's salvation, and it is written in Malachi 1.6. If then I be a father, where is my honor? And if I be a master, where is my fear? But man revere God the more by considering him as elevated above all, and far beyond man's senses. Hence Psalm 112 verse 4 says, The Lord is high above all nations, and his glory above the heavens. And further on, who is as the Lord our God? Which pertains to reverence. Therefore it would seem unfitting to man's salvation that God should be made like unto us by assuming flesh. On the contrary, what frees the human race from perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the incarnation is such. According to John 3 verse 16, God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting. Therefore it was necessary for man's salvation that God should become incarnate. I answer that. A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it, as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God, with his omnipotent power, could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says, in On the Trinity, 1210, We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to whose power all things are equally subject, but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery. Now this may be viewed with respect to our furtherance in good. First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself who speaks. Hence Augustine says, in On the City of God, 1112 In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith. Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened. Hence Augustine says, in On the Trinity, 13 Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature? Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly inkindled by this. Hence Augustine says, in On Catechizing Beginners, 4 What greater cause is there of the Lord's coming than to show God's love for us? And afterwards he adds, If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return. Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which he set us an example. Hence Augustine says, in a Sermon, Man who might be seen was not to be followed, but God was to be followed, who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that he who might be seen by man, and whom man might follow, might be shown to man. Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life. And this is bestowed upon us by Christ's humanity. For Augustine says again in a Sermon, God was made man, that man might be made God. So also was this useful for our withdrawal from evil. First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin. Hence Augustine says in On the Trinity, 1317, Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies. Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man's dignity, lest we should sully it with sin. Hence Augustine says in On True Religion, 16 God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, in as much as he appeared to men as true man. And Pope Leo says in a Sermon on the Nativity, his Hommily 21, Learn, O Christian, thy worth, and being made a partner of the Divine Nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness. Thirdly, because in order to do away with man's presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ. Though no merits of ours went before. As Augustine says in On the Trinity, 1317, Fourthly, because man's pride, which is the greatest stumbling block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great. As Augustine says in the same place, Fifthly, in order to free man from the thralldom of sin, which, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, 1313, ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ. And this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy. And said, Behoved, Jesus Christ, to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon, Weakness is assumed by strength, Lowliness by majesty, Mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same mediator of God and man might die in one and rise in the other. For this was our fitting remedy. Unless he was God, he would not have brought a remedy. And unless he was man, he would not have set an example. And there are very many other advantages which accrue above man's apprehension. Reply to Objection 1. This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end. Reply to Objection 2. Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways. First, perfectly, inasmuch as it is confined, being adequate to make good the fault committed. And in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature. And also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine Majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence, for Condyne satisfaction, it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency as being of God and man. Secondly, man's satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly, that is, in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not Condyne, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is insufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing by which it is sustained, hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ. Reply to Objection 3. By taking flesh, God did not lessen his majesty, and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of him. But on the contrary, inasmuch as he wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, he greatly drew us to know him. Third article. Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Objection one, it would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says, and on the Trinity, 1317, many other things are to be considered in the incarnation of Christ, besides absolution from sin. And these were discussed above in article two. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Objection two further. It belongs to the omnipotence of the divine power to perfect his works, and to manifest himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now seemingly, in the work of the incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united. Inasmuch as it has been brought about, that man is God. And in this work especially, the universe would seem to be perfected inasmuch as the last creature, notably man, is united to the first principle, notably God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Objection three further. Human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace. Nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. Objection four further. God's predestination is eternal. For it is said of Christ, in Romans 1.4, who was predestined the Son of God in power. Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate in order to fulfill God's predestination. Objection five further. The mystery of the incarnation was revealed to the first man as his plane from Genesis 2, verse 23. This now is bone of my bones, etc., which the apostle says is a great sacrament in Christ and in the church as his plane from Ephesians 5, 32. But man could not be for conscious of his fall for the same reason that the angels could not as Augustine proves in on the literal meaning of Genesis 11, 18. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate. On the contrary, Augustine says in his homily 174, expounding what is set down in Luke 19, 10, for the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost. Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of man would not have come. And on 1 Timothy 1, 15, Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners. Agloss says, There is no cause of Christ's coming into the world except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine. I answer that. There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary and seemingly are assent ought rather to be given to this opinion. For such things as spring from God's will and beyond the creatures do can be made known to us only through being revealed in the sacred scripture, in which the divine will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the sacred scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin, so that had sin not existed, the incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this. Even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate. Reply to Objection 1. All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with the remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on John 1, verse 14, and the word was made flesh, and Augustine says, Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee. For Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh. Reply to Objection 2. The infinity of divine power is shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. Again, it is vices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature. Reply to Objection 3. A double capability may be remarked in human nature. One in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, who apportions to each according to its natural capability. The other in respect to the order of the divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey. And the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfill all such capabilities. Otherwise, God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated above in the Parse Prima, Question 105, Article 6. But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom. Hence it is written in Romans 5, verse 20, Where sin abounded, grace did more abound. Hence too, in the blessing of the paschal candle we say, O happy faults, that merited such and so great a redeemer. Reply to Objection 4. Objection presupposes the foreknowledge of future things. And hence as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others. So also He predestined the work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin. Reply to Objection 5. Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence the mystery of the Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being for conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause. End of Question 1, Part 1, read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 1 of Summa Theologica Terzia Paz. Triates on the Saviour. Part 2, Question 1, Articles 4-6. This is a Librivox recording. While Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org. Summa Theologica Terzia Paz, Triates on the Saviour. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 1 of Summa Theologica Terzia Paz. Part 2, Question 1, Articles 4-6. Fourth Article. Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin rather than to take away original sin. Objection 1. It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter to man's salvation, for which God became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin. For the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says, in Against Julian 5.11. Therefore, the incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins. Objection 2, further. Pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown above in the Parse Prima Secunde, Question 87, Article 5. But Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the cross since satisfaction for sins, and not the pain of loss, for he had no defect of either the beatific vision or fruition. Therefore, he came in order to take away actual sin rather than original sin. Objection 3, further. As Chrysostom says in On the Heart's Gentrition 2.3. This must be of the mind of the faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2.20, Christ loved me and delivered himself for me, but our individual sins are actual sins. For original sin is the common sin. Therefore, we ought to have this conviction, so as to believe that he has come chiefly for actual sins. On the contrary, it is written in John 1, verse 29. Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sins of the world. I answer that. It is certain that Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it. Not that all are taken away, and this is from men's fault in as much as they do not adhere to Christ, according to John 3.19. The light is come into the world and men loved darkness rather than the light. But because he offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is written in Romans 5, verses 15 and 16. But not as the offense, so also the gift. For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification. Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. But greater is said in two ways. In one way, intensively, as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and in this way actual sin is greater than original sin, for it has more of the nature of voluntary as has been shown in the parts Prima Secunde, question 81, article 1. In another way, a thing is said to be greater extensively, as whiteness on a greater surface is said to be greater, and in this way original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect, Christ came principally to take away original sin in as much as the good of the race is a more divine thing than the good of an individual, as is said in Ethics 1, 2. Reply to Objection 1. This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin. Reply to Objection 2. In the future award, the pain of sense will not be meted out to original sin, yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life, flow from original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain that he might consume death and the like in himself. Reply to Objection 3. Chrysostom says in On the Hearts Contrition 2.6. The apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than yourself? And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to others. And thus we do not exclude that he came to wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one. Fifth Article. Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race? Objection one. He would seem that it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the incarnation sprang from the immensity of divine charity according to Ephesians 2, verses 4 and 5. But God, who is rich in mercy, for his exceeding charity were with he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ. But charity does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend to a suffering need according to Proverbs 3, 28. Say not to thy friend, go and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present. Therefore God ought not to have put off the work of the incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning. Objection two. Further it is written in 1 Timothy 1.15, Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners. But more would have been saved had God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race, for in the various centuries very many, through not knowing God perished in their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. Objection three. Further the work of grace is not less orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as Boethius says in On the Consolation of Philosophy 3. Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the incarnation we see the perfection of grace according to John 1.14, the word was made flesh, and afterwards it is added, full of grace and truth. Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. On the contrary it is written in Galatians 4.4, But when the fullness of time was come, God sent his Son made of a woman made under the law, upon which a glass says that. The fullness of the time is when it was decreed by God, the Father, to send his Son. But God decreed everything by his wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time, and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race. I answer that, since the work of the incarnation is principally ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence our Lord himself says in Matthew 9 verses 12 and 13, They that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill. For I am not come to call the just, but sinners. Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of man's sin, which had come of pride. Hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words in Galatians 319, Being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator, a gloss says, With great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of man should not be sent immediately after man's fall. For first of all God left man under the natural law with the freedom of his will in order that he might know his natural strength, and when he failed in it he received the law. Whereupon, by the fault not of the law but of his nature, the disease gained strength, so that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician and beseech the aid of grace. Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the apostle says in 1 Corinthians 15, verses 46 and 47, Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural. Afterwards that which is spiritual. The first man was of the earth, earthy. The second man from heaven, heavenly. Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate word, for on the words in Galatians 4.4, But when the fullness of time was come, a gloss says, The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him. Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence, in Luke 18, verse 8, it is written, But yet the Son of man when he cometh, Shall he find, think you, Faith on earth? Reply to Objection 1. Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a friend, always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state of persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the very outset of the ailment, it would do less good and would hurt rather than benefit. Hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human race the remedy of the incarnation in the beginning, lest they should despise it through pride if they did not already recognize their disease. Reply to Objection 2. Augustine replies to this in his letter 102, on six questions of the Pagans, Question 2 that Christ wished to appear to man and to have his doctrine preached to them, when and where he knew those were who would believe in him. But in such times and places as his gospel was not preached he foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear themselves towards his preaching as not to believe in his corporeal presence, even were he to raise from the dead. But the same Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book, on Perseverance 9 says, How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst? Or would not have believed had they been wrought when God himself bears witness that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of divine power had been wrought in their midst? And he adds in answer, Hence, as the apostle says in Romans 9.16, It is not of him that willeth nor of him that runeth, but of God that showeth mercy. Who, suckers whom he will of those who, as he foresaw, would believe in his miracles if wrought amongst them, while others he suckers not, having judged them in his predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore, let us unshrinkingly believe his mercy to be with those who are set free, and his truth with those who are condemned. Reply to Objection 3. Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time and nature, in things that are different, for what brings others to perfection must itself be perfect. But in one and the same imperfection is prior in time, though posterior in nature, and thus the eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of human nature. But the latter's ultimate perfection in union with God follows. Sixth Article Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off to the end of the world? Objection 1. It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to have been put off to the end of the world, for it is written in Psalm 91 verse 11, My old age in plentiful mercy, that is, in the last days, as a gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to Psalm 101 verse 14, for it is time to have mercy on it. Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off to the end of the world. Objection 2. Further, as has been said in Article 5 Third Reply, in the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human nature is in the union with the word, because in Christ it had pleased the Father that all the fullness of the Godhead should dwell, as the Apostle says in Colossians 1, 19 and in Colossians 2, 9. Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off to the end of the world. Objection 3. Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for him to come beforehand in his Incarnation, and hence the Incarnation ought to have been put off to the end of the world. On the contrary, it is written in Habakkuk 3.2 In the midst of the years thou shalt make it known. Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation, which was made known to the world, ought not to have been put off to the end of the world. I answer that, as it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off to the end of the world. And this is shown first from the union of the divine and human nature. For as it has been said in Article 5, Third Reply, Perfection precedes imperfection in time in one way, and contrary wise in another way imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur, for by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection, and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human race. And the word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection of human nature. According to John 1.16, of his fullness we have all received, and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been put off to the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which the human nature is to be finally raised by the word incarnate will be at the end of the world. Secondly, from the effect of man's salvation. For, as is said in questions on the Old and New Testament, question 83, it is in the power of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, he wills. Hence he came when he knew it was fitting to succour, and when his boons would be welcome. For when, by the feebleness of the human race, man's knowledge of God began to grow dim, and their morals lax. He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living. And later on, when reverence grew weaker, he gave the law to Moses in writing. And because the Gentiles despised it, and would not take it upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God sent his son to grant to all remission of their sin, and to offer them, justified, to God the Father. But if this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God, and all uprightness of morals, would have been swept away from the earth. Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the divine power, which has saved men in several ways, not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past. Reply to Objection 1. This gloss has in view the mercy of God which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by the incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine says in his Retractions 1, the time of the incarnation may be compared to the youth of the human race. On account of the strength and fervor of faith which works by charity, and to old age, that is the sixth age, on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age, and although youth and old age cannot be put together in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of quickness, the latter on account of gravity, and hence Augustine says elsewhere, in his 83 Questions, Question 44, that it was not becoming that the master by whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth, but in another work, in his On Genesis against the Manichaeans, 123, he says, that Christ came in the sixth age, that is in the old age of the human race. Reply to Objection 2. The work of the incarnation is to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement, from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said. Reply to Objection 3. As Chrysostom says on John 3.11, For God sent not his Son into the world to judge the world, as he mentions in his Homily 28. There are two comings of Christ, the first for the remission of sins, the second to judge the world. For if he had not done so, all would have perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God. Hence it is plain that he ought not to have put off the coming and mercy till the end of the world. End of Question 1. Read by Michael Shane Craig Lambert, LC. Question 2, Part 1 of Summa Theologica Terziapars. Treaties on the Saviour. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org. Summa Theologica Terziapars, Treaties on the Saviour, by St. Thomas Aquinas, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Question 2, of the mode of union of the word incarnate in 12 articles. Part 1, Articles 1-5. Now we must consider the mode of union of the incarnate word. And first, the union itself. Secondly, the person assuming. Thirdly, the nature assumed. Under the first head, there are 12 points of inquiry. First, whether the union of the word incarnate took place in the nature. Second, whether it took place in the person. Third, whether it took place in the suppositum or hypothesis. Fourth, whether the person or hypothesis of Christ is composite after the incarnation. Fifth, whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ. Sixth, whether the human nature was united to the word accidentally. Seventh, whether the union itself is something created. Eighth, whether it is the same as assumption. Ninth, whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union. Tenth, whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by grace. Eleventh, whether any merits preceded it. Twelfth, whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ. First, article. Whether the union of the incarnate word took place in the nature. Objection, Juan. He would seem that the union of the word incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says, and he is quoted in the Acts of the Council of Calcedon, Part 2, Act 1. We must understand not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the word of God. And this could not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the word incarnate took place in the nature. Objection, too, further. Athanasius says that as the rational soul and the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a certain one nature. Therefore the union took place in the nature. Objection, three, further. Of two natures one is not denominated by the other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other. For Cyril says, quoted in the Acts of the Council of Calcedon, Part 2, Act 1, that the divine nature is incarnate. And Gregory Natciansen says, in his first letter to Claytonus, that the human nature is deified as appears from Damocene in On the True Faith 3, 6 and 11. Therefore, from two natures one seems to have resulted. On the contrary, it is said in the Declaration of the Council of Calcedon, We confess that in these latter times the only begotten Son of God appeared in two natures without confusion, without change, without division, without separation. The distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union. Therefore the union did not take place in the nature. I answer that to make this question clear we must consider what is nature. Now it is to be observed that the word nature comes from nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the begetting of living beings. Which is called birth or sprouting forth. The word natura meaning as it were, nashitura. Afterwards this word nature was taken to signify the principle of this begetting. And because in living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle. This word nature was further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion. Thus the philosopher says in physics too that nature is the principle of motion. In that in which it is essentially and not accidentally. Now this principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural generation in that which is generated is the essence of the species which the definition signifies this essence of the species is called the nature. And thus Boethius defines nature in On the Two Natures. Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference. That is which perfects the specific definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the essence or the what it is or the quiddity of the species. Now if we take nature in this way it is impossible that the union of the incarnate word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of two in more than three ways. First from two complete things which remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is composition, order or figure. As a heap is made up of many stones brought together without any order but solely with juxtaposition. And a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order and fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of confusion, which is without order or by manner of commesuration which is with order. But this cannot be. First because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form but accidental. And hence it would follow that the union of the incarnation was not essential but accidental, which will be disproved later on in Article 6. Secondly because thereby we should not have an absolute unity but relative only for there remain several things actually. Thirdly because the form of such is not a nature but an art as the form of a house. And thus one nature would not be constituted in Christ as they wish. Secondly one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements. And in this way some have said that the union of the incarnation was brought about by manner of combination. But this cannot be. First because the divine nature is altogether immutable, as has been said in the Paras Prima Question 9, Articles 1 and 2. Hence neither can it be changed into something else since it is incorruptible nor can anything else be changed into it for it cannot be generated. Secondly because what is mixed is of the same species as the other. And secondly because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements, for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with his father nor with his mother. Thirdly because there can be no mingling of things widely apart for the species of one of them is absorbed. For example if we were to put a drop of water into a flagon of wine and hence since the divine nature infinitely exceeds the human nature there could be no mixture but the divine nature alone would remain. Thirdly a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed but imperfect as man is made up of soul and body and likewise of diverse members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the incarnation. First because each nature that is the divine and the human has its specific perfection. Secondly because the divine and human natures cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts as the members make up the body. For the divine nature is incorporeal nor after the manner of form and matter. For the divine nature cannot be the form of anything especially of anything corporeal since it would follow that the species resulting there from would be communicable to several and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the divine nature since any difference varies the species as unity varies number as is said in metaphysics 810. Reply to Objection 1. This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod that is in Constantinople 2 collection 8 canon 8 thus. If anyone proclaiming one nature of the word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as the Father's taught notably that from the divine and human natures a union in subsistence having taken place one Christ results but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of the divinity and flesh of Christ let such a one be anathema hence the sense is not that from two natures one results but that the nature of the word of God united flesh to itself in person. Reply to Objection 2. From the soul and body a double unity notably of nature and person results in each individual of nature in as much as the soul is united to the body and formally perfects it so that one nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter and form but the comparison is not in this sense for the divine nature cannot be the form of a body as was proved in the Parse Prima question 3 article 8. Unity of person results from them however in as much as there is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul and herein lies the likeness for the one Christ subsists in the divine and human natures. Reply to Objection 3. As Damascene says in On the True Faith 3 6 and 11 the divine nature is said to be incarnate because it is united to flesh personally and not that it is changed into flesh so likewise the flesh is said to be deified as he also says in On the True Faith 15 17. Not by change but by union with the word its natural properties still remaining and hence it may be considered as deified in as much as it becomes the flesh of the word of God but not that it becomes God. Second article whether the union of the incarnate word took place in the person. Objection 1. It would seem that the union of the incarnate word did not take place in the person for the person of God is not distinct from his nature as we have said in the Parse Prima question 39 article 1. If therefore the union did not take place in the nature it follows that it did not take place in the person. Objection 2. Further Christ's human nature has no less dignity than ours but personality belongs to dignity as was stated above in the Parse Prima question 29 article 3 second reply. Hence since our human nature has its proper personality much more reason was there that Christ's should have its proper personality. Objection 3. Further as Buithya says in On the True Nature's a person is an individual substance of rational nature but the word of God assumed an individual human nature for universal human nature does not exist of itself but is the object of pure thought as Damascene says in On the True Faith 311. Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person. On the contrary we read in the Synod of Calcedon part 2 act 5. We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons but is one and the same only begotten Son and Word of God. Therefore the union took place in the person. I answer that person has a different meaning from nature. For nature as has been said in article 1 designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition and if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature which is the individual subsisting in this nature because every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species notably accidents and individuating principles which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ not indeed as if they were wholly separate but because the suppositum includes the nature and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the species hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it and consequently in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the suppositum for we do not say that this man is his manhood but if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature as in God the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it but only in our way of thinking in as much it is called nature as it is an essence and a suppositum as it is subsisting and what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures for a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature according to Boethias therefore whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person whether it belongs to its nature or not hence if the human nature is not united to God the word in person it is no wise united to him and thus belief in the incarnation is altogether done away with and christian faith wholly overturned therefore in as much as the word has a human nature united to him which does not belong to his divine nature it follows that the union took place in the person of the word and not in the nature reply to objection one although in God nature and person are not really distinct yet they have distinct meanings as was said above in as much as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting and because human nature is united to the word so that the word subsists in it and not so that his nature receives there from any addition or change it follows that the union of human nature to the word of God took place in the person and not in the nature reply to objection two personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a thing and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing to exist by itself which is understood by the word person now it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself hence the human nature of christ has a greater dignity than ours from this very fact that in us being existent by itself it has its own personality but in christ it exists in the person of the word thus to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form yet the sensitive part in man on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the species is more nobler than in brutes where it is itself the form which perfects reply to objection three the word of God did did not assume human nature in general but in atomo that is in an individual as damasin says in on the true faith three eleven otherwise every man would be the word of god even as christ was yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance even in rational nature is a person but that alone which exists by itself and not that which exists in some more perfect thing hence the hand of socrates although it is a kind of individual is not a person because it does not exist by itself but in something more perfect notably in the whole and hence to this is signified by a person being defined as an individual substance for the hand is not a complete substance but part of a substance therefore although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance it has not its own personality because it does not exist separately but in something more perfect notably in the person of the world therefore the union took place in the person third article whether the union of the word incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis objection one it would seem that the union of the word incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis for augustin says in his incorridian 35 and 38 both the divine and human substance are one son of god but they are one thing allude by reason of the word and another thing allude by reason of the man and pope leo says in his letter to flavian his letter 28 one of these is glorious with miracles the other succumbs under injuries but one allude and the other allude differ in suppositum therefore the union of the word incarnate did not take place in the suppositum objection to further hypostasis is nothing more than a particular substance as buithias says in on the two natures but it is plain that in christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the word notably the body and the soul and the resultant of these purposes therefore there is another hypostasis in him besides the hostesses of the word objection three further the hypothesis of the word is not included in any genus or species as is plain from the first part in question three article five but christ in as much as he is made man is contained under the species of man for Dionysius says in on the divine names one within the limits of our nature he came who far surpasses the whole order of nature super substantially now nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human species therefore in christ there is another hypothesis besides the hypothesis of the word of god and hence the same conclusion follows as above on the contrary damasin says in on the true faith three three through five in our lord jesus christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypothesis i answer that some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person although granting that there is about one person in christ held nevertheless that there is one hypothesis of god and another of man and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypothesis now this for three reasons is clearly erroneous first because person only adds to hypostasis a determinant nature notably rational according to what voith here says in on the two natures a person is an individual substance of rational nature and hence it is the same to attribute to the human nature in christ a proper hypothesis and a proper person and the holy fathers seeing this condemned both in the fifth council held at constantan opal saying if anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the incarnation two substances or two persons let him be anathema for by the incarnation of one of the holy trinity god the word the holy trinity received no augment of person or subsistence now subsistence is the same as the subsisting thing which is proper to hypostasis as is plain from boethius in on the two natures secondly if it is granted that person adds to hypothesis something in which the union can take place this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity according as it is said by some that a person is a hypothesis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity if therefore the union took place in the person and not in the hypothesis it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity and this is what ciril with the approval of the council of emphasis in part three canon three condemned in these terms if anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one christ only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or power and not rather in a concourse of natural union let him be anathema thirdly because to the hypothesis alone are attributed the operations and the natural properties and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete for we say that this man reasons and is reasonable and is a rational animal so likewise this man is said to be a suppositum because he underlies supone tour whatever belongs to man and receives its predication therefore if there is any hypothesis in christ besides the hostesses of the word it follows that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the word for example that he was born of a virgin suffered was crucified was buried and this too was condemned with the approval of the council of emphasis in part three canon four in these words if anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic scriptures or have been said of christ by the saints or by himself of himself and moreover applies some of them to the man taken as distinct from the word of god and some of them as if they could be used of god alone only to the word of god the father let him be anathema therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the church to say that in christ there are two apostasies or two supposita or that the union did not take place in the hostesses or suppositum hence in the same synod in canon twos it is said if anyone does not confess that the word was united to flesh in subsistence and that christ with his flesh is both to wit god and man let him be anathema reply to objection one as accidental difference makes a thing other alter room so essential difference makes another thing allude now it is plain that the otherness which springs from accidental difference may pertain to the same apostasies or suppositum in created things since the same thing numerically can underlie different accidents but it does not happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in diverse essences or natures hence just as when we speak of otherness in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum but only diversity of accidental forms so likewise when christ is said to be one thing or another thing we do not imply diversity of suppositum or apostasies but diversity of nature hence gregari nancy anson says in a letter to kelledonius in his letter 101 in the savior we may find one thing and another yet he is not one person and another and i say one thing and another whereas on the contrary in the trinity we say one person and another so as not to confuse the subsistences but not one thing and another reply to objection two apostasies signifies a particular substance not in every way but as it is in its complement yet as it is in union with something more complete it is not said to be a apostasies as a hand or a foot so likewise the human nature in christ although it is a particular substance nevertheless cannot be called a apostasies or suppositum seeing that it is in union with a completed thing notably the whole christ as he is god and man but the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a apostasies or suppositum reply to objection three in created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or species not on account of what belongs to its individuation but on account of its nature which springs from its form and in composite things individuation is taken more from matter hence we say that christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed and not by reason of the apostasies fourth article whether after the incarnation the person or apostasies of christ is composite objection one it would seem that the person of christ is not composite for the person of christ is not else than the person or apostasies of the word as appears from what has been said in article two but in the word person and nature do not differ as appears from the first part in question thirty nine article one therefore since the nature of the word is simple as was shown above in the parse prima question three article seven it is impossible that the person of christ be composite objection to further all composition requires parts but the divine nature is incompatible with the notion of a part for every part implicates the notion of imperfection therefore it is impossible that the person of christ be composed of two natures objection three further what is composed of others would seem to be homogeneous with them as from bodies only a body can be composed therefore if there is anything in christ composed of the two natures it follows that this will not be a person but a nature and hence the union in christ will take place in the nature which is contrary to article two on the contrary damasin says in on the true faith three three through five in the lord jesus christ we acknowledge two natures but one apostasis composed from both i answer that the person or apostasis of christ may be viewed in two ways first as it is in itself and thus it is altogether simple even as the nature of the word secondly in the aspect of person or apostasis to which it belongs to subsist in the nature and thus the person of christ subsists in two natures hence though there is one subsisting being in him yet there are different aspects of subsistence and hence he is said to be a composite person in so much as one being subsists in two and thereby the solution to the first objection is clear reply to objection to this composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts but by reason of number even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them reply to objection three it is not verified in every composition that the thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts but only in the parts of a continuous thing for the continuous is composed solely of continuous parts but an animal is composed of soul and body and neither of these is an animal fifth article whether in christ there is any union of soul and body objection one it would seem that in christ there was no union of soul and body for from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human apostasis is caused hence if the soul and body were united in christ it follows that a apostasis resulted from their union but this was not the apostasis of god the word for it is eternal therefore in christ there would be a person or apostasis besides the apostasis of the word which is contrary to articles two and three objection to further from the union of soul and body results the nature of the human species but damasin says and on the true faith three three that we must not conceive a common species in the lord jesus christ therefore there was no union of soul and body in him objection three further the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of quickening it but the body of christ could be quickened by the word of god himself seeing he is the fount and principle of life therefore in christ there was no union of soul and body on the contrary the body is not said to be animated save from its union with the soul now the body of christ is said to be animated as the church chants taking an animate body he deigned to be born of the virgin a hymn from the feast of the circumcision at lords therefore in christ there was a union of soul and body i answer that christ is called a man univocally with other men as being of the same species according to the apostle in philippians 2 7 being made in the likeness of a man now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body for the form does not constitute the species except in as much as it becomes the act of matter and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species hence it must be said that in christ the soul was united to the body and the contrary is heretical since it destroys the truth of christ's humanity reply to objection one this would seem to be the reason which was of weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in christ notably lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in christ since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men resulted in a person but this happens in mere men because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves but in christ they are united together so as to be united to something higher which subsists in the nature composed of them and hence from the union of the soul and body in christ a new hypothesis or person does not result but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypothesis or person nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in christ is of less effect than in us for its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the species as being considered the ultimate form yet it does not do so in man although it is of greater effect and dignity and this because of its union with a further and nobler perfection notably the rational soul as has been said above in article two second reply reply to objection to this saying of damasin may be taken in two ways first as referring to human nature which as it is in one individual alone has not the nature of a common species but only in as much as either it is abstracted from every individual and considered in itself by the mind or according as it is in all individuals now the son of man did not assume human nature as it exists in the pure thought of the intellect since in this way he would not have assumed human nature in reality unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea just as the Platonists conceived of man without matter but in this way the son of god would not have assumed flesh contrary to what is written in Luke 24 39 a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me to have neither can it be said that the son of god assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the same species otherwise he would have assumed all men therefore it remains as damasin says further on in on the true faith 311 that he assumed human nature in atomo that is in an individual not indeed in another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature but in the person of the son of god secondly this saying of damasin may be taken not as referring to human nature as if from the union of soul and body one common nature notably human did not result but as referring to the union of the two natures divine and human which do not combine so as to form a third something that becomes a common nature for in this way it would become predictable of many and this is what he is aiming at since he adds for there was not generated neither will there ever be generated another christ who from the godhead and manhood and in the godhead and manhood is perfect god and perfect man reply to objection three there are two principles of corporeal life one the effective principle and in this way the word of god is the principle of all life the other the formal principle of life for since in living things to be is to live as the philosopher says in on the soul 237 just as everything is formally by its form so likewise the body lives by the soul in this way a body could not live by the word which cannot be the form of a body end of question two part one read by michael shane craig lambert lc