 Battle of Midway by Yaron Brooke. I don't know about you, but this is one of my favorite conference dinner venues ever. With the whole city, modern city, the lights, the life before us, this is really a perfect place to celebrate our values. But more than the view, what makes this special is that under our feet and around us is one of the most potent, deadly and effective weapons man has ever produced. And it is a weapon produced with explicit purpose of protecting the values that we are here to celebrate. So especially at, so especially at the time of war, when men and women are in the field trying to protect us, this is an appropriate venue in which to hear stories about history and heroism and to gain appreciation for the gallant efforts of our military. As objectorists, we're often reminded that the unbelievable standard of living we enjoy, including the ability to have dinners like this, is the product of men of the mind, past and present. Most directly it is the product of scientists, engineers and businessmen. My talk tonight is about a different kind of men of the mind, the military men of the mind. The men of our military, flying up there, the men of our military do the crucial job of protecting our liberty from foreign aggressors and thus make it possible for scientists, engineers and businessmen and all the rest of us to flourish. And in this field, no less than in science or business, America's unparalleled greatness and achievement is made possible by its best minds and by the commitment of those minds to see their values achieved in reality. There are few battles that showcase this fact better than the Battle of Midway, after which this magnificent ship is named. The Battle of Midway, I believe, exemplifies much of what makes American military men so great. More broadly, the Battle of Midway and the men who fought in it exhibit many of the virtues necessary to win in any war. Before I begin, I want to give a qualification about what this talk is and isn't. It is not a comprehensive, expert account of the battle from the aspect of military strategy. I am not qualified to give such an account and most of you would probably not like to hear one. It would take many complex diagrams and many hours. For those interested in a more detailed account and a good read, I recommend the book Miracle at Midway by Gordon W. Prang, Donald Goldstein and Catherine Dillon. I also recommend the chapter on Midway in Victor Davis Hanson's excellent book, Carnage and Culture. Now when I quote, unless I indicate otherwise, it is from Miracle at Midway. So let us begin. On December 7th, 1941, six months before the Battle of Midway, Japan shocked the U.S. military and American people with a devastating surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese were able to destroy much of the American Pacific fleet while suffering virtually no damage themselves. Following Pearl Harbor, the U.S. and its allies suffered setback after setback from the loss of Wake Island on December 20th, to MacArthur's retreat from the Philippines, to the surrender of Singapore, to the naval defeat in the Java Sea, to the sinking of the British battleship, the Prince of Wales, to the Japanese bombing of Australia. And just before Midway, in the Battle of the Carwell Sea, the only significant naval battle the U.S. did not lose in those six months, the Yorktown, one of the only three U.S. aircraft carriers in the Pacific was badly damaged. The battle in the Pacific had been going badly. A prospect for the future looked no better. The U.S. had inferior equipment because it was unprepared for war and because FDR had decided the defeating Hitler was more urgent than defeating the Japanese. In the spring of 1942, the Japanese decided that they would try to gain control of the Pacific with a surprise attack on the tiny island of Midway, which is situated about two-thirds of the way between Japan and Hawaii. The Japanese believed that control of Midway would allow them both to reach Hawaii with land-based bombers and to cut off the U.S. Navy from Southeast Asia and Australia. Even more importantly, they believed that an assault on the Midway would draw the U.S. Navy into an open sea battle with a far superior Japanese fleet. If they could destroy the remnants of the U.S. Navy, particularly its carriers, the Pacific would be theirs. Indeed, had the Japanese successfully executed their plan, they would have succeeded in isolating Australia and MacArthur, gaining easy access to Hawaii, and possibly given their battleships and aircraft carriers had a clear shot at the entire West Coast. If the attack on Pearl Harbor was devastating, imagine the effects that an attack on Los Angeles or San Francisco would have had. The fate of the Pacific war was at stake. If the Japanese had succeeded in Midway, the war would have probably lasted significantly longer, diverting resources from the European Front and causing many, many more casualties on our side. And every indication at the time was that the Japanese would succeed in taking Midway. Their naval might was superior to the U.S. on all fronts. They had more ships and more aircraft in the U.S. Their equipment was technologically superior, particularly when it came to aircraft. Their fighter plane, the Zero, was unmatched by anything the U.S. Navy had at the time. Their torpedo bombers were faster, more maneuverable, and more accurate than the slow, cumbersome, inaccurate U.S. torpedo planes, which were inferior to the point where their torpedoes often did not explode even on impact. Finally, the Japanese sailors and particularly their airmen were more experienced and proficient than their American equivalents. Japan had been at war for almost 10 years. Their Americans were mostly rookies. On paper, the U.S. was doomed, even leaving aside that the Japanese seemingly had their element of surprise on their side. A sprang put the point in the miracle at Midway. Quote, any Admiral thinking in terms of a conventional naval battle would have laughed himself into a permanent state of hiccups at the idea of an engagement on such comparative strengths. Unquote. And yet, here is what happened. This is from Victor Davis Hansen. Quote, in less than six minutes from 1022 AM to 1028 on June 4th, 1942, the pride of the Japanese carrier fleet was set aflame, and the course of World War II in the Pacific radically altered. In less than 12 hours, 2,155 Japanese sea men were dead. Four fleet aircraft carriers were wrecked and soon to sink, and more than 332 aircraft, along with their most skilled pilots, were gone. The sinking of the carriers represented an irreplaceable investment of millions of days of precious, skilled labor and even scarce capital. And the only capability for the Japanese to destroy both the American fleet and the Pacific bases. More than 100 of the best carrier pilots perished in one day, equal to the entire graduating class of naval aviators that Japan could turn out in a single year. Never had the Japanese military lost so dramatically when technology, material, experience and manpower were so decidedly in their favor. Back in Washington D.C., Admiral Ernest J. King, chief of all U.S. naval operations, concluded of the action of June 4th that the Battle of Midway had been the first decisive defeat of the Japanese Navy in 350 years and had restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific. Unquote. How in the face of such massive odds did the U.S. manage to pull off such a spectacular victory? Can you hear in the back when this is going off? Yeah, I can't. The U.S. victory. The U.S. victory began with a vital contribution of a group of unlikely military heroes. Not the Navy's brave sailors or airmen, but it's in modern terms, it's nerds. Much of the battle was one month before any shots were fired by an eccentric group of code breakers charged with the awesome responsibility of breaking the Japanese naval code. Working in what Hanson describes as, quote, a super security chamber with a sunlight never penetrated. They spent their days poring over numbers, letters and numbers in endless permutations. These code breakers were part of the Combat Intelligence Office known as Hippo, I think I'm pronouncing that right. They were led by commanders Joseph J. Rockford and Lawrence Safford. Now the essence of the leadership of Rockford and Safford was to give the brilliant code breakers that they supervised great latitude with a concern for only one thing, results. Now here is a passage from Hanson on the two leaders in their management style. Quote, in slippers in a smoking jacket, Rockford ran an unusually autonomous Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence Unit, which was more or less given free reign by Safford in a windowless basement office at Pearl Harbor to decipher Japanese transmissions as it saw fit, unquote. He then goes on to quote the book, The Pacific Campaign, World War Two, by D. Van Vandevat, quote. It is difficult to determine which of the two was more eccentric. Safford, who graduated for the Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1916, was one of those people who are the despair of uniformed tailors as well as orderly organizations. He was here in the mad professor style and talked just disjointedly because his mouth could not keep up with his mind. His forte was pure mathematics. Rockford was mild-mannered, dedicated, and serious, but also persistent, energetic, and impatient of hierarchies and bureaucracy. His mind unfettered by Orthodox officer training, unquote. Given the unconventional personalities, the personnel at Hypo were often not taken seriously at the Naval Command Chain. Fortunately, Admiral Nimitz, who had taken command of the Pacific Fleet after Pearl Harbor, did take them seriously. Nimitz, who is described as a, quote, thinking leader, a real intellectual, unquote, came to appreciate their work and gave Rockford complete freedom to carry it out. Such a motley assortment of characters would have never made it in the Japanese Navy with its excessive concerns for order and formality. Quote, it is surely no accident, writes Hansen, that all of the belligerents in World War II, that of all of the belligerents in World War II, the British and the Americans with former military branches of code-breaking dating back to World War I and completely autonomous universities were the most accomplished code-breakers and the Japanese the most dismal, unquote. By 1942, Hypo had cracked the Japanese codes. By spring of 1942, Rockford's team had refined their work to the point of being able to recognize individual Japanese operators by their transmission habits. Quote, Rockford's black chamber broke the Japanese code by hard-patient work. After that, it was a matter of fitting bits and pieces into a meaningful pattern. By March 1st, 1942, Rockford knew within three to 400 miles where most Japanese ships were located, unquote. By May 2nd, Nimitz had come to accept the intelligence that Midway was the target of a Japanese invasion and started planning for it. Despite the skepticism of much of the naval command chain, many of whom did not trust intelligence or thought Midway was an unlikely target or thought the Japanese were deceiving us by letting us break their codes, Nimitz committed all the resources he could, knowing full well the consequences of error for his own career, consequences for his own career, and of course for the nation. While Rockford was convinced Midway was the Japanese primary target, he wanted to be certain. So he set the Japanese a trap. And we're going fast. Speed. Credit Coaster is here and now open at Pixar Pier at Disney California Adventure Park. Bring your super family and your friends and come celebrate friendship and beyond at Pixar Fest before it ends September 3rd, only at Disneyland Resort. Attractions and entertainment subject to change without notice. Stop by any of the 133 Los Angeles area O'Reilly Auto Parts stores where you'll find everyday low prices on the parts you need to keep your vehicle at its best. Our guaranteed low prices ensure you're always getting our best deal. In fact, we'll match any auto parts stores price on any like item. O'Reilly Auto Parts, better parts, better prices every day. The Japanese occasionally referred to a place designated for the attack as AF, which Rockport was convinced based on other evidence was Midway. So to make sure on May 10th, he had Midway dispatch a message that the Japanese could easily pick up that the Midway was low on water. Within 48 hours, the intelligence group intercepted a Japanese message advising all commanders concerned that AF was low on water. Thus Nimitz was convinced. On the morning of May 25th, Hippo deciphered what amounted to the Japanese order of battle, including the approximate attack date of June 3rd. With the knowledge of the target of the attack, the approximate composition of the Japanese force, and the target of attack, Nimitz could prepare a surprise for the Japanese. Thanks to the liberated brain power of America's nerds, the battle of Midway went from a surprise attack by the Japanese to a surprise attack by the Americans. In drawing up the battle plan, Nimitz knew that he would have no hope against the Japanese in a head-on confrontation in the open sea. But he thought that the Americans could defeat the Japanese with a surprise attack from the air. Thus, Nimitz made the farsighted and daring decision to send a light force with no battleships focused on aircraft carriers. He built the force around the only three aircraft carriers he could get his hands on, and in addition decided to use the island of Midway as an additional launching point for U.S. bombers. The basic battle plan was to attempt to relentlessly torpedo and bomb Japanese carriers when they were most vulnerable, hoping that with the element of surprise and with their persistence they could penetrate the formidable Japanese defenses. On May 26, the Enterprise and Hornet, two of America's three aircraft carriers, Dr. Pearl Harbor, ready for battle. Unfortunately, their commander, Admiral Halsley, who was Nimitz's choice to lead the Midway battle, was not. He had fallen ill and was too sick to continue. In his place, Nimitz immediately appointed rear-admiral Raymond Spruntz to command the two carriers. Spruntz was not the most senior officer available for the job, but Nimitz judged him as the most qualified. On May 28, just two days after arriving in Pearl Harbor and with very little time to plan for battle, Spruntz led his two carriers towards Midway Island. On the 27th, the third carrier, the Yorktown, we heard about the Yorktown this afternoon, arrived with rear-admiral Jack Fletcher. Now Fletcher was ready. Fletcher outranked Spruntz and would lead the Midway mission from the Yorktown. Unfortunately, while Fletcher was healthy and ready for battle, the Yorktown was not. The damage it had suffered at the Battle of the Carlos Sea was extensive. A quick evaluation of the craft when it docked on the 27th estimated that its repair would take anywhere from two weeks to three months. Nimitz, realizing that in three weeks the battle would be over and confident in the ability of his engineers to pull off miraculous feats, ordered that the Yorktown be made battle-worthy by whatever means necessary in two days. By 6.45 on the morning of May 28th, Yorktown was on the way to the dry dock. No sooner had she settled into dry dock when she nearly disappeared under a swarm of electricians, fitters, machinists, welders. No time for blueprints, no time for scale drawings, wooden templates were made on the carrier, rushed to the repair shops, the parts made on the spot and sped to the ship. Workers toiled through the night under the repairs. Hundreds of workers were still on board the next morning when she started leaving the dry dock. The following day she took on airplanes and sailed out of Pearl Harbor while repairmen were still at work. Thus, in slightly more than 48 hours that the carrier was available to the Navy behind the Navy, it had been repaired. While not in perfect shape, the Yorktown could sail at reduced speed and she could launch and recover aircraft. She sailed to join the two other carriers awaiting the Japanese forces at midway. Throughout the US preparations for war, America's personnel demonstrated a commitment to harness every mental and physical resource at their disposal to defeat the Japanese. The Japanese preparations was very much different. While the Japanese had more time to prepare than the Americans did, their preparation was undermined by a pervasive overconfidence throughout their Navy. They felt nearly invulnerable. This feeling was not simply the result of past successes, but also of a collectivistic belief that the Japanese were superior warrior race, with a divinely determined destiny to rule the world. As a result, the Japanese were often careless and lazy in their preparations for what they believed to be a cowardly, dull-witted and feeble American enemy. For example, although they spent weeks simulating various war scenarios, they treated as impossible scenarios such as an American surprise attack. Another illustration of their poor preparation was that prior to the battle, the Japanese had two additional carriers under repair in Japan. But unlike the US's frantic effort to salvage the Yorktown, they made no effort to speed up the repairs to make the ships available for the battle. They could not imagine that they might need them to defeat the Americans. On May 29th, two fleets sailed towards Midway. Japan with the far superior naval capabilities and the US with the element of surprise. The Japanese brought 86 ships into battle, including four heavy aircraft carriers and 11 battleships. The US brought 27 ships, including the three carriers and no battleships. The Japanese brought 325 high quality aircraft into battle. And while the US brought 348 aircraft, many of these were vastly inferior torpedo planes and land bombers that were nearly useless for sea battle. Quote, on paper the American carrier force racing westward looked like a sea-going David, going forth to tango with the saltwater Goliath. The Japanese were led by the legendary Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of Pearl Harbor. The US was led by Fletcher and Spruance. Quote, with the ships rode the intangibles. With Yamamoto along with his superiority in tonnage and firepower sailed the habit of victory, self-confidence, a warrior tradition, a burning desire to bring the eight corners of the world under one roof. With Fletcher sped surprise, flexibility, naval intelligence, and a brisk decision that this nonsense had gone far enough, the US Navy no less than the American people were sick and tired of being kicked around in this war. Unquote. The Americans had prepared an ingenious surprise attack on the Japanese and many were confident in their chances. But they knew success was far from assured and that there were great challenges, risks, and dangers ahead. For example, the knowledge of the location of the Japanese fleet was only approximate. Since this was in the days before satellite photography, with only primitive radar available to ships and none available to planes, it could be very difficult to find the Japanese. And while the attack was expected to be a surprise, it would only be a surprise for so long. Once the Japanese find out, which could be very likely, the Americans would face the wrath of the mighty Japanese Navy. Further, for any given pilot, the mission was treacherous. The pilots of America's primitive torpedo planes, who had to fly close to the water at very low speeds, were easy targets for Japanese fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns, as were the pilots of the American dive bombers who had to dive close to the ships to drop their bombs. The American warriors were not deceived about what lay ahead, but they were committed to doing everything they could to implement Nimitz's war plan, no matter what difficulties and risks stood in their way. The spirit of these men is illustrated in a note by Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, commander of the torpedo bombers that launched off of the Hornet, distributed to his men the night before the battle. Just a word to let you feel we are already. We have had a very short time to train, and we have worked under the most severe difficulties, but we have truly done the best humanly possible. I actually believe that under these conditions we are the best in the world. My greatest hope is that we encounter a favorable tactical situation, but if we don't, and worst comes to worst, I want each one of us to do his utmost to destroy our enemies. If there is only one plane left to make a final run in, I want that man to go in and get a hit. May God be with us all. Good luck. Happy landing. And give him hell." At 4 a.m. on June 4th, the first aircraft took off from the Japanese aircraft carrier to start bombing midway. The Japanese, regarding an attack by a U.S. carrier, is very unlikely, left few fighter planes or torpedo planes on board to defend the ship against a potential U.S. threat. By 6 a.m. U.S. scout planes from the midway had found the main body of the Japanese fleet and had spotted Japanese planes on their way to bomb the island of midway. The Americans sent planes off midway island to attack the Japanese carriers. With the location of the Japanese known, Admiral Spruance saw an opportunity to attack the carriers when they were most vulnerable. Estimating that the Japanese bombers would be back on the decks of the aircraft carriers at 9 a.m., he knew that if he could successfully hit the carriers then, at 9 a.m., he could do massive damage. Now carriers, like the carrier one today, are very resilient vessels and can sustain significant damage without being completely crippled. But as Hanson describes, when carriers are loaded on deck and below, with armed and fueled airplanes ready to take off, they are extremely vulnerable. Just imagine this is full of planes with bombs, torpedoes, full of fuel, and underneath in the deck that you walk through, that is full of planes fueled and loaded with bombs. To quote Hanson, under those rare circumstances of carrier vulnerability, a single 1,000 pound bomb that hit the targeted deck full of gas and armed planes might trigger a series of explosions that could incinerate the entire ship and send it to the bottom in minutes. 1,000 pounds of explosives ruining in a minute or two what five years of labor and 60 million pounds of steel had created. However, such a strike would require Spruance to launch his plane from further away than he had planned. Launching from that distance would make the Japanese carriers more difficult for the pilots to find, putting them at greater risk, and increasing the chances that they would run out of fuel before returning to the carriers. But Spruance went ahead, confident in his pilot's ability to hunt down the aircraft carriers from afar, and realizing that the opportunity was too great to pass up. Quote, the decision to launch immediately was one of the most difficult he would ever have to make. For the longer range imposed great difficulties on all his aircraft, and particularly assured that the slow, low flying TBD devastated torpedo bombers with a combat range of only 175 miles would not make it back to their carriers. He faced without flinching the most heart rendering necessity a good commander ever knows, to risk the lives of a few that many more may live. Quote. At 6.30 a.m. Spruance ordered all planes to take off and attack the Japanese carriers. Starting at 7, 116 planes dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and fighter bombers to cover the bombers, took off from the Enterprise and the Hornet, the two carriers under Spruance's command. At 7.10 the first torpedo planes from the island of Midway reached the Japanese aircraft carriers. They scored no hits and only one of the planes survived. No hits were scored by the U.S. B-26s and B-19 land bombers either. But these attacks accomplished a goal. They began to engage the Japanese zero pilots for the beginning of what would be many tiring hours. At 7.15 after receiving a report from the bombers that, quote, there is need for a second attack wave, unquote, on Midway, the Japanese decided to send a second wave immediately. Ignoring the risk that the American aircraft carriers might be in the area, they lowered the remaining bombers below deck to replace the torpedoes with bombs. So the decks below were full of planes where they were replacing torpedoes with bombs. Meanwhile, the U.S. planes from the Midway continued to attack the Japanese aircraft carriers relentlessly, but with no hits. At 8.30, a Japanese scout spotted an American carrier for the first time. At this point, the Japanese Admiral Nagumo, commander of the Midway strike force and the carrier fleet, had a crucial decision to make. Should he launch an attack on the U.S. carriers with what he had ready, some planes with torpedoes and bombs, but no fighter coverage? Or should he let his planes returning from Midway land re-arm them quickly and send them all out against the new naval threat, a process that would delay launching an attack by two hours? In a fatal decision, Nagumo decided to replace the bombs in all on-board planes with torpedoes, clear the decks, and allow the returning planes to land. In doing so, he was, Hanson explains following quote, the standard procedure of the Japanese Navy. Without realizing how different the fight with Americans might be from the past experience of easy victories over surprised, outnumbered, and inexperienced adversaries. Welcome to the Total Wireless Store, where total confidence awaits. I need to keep up with my teens this summer without sweating high cell phone bills. Don't worry, you got this with Total Wireless. We have plans to fit all your family's needs starting at just 25 bucks on the nation's best 4G LTE network. I won't miss a thing. Now you can focus on the important stuff, like arguing about curfew. Discover the Total Wireless Stores and get Total Confidence. The latest phones. The best network. All at great prices. Now open in L.A. Refer to the latest terms and conditions of service at TotalWireless.com. Some of Nagumo's subordinates internally questioned the decision, realizing that the last time in such a situation could be deadly. But according to Japanese protocol, they were not to question a commanding officer's decision. So they didn't. By 1918, the first torpedo planes that had taken off the Hornet, led by Waldron, who we heard from earlier, began attacking Japanese aircraft carriers. Finding the carriers was an achievement in itself. They were not where the pilots were told to expect them. And the pilots had very little fuel with which to find them. Yet Waldron, a dedicated student of Japanese military tactics, seemed to know exactly where they would be. As Lieutenant Gay, the sole survivor of Waldron's squadron, put it, quote. He told us when he left not to worry about navigation, but to follow him, as he knew where he was going. And it turned out just exactly that way. He went as straight to the Jap fleet as if he'd had a string tied to them, unquote. As the planes from Waldron's group, including his own, were being shot down by Japanese zeroes, torpedo planes from the Enterprise and the Yorktown soon joined in attacking the Japanese carriers. They scored no hits. Of the 41 torpedo planes launched on June 4th, only four returned to their carriers, and very few of the pilots survived. These slow planes had no chance. The zeroes shot them down easily, as if a target practice. But thanks in part to the efforts of these fallen pilots, the US's fortunes were about to turn. At 938, Wade McCluxkey, leader of 32 dive bombers from the Hornet, reached the area where he had been told the Japanese fleet was, and found nothing but open sea. McCluxkey was an example of why the American force looked inferior on paper. He was trained as a fighter pilot and had very few flying hours on Obama. He could take off from a carrier and land back on the flight deck, but he had never dropped a bomb from a plane. He had been appointed a group commander two and a half months earlier, and during that time had familiarized himself with Obama as well he could. Faced with no Japanese fleet running low on fuel, he had to make a quick decision. A conventional air search was impossible because of the low fuel and would have probably missed the target. So he quickly reasoned where he thought the Japanese fleet would go and headed in that direction, in what Nimitz later called, quote, one of the most important decisions of the battle and one that had decisive results, unquote. Seven minutes after his decision, McCluxkey spotted the wake left by a Japanese ship. Ten minutes later, the entire fleet came into view. McCluxkey split his force into two, each to attack a different carrier. At 10.22, after hours of failed attempts by dozens of fallen pilots, both groups attacked, scoring four hits on the aircraft carrier cargo and three on the Japanese flagship, the Akagi. Three minutes later, die bombers from the Yorktown who had made the same estimation as McCluxkey as to their location of the Japanese, scored three direct hits on the third Japanese carrier. These flyers, these flyers, too, were improvising after the original attack plan, a coordinated attack with torpedo bombers did not materialize. What followed is the scene I related earlier at the beginning of this talk, the utter obliteration of the Japanese aircraft carriers, planes and personnel. In one sense, the appearance of so many die bombers from separate aircraft carriers on the scene at almost the same moment was a matter of chance. But their success was ultimately a consequence of a series of brilliant decisions and unbelievable persistence and determination. Had it not been for the persistence of the pilots, like Waldron, the Japanese zeroes would have had a much easier time with the dive bombers. But from 7.10 in that morning until minutes before the dive bombers attacked about 20 minutes after 10, the Japanese fighter pilots and their zeroes had been fighting off wave after wave of American attacks. By 10.22 the pilots of the zeroes were tired after over three hours of almost non-stop fighting. And it was the relentless American barrage of planes that caused the zeroes to be diverted by the torpedo bombers and thus be flying too low to stop the dive bombers as they descended on their carriers from high altitude. While the destruction of the three Japanese carriers was a spectacular feat for the Americans, it was not the end of the battle, not even for that day. A fourth deadly Japanese carrier was still afloat, led by one of Japan's most aggressive admirals. Less than 30 minutes from the beginning of the dive bombers attack, he launched this plane, his planes, to attack the American carriers. The first wave of his dive bombers struck the Yorktown at 12.01, scoring three hits. The second wave of Japanese torpedo bombers struck the Yorktown at 14.43 scoring two torpedo hits. Within minutes the call to abandon ship was sounded. Yorktown was lost, having played a crucial part in the battle. Its pilots had sunk the third Japanese carrier. Now the score at this point was three destroyed aircraft carriers to one in favor of the US. But the Japanese still had one lethal carrier that had already struck a blow to the Yorktown and was preparing for more. A way of the danger posed by this carrier, Hiroyo, which is the name of the carrier, sprints on the enterprise waited patiently for verification of its exact location. With the elevator surprise gone, he did not rush and recklessly send his limited number of surviving planes out to search for the carrier. But when it was located by a scout plane at 14.45, sprints ordered the launch of all available dive bombers against it. Two hours later, the bombers sighted Hiroyo. The first group of bombers missed, but a second group, in spite of orders to attack a nearby destroyer, changed course and attacked. One more instance of quick thinking and initiative on the part of American fliers. Four bombs hit the Japanese carrier with planes caught on deck waiting for a third strike to take off against American carriers. The Japanese carrier was destroyed. With the destruction of the fourth Japanese carrier, sprints made one final decision at the end of the day that guaranteed the American victory. He turned away from the Japanese. While all four Japanese carriers were out of action, the Japanese still had a formidable navy in the sea of battle. The last chance to snatch victory out of defeat was to engage the Americans in a night battle, ship versus ship, in which carriers laden with aircraft were useless. By avoiding such a clash, sprints sealed the fate of the battle. At every point in this battle, sprints was extraordinary in command and decision making. Quote, as soon as he knew whether his target was, he hit with every available plane. He led his fleet with a sure hand, a delicate sense of timing. His turning east on the night of the June 4th was exactly the right thing to do to avoid a Japanese night attack. By the same token, going west on June 5th was the correct decision for it frightened the Japanese badly. Unquote, as naval historian Samuel Elliott Morrison writes, quote, Spruice's performance was superb, calm, collected, decisive, yet receptive to advice, keeping his mind the picture of widely disparate forces, yet boldly seizing every opening, Raymond A. Spruance emerged from this battle one of the greatest admirals in American naval history, unquote. By the morning of June 5th, the battle for all intents and purposes was over. The Japanese fleet retreated pursued by the Americans until the afternoon of the 6th. Thus the battle of Midway was won, quote, at Midway the United States laid down the shield and picked up the sword. And through all the engagements to follow, never again yielded the strategic offensive, unquote. While the Americans won a numerical battle, they won an even greater spiritual battle. In one day they had destroyed the confidence of the Japanese military and renewed their own self-confidence. And in one more realm they scored a significant victory. By making the best of the setbacks they encountered while the Japanese made their own setbacks far worse. When the Yorktown was attacked and hit, Admiral Fletcher and his staff evacuated before their lives were endangered by the ship sinking. While the captain of the Yorktown initially tried to salvage her, he evacuated when the futility of the efforts became evident. Thus these men lived to fight another day, bringing this skill, knowledge and experience to bear in many future battles in the Pacific. Contrast this with the many of the Japanese commanders, who accepted the doctrine that it was noble to go down with one ship and shameful to be alive after having made a mistake. When the first carrier, the cargo, was hit, fires and explosions were spreading, the captain was encouraged to leave the bridge which had become a dangerous place and one thing from a different location. He refused and died in the bridge minutes later. When the flagship doggy was hit, it took long arguments to convince the fleet commander Nagumo to evacuate and lead from elsewhere. He wanted to go down with the carrier. This is what the captain of the third carrier did. Thus the devastation inflicted by the US dive bombers was compounded by the self-inflicted devastation of Japanese leadership. And in the most significant loss to the Japanese war effort that day, when the fourth carrier began to sink, Admiral Yamaguchi announced his plan to go down with the ship. He gave a speech to this effect, spent 30 minutes on various ceremonies departing from his staff. The Admiral, quote, kept staff in 800 crewmen standing around for over half an hour on a flaming, badly listed carrier while he indulged his taste for melodrama. Certainly he did the enemy a big favor. The loss to Japan of this aggressive, promising Admiral was a large plus sign in the United States column, unquote. Now in my brief, this was brief, account of the battle, I've shared with you a sketch of the actions that made possible the triumph of US forces over the force technically superior Japanese. And in the sketch I've tried to emphasize the virtues behind these actions. I believe that the basic cause of the US victory was that while the Japanese were, at this point in time, technically superior, the Americans were philosophically superior. I would like to take a minute to reflect on the virtues of the Americans in this battle and contrast them with the vices of the Japanese. The number one thing that stands out to me about the Americans is the time and time again. The focus was on nothing but what was required for success. In more philosophical terms, the primary orientation was always towards reality. From Nimitz's willingness to stake a battle on the findings of the shoveled nerds, to Spruance's gutsy decision to send his planes from afar to hit Japanese aircraft carriers, to the pilots improvising on the spot to locate the Japanese fleet or to attack the fourth Japanese carrier in spite of orders to the contrary, nothing mattered to the Americans more than victory. Not the feelings of the chain of command. Not the possible criticism that they might endure if they failed. Not convention. Not even the risk of death. This trait was admirably displayed in an event I did not mention earlier, which was the decision by Admiral Fletcher after the fall of the Yorktown to pass the command of the entire fleet to Spruance. Fletcher, quote, knew well that the Admiral who led his ships to the first major American sea victory in World War II would be a popular hero assured of his place in history. Yet when he realized that he could no longer command his air striking units at top efficiency, he turned the reins over to Spruance. This was an act of integrity and patriotism in action. The reputation of Nimit and Spruance have overshadowed Fletcher, but he was the link between the two. A man of talent who had the brains and character to give a free hand to a man of genius, unquote. Fletcher placed winning the battle and ultimately the war as his top priority. Oh, what a great audience. Let's dim the lights for this next one. Nope, too much. There it is. Gotta get things just right. Like progressives, name your price tool. Tell us what you want to pay and we'll help you find coverage options that fit your budget. And now the mood is right. Wait, the lights are back on again. Trudy, can you? And now it's completely dark. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and Affiliates pricing coverage match limited by state law. Unlike Nimit's, Spruance and Fletcher, the Japanese soldier was not committed first and foremost to recognizing reality, but to obeying orders. He was not committed to what made practical military sense, but that which obeyed his collective dogma. If success and war required that he save his own life when his carrier was struck, but Japanese honor required that he die nobly, he often chose honor. Like the Japanese admiral who endangered hundreds of his men and the war efforts of his country while engaging in a mystical suicide rituals. A second aspect of the Americans' virtues was their dedication and courage. Their unlimited willingness to pursue their objectives in action, often in the face of incredible risks. Perhaps the most outstanding example of this was the pilot who knew that any one of them was very likely to die and that individually they would probably not score a hit, but still attacked fearlessly and relentlessly, knowing that such an attack was their side's only chance for success. I cannot help recalling that coming into the battle the Japanese had assumed that the US pilots would be lazy, cowardly, and lacking in fighting spirit. They would never assume that again. As I conclude, I would like to stress the connection between our soldiers' bravery and their rationality, their commitment to knowing reality. It is often stressed that these men risk their lives and are willing to die if necessary to protect their country. Now this is true and we should all be profoundly grateful for that, but to treat this as an essential is to make the potential loss of life central to their virtue and that can only be valid according to the code of self-sacrifice, not egoism. What is distinctive and most praiseworthy about American soldiers generally is not that they are willing to die to protect their country, but that they are willing to live to protect their country, which means that they are willing to think to protect their country and act accordingly. A similar point was made by Ayn Rand when asked if she would die for objectivism. She responded that if a man's values are threatened, he quote, has to be willing to fight and die if necessary for his right to live like a rational being. You asked me, would I be willing to die for objectivism? I would. But what is more important, I am willing to live for it, which is much more difficult, unquote. And if you think of what it takes to be a spruant or a Waldron versus a suicidal Japanese commander or a kamikaze pilot, you see that this applies just as much to our military men and women. What makes our soldiers so amazing is that they are willing to think rationally, purposefully to do their jobs. And then they have the courage to act, no matter how dangerous, scary and daunting the task. So on this day, after July 4th, I'd like to raise a toast to these brave men, these thinking men. I'm going to wait for this. So I'd like to raise a toast to these brave men these thinking men. From the war of independence to the war we are fighting today and often in the face of bad leadership, the fighting men of this country have faced every challenge with courage, conviction and intelligence. They have risked and too often given their lives for this country for their values, for their and our freedom. So we raise a glass to them and in the words of Lieutenant Commander John C. Waldron, we wish them good luck, happy landing and give them hell. Cheers. Thank you. What a story, huh? Now I don't know if I could answer any questions. I'm certainly not an expert as I said, but if there are questions I'd be happy to take a shot at that maybe a commander would help me out answering some of them. So just raise your hand and stand up and yell them out. Yeah, Dan. I mean one of the really good things about the miracle at Midway, the book, is that, so the question is for the tape, how did the Japanese react to the loss, even today, at the time and even today, is that it gives you extensive quotations both from the Japanese commander's diaries at the time and then from books they wrote after the war about the battle so we know much of what they thought. So the first response, I think the Japanese commander realized what had happened. Now they did not know that the naval codes had been broken. So they somewhat were mystified by the fact that the Americans were there. They thought that at some point the carriers had broken communication silence and had spoken. They thought that had caused, that was the reason why the Americans knew they were there. So they speculate a lot about how did the Americans know was they spying in Japan? I mean how did they figure this out? But they recognized at the time, the people, the commanding officers recognized at the time what had happened. Many of them wanted to commit suicide and had to be ordered not to as a consequence. The Japanese media right after the Battle of Midway declared it a victory. And actually according to the book, the injured, Farm Midway were taken and isolated in this hospital and they were sealed off so that they couldn't tell stories and couldn't expose the truth. But they were in denial, the press were in denial. I don't think Yamamoto or Nugamo or those guys, they knew. They knew what had happened and they knew the consequences. Even diary entries of some of the commanders saying, you know, this is it, this is devastating. We don't know if we can ever recover from this. The war for the Pacific has changed. They've got the strategic advantage at this point. So the small ones among the Japanese commanders knew what was going on. When they wrote about the battle and they actually went and they met Nimitz and met Spuence, they wrote about it quite accurately, I think. I mean, I haven't read their books, but from what I saw, they understood the battle. Yeah. So the question is when would he be right to somebody to disobey an order in terms of China command? I think in, you know, that's a big question. Let me just state, in the context of this particular decision, they knew that the main target was the aircraft carrier. I mean, that was clear and obvious. And so when they were diverted to the destroyer because other planes were going for the carrier, when they saw that the first planes had missed, they didn't hesitate to turn around and go for the carrier because they knew that that was a primary target. They knew that if the commander could give them a new order, if there was time, that that would be the new order. That was completely legitimate and certainly none of them, given that they hit the aircraft carrier, they were probably given medals, not reprimanded for that. When is it appropriate? I think when you, you know, within the context of everything you know and the inability to communicate with the chain of command, you have to, you sometimes make those kind of decisions and you have to make sometimes decisions that mean disobeying orders. But if there is an opportunity to get an order, a new order, then obviously you try to communicate. But often there isn't and you just have to make a decision on the spot and you have to take into account your context. But this is what wakes it tricky. You also know that your commanding officer has a wider context and therefore have to take into account your own ignorance and the fact that he knows more than you. And there was a reason why he gave you that particular command. So it's very tricky. And I'm sure a lot of mistakes were made by, you know, soldiers who made those kind of decisions and later regretted it. Yeah, Harry. Two questions. Isn't Midway heavily reported? Isn't that... Yeah, Frank Kappa. Frank Kappa has a series of documentaries, I think it's called Why We Fought. And he, because they knew that Midway was the target, they actually sent, he went out with this crew on some of the islands near Midway and actually filmed it. I think, I don't know if there were cameras on the American aircraft carriers, but there were definitely cameras on some of the islands. And therefore there's a lot of footage around that. I recall seeing many, many times photos from dive bombing planes showing carriers. Yeah. I don't know if there's anybody else. I mean, it's definitely part of that documentary, but I don't know where they had cameras. Yeah. But there is a lot of footage on the battle. Because they knew it in advance and they sent him there with his film crews. So they might have even put them in the planes. Part two. Yeah. I seem to recall somewhere that to throw the Japanese off the idea that we had their boat, we pulled some scot like sending a lone plane to seemingly discover the fleet by accident. Do you know anything about that? No. I mean, we sent planes because, again, well, they knew that the Japanese fleet was approaching Midway. They didn't know where. So there were lots of scout planes. I mean, I didn't get it on all the details. There were scout planes being sent by the Midway. There were scout planes being sent by the Hornet and Enterprise in Yorktown, all searching for the exact location. Of course, the fleet, the Japanese fleet is moving. So it's not in one place at any given point in time. So they continue to have to figure out where it is. But no, I don't know of that as a trick to fool the Japanese. Yes. I think there would have been at least two movies made about the Battle of Midway. There was a 1946 movie. And I think a 1949 movie and a 1976 movie. With Robin Mitchum, I think. Yeah. So there have been two movies made of the battle. I think a wood sink. Yeah, I'll try to remember. It's hard to remember. Other questions? Yeah. You spoke about... Yeah, so the question is, I discussed the code breaking before the battle and how they discovered the battle plans. But were they breaking the codes, were they translating the codes during the battle, while the battle was going on? And the answer is no. I mean, there was... The communication between ships and a fleet is done a lot by, you know, through flags like these, through voice commands, signaling, you know, they... And plus, relaying. Let's say there were, you know, commands going back and forth. How would you... This was in Hawaii. The code breaking was going on. And they would have to relay it back. I don't think there was any of that. Is that right? I mean, Talbot, I'm asking you. Yeah. Do you know? Yeah. Yeah, so it's... And I also think... I actually think I read that the code they broke on May 25th, which was the battle plan for Midway, the Japanese battle plan for Midway, right after that, the Japanese did... made some change to the code. And they, in a sense, went silent for a while, where they couldn't, you know, they had to kind of figure out the new variation in the code. So they actually... You know, they probably couldn't have broken the code at the time of the battle in Midway because they were still working on figuring out the new code that the Japanese were using, the new variants in the code. Okay, great. Thank you. Enjoy. For additional information about other available programs, please contact Second Renaissance at 1-800-729-6149 at www.ionrandbookstore.com. All material in this program is protected by copyright and may not be reproduced in any form or manner nor played before an audience without the express written permission of the producer Second Renaissance Incorporated. 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