 Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this discussion on elite capture and the corruption of security sectors My name is Lisa Grande and I'm the head of the United States Institute of Peace USIP is part of the US's national security infrastructure It has specific capabilities that help parties to resolve their grievances before they lead to armed conflict The Institute also engages with belligerence and security forces to reduce violence and protect civilians when conflicts do erupt and USIP studies and shares options for terminating more and Establishing stable security and governance arrangements Institute is strictly non-partisan We support congressional, foreign and national security priorities and we work across the US agencies and departments to do this One of the Institute's most important roles is to convene senior study groups of leaders and experts and practitioners To examine critical national security issues right now the USIP is facilitating 15 bipartisan study groups these include groups that are looking at strategic stability in South Asia between the nuclear powers and groups focused on countering violent extremism in Afghanistan Pakistan and the Sahel It's our great pleasure to be here today to discuss the report of one of USIP's most important study groups This study group has been looking at the very vexing problem of why security cooperation and assistance Does not have the kind of impact that we think and expect that it should Like many other countries the US invest significantly in security cooperation and assistance Although there are many cases where this assistance has worked Well, what we're concerned about are the many more cases where it hasn't USIP study group which has been supported by USAID has been looking at the reasons why Study group was led by four distinguished co-chairs US ambassadors and Patterson and Carl Eikenberry Ambassador Don LaBurie and Ambassador Bill Taylor We're joined this afternoon by two of the co-chairs Ambassador Patterson Ambassador Eikenberry the group met for two years it engaged with tens of security political and humanitarian experts and The defense industry civil society leaders and academics were deeply involved in the discussions The group had four case studies one focused on Afghanistan one on Uganda one on Ukraine and one on Mexico And that in-depth case study Helped to inform the conclusions that we're presenting to you today and copies of the report were pleased to say are here The main finding of the study group Is that many of the security sectors which we are trying to support are captured and corrupted By elites who are using these sectors for their own enrichment and political purposes It follows From this that a key reason security cooperation and assistance are less effective than we want them to be is Because not enough is being done To confront this corruption The report itself is organized around four conceptual blocks and the four case studies. I mentioned the first section It looks at the reasons why elites want to try and capture the security forces the second section describes the mechanics of how elite capture and Corruption actually work and manifest themselves on the ground The third section analyzes the short medium and long-term consequences of elite capture and the fourth Arguably the most important part of the report Includes 24 comprehensive recommendations on how to help detect confront Roll back the malign influence of elites and how to reduce the likelihood of Future capture and corruption if you allow me to present our two co-chairs who are with us today Ambassador Patterson has been the US ambassador in El Salvador Colombia Pakistan in Egypt and Anne was the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and North African Affairs She is the two-time recipient of the State Department's Distinguished Service Award has served on two congressional commissions on Syria and The US National Defense Strategy and she was named one of the 100 top global thinkers in 2011 General like and Barry is a retired lieutenant general in the US Army and former ambassador To Afghanistan he has commanded and served with mechanized light airborne and Ranger Infantry units in Hawaii, Korea, Italy and served as the commander of the American League Coalition in Afghanistan He is the recipient of 11 military awards for top awards from the Departments of State and Defense and has been decorated by Canada and France General I can bury is fluent in Mandarin and has a degree from Nanjing University in history He's considered an expert on China But we'd like to do today's to benefit from the extensive personal and professional knowledge That our two co-chairs have to reflect on the broad themes of the report We recognize that the specifics of the four case studies are in the report itself and if we can start With you the report that you presided over builds on years of research and investigation All of us who have worked in the field and worked in the security sectors have known for a very long time About elite capture and corruption What the report refers to as the effectiveness gap between the amount we invest in the impact it actually has Why hasn't more since we've all known about the problem been done to address it. Thank you very much Lisa Yes, we've known about this for a long time So let me jump in on what I think are the reasons for this one and many of these countries where we provide assistance We have conflicting objectives to we do what we understand We give equipment we give training. We often don't understand the complex social and ethnic identities that Underline some of these institutions, but the most important factor I think in the last 20 years is security assistance and reform was subordinated to the war on terror and Every place I serve that was our overwhelming Strategic objectives and of course countries understood this so they began to Basically play us in this respect. We had this specialized units. They would change their own legislation Often to to mask repressive techniques under the guise of counter-terrorism and The environment now has changed. We're involved in great power competition We're involved with competition with China, which is an economic powerhouse So our security structure has to be more efficient We have to get more for our money and our allies particularly in the global south Need to deploy more quickly and be able to defend themselves More effectively so that requires a really hard look at security assistance, which I think this report has Contributed to quite substantially When you were serving in Afghanistan, I know that you saw many of the Problems that are described in the report Why wasn't anything done to fix these? Yeah, and you know when I was in Afghanistan as the ambassador and was serving as the ambassador in pakistan So believe me some years ago over secure communications. We had this kind of a dialogue going on but to the point that We look at security assistance, but security assistance is taking place within a broader context of Diplomacy and development. How does this fit in? and During the war on terror What we had is in many cases a very difficult time of the u.s Departments and agencies aligning their efforts So the cia Was argument was we wouldn't even be in this country if it wasn't for terrorism. That's what we're here for That's the number one two and three priority The military their argument was well, we're here trying to build security forces until The shooting stops nothing much more can be done And then there's the embassy side or the ambassador side trying to pull together the development and the diplomacy And they're arguing well, we can Successfully kill the terrorist. We can build security forces But none of this is going to be lasting unless we have democratic institutions or accountable institutions that are politically sustainable and the inability of In washington dc to try to then prioritize and resolve these contradictions was significant If you had a magic wand general and you could go back and change something in fact ganesan to do To reduce security sector assistance. What would be the thing you would want to do? I think I think there are leads That look there's a lot that has to be done here. And I think the report's been good Is been effective in identifying Different things that must be done One I would particularly focus on is how do we develop the expertise That's going to be required to do long term security assistance and the complexities That when you go to a foreign country if you don't speak the language if you don't understand the culture If you don't have a insights into the real politics Then the security assistance effort is not going to succeed So in the past when the united states has gone into conflict We'll have a period of time where there's great interest and let's create a group of experts here but Then when the conflict is over Those those experts will find that the opportunity costs that they paid For developing the language expertise for the skills the repetitive assignments in that country Then they're lost at that point. So what you have to do Is develop expertise But not just for that particular conflict after the fact You have to be anticipating and then to try to come up with Personnel systems said that those people then their their careers are properly managed over the course of five 10 20 years I'm talking about the military here, but I think and the same probably applies to state and development Yeah, it's very dramatic in state and the development agencies and and when you talk to people that served at high levels in afghanistan They point to this is the most critical issue in short tours eight months No language capability and people who aren't there long enough to be invested and who have the incentive to learn what's going on And if you don't know what's going on on the ground believe me you make mistakes I would argue that's why we do a lot better in latin america We can draw on huge numbers of legacy speakers people are there for years And they go around the area and they have a good basis for comparison um And the report that you and the general Presided over came up with 24 recommendations. There's a lot in there Of them, which are the ones that you think are the most urgent the things that need to be done first So the ones I think are the easiest the most practical because some of them involve longer term analysis One transparency We have legislation which requires transparency and foreign assistance, but mostly it's it's honored only in the breach Or it's incomprehensible So we need to be transparent about what we're actually providing to these countries that would help enormously I think because citizens in those countries could then see it and make judgments about it And secondly the recipient countries need to be transparent and just in two Two areas that that I see all the time for our own dod One is in contracts and the value of contracts dod publishes that once once a day practically And the two is in promotions of high level personnel in both the police and the military So again the citizens could see what was being who was being promoted and who was in charge And then as a slightly longer term objective Which I I think is a little more difficult, but certainly not impossible is to train and empower Citizens of the recipient country think tanks of which we have many represented here think tanks journalists and and Legislators who are invariably weak in these countries teach them about defense budgeting So they can ask intelligent questions and call their own systems not to account But at least do some serious analysis We would welcome questions and observations from colleagues who are joining us today And since I know Philippe I'm going to ask him to jump in first So thanks for thanks for joining us The the question I would have would draw us back to Some of the incentives that the report seems to be listing For elite capture and one of the incentive is to co-proof to use the security sector To protect yourself against Coupre so I would ask ambassador Patterson or eikenberg if from their experience. They've seen Examples in the countries where they operate it where the security sectors are being used in order to protect regimes from from coup d'etat or I'd be interested in in in your reflections on that specific incentive for elite capture that the report seems to identify Well, if I can start It's it's very context specific when you talk about then elites in a country Trying to coo proof and they can go about that in many different ways You know a starting point is if you're an autograph You look at your security forces very differently than you will in a consolidated democracy though those and those security forces They've got guns and that can end your rule which you don't want to give up So, yeah, they they look at those forces in a quite different way and then how do they ensure the coup proofing? One is to create a dysfunctional security apparatus. So I'll create a national guard force That has guns and reports directly to me and a police force That's separate reporting directly to me and I'll create a very strong intelligence system That's reporting directly to me My main military force. That's one and we see that in many countries Another is just to use your security forces then who's got the guns and make sure that they're very happy through Through then the patronage that you're giving them We have certain countries that have taken their security forces and they're heavily involved in the economy And they're heavily involved in the economy because that's the patronage and they stay loyal to the leader so many different forms of this and to get to the point then what do you do about it it requires I think a Education program and a focus With your people that are conducting security assistance reform and security assistance programs Where they're not just looking at the tactical capability of the particular unit that they're working with But they're opening up the aperture wide and there's thinking then beyond tactical capability development What are the underlying institutions then that exist in that country that are going to be critical Then for ensuring that these military forces are acting responsibly in an accountable manner Other questions and reflections sir Thanks for your topic for your research. My name is Andrey bozarov. I am from ukraine I'm international journalist and phd researcher the question of elit. I may also Has a page phd on social philosophy and philosophy of history and the problems of elits It's a very very actual problem for ukraine, you know because after the collapse of soviet union We have some elit which was ex-soviet but became pro pro pro democratic anti-soviet the war the first war eight years ago in the second war Last year accelerated the process of construction of new elites in ukraine so One of the biggest challenges for ukrainian society that still I don't have as a ukrainian citizen Answer what will be next ukrainian elit. So we we had the post soviet Now we see that oligarchs and the others and they some of them they fled of ukraine So who can be in accordance with your with your experience afghanistan because you saw the pre-war During the war and post war societies. So what can be the base for the construction Of elit in ukraine in these five years ten years Thank you perhaps two points about two points about The war right now between russia and ukraine and to get on to this topic of security assistance The first is perhaps not directly related to security assistance But is an important insight into the performance of the ukrainian armed forces right now So with the security assistance programs that nato united states european countries had going back to 2014 One of the big successes that took place that was not known at the time Until the war began is an effort to change the professional military culture in the ukrainian armed forces which had the soviet legacy as i understood it a very top-down command approach and then a development of a new command approach which was very bottoms up So delegating authorities to junior leaders letting them take the initiative And that led to a dramatic improvement in the ukrainian armed forces as i understand it And perhaps also then importantly then made that an armed forces Which was much more in armed forces of the people than the elite the second question though the second insight i'd offer here is that Ukrainian right now is at war You know, heroic actions Deprivation by the people But as we're talking about security assistance And this question of elite capture very importantly As ukraine moves forward and importantly for the donor the donor countries Is that these questions? We're talking about with the elite capture Are moved front and center because you could win the war if there's a if that work can be won But then there's the question of the day after and With Ukraine will it be a consolidated democracy at that point? So what's going on right now you're under duress But these questions though about accountability and transparency they will greatly matter now I'm Greta Fener with the Bosnian Institute on governance. So i'm in the anti-corruption field And i'd be curious so this is about elite capture in the security sectors Did you see significant amounts of intersections with elite capture of other sectors because we would today say States are captured full stop and they you know, we wouldn't sort of look at it It's very very relevant what you did. I didn't want to but did you see intersections? Or did you just see this as a system that captures the security sector in every other sector? Was there anything specific that you would identify there? So I saw a lot of collusion in this Elite capture between civilian sectors and and security sectors And it's because some of this is the fault of the united states and other donors because they go to the same people And empower them on grounds of familiarity or effectiveness. So so put that aside But yes, there's a lot of because they learn they learn because they're not stupid They learn how to cooperate with each other and maximize their influence I don't actually think corruption is is the primary driver of elite capture I think it's super important, but the more important one is holding on the political power And and it's great to have money and funnel resources to your friends But you funnel resources to your friends who can help you retain power Because let's be honest and many of these countries losing power has lethal implications too So there's an enormous incentive to strengthen your position. So yes, I've seen that in a number of countries Can I respond on Ukraine? One thing I saw in Latin America and both in El Salvador and Colombia The role of the international community. I know this sounds trite is going to be hugely important I can't tell you how important a very very effective union leadership was in El Salvador That was seen as an honest broker that had a large enough staff to intervene in disputes among parties And by god, I hope the un's working on that now If I could also on this question of different sectors than within a country and how does that work with elite capture I think that you have to have a very hope my own experience a holistic view as you look at security sector reform So for instance, you Can find in certain cases Where the elite then Are turning to the judicial sector and they find a way to hollow that out And so even as you're focusing hard on the security forces the back doors getting open here Involvement in the economy a back door is open there and it's uh, it's something that without that Whole approach you're not going to solve these problems It goes on when I speak. Hi, I'm Andrew Solinger with foreign policy magazine excellent report I look forward to reviewing and I was just looking at your recommendations and thinking, you know, we don't operate in a vacuum unfortunately and there are other players who foster and Accelerate elite capture in countries where we may not be able to have the time to act with care and transparency And I'm thinking of some african nations the drc, etc. And I'm just kind of curious how you view that Competitive element when you have, you know, Wagner groups and the like Trolling the world intervening and really the are probably the the worst players in this space But we don't we we how how much time can we take to Take that care to follow these recommendations in some of these Regents, you know Sudan included So so Ron Newman says in the afghanistan portion that this was a huge dilemma because you've got to move You've got to first you don't have the personnel who knows the ground But you you're under pressure to move enormously quick to get it done and that's also been my experience When you have a conflict you got to get in there and and no one wants to hear any questions Yes, you have to get in there. You have to be competitive But you have to be mindful that at the same time you it you can look at these other issues In parallel with moving quickly and that's what our bureaucracy is very ill-suited to do right now But we have many african experts Who can do this even while you're moving ahead with security assistance with counterterrorism With all sorts of lethal assistance that that needs to be delivered In preparing for today's session. We were having a a discussion about one of the recommendations Which relates to staying there for a long time playing the long game and recognizing that US adversaries are also playing that game and if we go for short-term solutions we risk In the end losing out on our key aims because we are done and out and focus somewhere else When we were talking about how to we actually thought someone's going to ask us this question So we were talking about how to respond to this We were looking at what are the the risks of a short-term Intervention versus what the risks are for trying to mobilize the political support and resources that are necessary for playing that long game Since Anne's already answered part of the question general. Did you want to come in and share some of that? So you know getting back to what Anne had Talked about with this so-called war on terror over a 15-year period During that period of time We were not focused on china. We were not focused on russia. So now we talk about the return of great power competition Will this have an impact then on how the united states look at security assistance? I think it will That Now Is we look at different parts of the world? It's going to be through the prism of great power competition So that means that certain countries in the world based upon where they are geographically Is it important for a lines of communication of sea lines of communication? What kind of resources do they have? What kind of access now that's a very uh, that's Not a strong argument if we're saying that what we should be doing everywhere in the world is advancing democratic values But I think that it's quite clear that based upon our experience of the first 15 years of this century That there's a limit to what we can do and so People say well security assistance has worked look at korea as an example long ago but that was within the context of the cold war and what that gave then for the united states at that point in time was staying power and that The drc remains such a tragic country But there still is no compelling real politic argument about why should the united states Have a big security assistance effort in the drc. Are there other parts of the world right now? Which are crying out for political stability? Which over the next five to ten years as we talk about global competition will lead the united states and partners to say That's a very important country and that We need to move forward with smart security assistance programs for reasons of competition Or we just can't allow that to fail But we're going to look at the world in uh differently in different locations Some will draw our interest and others will not Other observations and comments Actually just just on that last point when you know some countries would draw your attention and you will go in and provide security assistance And hopefully you know also counter a leak after in other countries I'm not saying the united states only but for example united states has such vests that geopolitical interests itself That there is a risk that we accommodate for a leak capture because we cannot risk that that country Destabilizes and I think that's also in my view something that we've seen happen over and over again Possibly I'm not an expert in this field but ultimately Certainly some countries just cannot fail and we accept a lot from them in terms of a leak capture as long as they are aligned with us And that also undermines fundamentally and I think that's what we've seen in eastern europe as well On their minds ultimately the global Geopolitical security framework I would argue and I don't know how I would do it better of course, but I think that's a point We also can't neglect So so I think I think that's right The and again, it was quite dramatic during the war on terra that you get a full pass If you're if you're a friendly on the war on terra, but but it doesn't have to be that way I mean we certainly have the Knowledge and the expertise and that's the purpose of this report is to sort of open the discussion on this That you can still have countries that are too big to fail or on the brink or For all sorts of reasons that we have to support them And still work with elements in that society because that's also where we tend to sort of give it a pass To do a better job of monitoring their own systems It's not impossible. It's just hard and our system is not directed that way. That's what we're trying to promote here ma'am Yes, feel of increment from the european parliament And i'm working in eastern europe in particular, but also working on anti-corruption and I have to admit I have not read your study yet, but I will do very soon uh, I was always puzzled because many of our countries are tax haven For for for everything money laundering we we're having all these enablers who help those elite who are Keeping their their country's hostages and so on I Think that could not be maybe it isn't the part of your of your study but I mean what kind of recommendations would you give in particular to those countries where we have many of them in the european union To go much harder Against those who actually yeah enable the structures of Of yeah elite capture in in in some of the least development countries So the u.s. Government's done a lot of recent years to crack down on enablers And here's what I'd say and that this is the most honest reply. I can give you it is very ad hoc It's whack-a-mole. It doesn't get at the underlying issues of institutionality. It doesn't go after the The corruption within the society It just gets at individuals and believe me if you take one off the field another one is behind him So that's why I think we need to focus on institutionalization better laws better banking laws more control of the central bank etc But but at least in the individuals. I think you would find that the u.s. Government mostly through visa restrictions Has has done a more comprehensive job, but it's not the answer in my view One of the most interesting parts of the report is and it's based on the case studies is where we look deeply at how Corrupt practices on the ground actually manifest themselves And I know that as co-chairs you watch that section particularly of the myriad ways That elites manipulate systems for their own benefit Which do you think tactically are the most difficult for us and our allies to address? Well, I I think Lee's uh one would be that the more that What has got the united states interest in a particular country um Where there might be a threat that's emanating from that country possibly for transnational terrorism that Then you've got a principal agent problem or you've got the problem of moral hazard That the leadership the president of the united states then as he's looking at the relationship with that particular country Uh, he's continually thinking about the threat that that country could pose So these trade-offs that we've been talking about then that well, let's play the long game. Let's build institutions There's a tension that goes with that and uh, I've certainly experienced that tension as the ambassador to afghanistan where I'd be making arguments then for questions of transparency and accountability but Given the nature of the threat that was there been laden had not been found yet That that's going to be subordinated. So that's important and I think what the report is does effectively and arguing is taking that problem up front And then saying how can you frame this in different ways that you do see the importance of the transparency? But still you're trying to manage some very difficult problems and trade-offs The second would be where I think it gets to be Difficult to root this out is when the security forces get heavily involved in the economy So we've seen that in cases like, uh, egypt other countries, uh, that we could uh name And when that occurs then it uh, is your as you're trying to then shine a light on the security forces and try to get Accountability you're finding that they're everywhere and they've got the ability to undermine your efforts And what did you think were some of the most difficult? I think the most difficult we have and this is is being aware of the ethnic and tribal Dynamics of this in many countries because it's something so alien to the west And the next thing I think is is basically what carl is saying is is the military structure Because not only are these institutions often corrupt and integrated into the economy They become unstable themselves because because Cronies are favored with promotions and with money and with post retirement jobs And that makes and this makes them means young leaders promising leaders can't rise to the top It means that security forces won't innovate and they're stuck in the past It has lots of pernicious effects on the institution itself But one of the worst is the institution becomes unstable because lower ranking people want to get their top at the Want to get their crack at the at the rewards So it's always in a state of distrust and flux and that you know the the kind of programs that The our government in washington then that they'll legislate with best of intentions and they will then Have these different kinds of development programs or military programs that Become legislation and they go and they stream into a u.s. Embassy abroad So the host country then As they look at where the money is coming from washington dc They get to be very very adept in presenting their case about why that money stream is something that Should be coming their way. I'll give you an example so in nigeria when I visited there several years ago and I talked to our country team at that time the the different embassy offices And it was boko haram boko haram boko haram and there was A question on my part. Yes. That's that's important for nigeria, but they've got a lot of problems right now with security And so afterwards and I talked to several of the leaders separately after the meeting and said, you know It was interesting. We didn't talk about all these other problems Say yes, but where we can get money from washington dc is if we talk about boko haram That's countering violent extremism Best of intentions with that with that embassy team best of intentions, of course get more resources and see how they can be used But that also to get at these These problems that exist Then that washington they've got money for countering violent extremism for terrorism programs But that might not be what is absolutely needed to holistically affect the problems that are affecting that country We're coming toward the end of the session. May we ask if there are other questions from the The colleagues A final question general ambassador There's an argument that the problems we're facing in security cooperation and assistance are So in bed so intractable that we should scrap the whole effort and start again How would you respond to that? well The united states now is facing a very different world than we faced 25 years ago. We uh, there was an The end of the cold war proved I think has kind of proven the greater course of history and anomaly So we had this period of time in the 1990s maybe for the first decade of this century A period where it's overstated that the united states was a The the only superpower unipolar, but certainly militarily we were at that period of time Now we have got a competition From china competition from russia We see that Now different regions of the world Are starting to move on their own with Major powers within particular regions And all the while the united states now our ability to try to maintain Military presence everywhere in the world. We cannot so if we want to say well security assistance, then We'll should just go away. We'd have to reinvent it because our ability then to try to Provide stability to certain parts of the world to compete effectively Is going to be very dependent upon tools of security assistance and I'd say that what this report is talking about then leaves, you know ways to look at security assistance It's something that we have to take seriously Because if we walk away from this and think that if we lock our doors Shut that we don't have to worry about what's going on in the front yard at night or the backyard We're going to be we're going to be shaken by that ambassador First let me say that there are countries where security assistance has been very effective and we need to realize Understand why that was but secondly, I totally agree the united states is a global power And we're in a very important shift right now in our in our presence in the world and we're going to be unable again to project power in the way that we used to project power so countries have to do it for themselves And that's why I think this report is actually very well timed because it's a way of thinking about security assistance differently than we thought about in the past And it can be transformed if people will pay attention to it There was no need to really pay attention to this for a long time to tell you the truth It was sort of on autopilot and the administration and the congress and everyone went through their Frankly wrote performance year after year, but that's changed and I think the report and and frankly the general discussion Of america's strategic interest have made that very timely general ambassador, thank you before we conclude we would like to recognize the role that philippe the rube martin and call it turn cup fair mop played They're the team leader and senior expert and usip's unit that works on security governance The report would not have been possible without their dedication and leadership gentlemen. Thank you Thank you all for being with us. We have copies of the report here and it's also available at usip dot org Good afternoon