 Part 2, Section 2 of the Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards, this LibriVox recording is in the public domain. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered. If to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said that when the Armenians speak of the will, determining its own acts, they do not mean that the will determines them by any preceding act, or that one act of the will determines another, but only that the faculty or power of will or the soul in the use of that power determines its own volitions, and that it does it without any act going before the act determined, such an evasion would be full of the most gross absurdity. I confess it is an evasion of my own inventing, and I do not know but I should wrong the Armenians in supposing that any of them would make use of it, but it being as good a one as I can invent, I would observe upon it a few things. First, if the power of the will determines an act of volition, or the soul in the use or exercise of that power determines it, that is the same thing as for the soul to determine volition by an act of will. For an exercise of the power of will and an act of that power are the same thing. Therefore to say that the power of will or the soul in the use or exercise of that power determines volition without an act of will preceding the volition determined is a contradiction. Secondly, if a power of will determines the act of the will, then a power of choosing determines it. For as was before observed in every act of will there is choice and a power of willing is a power of choosing. But if a power of choosing determines the act of volition it determines it by choosing it. It is most absurd to say that a power of choosing determines one thing rather than another without choosing anything. But if a power of choosing determines volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition determined by an antecedent choice, choosing that volition. Thirdly, to say that the faculty or the soul determines its own volition but not by any act is a contradiction because for the soul to direct, decide, or determine anything is to act, and this is supposed for the soul is here spoken of as being a cause in this affair doing something or which is the same thing exerting itself in order to an effect which effect is the determination of volition or the particular kind and manner of an act of will. But certainly this action is not the same with the effect in order to the production of which it is exerted but must be something prior to it. The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the will speak of a certain sovereignty in the will whereby it has power to determine its own volitions and therefore the determination of volition must itself be an act of the will for otherwise it can be no exercise of that supposed power and sovereignty. Again if the will determines itself then either the will is acted in determining its volitions or it is not. If acted then the determination is an act of the will and so there is one act of the will determining another but if the will is not acted in the determination then how does it exercise any liberty in it? These gentlemen suppose that the thing wherein the will exercises liberty is in its determining its own acts but how can this be if it be not active in determining? Certainly the will or the soul cannot exercise any liberty in that wherein it does not act or wherein it does not exercise itself so that if either part of this dilemma be taken this scheme of liberty consisting in self-determining power is overthrown. If there be an act of the will in determining all its own free acts then one free act of the will is determined by another and so we have the absurdity of every free act even the very first determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise of the will in determining its own acts then no liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows that no liberty consists in the will's power to determine its own acts or which is the same thing that there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power of the will? If it should be said that although it be true if the soul determines its own volitions it must be active in so doing and the determination itself must be an act yet there is no need of supposing this act to be prior to the volition determined but the will or soul determines the act of the will and willing. It determines its own volition in the very act of volition. It directs and limits the act of the will causing it to be so and not otherwise in exerting the act without any preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this manner they must mean one of these three things, either one that the determining act though it be before the act determined in the order of nature yet is not before it in order of time, or two that the determining act is not before the act determined either in the order of time or nature nor is truly distinct from it, but that the soul's determining the act of volition is the same thing with its exerting the act of volition. The mind's exerting such a particular act is its causing and determining the act or three that volition has no cause and is no effect but comes into existence with such a particular determination without any ground or reason of its existence and determination. I shall consider these distinctly. One, if all that is meant be that the determining act is not before the act determined in order of time, it will not help the case at all though it should be allowed. If it be before the determined act in the order of nature, being the cause or ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct from and independent on it as if it were before in the order of time. As the cause of the particular motion of natural body in a certain direction may have no distance as to time, it cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but must be as distinct from it as any other cause that is before its effect in the order of time, as the architect is distinct from the house which he builds or the father distinct from the son which he begets, and if the act of the will determining be distinct from the act determined and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another till we come to the first in the series which has no act of the will before it in the order of nature determining it and consequently is an act not determined by the will and so not a free act in this notion of freedom, and this being the act which determines all the rest, none of them are free acts as when there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand all the rest may follow and be moved at the same instant without any distance of time, but yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the order of nature, the last is moved by the next and that by the next and so till we come to the first, which not being moved by any other but by something distinct from the whole chain, this as much proves that no part is moved by any self moving power in the chain as if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of time. Two, if any should say that the determining act is not before the determined act either in the order of time or of nature, nor is distinct from it, but that the exertion of the act is the determination of the act that for the soul to exert a particular volition is for it to cause and determine that act of volition. I would on this observe that the thing in question seems to be forgotten or kept out of sight in a darkness and an intelligibleness of speech unless such an objector would mean to contradict himself. The very act of volition itself is doubtless a determination of mind. That is, it is the minds drawing up a conclusion or coming to a choice between two or more things proposed to it. But determining among external objects of choice is not the same with determining the act of choice itself among various possible acts of choice. The question is, what influences directs or determines the mind or will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does? Or what is the cause ground or reason why it concludes thus and not otherwise? Now it must be answered according to the Armenian notion of freedom that the will influences orders and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say it must be by some antecedent act to say it is caused, influenced and determined by something and yet not determined by anything antecedent either in order of time or nature is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by things being prior in the order of nature that it is some way the cause or reason of the thing with respect to which it is said to be prior. If the particular act or exertion of will which comes into existence be anything properly determined at all, then it has some cause of existing and of existing in such a particular determinate manner and not another, some cause whose influence decides the matter, which causes distinct from the effect and prior to it. But to say that the will or mind orders influences and determines itself to exert an act by the very exertion itself is to make the exertion both cause and effect or the exerting such an act to be a cause of the exertion of such an act. For the question is what is the cause and reason of the soul's exerting such an act to which the answer is the soul exerts such an act and that is the cause of it. And so by this the exertion must be distinct from and in the order of nature prior to itself. Three, if the meaning be that the soul's exertion of such a particular act of will is a thing that comes to pass of itself without any cause and that there is absolutely no reason of the soul being determined to exert such a volition and make such a choice rather than another, I say if this be the meaning of Armenians when they contend so earnestly for the will determining its own acts and for liberty of will consisting and self determining power they do nothing but confound themselves and others with words without a meaning. In the question what determines the will and in their answer that the will determines itself and in all the dispute it seems to be taken for granted that something determines the will and the controversy on this head is not whether its determination has any cause or foundation at all but where the foundation of it is whether in the will itself or somewhere else. But if the thing intended be what is above mentioned then nothing at all determines the will volition having absolutely no cause or foundation of its existence either within or without. There is a great noise made about self determining power as the source of all free acts of the will but when the matter comes to be explained the meaning is that no power at all is the source of these acts neither self determining power nor any other but they arise from nothing no cause no power no influence being at all concerned in the matter. However this very thing even that the free acts of the will are events which come to pass without a cause is certainly implied in the Armenian notion of liberty of will though it be very inconsistent with many other things in their scheme and repugnant to some things implied in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies that the particular determination of volition is without any cause because they hold the free acts of the will to be contingent events and contingents is essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly those things which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence a cause which antecedently determines them to be and determines them to be just as they are do not happen contingently. If something foregoing by a casual influence and connection determines and fixes precisely they're coming to pass and the manner of it then it does not remain a contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or know and because it is a question in many respects very important in this controversy whether the free acts of that will are events which come to pass without a cause I shall be particular in examining this point in the two following sections. In the part to section to part to section three of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain whether any event whatsoever and volition in particular can come to pass without a cause of its existence. Before I enter on any argument on this subject I would explain how I would be understood when I use the word cause in this discourse since for want of a better word I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive than that in which it is sometimes used the word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing or bring it to pass but there are many things which have no such positive productive influence which yet are causes in this respect that they have truly the nature of a reason why some things are rather than others or why they are thus rather than otherwise. Thus the absence of the sun in the night is not the cause of the fall of do at that time in the same manner as its beams are the cause of the ascent of vapors in the daytime and its withdrawment in the winter is not in the same manner the cause of the freezing of the waters as its approach in the spring is the cause of their thawing but yet the withdrawment or absence of the sun is and antecedent with which these effects in the night and winter are connected and on which they depend and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they come to pass at that time rather than at other times though the absence of the sun is nothing positive nor has any positive influence. It may be further observed that when I speak of connection of causes and effects I have respect to moral causes as well as those that are called natural in distinction from them. Moral causes may be causes in as proper a sense as any causes whatsoever may have as real and influence and may as truly be the ground and reason of an events coming to pass. Therefore I sometimes use the word cause in this inquiry to signify any antecedent either natural or moral positive or negative on which an event either a thing or the manner and circumstance of a thing so depends that it is the ground and reason either in whole or in part why it is rather than not or why it is as it is rather than otherwise or in other words any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event is true whether it has any positive influence or not and agreeably to this I sometimes use the word effect for the consequence of another thing which is perhaps rather an occasion than a cause most properly speaking. I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning that I may cut off occasion from any that might seek occasion to cavill and object against some things which I may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass on some cause and their connection with their cause. Having thus explained what I mean by cause I assert that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity and must be unchangeable but as to all things that begin to be they are not self-existent and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without themselves that whatsoever begins to be which before was not must have a cause why it then begins to exist seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God had implanted in the minds of all mankind and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things past present or to come and this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes or things and the manner and circumstances of things thus if we see a body which has hitherto been at rest start out of a state of rest and begin to move we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some cause or reason of this new mode of existence as of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed and so if a body which had hitherto moved in a certain direction should suddenly change the direction of its motion or if it should put off its old figure and take a new one or change its color the beginning of these new modes is a new event and the human mind necessarily supposes that there is some cause or reason of them if this grand principle of common sense be taken away all arguing from effects to causes these sith and so all knowledge of any existence besides what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition particularly all our proof of the being of God ceases we argue his being from our own being and the being of other things which we are sensible once were not but have begun to be and from the being of the world with all its constituent parts and the manner of their existence all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own nature and so not self-existent and therefore must have a cause but if things not in themselves necessary may begin to be without a cause all this arguing is vain indeed I will not affirm that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the being of God without any evidence of it from his works I do suppose there is a great absurdity in denying being in general and imagining an eternal absolute universal nothing and therefore that there would be in the nature of things a foundation of intuitive evidence that there must be an eternal infinite most perfect being if we had strength and comprehension of mind sufficient to have a clear idea of general and universal being but then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the being of God by arguing our evidence would be intuitive we should see it as we see other things that are necessary in themselves the contrariers of which are in their own nature absurd and contradictory as we see that twice two is four and as we see that a circle has no angles if we had as clear an idea of universal infinite entity as we have of these other things I suppose we should most intuitively see the absurdity of supposing such being not to be should immediately see there is no room for the question whether it is possible that being in the most general abstract notion of it should not be but we have not that strength and extent of mind to know this certainly in this intuitive independent manner but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of the being of God is that which the apostle speaks of Romans 120 the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made even his eternal power and godhead we first descend and prove a pasti reori or from effects that there must be an eternal cause and then secondly proved by argumentation not intuition that this being must be necessarily existent and then thirdly from the proved necessity of his existence we may descend and prove many of his perfections a priori but if once this grand principle of common sense be given up that what is not necessary in itself must have a cause and we begin to maintain that things which heretofore have not been may come into existence and begin to be of themselves without any cause all our means of ascending in our arguing from the creature to the creator and all our evidence of the being of God is cut off at one blow in this case we cannot prove that there is a God either from the being of the world and the creatures in it or from the manner of their being their order beauty and use where things may come into existence without any cause at all then they doubtless may without any cause answerable to the effect our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things namely that what begins to be has a cause and also that it has a cause proportionable to the effect the same principle which leads us to determine that there cannot be anything coming to pass without a cause leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the cause yay if once it should be allowed that things may come to pass without a cause we should not only have no proof of the being of God but we should be without evidence of the existence of anything whatsoever but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness but we have no way to prove anything else but by arguing from effects to causes from the ideas now immediately in view we argue other things not immediately in view from sensations now excited in us we infer the existence of things without us as the causes of these sensations and from the existence of these things we argue other things on which they depend as effects on causes we infer the past existence of ourselves or anything else by memory only as we argue that the ideas which are now in our minds are the consequences of past ideas and sensations we immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds we perceive or know other things only by means of these as necessarily connected with others and dependent on them but if things may be without causes all this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved and so all means of our knowledge is gone if there be no absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being of itself without a cause and there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions for nothing or no difficulty multiplied still is nothing or no difficulty nothing multiplied by nothing does not increase the sum and indeed according to the hypothesis I'm opposing of the acts of the will coming to pass without a cause it is the cause in fact that millions of millions of events are continually coming into existence contingently without any cause or reason why they do so all over the world every day and hour through all ages so it is in a constant succession in every moral agent this contingency this efficient nothing this effectual null cause is always ready at hand to produce this sort of effects as long as the agent exists and as often as he has occasion if it were so that things only one kind these acts of the will seemed to come to pass of themselves and it were an event that was continual and that happened in a course wherever were found subjects capable of such events this very thing would demonstrate that there was some cause of them which made such a difference between this event and others and that they did not really happen contingently for contingency is blind and does not pick and choose a particular sort of events nothing has no choice this no cause which causes no existence cannot cause the existence which comes to pass to be of one particular sort only distinguished from all others thus that only one sort of matter drops out of the heavens even water and that this comes so often so constantly and plentifully all over the world in all ages shows that there is some cause or reason of the falling of water out of the heavens and that something besides mere contingence has a hand in the matter if we should suppose non-entity to be about to bring forth and things were coming into existence without any cause or antecedent on which the existence or kind or manner of existence depends or which could at all determine whether the things should be stones or stars or beasts or angels or human bodies or souls or only some new motion or figure in natural bodies or some new sensations in animals or new ideas in the human understanding or new volitions in the will or anything else of all the infinite number of possibles then certainly it would not be expected although many millions of millions of things were coming into existence in this manner all over the face of the earth that they should all be only of one particular kind and that it should be thus in all ages and that this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass where there is room for them or a subject capable of them and that constantly whenever there is occasion if any should imagine there is something in the sort of event that renders it possible for it to come into existence without a cause and should say that the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things the reason of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it though other things cannot if they make this objection in good earnest it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves for they would be giving an account of some ground of the existence of a thing when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence therefore I would observe that the particular nature of existence be it never so diverse from others can lay no foundation for that thing coming into existence without a cause because to suppose this would be to suppose the particular nature of existence to be a thing prior to the existence and so a thing which makes way for existence without a cause or reason of existence but that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming into being or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence must be prior to the existence the distinguished nature of the effect which is something belonging to the effect cannot have influence backward to act before it is the peculiar nature of that thing called volition can do nothing can have no influence while it is not and afterwards it is too late for its influence for then the thing has made sure of existence already without its help so that it is indeed as repugnant to reason to suppose that an act of the will should come into existence without a cause as to suppose the human soul or an angel or the globe of the earth or the whole universe should come into existence without a cause and if once we allow that such a sort of effect as a volition may come to pass without a cause how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too it is not the particular kind of effect that makes the absurdity of supposing it has been without a cause but something which is common to all things that ever begin to be these that they are not self-existent or necessary in the nature of things end of part two section three part two section four of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain where the volition can arise without a cause through the activity of the nature of the soul the author of the essay on the freedom of the will in God and the creatures in answer to that objection against his doctrine of a self-determining power in the will page 68 to 69 that nothing is or comes to pass without a sufficient reason why it is and why it is in this manner rather than another allows that it is thus incorporeal things which are properly and philosophically speaking passive being but denies it is thus in spirits which are beings of an active nature who have the spring of action within themselves and can determine themselves by which it is plainly supposed that such an event as an act of the will may come to pass in a spirit without a sufficient reason why it comes to pass or why it is after this manner rather than another but certainly this author in this matter must be very unwary and inadvertent for one the objection or difficulty proposed by him seems to be forgotten in his answer or solution the very difficulty as he himself proposes it is this how an event can come to pass without a sufficient reason why it is or why it is in this manner rather than another instead of solving this difficulty with regard to volition as he proposes he forgets himself and answers another question quite diverse these what is a sufficient reason why it is and why it is in this manner rather than another and he assigns the active beings own determination as the cause and a cause sufficient for the effect and leaves all the difficulty unresolved even how the soul's own determination which he speaks of came to exist and to be what it was without a cause the activity of the soul may enable it to be the cause of effects but it does not at all enable it to be the subject of effects which have no cause which is the thing this author supposes concerning acts of the will activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce effects and determine the manner of their existence within itself without a cause than out of itself in some other being but if an active being should through its activity produce and determine an effect in some external object how absurd would it be to say that the effect was produced without a cause to the question is not so much how a spirit endowed with activity comes to act as why it exerts such an act and not another or why it acts with such a particular determination if activity of nature be the cause why a spirit the soul of man for instance acts and does not lie still yet that alone is not the cause why its action is thus and thus limited directed and determined active nature is a general thing it is an ability or tendency of nature to action generally taken which may be a cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is given but this alone cannot be a sufficient cause why the soul exerts such a particular act at such a time rather than others in order to this there must be something besides a general tendency to action there must also be a particular tendency to that individual action if it should be asked why the soul of man uses its activity in such a manner as it does and it should be answered that the soul uses its activity thus rather than otherwise because it has activity would such an answer satisfy a rational man we did not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one three an active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity but what are consequent upon his acting he produces nothing by his activity any other way than by the exercise of his activity and so nothing but the fruits of its exercise he brings nothing to pass by a dormant activity but the exercise of his activity is action and so his action or exercise of his activity must be prior to the effects of his activity if an active being produces an effect in another being about which his activity is conversant the effect being the fruit of his activity his activity must be first exercised or exerted and the effect of it must follow so it must be with equal reason if the active being is his own object and his activity is conversant about himself to produce and determine some effect in himself still the exercise of his activity must go before the effect which he brings to pass and determines by it and therefore his activity cannot be the cause of the determination of the first action or exercise of activity itself once the effects of activity arise for that would imply a contradiction it would be to say the first exercise of activity is before the first exercise of activity and is the cause of it for that the soul though an active substance cannot diversify its own acts but by first acting or be a determining cause of different acts or any different effects sometimes of one kind and sometimes of another any other way than in consequence of its own diverse acts is manifest by this that if so then the same cause the same cause will influence without variation in any respect would produce different effects at different times for the same substance of the soul before it acts and the same active nature of the soul before it is exerted that is before in the order of nature would be the cause of different effects these different volitions at different times but the substance of the soul before it acts and its active nature before it is exerted are the same without variation For it is some act that makes the first variation in the cause as to any causal, exertion, force, or influence. But if it be so that the soul has no different causality or diverse causal influence in producing these diverse effects, then it is evident that the soul has no influence in the diversity of the effect, and that the difference of the effect cannot be owing to anything in the soul, or, which is the same thing, the soul does not determine the diversity of the effect, which is contrary to the supposition, it is true, the substance of the soul before it acts, and before there is any difference in that respect may be in a different state and circumstances. But those whom I oppose will not allow the different circumstances of the soul to be the determining causes of the acts of the will as being contrary to their notion of self-determination. Five, let us suppose as these divines do that there are no acts of the soul strictly speaking but free volitions, then it will follow that the soul is an active being in nothing further than it is a voluntary or elective being, and whenever it produces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and electively. But to produce effects thus is the same thing as to produce effects in consequence of, and according to, its own choice. And if so then surely the soul does not by its activity produce all its own acts of will or choice themselves. For this by this supposition is to produce all its free acts of choice voluntarily and electively, or in consequence of its own free acts of choice which brings the matter directly to the aforementioned contradiction of a free act of choice before the first free act of choice. According to these gentlemen's own notion of action, if there arises in the mind a volition without a free act of the will to produce it, the mind is not the voluntary cause of that volition because it does not arise from nor is regulated by choice or design. And therefore it cannot be that the mind should be the active voluntary determining cause of the first and leading volition that relates to the affair. The mind being a designing cause only enables it to produce effects in consequence of its design. It will not enable it to be the designing cause of all its own designs. The mind being an elective cause will enable it to produce effects only in consequence of its elections and according to them, but cannot enable it to be the elective cause of all its own elections because that supposes an election before the first election. So the mind being an active cause enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own acts but cannot enable it to be the determining cause of all its own acts for that is in the same manner or contradiction as it supposes a determining act conversant about the first act and prior to it having a causal influence on its existence and manner of existence. I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul having power to cause and determine its own volitions as a being to whom God has given a power of action but this that God has given power to the soul sometimes at least to excite volitions at its pleasure or according as it chooses and this certainly supposes in all such cases a choice preceding all volitions that has caused even the first of them which runs into the forementioned great absurdity therefore the activity of the nature of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties with which the notion of a self determining power in the will is attended nor will it help in the least its absurdities and inconsistencies. End of part 2 section 4 part 2 section 5 of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain showing that if the things asserted in these evasions should be supposed to be true they are all together impertinent and cannot help the cause of Armenian liberty and how this being the state of the case Armenian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently what was last observed in the preceding section may show not only that the act of nature of the soul cannot be a reason why an act of the will is or why it is in this manner rather than another but also that if it could be proved that volitions are contingent events their being and manner of being not fixed or determined by any cause or anything antecedent it would not at all serve the purpose of Armenians to establish their notion of freedom as consisting in the will's determination of itself which supposes every free act of the will to be determined by some act of the will going before in as much as for the will to determine a thing is the same as for the soul to determine a thing by willing and there is no way that the will can determine an act of the will than by willing that act of the will or which is the same thing choosing it so that here must be two acts of the will in the case one going before another one conversant about the other and the object of the former and chosen by the former if the will does not cause and determine the act by choice it does not cause or determine it at all for that which is not determined by choice is not determined voluntarily or willingly and to say that the will determines something which the soul does not determine willingly is as much as to say that something is done by the will which the soul doth not with its will so that if Armenian liberty of will consisting in the will determining its own acts be maintained the old absurdity and contradiction must be maintained that every free act of will is caused and determined by a foregoing free act of will which doth not consist with the free acts arising without any cause and being so contingent as not to be fixed by anything foregoing so that this evasion must be given up as not at all relieving this sort of liberty but directly destroying it and if it should be supposed that the soul determines its own acts of will some other way than by a foregoing act of will still it will help not their cause if it determines them by an act of the understanding or some other power then the will does not determine itself and so the self-determining power of the will is given up and what liberty is there exercised according to their own opinion of liberty by the soul being determined by something besides its own choice the acts of the will it is true may be directed and effectually determined and fixed but it is not done by the soul's own will and pleasure there is no exercise at all of choice or will in producing the effect and if will and choice are not exercised in it how is the liberty of the will exercised in it so that let Armenians turn which way they please with their notion of liberty consisting in the will determining its own acts their notion destroys itself if they hold every free act of will to be determined by the soul's own free choice or foregoing free act of will foregoing either in the order of time or nature it implies that gross contradiction that the first free act belonging to the affair is determined by a free act which is before it or if they say that the free acts of the will are determined by some other act of the soul and not an act of will or choice this also destroys their notion of liberty consisting in the acts of the will being determined by the will itself or if they hold that the acts of the will are determined by nothing at all that is prior to them but that they are contingent in that sense that they are determined and fixed by no cause at all this also destroys their notion of liberty consisting in the will determining its own acts this being the true state of the Armenian notion of liberty the writers who defend it are forced into gross inconsistencies in what they say upon this subject to instance in Dr. Whitby he in his discourse on the freedom of the will opposes the opinion of the Calvinists who place man's liberty only in a power of doing what he will as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes and yet he himself mentions the very same notion of liberty as the dictate of the sense and common reason of mankind and a rule laid down by the light of nature these that liberty is a power of acting from ourselves or doing what we will this is indeed as he says a thing agreeable to the sense and common reason of mankind and therefore it is not so much to be wondered at that he unawares acknowledges it against himself for if liberty does not consist in this what else can be devised that it should consist in if it be said as Dr. Whitby elsewhere insists that it does not only consist in liberty of doing what we will but also a liberty of willing without necessity still the question returns what does that liberty of willing without necessity consist in but in a power of willing as we please without being impeded by a contrary necessity or in other words a liberty for the soul in its willing to act according to its own choice yea this very thing the same author seems to allow and suppose again and again in the use he makes of sayings of the fathers whom he quotes as his vouchers thus he cites the words of origin which he produces as a testimony on his side the soul acts by her own choice and it is free for her to incline to whatever part she will and those of Justin Martyr the doctrine of the Christians is this that nothing is done or suffered according to fate but that every man doth good or evil according to his own free choice and from Eusebius these words if fate be established philosophy and piety are overthrown all these things depending upon the necessity introduced by the stars and not upon meditation and exercise proceeding from our own free choice and again the words of Macarius God to preserve the liberty of man's will suffered their bodies to die but it might be in their choice to turn to good or evil they who are acted by the Holy Spirit are not held under any necessity but have liberty to turn themselves and do what they will in this life thus the doctor in effect comes into that very notion of liberty which the Calvinists have which he at the same time condemns as agreeing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes namely the soul acting by its own choice men doing good or evil according to their own free choice their being in that exercise which proceeds from their own free choice having it in their choice to turn to good or evil and doing what they will so that if men exercise this liberty in the acts of the will themselves it must be in exerting acts of will according to their own free choice or exerting acts of will that proceed from their choice and if it be so then let everyone judge whether this does not suppose a free choice going before the free act of will or whether an act of choice does not go before that act of the will which proceeds from it and if it be thus with all free acts of the will then let everyone judge whether it will not follow that there is a free choice going before the first free act of the will exerted in the case and finally let everyone judge whether in the scheme of these writers there be any possibility of avoiding these absurdities if liberty consists as Dr. Whitby himself says in a man's doing what he will and a man exercises this liberty not only in external actions but in the acts of the will themselves then so far as liberty is exercised in the latter it consists in willing what he wills and if any say so one of these two things must be meant either one that a man has power to will as he does will because what he wills he wills and therefore power to will what he has power to will if this be their meaning then all this mighty controversy about freedom of the will and self determining power comes wholly to nothing all that is contended for being no more than this that the mind of man does what it does is the subject of what it is the subject or that what is is wherein none has any controversy with them or to the meaning must be that a man has power to will as he chooses to will that is he has power by one act of choice to choose another by an antecedent act of will to choose a consequent act and therein to execute his own choice and if this be their meaning it is nothing but shuffling with those they dispute with and baffling their own reason for still the question returns wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent act of will which chose the consequent act the answer according to the same principles must be that his liberty in this also lies in his willing as he would or as he chose or agreeable to another act of choice preceding that and so the question returns in infinitum and the like answer must be made in infinitum in order to support their opinion there must be no beginning but free acts of will must have been chosen by foregoing free acts of will in the soul of every man without beginning End of Part 2, Section 5 Part 2, Section 6 of The Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards This LibriVox recording is in the public domain concerning the wills determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind A great argument for self determining power is the supposed experience we universally have of an ability to determine our wills in cases wherein no prevailing motive is presented The will as is supposed has its choice to make between two or more things that are perfectly equal in the view of the mind and the will is apparently altogether indifferent and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a choice The will can instantly determine itself to one by a sovereign power which it has over itself without being moved by any preponderating inducement Thus the fore mentioned author of an essay on the freedom of the will, etc. Pages 25, 26, 27 supposes that there are many instances wherein the will is determined neither by present uneasiness nor by the greatest apparent good nor by the last dictate of the understanding nor by anything else but merely by itself as a sovereign self determining power of the soul and that the soul does not will this or that action in some cases by any other influence but because it will Thus as he I can turn my face to the south or the north I can point with my finger upward or downward and thus in some cases the will determines itself in a very sovereign manner because it will without a reason borrowed from the understanding and hereby it discovers its own perfect power of choice rising from within itself and free from all influence or restraint of any kind and Pages 66, 70, 73, 74 this author very expressly supposes the will in many cases to be determined by no motive at all and acts altogether without motive or ground of preference here I would observe one the very supposition which is here made directly contradicts and overthrows itself for the things supposed wherein this grand argument consists is that among several things the will actually chooses one before another at the same time that it is perfectly indifferent which is the very same thing as to say the mind has a preference at the same time that it has no preference what is meant cannot be that the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice or until it has a preference for certainly this author did not imagine he had a controversy with any person in supposing this besides it appears in fact that the thing which he supposes is not that the will chooses one thing before another concerning which it is indifferent before it chooses but that the will is indifferent when it chooses and that it being otherwise then indifferent is not until afterwards in consequence of its choice that the chosen thing appearing preferable and more agreeable than another arises from its choice already made is words are page 30 where the objects which are proposed appear equally fit or good the will is left without a guide or director and therefore must take its own choice by its own determination it being properly a self-determining power and in such cases the will does as it were make a good to itself by its own choice that is creates its own pleasure or delight in this self-chosen good even as a man by seizing upon a spot of unoccupied land in an uninhabited country makes it his own possession and property and as such rejoices in it where things were indifferent before the will finds nothing to make them more agreeable considered merely in themselves but the pleasure it feels arising from its own choice and its perseverance therein we love many things which we have chosen and purely because we chose them this is as much as to say that we first begin to prefer many things purely because we have preferred and chosen them before these things must needs be spoken inconsiderately by this author choice or preference cannot be before itself in the same instance either in the order of time or nature it cannot be the foundation of itself or the consequence of itself the very act of choosing one thing rather than another is preferring that thing and that is setting a higher value on that thing but that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than another is not in the first place the fruit of it setting a higher value on that thing this author says page 36 the will may be perfectly indifferent and yet the will may determine itself to choose one or the other and again in the same page I am entirely indifferent to either and yet my will may determine itself to choose and again which I shall choose must be determined by the mere act of my will if the choice is determined by a mere act of will then the choice is determined by a mere act of choice and concerning this matter these that the act of the will itself is determined by act of choice this writer is express page 72 speaking of the case where there is no superior fitness and objects presented he has these words there it must act by its own choice and determine itself as it pleases where it is supposed that the very determination which is the ground and spring of the will's act is an act of choice and pleasure wherein one act is more agreeable than another and this preference and superior pleasure is the ground of all it does in the case and if so the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself but I'd rather determine itself one way than another and therefore the will does not act at all in indifference not so much as in the first step it takes if it be possible for the understanding to act in indifference yet surely the will never does because the will beginning to act is the very same thing as it beginning to choose or prefer and if in the very first act of the will the mind prefers something than the idea of that thing preferred does at that time preponderate or prevail in the mind or which is the same thing the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the will so that this holy destroys the things supposed these that the mind can by a sovereign power choose one of two or more things which in the view of the mind are in every respect perfectly equal one of which does not at all preponderate nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above another so that this author in his grand argument for the ability of the will to choose one of two or more things concerning which it is perfectly indifferent does at the same time in effect deny the thing he supposes even that the will in choosing is subject to no prevailing influence of the view of the thing chosen and indeed it is impossible to offer this argument without overthrowing it the thing supposed in it being that which denies itself to suppose the will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing to say that when it is indifferent it can do as it pleases us to say that it can follow its pleasure when it has no pleasure to follow and therefore if there be any difficulty in the instances of two cakes or two eggs etc which are exactly like one as good as another concerning which this author supposes the mind in fact has a choice and so in effect supposes that it has a preference it as much concerned himself to solve the difficulty as it does those whom he opposes for if these instances prove anything to his purpose they prove that a man chooses without choice and yet this is not to his purpose because if this is what he asserts his own words are as much against him and does as much contradict him as the words of those he disputes against can do too there is no great difficulty in showing in such instances as are alleged not only that it must needs be so that the mind must be influenced in its choice by something that has a preponderating influence upon it but also how it is so a little attention to our own experience and a distinct consideration of the acts of our own minds in such cases will be sufficient to clear up the matter thus supposing I have a chess board before me and because I am required by a superior or desired by a friend or on some other consideration I am determined to touch some one of the spots or squares on the board with my finger not being limited or directed in the first proposal to anyone in particular and there being nothing in the squares in themselves considered that recommends any one of all the 64 more than another in this case my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgarly called accident by determining to touch that square which happens to be most in view which my eye is especially upon at that moment or which happens to be then most in my mind or which I shall be directed to by some other such like accident here are several steps of the mind proceeding though all may be done as it were in a moment the first step is its general determination that it will touch one of the squares the next step is another general determination to give itself up to accident in some certain way as to touch that which shall be most in the eye or mind at that time or to some other such like accident the third and the last step is a particular determination to touch a certain individual spot even that square which by that sort of accident the mind has pitched upon has actually offered itself beyond others now it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind proceed in absolute indifference but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement so it is in the first step the mind's general determination to touch one of the 64 spots the mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no it is induced to it for the sake of making some experiment or by the desire of a friend or some other motive that prevails so it is in the second step the mind determining to give itself up to accident by touching that which shall be most in the eye or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the mind etc the mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no but chooses it because it appears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfill the general purpose and so it is in the third and last step which is determining to touch that individual spot which actually does prevail in the mind's view the mind is not indifferent concerning this but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reason which is that this is a prosecution of the preceding determination which appeared requisite and was fixed before in the second step accident will ever serve a man without hindering him a moment in such a case among a number of objects in view one will prevail in the eye or in idea beyond others when we have our eyes open in the clear sunshine many objects strike the eye at once and innumerable images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light but the attention of the mind is not equal to several of them at once or if it be it does not continue so for any time and so it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general several ideas are not in equal strength in the mind's view and notice at once or at least does not remain so for any sensible continuance there is nothing in the world more constantly varying than the ideas of the mind they do not remain precisely in the same state for the least perceivable space of time as is evident by this but all time is perceived by the mind only by the successive changes of its own ideas therefore while the perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the same state there is no perceivable length of time in the unsearchable succession at all as the acts of the will in each step of the forementioned procedure do not come to pass without a particular cause but every act is owing to a prevailing inducement so the accident as I have called it or that which happens in the unsearchable course of things to which the mind yields itself and by which it is guided is not anything that comes to pass without a cause by it is not determined by something that has no cause any more than if it be determined to be guided by a lot or the casting of a die for though the die falling in such a manner be accidental to him that casts it yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it does the involuntary changes in that succession of our ideas though the cause may not be observed have as much a cause by the continual motions of the motes that float in the air or the continual infinitely various successive changes of the unevennesses on the surface of the water there are two things especially which are probably the occasions of confusion in the minds of them who insist upon it that the will acts in a proper indifference and without being moved by any inducement in its determinations in such cases as have been mentioned they seem to mistake the pointing question or at least not to keep it distinctly in view the question they dispute about is whether the mind be indifferent about the objects presented one of which is to be taken touched, pointed to, etc as two eggs, two cakes which appear equally good whereas the question to be considered is whether the person be indifferent with respect to his own actions whether he does not on some consideration or other prefer one act with respect to these objects before another the mind in its determination and choice in these cases is not most immediately and directly conversant about the objects presented but the acts to be done concerning these objects the objects may appear equal and the mind may never properly make any choice between them without the external actions to be performed taking, touching, etc these may not appear equal and one action may properly be chosen before another in each step of the mind's progress the determination is not about the objects unless indirectly and improperly but about the actions which it chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects and for reasons not taken at all from the objects the necessity of supposing that the mind does ever at all properly choose one of the objects before another either before it has taken or afterwards indeed the man chooses to take or touch one rather than another but not because it chooses the thing taken or touched but from foreign considerations the case may be so that of two things offered a man may for certain reasons prefer taking that which he undervalues and choose to neglect that which his mind prefers in such a case choosing the thing taken and choosing to take are diverse and so they are in a case where the things presented are equal in the mind's esteem and neither of them preferred all that fact and experience makes evident is that the mind chooses one action rather than another and therefore the arguments which they bring in order to be to their purpose should be to prove that the mind chooses the action imperfect in difference with respect to that action and not to prove that the mind chooses the action imperfect in difference with respect to the object which is very possible and yet the will not act at all without prevalent inducement and proper preponderation to another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter seems to be not distinguishing between a general indifference or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it and a particular indifference or an indifference with respect to the next immediate act viewed with this particular and present circumstances a man may be perfectly indifferent with respect to his own actions in the form of respect and yet not in the latter thus in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares of a chess board when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch because as yet I view the matter remotely and generally being but in the first step of the mind's progress in the affair but yet when I am actually come to the last step and the very next thing to be determined is which is to be touched that I will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind and my mind being now fixed on a particular one the act of touching that considered thus immediately and in these particular present circumstances is not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about end of part two section six part two section seven of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain concerning the notion of liberty of will consisting in indifference what has been said in the foregoing section has a tendency in some measure to events the absurdity of the opinion of such as place liberty in indifference or in that equilibrium whereby the will without all antecedent bias that the determination of the will to either side may be entirely from itself and that it may be owing only to its own power and the sovereignty which it has over itself that it goes this way rather than that but in as much as this has been of such long standing and has been so generally received and so much insisted on by Pelagians semi-Pelagians, Jesuits So-Synians Armenians and others it may deserve a more full consideration and therefore I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough inquiry into this notion now, lest some should suppose that I do not understand those that place liberty in indifference or should charge me misrepresenting their opinion I would signify that I am sensible there are some who when they talk of liberty of the will as consisting in indifference express themselves as though they would not be understood to mean the indifference of the inclination or a tendency of the will but an indifference of the soul's power of willing or that the will with respect to its power or ability to choose is indifferent can go either way indifferently either to the right hand or left either act or forbear to act one as well as the other this indeed seems to be a refining of some particular writers only and newly invented which will by no means consist with the manner of expression used by the defenders of liberty of indifference in general I wish such refiners would thoroughly consider whether they distinctly know their own meaning when they make a distinction between an indifference of the soul as to its power or ability of choosing and the soul's indifference as to the preference or choice itself and whether they do not deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct meaning at all the indifference of the soul as to its ability or power to will must be the same thing as the indifference of the state of the power or faculty of the will or the indifference of the state which the soul itself which has that power or faculty either to remains in as to the exercise of that power in the choice it shall by and by make but not to insist any longer on the inexplicable abstruseness of this distinction let what will be supposed concerning the meaning of them that use it thus much must at least be intended by Armenians when they talk of indifference as essential to liberty of will they intend anything in any respect to their purpose these that it is such an indifference as leaves the will not determined already but free from actual possession and vacant of predetermination so far that there may be room for the exercise of the self determining power of the will and that the will's freedom consists in or depends upon this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the will itself to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act and here I would observe in the first place that to make out the scheme of liberty the indifference must be perfect and absolute there must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination because if the will be already inclined before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself if when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of indifference then it is not found in a state of liberty for mere self-determination the least degree of an insistent with their notion of liberty for so long as prior inclination possesses the will and is not removed the former binds the latter so that it is utterly impossible that the will should act otherwise then agreeably to it surely the will cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the will to suppose otherwise would be the same thing as to suppose that the will is inclined contrary to its present prevailing inclination or contrary to what it is inclined to that which the will prefers to that all things considered it preponderates and inclines it is equally impossible for the will to choose contrary to its own remaining and present preponderating inclination as it is to prefer contrary to its own present preference or choose contrary to its own present choice the will therefore so long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating inclination is not at liberty for a new free act or any that shall now be an act of self-determination that which is a determined free act must be one which the will determines in the possession and use of a peculiar sort of liberty such as consists in a freedom from everything which if it were there would make it impossible that the will at that time should be otherwise than that way to which it tends if anyone should say there is no need that the indifference or former inclination still remains yet if it be not very strong possibly the strength of the will may oppose and overcome it this is grossly absurd for the strength of the will let it be never so great gives it no such sovereignty and command as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time or to choose contrary to its own present choice therefore if there be the least degree of antecedent preponderation of the will it must be perfectly abolished before the will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary way and if the will determines itself the same way it was not a free determination because the will is not wholly at liberty in so doing its determination is not altogether from itself but it was partly determined before in its prior inclination and all the freedom the will exercises in the case is an increase of inclination which it gives itself added to what it had a foregoing bias so much is from itself and so much is from perfect indifference for though the will had a previous tendency that way yet as to that additional degree of inclination it had no tendency therefore the previous tendency of inclination with respect to the act wherein the will is free so that it comes to the same thing which was said at first but as to the act of the will wherein the will is free there must be perfect indifference or equilibrium to illustrate this suppose a sovereign self moving power in a natural body but that the body is in motion already by an antecedent bias inclination towards the center of the earth and has one degree of motion by virtue of that previous tendency but by itself moving power it adds one degree more to its motion and moves so much more swiftly towards the center of the earth than it would do by its gravity only it is evident all that is owing to a self moving power in this case is the additional degree of motion and that the other degree it had from gravity is of no consideration in the case the effect is just the same as if the body had received from itself one degree of motion from a state of perfect rest so if we suppose a self moving power given to the scale of a balance which has a weight of one degree beyond the opposite scale and if we ascribe to it an ability to add to itself another degree of force the same way by itself moving power as the same thing as to ascribe to it a power to give itself one degree of preponderation from a perfect equilibrium and so much power as the scale has to give itself an over balance from a perfect equi-poise so much self moving self preponderating power it has and no more so that its free power this way is always to be measured from perfect equilibrium I need say no more to prove that if indifference be essential to liberty it must be perfect indifference and that so far as the will is destitute of this so far is it destitute of that freedom by which it is in a capacity of being its own determiner without being at all passive or subject to the power and sway of something else in its motions and determinations having observed these things let us now try whether this notion of the liberty of will consisting in indifference and equilibrium and the will self determination in such a state be not absurd and inconsistent and here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth that every free act is done in a state of freedom and not only after such a state if an act of the will be in act of the will is free it must be exerted in a state of freedom and in the time of freedom it will not suffice that the act immediately follows a state of liberty but liberty must yet continue and coexist with the act the soul remaining in possession of liberty because that is the notion of a free act of the soul even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises liberty not in the very time of the act in the possession of liberty it cannot at that time be in the use of it now the question is whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of will while it yet remains in a state of liberty these as implying a state of indifference or whether the soul ever exerts an act of preference while at that very time the will is in a perfect equilibrium not inclining one way more than another the very pudding of the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirmative answer for how ridiculous would it be for anybody to insist that the soul chooses one thing before another when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent with respect to each this is the same thing as to say the soul prefers one thing to another at the very same time that it has no preference choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference than motion can be in a state of rest or then the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium motion may be the next moment after rest but cannot coexist with it in any even the least part of it so choice may be immediately after a state of indifference but cannot coexist with it at the very beginning of it is not in a state of indifference and therefore if this be liberty no act of the will in any degree is ever performed in a state of liberty or in the time of liberty volition and liberty are so far from agreeing together and being essential one to another that they are contrary one to another and one excludes and destroys the other as much as motion and rest so that the will acts not at all does not so much as begin to act in the time of such liberty freedom has ceased to be at the first moment of action and therefore liberty cannot reach the action to effect or qualify it or give it a denomination any more than if it had ceased to be 20 years before the action began the moment that liberty ceases to be it ceases to be a qualification of anything if light and darkness succeed one another instantaneously light qualifies nothing after it is gone out to make anything light some more bright at the first moment of perfect darkness any more than months or years after life denominates nothing vital at the first moment of perfect death so freedom if it consists in or implies indifference can denominate nothing free at the first moment of preference or preponderation therefore it is manifest that no liberty which the soul has possessed that or ever uses in any of its acts of volition consists in indifference and that the opinion of such as supposed that indifference belongs to the very essence of liberty is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory if anyone should imagine that this manner of arguing is nothing but a trick and delusion and to evade the reasoning should say that the thing wherein the will exercises its liberty is not in the act of choice or preponderation of itself but in determining itself to a certain choice or preference that the act of the will wherein it is free and uses its own sovereignty consists in its causing or determining the change or transition from a state of indifference to a certain preference or determining to give a certain turn to the balance which has hitherto been even and that the will exerts this act in a state of liberty or while the will yet remains in equally rim and perfect master of itself I say if anyone chooses to express his notion of liberty after this or some such manner let us see if he can succeed any better than before what is asserted is that the will while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium without preference determines to change itself from that state and exciting itself a certain choice or preference now let us see whether this does not come to the same absurdity we had before if it be so that the will while it yet remains perfectly indifferent determines to put itself out of that state and to give itself a certain preponderation that I would inquire whether the soul does not determine this of choice or whether the will coming to a determination to do so be not the same thing as the soul coming to a choice to do so if the soul does not determine this choice or in the exercise of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily and if the soul does not determine it voluntarily red it s own will And if the will does not determine it, then how is the liberty of the will exercised in the determination? What sort of liberty is exercised by the soul in those determinations wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary and wherein the will is not concerned? But if it be allowed that this determination is an act of choice and it be insisted on that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state and to turn itself one way, then the soul has already come to a choice and chooses that way. And so we have the very same absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a state of choice and in a state of equilibrium, both at the same time. The soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect indifference and has no choice of one way more than the other. And indeed, this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the absurdity and the obscurity of expression, increases the inconsistence. To say the free act of the will or the act which the will exerts in a state of freedom and indifference does not imply preference in it, but is what the will does in order to cause or produce a preference is as much as to say the soul chooses for it to will and to choose are the same thing without choice and prefers without preference in order to cause or produce the beginning of a preference or the first choice. And that is that the first choice is exerted without choice in order to produce itself. If any to evade these things should own that a state of liberty and a state of indifference are not the same and that the former may be without the latter, but should say that indifference is still essential to freedom as it is necessary to go immediately before it. It being essential to the freedom of an act of will that it should directly and immediately arise out of a state of indifference. Still, this will not help the cause of Armenian liberty or make it consistent with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a state of indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent choice or preference. But if the act arises directly out of a state of indifference without any intervening choice to determine it, then the act not being determined by choice is not determined by the will. The mind exercises no free choice in the affair and free choice and free will have no hand in the determination of the act, which is entirely inconsistent with their notion of the freedom of religion. If any should suppose that these absurdities may be avoided by saying that the liberty of the mind consists in a power to suspend the act of the will and so to keep it in a state of indifference until there has been opportunity for consideration. And so shall say that however, indifference is not essential to liberty in such a manner that the mind must make its choice in a state of indifference, which is an inconsistency or that the act of will must spring immediately out of indifference, yet indifference may be essential to the liberty of acts of the will in this respect be that liberty consists in a power of the mind to forbear or suspend the act of volition and keep the mind in a state of indifference for the present until there has been opportunity for proper deliberation. I say if anyone imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great mistake. It reconciles no inconsistency and relieves no difficulty for here the following things must be observed. One, that this suspending of volition if there be properly any such thing is itself an act of volition. If the mind determines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily. It chooses on some consideration to suspend it and this choice of determination is an act of the will and indeed it is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis for it is supposed that the liberty of the will consists in its power to do this and that it's doing it is the very thing wherein the will exercises its liberty but how can the will exercise liberty in it if it be not an act of the will? The liberty of the will is not exercised in any thing but what the will does. Two, this determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the will but it is supposed to be the only free act of the will because it is said that this is the thing of which the liberty of the will consists. If so, then this is all the act of will that we have to consider in this controversy and now the former question returns upon us. These wherein consists the freedom of the will and those acts wherein it is free and if this act of determining a suspension to be the only act in which the will is free then wherein consists the will's freedom with respect to this act of suspension and how is indifference essential to this act? The answer must be according to what is supposed in the evasion under consideration that the liberty of the will in this act of suspension consists in a power to suspend even this act until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation but this will be to plan directly into the grossest nonsense for it is the act of suspension itself that we are speaking of and there's no room for a space of deliberation and suspension in order to determine whether we will suspend or no. For that suppose is that even suspension itself may be deferred which is absurd for the very deferring the determination of suspension to consider whether we will suspend or no will be actually suspending. For during the space of suspension to consider whether to suspend the act is if so fact suspended. There is no medium between suspending to act and immediately acting and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment. And besides this is attended with ridiculous absurdity another way. For now it seems liberty consists wholly in the mind having power to suspend its determination whether to suspend or no that there may be time for consideration whether it be best to suspend. And if liberty consists in this only then this is the liberty under consideration. We have to inquire now how liberty with respect to this act of suspending a determination of suspension consists in indifference or how indifference is essential to it. The answer according to the hypothesis we are upon must be that it consists in a power of suspending even this last mentioned act to have time to consider whether to suspend that. And then the same difficulties and inquiries return over again with respect to that and so on forever which if it would show anything would show only that there is no such thing as a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom back in infinitum and that is to drive it out of the world. And besides all this there is a delusion and a latent gross contradiction in the affair another way in as much as in explaining how or in what respect the will is free with regard to a particular act of volition it is said that its liberty consists in a power to determine to suspend that act which places liberty not in that act of volition which the inquiry is about but altogether in another antecedent act which contradicts the thing supposed in both the question and answer. The question is wherein consists the mind's liberty in any particular act of volition and the answer in pretending to show wherein lies the mind's liberty in that act in effect says it does not lie in that act at all but in another visa volition to suspend that act and therefore the answer is both contradictory and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose for it does not show wherein the liberty of the will consists in the acting question instead of that it supposes it does not consist in that act at all but in another act distinct from it even a volition to suspend that act and take time to consider of it and no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act wherein this answer supposes the liberty of the mind indeed consists these the act of suspension or of determining the suspension. On the whole it is exceeding manifest that the liberty of the mind does not consist in indifference and that indifference is not essential or necessary to it or at all belonging to it as the Armenian suppose that opinion being full of nothing but self-contradiction. End of part two, section seven. Part two, section eight of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards. This lever box recording is in the public domain. Concerning the suppose liberty of the will as opposite to all necessity. It is chiefly insisted on by Armenians in this controversy as a thing most important and essential in human liberty that volitions or the acts of the will are contingent events understanding contingents as opposite not only to constraint but to all necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this matter and first I would inquire whether there is or can be any such thing as a volition which is contingent in such a sense as not only to come to pass without any necessity or constraint or a correction but also without a necessity of consequence or an infallible connection with anything foregoing. Secondly, whether if it were so, this would at all help the cause of liberty. One, I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does or can come to pass in this manner contingently. And here it must be remembered that it has been already shown that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause or a reason why it exists in this manner rather than another. And the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the acts of the will. Now if this be so it will demonstrably follow that the acts of the will are never contingent or without necessity in the sense spoken up in as much as those things which have a cause or a reason of their existence must be connected with their cause disappears by the following considerations. One, for an event to have a cause and ground of its existence and yet not to be connected with its cause is an inconsistence. For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not dependent on the cause. Its existence is as it were loose from its influence and may attend it or may not it being a mere contingence whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause or not. And that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it and to say the event is not dependent on its cause is absurd. It is the same thing as to say it is not its cause nor the event the effect of it. For dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect. If there be no such relation between one thing and another consisting in the connection and dependence of one thing on the influence of another then it is certain there is no such relation between them as is signified by the terms cause and effect. So far as an event is dependent on a cause and connected with it so much causality is there in the case and no more. The cause does or brings to pass no more in any event than is dependent on it. If we say the connection and dependence is not total but partial and that the effect that it has some connection and dependence yet is not entirely dependent on it. That is the same thing as to say that not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause but that only part of it arises from thence and part some other way. To if there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes then it will follow that there are some things which come to pass without any cause contrary to the supposition. For if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under such circumstances then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the cause or no. It might have followed and it might not when the cause was the same. It's influenced the same and under the same circumstances and if so why did it follow rather than not follow of this there is no cause or reason. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it is V's the following of the effect on the influence of the cause with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be no necessary connection of the effect on anything antecedent then we may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause and sometimes not when the cause is the same and in every respect in the same state and circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon even this diversity that in one instance the effect should follow in another not it is evident by the supposition that this is holy without any cause or ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things and state of the world that is absolutely without a cause which is contrary to the supposition and contrary to what has been before demonstrated. Three to suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause. Thus if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause with its influence and influential circumstances then as I observed before it is a thing possible and supposable that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence under the same circumstances and yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any instance this instance is a proof in fact that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect for if it had been sufficient it would have done it and yet by the supposition in another instance the same cause with perfectly the same influence and when all circumstances which have any influence are the same it was followed with the effect by which it is manifest that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause but must come to pass some other way for it was proved before that the influence of the cause was not sufficient to produce the effect and if it was not sufficient to produce it then the production of it could not be owing to that influence but must be owing to something else or owing to nothing and if the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause then it is not the cause which brings us to the contradiction of a cause and no cause that which is the ground and reason of the existence of a thing and at the same time is not the ground and reason of its existence. If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent I would say that which seems to be the cause in the supposed case can be no cause its power and influence having on a full trial proved insufficient to produce such an effect and if it be not sufficient to produce it then it does not produce it. To say otherwise is to say there is power to do that which there is not power to do if there be in a cause sufficient power exerted and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect and so the effect be actually produced at one time all these things concurring will produce the effect at all times and so we may turn it the other way that which proves not sufficient at one time cannot be sufficient at another with precisely the same influential circumstances and therefore if the effect follows it is not owing to that cause unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence but that is contrary to the supposition for it is supposed that all circumstances that have influence are the same and besides this would be to suppose the time to be the cause which is contrary to the supposition for the other thing being the cause but if merely diversity of time has no influence then it is evident that it is as much of an absurdity to say the cause was sufficient to produce the effect at one time and not at another as to say that it is sufficient to produce the effect at a certain time and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the same time. On the whole it is clearly manifest that every effect has a necessary connection with its cause or with that which is the true ground and reason of its existence and therefore if there be no event without a cause as was proved before then no event whatsoever is contingent in the manner that Armenians suppose the free acts of the will to be contingent. End of part two, section eight.