 And before I talk about the forthcoming elections, I need to give some context. So it's unfashionable, certainly in academic circles, and to a certain degree also in European circles, to go on nagging about the democracy deficit. Because the view is that, yes, there was a democracy deficit, but essentially it's been addressed because the way our classical understanding used to be, the democracy deficit was a result of having a powerful double executive, the Commission, and the Council of Ministers, which is the representatives of the executive branches of the member states. And with no effective parliamentary control, because national parliaments were not really effective, especially in the large member states, in controlling what the executive branch did in the legislative context in Europe, and also once majority voting came in, even if you were effective, you couldn't shape the result. There was no more veto, thankfully. And that the European Parliament had weak powers, so then the democratization of the European process meant giving more powers or increasing powers to the European Parliament. And the crowning achievement being Lisbon, which was the constitution of Europe in disguise as a treaty, but having for the most part the same provision as the constitution. And I think for most, to most intents and purposes, the European Parliament is regarded as a co-legislature with the Council of Ministers. And therefore stop nagging about democracy deficit. So one uncomforting fact pushes us or forces us to rethink this. And the very first book I wrote, and I'm for many reasons, actually I don't like talking about that book. It's not such a good one. It was about the European Parliament. And it was probably shortly after the first elections in 1979, direct elections to the European Parliament, where the voter turnout was in the high 60s. And I lamented the low turnout in elections to the European Parliament. And then with confidence, I said, but the European population is not stupid. There's no reason for them to turn out and vote for the European Parliament because it's a parliament without really any effect of powers. And then I predicted as the powers to the European Parliament are increased, one can expect to see an increase in voter turnout because once it has real powers, it will make sense to vote for the European Parliament. As everybody in this room knows, that was just one of the clamorous mistakes I made in that book. Because indeed, from 1979 to 2009, the powers of the European Parliament increased more and more in an effective and responsible and altogether laudable way. And yet in every single election, the turnout, the voter turnout decreased. And that in the 2009 election, it was about 34%. And if we eliminate a couple of member states where voting is obligatory, it's even lower than that. But it's this kind of conflict between giving more powers to the European Parliament and less and less citizens going and voting. And in those countries where they do vote, very often it's just treated as a by-election, as a mid-term election to express opinion on how the government is doing rather than how Europe is doing. And in analyses of the election manifestos of the parties competing for the European Parliament, of course there is some difference in rhetoric, et cetera, but it's really a little bit a European version of motherhood and apple pie. Everybody believes in transparency and everybody believes in increasing the citizens' voice, et cetera. It's not much of a sharp policy debate. So that gives pause. That suggests that not everything is healthy in this territory called European democracy. If people not only show up, don't show up to vote, but there's been a continuous decline since 1979 up to the last elections, which is 2009. Now, I think the malaise is much deeper. I think there remains two very deep flaws in European democracy, even given the powers of the European Parliament. And very briefly, these two very deep primordial, this is not superficial, this is not epiphenomenal stuff, this goes to the heart of the matter, is that on two fundamental issues, European democracy or European institutions and processes are unable to replicate what we come to expect from democracy in states, in member states, and I'm aware that Europe is not a state. The first is the principle of accountability, the ability to throw the scoundrels out. It's not about, I like this policy, I like that policy, et cetera. It's not I'm left, center-left, but maybe now we should try some center-right, et cetera. It's I'm unhappy with the government. Maybe I like their policies and I don't like the way they're administered. Maybe there's corruption. There can be many reasons which do not go to policy, but I have the ability to throw the scoundrels out. I call it the principle of accountability. In every system we have, and we have so many different systems, whether it's the French presidential or the British Parliamentary or the German or the Italian, there's a moment in the civic life of the polity that if enough people go and vote in a certain way, they can change the government. And I think that has salutary effects on a whole range of issues, understanding of ownership of the polity and keeping politicians on their toes because there's a day of reckoning, et cetera. It's not a definition of what democracy is, but when we don't have that moment in the civic life, it's difficult to talk about democracy. And Europe doesn't have that. It's not because they're evil. It's not because it's a conspiracy. It's not because it's the gnomes of Brussels or Geneva. It's a structural part of the European that we have governance without government. The Commission is not the government. And the fact that Parliament can vote no confidence in the Commission, et cetera, is not the electorate going and changing the government. And if I had more time, I would explain that it also has an impact on the culture of accountability. So it's not only that it lacks that primordial moment of throwing the scoundrel out and changing the government, which is that deep satisfying thing that we like about democracy, but it creates a culture of accountability. It's not. It's very difficult in the political history of Europe to find a moment where a European politician paid a price for political failure. I'm not talking about corruption, et cetera. That Europe is very good. It's not a corrupt system. It's tough, et cetera. But political failure. And there have been political failure. It's not part of the political culture of the Union, and it's tied to this principle of accountability or its absence. That's the first thing. The second thing is, again, it doesn't define democracy, but when we don't have it, it makes us difficult to understand ourselves in classical democratic terms. It's a principle of representation. Simply put, if enough people vote in a certain way, then we can expect that voter preference to be translated into policies. So that if we have a majority, even if it's a majority made out of several parties which are center-left, then the policies of the polity will go in a center-left direction. And if it's center-right, they will go in a center-right direction. European politics are not extreme as politics. Typically, our governments are either center-left or center-right. But it makes a difference. It makes a difference if it's a Renzi or a Leto or Belosconi, if it's a Hollande or Sarkozy. Not a huge difference, but it makes a difference in redistribution policies and foreign policy, et cetera. In Europe, even in elections to the European Parliament, there's a certain voter preference which is center-right, center-left. All our studies show that there's a very tenuous connection between that and the policy output of the European Union. In other words, it's difficult to find a correlation. Occasionally it existed. Certainly it existed on pointed issues, on this proposal and on that proposal. But it's very difficult to find a kind of correlation when there was a center-left Parliament. Europe went in this direction and when there was a center-right Parliament, it went in that direction. And again, it's part of the structural nature of the European Union where we don't get that translation of voter preference into actual policy. So again, maybe the only thing that I said in that ill-fated book in 1980 was that the European electorate is not stupid, at least in the sense that there's not a feel that my vote really matters, that by voting to the European Parliament I can either change the government because it doesn't have that kind of dramatic result, et cetera, or that really it will shape, it will be a different Europe if I vote for this party or for that party at the European level. It just doesn't have those two things. And that might be one of the explanations, surely not the only one, why despite increased powers to the European Parliament, voter turnout has declined and declined. Because citizens are not interested in abstract principles or powers are not powers to the European Parliament, they're interested in democratic politics, if what I do, et cetera. When there are elections to the European Parliament, the campaigning is not if you vote for me, Europe will be different. I'm much more nebulous or diffuse or opaque kind of why you should vote for me. The principle of re-election is very weak. The principle of re-election is one of our strongest analytical tool and instruments of democracy. What I do as a parliamentarian will affect my chances of being re-elected. I don't think there's any Euro-parliamentarian who will claim with seriousness that their performance or even their performance of their party in the European Parliament can be showed to be tied to their prospects of re-election. It doesn't work that way. So we have a problem, especially people like me who believe in Europe it's a noble experience who think it would be a disaster if it fell apart, et cetera. But one has to face the reality that in this core sense of the democratic habits and practices with which we are habituated from our member states, there are these deep structural flaws in the European construct. How might the elections to the next European Parliament be different? So I want to give two scenarios of difference and then question these two scenarios because it really can go in one of many ways. So one thing that has never happened before although it has been talked about for decades but you know, as the Italians say, nor ver parlano uno far, nine people talk, one does. And now one European politician, of course if it's success, there will be many who will claim fatherhood or motherhood. Martin Schultz, who's from the Social Democrat grouping or family in the European Parliament, he and is now president of the parliament, he pushed forward the notion that the major groupings in parliament should elect their candidate who if they constitute the majority in parliament will become the next president of the commission of the European Union. So he was elected by the Social Democrats recently to represent them as in the election campaign for the president of the European Commission, not for the president of parliament. And with some reluctance, with more or less reluctance, it seems as if all other party groupings are going to follow suit. And the next elections to the European Parliament will not simply be, you know, vote for us, etc., but it will be, they will try to present it as you are actually now voting for the next president of the commission of the European Union. I must drop a footnote now. It's interesting that the position is president of the commission of the European Union and not the president of the council of ministers. You remember, after Lisbon, one thought that maybe the president of the council would become Mr. Europe or Ms. Europe. It hasn't turned out that way for a whole variety of reasons. Now, there's a lot of hope by those who have been advocating this position that this could lead to a different type of electoral campaign because suddenly it looks much more like national politics. One is voting for an actual leader. We don't call him or her the prime minister, but they are the president of the commission. It's a kind of personality one sees on television regularly. And suddenly I will have the possibility of shaping or even deciding who will be the next president of the commission of the European Union even with a very, very vague understanding of what are the powers of the president, et cetera. This is a very different ballgame. It's never been tried before, and it's important in two ways. First of all, it will be not quite but an indirect way of a popular mandate for the president of the commission, giving him or her an authority in negotiation with member states, with the council of ministers, et cetera, that hitherto presidents who were elected or selected by a caucus of heads of state and government did not have. That's a huge change, and that's why many member states or governments, I should never say member states, executive runs, governments of member states, really do not like this idea. Simply because of the empowerment effect it will give to the president of the commission of the European Union, who could be able to say, I was elected by the people, rather than I was selected by the heads of state of government in the European council. So that's one big difference, and the second difference, it puts the stake in the European elections, a European stake. It's not about national politics, at least in a big part, it's who will be the president of the commission. This has never been tried before, and it can be a game changer. To be a real game changer, and not to result in deception, three things have to happen. Number one, the media has to play ball. In other words, a lot will depend on the media. So, of course, there's got to be televised debates. One of the televised debates among the candidates is planned for the 9th of May at the European University Institute in Florence. There will be other televised debates. But it's not only giving visibility to a campaign you are electing, de facto the president of the commission of the European Union, but the questioning has to be different. I've written about this, and I've written to the candidates, I say, I've seen Schultz's stump speech. It's a very effective stump speech, one that anybody, regardless of the ideological commitment, can agree with. We need more employment, we need more transparency, we have to take subsidiarity seriously. Who can oppose all of that? What the media really have to do is again and again to hammer at these candidates, why would voting for you, apart from your personal abilities, make it a different Europe than voting for him or her? In other words, that it doesn't become a beauty contest, but it forces the candidates and their party to come up with a real programmatic difference. If you vote for me and my party, we will take Europe in this direction, which will not be taken by that other candidate. And confront them so that I say it's not just electing the president, but by electing the president, one is forcing a real policy campaign. It makes a difference if you vote for me. And not vote for him or her. Because we have a different Europe in mind. Less austerity and more job creation or whatever the issues might be. So for this to succeed, it's not enough that they're already doing it, but the media has to link up. And they have to shape the debate away from beauty contests so that it actually politicizes the process. It politicizes the process. This is a totally new ball game to Europe. Because until now, to become president of the European Commission, it was a little bit like becoming a judge. I have to forget my prior political commitments. That I was a social democrat prime minister or a conservative prime minister. You know that I was a Roy Jenkins or I was a Jacques Delors who was a man of the left. Now I just speak for the general interest of Europe. The commission's legitimacy was rooted in we are not partisan politics. And this is very, very different. But this is real politics. There are some that argue that democracy without politics is not democracy. What is one voting for? Thirdly, it's not enough to get elected. Otherwise there will be a long term deception. You have to be able to deliver. And the only way these candidates will be able to deliver and therefore in the campaign they should be asked this, would you be willing to exercise the powers that the treaty gives you to shape your commission? So that at least there are plurality of commissioners who share your ideological commitments. Because actually the individual powers of the president of the commission are very limited. So if there's not a plurality of commissioners who share the ideological outlook on which the commissioner campaign, he or she will not be able to deliver the goods. Because they are primus intapales. It's not a presidential system. They don't have as president particularly important powers. Their power is in shaping the direction the commission takes, et cetera. So all these are conditions which would have to fall into place if this experiment can change the dynamics of European elections and reverse the trend of voter disinterest which is so inimical to the legitimacy of the European enterprise and not just to its legitimacy, to disinterest, et cetera. I want to say before I move to the second way in which the elections might be different that it's really a very open question whether the Schultz gambit with which now everybody is falling into place is good for Europe. Because it might be good for the legitimacy of the European Parliament. It might increase voter turnout. It might politicize Europe and make it really a more citizens' Europe because I get to shape the policies of Europe. But it will be a very, very different Europe to the one we know it today where the commission is really treated about party politics and therefore is accepted by the council, et cetera, as a body that is not driven by party politics which is not driven by people who want to be re-elected. But is driven by a policy maker which thinks about the overall interest of Europe. Suddenly you could say, one could hear voices why should we listen to that commission? We are a Christian Democrat majority country and it happens to be a socialist president of the commission. We're not interested. It's a very, very different Europe. So it's a really, in one piece I wrote about it I called it a fatal choice and another even a tragic choice because no matter which direction we go they're going to be high cost to pay. The status quo nonetheless seems to me equally unacceptable. To go on with elections which less and less people vote and this disinterest in apathy is not good. The second point and Mr. Chairman I will conclude here it's the Eurosceptic voice. Now, I hope this will not prevent you from inviting me again. If I had the choice between voter turnout at least at the level of 1979, between 60 and 70 percent I think I'm getting the number right. And having 30 percent of MPs, Eurosceptic or anti-Europeans in the European Parliament that's one option. Between that or having the current trend of the low 30s turnout and in some member states well below 30 percent and only having 10 percent anti-Europeans in the European Parliament I would easily go for the first. In other words I think it's a better Europe and a better European Parliament and better politics to have a robust parliament that speaks for the people with a high turnout which shows civic engagement and citizen engagement etc. Even if the price I pay is that 30 percent of MPs from Eurosceptic or anti-European or even more odious groupings in our member states then a European Parliament which has a marginal presence of anti-Europeans but is only voted by 30 percent of the population and really cannot speak as the Vox populace. I am firmly of the opinion that the first option is better than the second. That means we'll get either. My hope is since I take it as discounted nothing can, we cannot change it that there will be a very robust campaign waged by the anti-Europeans by UKIP in the United Kingdom and by Marie Le Pen in France and by builders in Holland and by the Lega Nord in Italy etc. a very robust campaign that will globalize much more strongly than maybe main political forces and their vote to turnout will be higher because usually when people feel passionate about an argument but the hope is that that will actually bring to life the campaign of the mainstream parties. The fear that they will lose or actually lose that one of these anti-European parties will be the largest party etc. might galvanize the politics with one very beneficial effect that it will mean that at least a big chunk of the campaign will be about European politics and not about domestic issues because the anti-Europeans are campaigning about Europe. So again, it's not a silver lining it's much more than a silver lining to have a campaign about Europe and here Ireland is the exception but to have a campaign about Europe is a very good thing for European democracy and European politics. The worst possible outcome is that there would still be a lower turnout with the European Parliament with 30 or 40% of anti-Europeans. That is a scenario that does not even bear thinking about because it's not only inimical to the legitimacy of the European Parliament if yet again there's a very low turnout etc. It's just not good to have a parliament weakened by very low voter turnout. I want to drop a footnote. I regularly have people say but look at the United States even presidential elections less than 50% go and vote. We shouldn't compare ourselves to the United States for two reasons. First of all, their politics are it's a photo finish which are more dysfunctional. European politics are American politics. So if it's okay, if the Americans do it and it's okay for Europe, it doesn't. It's bad for America and it's bad for Europe. But that's not the real issue. The real issue, what we have to the yardstick for comparison vote to turn out to the European Parliament is vote to turn out to national parliaments. That's the effect of comparison. And there in many member states it's almost half or lower. So it would be very bad if we get the worst of all worlds a very low vote to turn out plus a very high anti-European vote in the European Parliament which will in some ways I believe in robust politics etc. but it will also be make solving Europe's problems much more difficult in terms of my understanding of what Europe's problems are and what would be the right kind of solutions to solve them. Now you take two things and with this I end you can see why these elections are like no other elections before. The fact that we will be actually in some ways voting for the President of the Commission will be very difficult for the Council of Ministers to disavow or disregard a strong shot for one party or another. And the fact that the prospect of an anti-European vote actually winning the elections in several member states might galvanize the politics around the elections and make the mainstream parties put in a much bigger effort and actually put European policies in the future of Europe as the agenda of the election campaign and not like a by-election just a referendum on how the government is doing generally in managing the economy. Thank you very much sir.