 Good afternoon everyone. My name is Heather Conley. I'm the senior fellow and director of the Europe program here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and we are delighted we had such a wonderful turnout for our discussion this afternoon. The true purpose of this event is to do a public unveiling of our reports that we released in January, a new security architecture for the Arctic and American perspective. But for this discussion I'm going to tweak that title a little bit and call it from a North American perspective. And I can think of no other people to help us talk about both the challenges and the opportunities of the Arctic security environment than our two guests. We are extremely privileged to have the tenant general Walt Salyanov, commander of US, sorry, commander of Canada command. Yes. And when he puts that in our ad, exactly, experience. And also with his vice admiral Brian Salerno of the United States Coast Guard, the deputy commandant for operations and I'm going to introduce them a little bit in greater detail. What I'd like to do is give you a very brief overview of this report and I do mean brief and then get to the discussion and talk to General Salyanov and Admiral Salerno about the security environment. So with that, I was doing some reading of some recent articles and I pulled some interesting quotes. Recently, Senator Begich of Alaska was quoted as saying, we are at the cusp of a new era of economic development in the Arctic. Fran Olmer, chair of the US Arctic Research Council, called it the industrialization of the Arctic. Coast Guard official speaking about this summer's drilling and the Chucky and Beaufort Sea said this would be the Coast Guard's most active summer in the Arctic ever. A colleague who is working very closely with Shell and their drilling this summer had said in a quote in a workshop I attended recently, if you need it in the Arctic, bring it with you. I thought that was a good quote. And here's my question to you. Are we ready for this economic development in the Arctic? So what we did with our report, we spent a great deal of time in the very beginning not talking about security, but actually talking about the economic drivers of the Arctic. For it's our view that we are at the beginning of a new era of economic development in the Arctic. And this will shape the security picture of the Arctic. So in the beginning of the report, we looked at these main drivers, and they're not going to be anything new to this group, oil and gas. And obviously this summer's exploration offshore Alaska, the Chucky and Beaufort Seas is the beginning of America's discovery of oil and gas resources in the Arctic. Mineral resources, again, perhaps not always a well publicized event, but the mineral resources in the Arctic are profound and certainly for Alaska. We also looked at fisheries, shipping, both destination and trans shipping and tourism. Human activity, commercial activity in the Arctic will profoundly shape what this region will look like. So what we posit on our report and what we urge senior US policymakers is we need an Arctic national economic strategy. We need a vision. So we can understand what security package we need to support that economic vision. It's not enough to do drilling permits for the next few years. We need to understand what this region will look like in 10, 15, 20, 25 years. Do we need one icebreaker? Do we need 20? I don't know, because I don't know what our economic vision is for the Arctic. Do we need permanent basis? Do we need more infrastructure? It will depend on how the United States sees its overarching development of its region and making sure that there is an important balance between economic development and maintaining a very responsible approach to the environment. So we spend a lot of time in the report and you'll forgive us. But if we don't get that part right, we don't get the rest of this right. And so that's why we encourage everyone to look at the drivers of change in the Arctic and that's the economics. The second part of the report, we take a fairly deep dive into looking at the US position in the Arctic. And of course, you can only start at the beginning. And that's the release of the National Security Presidential Directive 66 in January of 2009. I was at a wonderful event yesterday at the Stimson Center, Caitlin, and a Russian official was doing a presentation for us. And he was comparing the different Arctic strategies of the Arctic Council members. And he had the pages, the page allotments of each of the Arctic strategies for the United States, eight pages, Finland 98. We need a more in depth look, not an affirmation statement, but a more in depth strategic document of not only what we believe in, but how we're going to get there. I think that was the first time I saw where an American strategic document was a little slimmer than our other coastal documents. But that NSPB 66 does outline our strategic interests in the Arctic. And certainly, it is a fulsome list, missile defense, obviously freedom of navigation, deployments, and preventing obviously protecting the homeland and preventing any events, terrorism or otherwise. So then after I did a fairly exhaustive look at the United States and its capabilities, I posed a question. We have an abundance of governance in the Arctic, but we have a scarcity of capabilities. And so we looked at some of this framing of the governance, particularly in the security area, and we found that the problem is, we don't have a place to talk about security in the Arctic. I'm told where we cannot talk about security in the Arctic. We cannot talk about it at NATO because there is not a consensus about whether NATO has a role in the Arctic. Although in the report, we do talk about ideas and ways that NATO could play a supportive role in the Arctic, the Science for Peace program, and some of the other programs that NATO offers. We cannot talk about security at the Arctic Council. It is not allowed in the auto declaration, the founding document of the Arctic Council. And that, just to remind you, was at the insistence of the Americans. We didn't want to talk about security. We did not want a sense of militarization of the Arctic. So if we can't talk about it, where can we talk about it? And is there a need to talk about it? I would offer to you that there is actually a significant need to talk about it. And our colleagues, our European Command colleagues and our Norwegian colleagues have already started to scratch their head and think, how can we talk about this? Last year, they created an Arctic Roundtable with the Arctic Council members. Again, different variety of representatives, whether it was the Russian border guards, the FSB. Some are represented by Coast Guard, some are represented by Navy, some both, different levels. But to start to begin a conversation, they're going to have another meeting this coming summer. They're also going to have a meeting Arctic Chiefs of Defense next month, hosted, I believe, in Goose Bay. I think I have that correct. For the first time, Chiefs of Defense of the Arctic are going to come together and talk. It tells me we need a place and we're struggling to find that place. So in our report, we offer some ideas, some food for thought. There are two current Coast Guard forms. We have a North Atlantic Coast Guard form that brings together mostly NATO members, I would argue. And then we have a North Pacific Coast Guard that brings together a few similar, but our Asian partners. What if we were to create a subset of those two groups, an Arctic Coast Guard form? Again, a place where the eight Arctic Council members could come at the Coast Guard or informed level and not only talk about what they're doing but start exercising and practicing this, we offer that as an idea. The missing actor here is the private sector. I think it's interesting that as I've read reports about shells upcoming drilling and what they are bringing to the Chutky and the Beaufort, 33 ships, 600 people, they will have almost greater capabilities than the military will have potentially at that point. How are we bringing the private sector into this conversation? How are we exercising with the private sector? Because it's very understandable that we could be calling on their assets and their resources in an emergency. How are they involved? What's the memorandums of understanding that we have with the private sector? And then where do you practice that? One idea we offer, and I'm sorry to say it's not original, it actually was in the Danish Arctic strategy, the Kingdom of Denmark, said what about Thule Air Force Base? Thule is an American facility in Greenland. Obviously, not as used as it was during the Cold War. It has a deep water harbor. Could a portion of that, obviously it has an important role with our missile defense architecture, but could Thule be used as a place for the private sector? Governments, can we find a way that there's already an American investment and can we practice it there? Again, it's to keep us thinking, to keep us focused on innovation. We all are working in a budget constrained environment, so there's not going to be an enormous amount of resources. So it demands creativity. It demands looking at available resources. And now I'm going to throw out a question as I transition from my podium to our discussion. One thing we didn't talk about in the report that I think I'm going to say for a future report. Are we ready for developing joint capabilities in the Arctic? Can we look at joint U.S.-Canadian ice breakers? Can we look at joint opportunities for search and rescue? This is so expensive. We have not in the United States built an ice breaker in over 30 years. To produce one ice breaker is estimated to be a billion dollars because we're producing one. How can we look at others? How can we look at infrastructure development a very new way and look at it from a very innovative way? So I think that's going to be a question, gentlemen, that I'm going to challenge you with in a moment. But first, that's the end of your scheduled program on our report. We have copies out there. We welcome your thoughts and your comments. We are so grateful to be able to do this research thanks to the Norwegian Research Council. CSIS is part of a larger four-year project called the Geopolitics of the High North, which brings together a Russian and Norwegian, a German and an American think tank partner in a long-term study. And this is really what's allowing us to do this extensive research. And so we're extremely grateful for that support. So we thank the Norwegian Research Council. So now I'm finished with my PowerPoint. In general, I know you have a PowerPoint. So let me again welcome Lieutenant General Walt Semyonov, Commander of Canada Command. He is such a distinguished career, not only in charge of Canadian forces and the defense and protection of Canada. He has served in so many important capacities. He was in 2005 responsible for Canadian forces operations in Southwest Asia. He supported the deployment of the Strategic Advisory Team to Kabul, established Canada's first PRT in Kandahar. He has served from 2007 to 2010 as the Assistant Chief Military Personnel and then later the Chief of Military Personnel. He cares deeply about the personnel and family of Canadian forces and has had a very rich and welcome career. And he came all the way to Ottawa to see us today. So we're extremely grateful. So please join me in welcoming General Semyonov. Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, first I'd like to take this opportunity to thank the sponsors of today's invent and to thank Heather for the very kind introduction and providing us all the opportunity to come here to talk about something that we in Canada believe is strategically important, that being our north. I can't think of a more topical issue or critically important issue to discuss and I'm sure as you've read in the report and I would encourage you all to read the report I went through it as well as a nice little video on the CSIS site which I went through prior to coming down here. Because it does raise and bring out what are those key issues that are going to drive us into doing more in this thing that we call the north. Past 25 years have seen the polar ice cap shrink by 40% from 2011 so the lowest levels of CSIS have been recorded and there are predictions by many that portions of the Arctic will be free in the next 50 years perhaps outside even of the summer period. We've already seen an increase in exploration, fishing and tourism trends which are all likely to continue well into the future leading to an increase in human activity across our north moving away from presentation. Heather touched on it and I throw this out to you by bringing people, by bringing humans you bring the good and you bring the bad. And that's what you've got to take a look at as we increase the number of people, the number of organizations, the number of both public, private organizations across the north it will see change even if you don't want it to change. And this is just the beginning, increased human activity in the Arctic will see as we set our dramatic rise of the next decades as new shipping routes open, very clear to all. Not only destination and trans shipping will increase but also tourism, fisheries, mineral and oil gas extractions, all of which we have seen in Canada already in the last number of years. And with this growth in activity we'll see the inevitable consequence that comes with it in the short term more search and rescue events, environmental remediation, natural amen made disasters and the possibility of increased criminal activity including piracy and terrorism just to name a few. The unique capabilities that the military can bring to bear in this harsh environment of the Arctic means that Canada's military will play an increasingly important role in that region in the future. But to be clear, and Heather mentioned it right up front, this is a supporting role. In Canada very much the Canadian military is not the lead for the North, but rather supports other government departments in addressing threats and hazards under the Canadian forces pillar of safety and security. To do this effectively we must answer what we think are those five strategic questions, why, what, when, how and where should we the Canadian military be to be able to address the threats and hazards over horizons one, horizons two and horizons three in the years to come. The North is a top priority for the government of Canada and so we have a number of high level policies or some would call them a chapeau or a foundation that provide overarching guidance to the Canadian forces. First the government of Canada's Northern strategy lays out the priority areas of environment, governance, development and finally Arctic sovereignty as building the four pillars to the strategy. The Canadian forces is responsible for ensuring we have the capability and capacity to know and to patrol the land, sea and sky in our sovereign Arctic territory. Next Canada's Arctic foreign policy, the international component to our view of that North, seeks to deliver on the international dimension of the Northern strategy through an emphasis on working with our Arctic neighbors to promote a stable region. The keys here are collaboration, working together, participation, coordination are the drivers of that international document. And finally the Canada First defense strategy further directs the Canadian forces to demonstrate a visible presence in the region to have the capacity to exercise control over and the defense of Canadian sovereignty and Arctic territory to provide assistance to other government departments. I'd ask you if you could, I'll break away from you just to look at the slide and when you see the roles of the Canadian forces, I'd ask you to look to the prism of time here. This is not just about today, this is about the next 20, 30 or 40 years. I would throw to you as another question, question number three, Heather had the first two, what will the world and the Arctic and North look like from an international perspective 30, 40, 50 years from today? Perhaps different for a number of reasons, but all of those speak to assisting others, having presence in the North, we do that right now and exercising control over the defense of Canada's Arctic territory. At times as I said to Heather prior to coming in here, we kind of get mixed and lost between this international and domestic discussion to this issue. Clearly from a domestic point of view, we know what Canada's Arctic is and that's that domestic sovereignty view that we have of this is Canadian and this will always remain Canadian. The rest could be perhaps international, let's sit down and figure all that out with the Arctic Council members. Canada command the organization of which I'm responsible for has the operational mandate and mission to defend against threats, hazards and security challenges at home and to support civilian authorities to enhance safety, security and stability. For us it's called the home game, the home game is nondiscretionary, the home game is no fail. Number one mandate of every military is ensure that its citizens are safe and secure regardless of where they're at. As are our mind folks at home, remember Canadians live in Canada's North, just like Americans live in Alaska. So I have to provide to the Canadians that live in Canada's North that same support that those that live in the lower region of the country get the support from we do every day. Protecting Canadians as I said is a home game and a way game is important, not denying that however the home game is stated as a no fail mission that we have to be successful at. It is one of our primary responsibilities to support Canadians under government departments as we do in Canada within 24 hours from the time of some type of disaster happening. Clearly there is a different construct north of the border than the south, we don't have FEMA, we don't have a National Guard. When you see men and women in uniform out doing stuff from a humanitarian perspective, it's already federal. Federal works with the provinces and the territories to move out quickly within the first 24 hours to ensure that during that shock period that we get the support that Canadians so rightly and richly deserve. Federally this whole of government approach is expressed through a document that we have which is called our federal emergency response plan. It is a plan put together by the government which addresses the threats and hazards across Canada and who does what to who when something does happen in those areas which you'll see here in a minute. That federal emergency response plan outlines the processes and mechanisms to facilitate an integrated government of Canada response to an emergency and to delineate who's in charge. And while the Canadian forces is only one part of a whole of government approach, Canada Command has prioritized the north as one of its key focus areas. For me it's the home game, the north, Canada-U.S. relations, and then finally the western hemisphere which I'm also responsible for from a combatant commander point of view. Yes, as a combatant commander I have the United States of America as my area of responsibility. That shocks some folks in Washington when I say that publicly, but that's the way it is. The north is very fragile region of members of local communities always remind me that a footprint in the north lasts 40 years. What does that mean? Having been in the north enough to be able to say it speaks to be that before we take that step and do some long term development I would throw out to you. You need to do not just some thinking but some deep thinking on what is it you want to do not in the short but in the long, long term. It takes in many cases four times as many resources as a minimum to build in the north than it does in the south. It takes in many cases four times as long. That in itself should speak to the fact that before I build infrastructure I better make sure it's the right infrastructure in that right location to have that what we call that strategic effect. Understanding these realities will help us to meet the needs of northerners who are the number one custodians and owners of Canada's north. They have that critical voice, that number one voice in what this government, our government is going to do in the north and they are connected internationally as some may know. Even at the Arctic Council they have come together they have a strong voice and need to continue to have that voice and to ensure that that voice is not diminished by too many voices as part of that discussion. And so we are building a comprehensive study that will ensure our planning addresses the unique challenges of the north. This is kind of just a step by step that we went through. This kind of led to the diagnostic very much what Heather did but shows that we sat down and took a look at what are the threats and hazards that we are going to meet over the next many years across our north. What were the deductions and conclusions? Very much what most would do. We did not in our organization do the threats and hazards. We gave that to another organization to look at, to folks much smarter than myself and others. We put this all together, did mission analysis and number four is really critical. Critical in the sense as General Jacobi and I have talked about this because we work very closely together. I see General Jacobi more than I see my wife in a lot of cases. Just saw him yesterday, seeing him next week, spending three or four days with him the week after. We are connected to Northcom and to Southcom to General Fraser. Those are my two counterparts down south of the border. We took a scenario approach to help us define where we need to go in the future. And it's very, very important. Requirements, analysis, initial draft that all the way down to socialization across town. And we've actually already been here to talk to a number of our players with US Coast Guard. It's part of their title 14 powers and much of this is Coast Guard more than it is military. I would throw it to you. Talk to the United States Navy with them tomorrow to talk a little bit more about where we need to go. But we have socialized this much of this already south of the border. We've learned from past experiences as well some key elements of Northern operations including that Northern operations are expeditionary in nature. It is tougher to do to plan and execute an operation in Canada's north than it is to go to Iraq or Afghanistan. I can tell you that. To plan an exercise given everything that's involved takes almost a year. Offshore, jumping a plane off to go you do your business to go you do what you do. In the north it takes much more time. And the key role that relationships and partnerships play within our organization what we know is that the center of gravity of doing our business and not just doing it but doing right it's all about relationships. Built on trust and respect. In the north that's even more important. It's not about as I remind my folks it's not about closing the deal. It's very much a North American view of let's get in the room tell me what you want to do and let's move on. It's not the way it works. In the north it's about getting to know, understanding, sitting down and then perhaps at some point in time we'll get to what we really want to do. But it is all about very much relationships if you want to have a comprehensive plan for the north. Scenario based approach we used here on the next slide is laid out here. The safety security and defense pillars this is just a oversimplification of an infant here. So I oversimplify a lot of stuff you know I don't use PowerPoint to oversimplify complex issues. But at the end of the day you know we kind of grouped and said what are those safety scenarios what are the security scenarios the defense scenarios that we think we're going to be challenged with over the next number of years. And then over that time what are more important ones than others and I would tell you right now but it's really under safety and security. And that is really where the focus is it's under safety be it search and rescue, maritime disasters, air disasters, natural disasters. That all speaks to a changing north in a number of different ways geographically environmentally and the like things are going to change. As we said we did a detailed analysis of those threats and hazards and this all helped us to determine what situations events are more likely to occur and of those events which ones directly or indirectly impact on the Canadian forces. So what you see up here is on the left are the lead departments or agencies on the right who supports. And what you'll quickly see is that the military is not leading on the left in any of them. You know it's all about other government departments, other agencies in Canada, be it our federal police, be it our Coast Guard, be it our public safety who have that lead we the military are in support. For the situations in which the Canadian forces is not the lead we use this analysis to determine when and how the CF might be in a position to assist. And it's helped us move ahead with other departments and agencies across Ottawa, across the country to say how are we going to figure these little pieces out on search and rescue. To do this as we said we looked over three horizons and applied them to a heat map to determine which are most probable in the near and distant future. And if you take all these some come to life more today others come to life more 20, 30, 40 years down the road because it is going to be a changing world. We are incorporating these scenarios based on an appointment of comprehensive joint combined and planned for the north. And this is because the role of the CF of the north is to first provide assistance as we said other government departments have a visible presence in the north and exercise control. The plan is an important step in Canadian forces planning in the north. The unique requirements for conducting operations are not dictate that they are achieved in a similar way as we know expeditionary forces and operations are conducted as mentioned here. But the challenge we have unlike in the south where the Canadian forces more clearly the force of last resort in the north capacity dictates that time between the first and last response would likely be extremely short. And come back to something Heather said across most if not all countries around the world you'll find there is first no one government department or agency has all the authorities or capabilities to meet the future security and defense challenges. Therefore it speaks to you need to come together, speaks to you have to work. Do I believe the government of Canada will go and buy for a federal police C-17s and lift them into the north if needed? Probably not. Especially not in today's environment where we're working together in a resource constrained environment. Therefore with all of that we need to work more together to be able to address our challenges in the north. When the CF's unique capabilities can make all the difference or when it's beyond the capacities of partners to respond we will be there that much is clear. It is a no fail mission and we will help other government departments and agencies achieve what they need to. As you see here on what we define as very much our north. At the same time the Canadian forces must be ready to do in the north. All of which it does in the rest of Canada as noted. This means having first a common operating picture. If you were to ask me what do we need more of in the north and get focused on it is the sense function sense act command shield sustain sensing focused on queuing. All about queuing there are not enough forces in the entire world to be able to cover all of the north. Therefore you need good situation awareness. Understand that picture in a common way and to be able to queue forces if needed to be able to address those threats and hazards. International dimension. Working in the north also has an important international dimension. This is a region that's shared by eight Arctic nations and what affects one of us affects all of us. Internationally the north is both the same and it is different. I would ask you to think about this question number five. Is Canada's north like Norway's north? I've been to Norway's north it is not it is very different. Canada's north like Russia's north probably more similar and like the US north. First question to ask would be whose north are similar and in what way and start the discussions from there. As I said each Arctic nation has different populations infrastructures capabilities and views their Arctic differently. We all face the same challenges of the austere environment and the changes that are happening here. That's why as we stated before we have to work with our partners to address challenges in the north. In fact Canada has recently with fellow members of the Arctic Council established a legally binding search and rescue agreement for the region. Canada Command the organization that I'm responsible for was responsible the first tabletop exercise for the Arctic Council which was conducting a white horse. And it was a resounding success. We went through scenarios talked about what if what if off the coast of Greenland there was a cruise ship that went into trouble what would we do. Each of the countries sent large delegations civilian and military we walked through each of the scenarios it can be done with the Arctic Council. In the wake of that agreement as we said we had a very successful tabletop search and rescue exercise lessons learned which went out to the countries and back to the Arctic Council to report back on what we did achieve. All of this is in keeping with our desire to build on existing defense relations in the region and strengthen operational links with a view to improving our common understanding of the challenges that we face. Clearly if we understand there will be less misunderstanding if we understand each other what we can do and can't do again we'll be there to help each other. And there are many many anecdotes that already have led to that not just in Canada but between Norway and Russia working together in search and rescue. And with many other countries that have clearly proven that the eight countries working together can get it done very well. The Arctic is a promising and challenging new horizon for human activity that much is clear to all in development. The future of the Arctic both in Canada and with our northern partners will no doubt see transformation. And I would throw this out to you that the diagnostic and I've read many of them when it comes to the Arctic and the North both domestically internationally are pretty well on the money and they're pretty well all the same. The question then is what do you do and that's where you get into the differences of what does that mean for me what does that mean for you and as I remind people we not only see the world from where we sit we define our solutions from where we sit. We need to be prepared for the future because there will be changes. The military and Canada's military needs to be ready to support the challenges and dangers that may come with the development and to do so we realize understand and demand that there is cooperation. We're not looking at traditional security threats here at all. We're looking at anticipating scenarios that will put the people of the Arctic at risk. We all have a stake in this. We understand that and we know that working together we can ensure that the region is not only safe secure and sovereign for Canada and for all of the nations in the Arctic and the North but prosperous and thriving for the world. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you very much. Thank you so much. That was really a great super overview. Well now we're going to turn to Admiral Salerno. Deputy Commodant for Operations Coast Guard Department of Homeland Security. When I think of marine safety I think of Admiral Salerno because most of his career has focused exactly on marine safety programs. He has served in a variety of capacities most recently as Assistant Commodant for Marine Safety Security and Stewardship and has served at many of the major U.S. port facilities and with great federal responsibility for those ports. So Admiral Salerno is the Coast Guard ready this summer for the Chucky and the Beaufort? Well let me I'll talk about that. First let me thank you Heather first of all for the introduction but also for hosting this discussion. I would agree with the general this is very timely. It's also very important that we really fully consider the implications of the emerging Arctic in terms of U.S. national interest and what that means from an Arctic community standpoint. I can assure you from a Coast Guard perspective the Arctic is a matter of great urgency because of what will take place this summer. And I would add that we're not alone in that view. There are many departments and agencies of the U.S. government which share that sense of urgency. But at the same time I would agree with Heather's point that that is probably not a national norm. You know one problem we have that I think Canada does not share. If you interviewed a person on the street in Canada and asked them are you an Arctic nation. I think the answer would be yes. But in the United States outside of Alaska if you ask the average person are we an Arctic nation. You may not get a yes. Chances are you might get a shrug or don't know or know. Simply because you know not everybody is really focused on that outside of Alaska. But I can tell you from a Coast Guard perspective we have had a long term focus in the Arctic. Our issues there are very much the same as they are in any other ocean area. Any area where the United States exerts its jurisdiction. The Arctic is a sea area and where we have responsibilities they include safety. They include security and they include stewardship. So we characterize them a little bit different than the general did but I think they really all bound many of the same things. That's how we define our roles in the Coast Guard or put another way. We protect those on the sea. We protect the nation from threats coming from the sea and we protect the sea itself. That applies everywhere. We exercise our jurisdiction. It applies in the Arctic. So those roles are not new but what is new is the fact that with the Arctic with conditions changing and with the increase in human activity the risks are going up. And that is so one of the one of the first points is really three main points I want to make today. The first one is the Arctic is now. It is an immediate concern for us. And I think that's an important one because when people talk about the Arctic in our country anyway it tends to be in terms of the Northwest Passage and cutting the sea routes from Asia to Europe. And it's quite an alluring prospect. You could potentially cut 5000 miles off a sea route between those continents. But is that something that's going to happen today? No. That may occur sometime in the future. But there's many reasons why that won't happen today. The reliability of the transit route is simply not there yet. And one thing that commercial shippers need more than anything else is reliability. They need to know that cargo will show up at its destination port on a given date, given time. You can't really make that assurance today. So I don't see that as a viable option today. But what is happening today is the Arctic becoming a destination for a host of maritime activity. Most prominently is the drilling that Heather referenced. The Chukchi Sea, the Beauford Sea, two areas where Royal Dutch Shell plans to conduct exploratory drilling beginning this summer. They've been in active dialogue of seeking permits from the U.S. Department of Interior in order to do that. There's been a host of federal agencies involved, including the Coast Guard, looking at all of the implications of that. We do expect that that will occur this summer. Now, one of the ways this has become very interesting is you all remember the Deepwater Horizon. This is very different than a Deepwater Horizon scenario. But the country, within the last few years, has experienced a major oil spill. And nobody wants to go through that experience again. Now, this is different in that it's not Deepwater. It's compared to the Gulf of Mexico, which was 5,000 feet of water in a place that is reasonably accessible for shore-side support and other vessels. We're talking in the Arctic relatively shallow water, but more than compensated by the fact that it is very, very remote and very, very austere. Whatever is brought up there has to be put on scene ahead of time. If you wait for something to happen and then look for resources, it will take weeks to get there. So the Royal Dutch Shell is on the hook to provide a lot of capability on scene at sea. There's really no shore-side infrastructure up there to base out of in any meaningful way. So it'll be at sea. And that has huge implications for the Coast Guard as well. But it's not just drilling. As water warms, fish stocks move forward, and that stewardship role, looking after living marine resources, also will move into the Arctic. We will see fishing. Environmental tourism is starting to emerge. People who want to go and visit the Arctic on cruise ships. Two years ago in the Canadian Arctic, there was a cruise ship that had a load of people on board and actually found a rock pinnacle that nobody knew was there. They didn't know until they hit it, and the ship was severely damaged. Canadian authorities were able to remove the people from that vessel, but it was flat, calm conditions. But that's indicative of the types of risks we have in an environment where we don't necessarily have good marine mapping, and it is very remote from rescue sources. So a lot of activity, we expect that to grow. It begins really this summer. That will also bring a lot of traffic through the Bering Strait. Shell is bringing 22 vessels up there. So traffic through the Strait. When you add that to activity from the northern sea route across the top of Russia, that also poses some maritime safety challenges as we go forward. So the Arctic is now. The second point is the operating conditions are very harsh. It started talking about this already, but when we talk about an ice-free Arctic, we don't mean that there's no ice up there. I mean, that sounds contradictory, but it's true. I mean, there's a lot of floating ice. The ships can perhaps navigate around it, but it's there. That ice will move. It will move with the wind. It will move with currents. It can aggregate. It can be set in a vessel, and sometimes ships may still need to be broken out. There is a lack of adequate charts. It stands to reason. Most of this area was covered with ice for as long as we can remember. There hasn't been a need for accurate maritime mapping in the past. Well, that need is now changing. Communications, very poor in the Arctic. Satellite coverage for navigation and communications, again, very poor, particularly when you get above 65 degrees north latitude. And then, of course, the logistical challenges. Just to give you an idea, the northernmost point in the United States is Point Barrel. For a Coast Guard cutter or any ship to be refueled and to operate up there, the closest place they can refuel is Dutch Harbor. That's about 1,000 miles from Point Barrel. So just to get up there, it's 1,000 mile transit from your last refueling point. And then to remain on station, of course, you're using up fuel, and then you have to get back. So that makes it very challenging. For aircraft, closest Coast Guard air station for search and rescue case, for example, to Barrel, 900 miles. So, again, the distances are extraordinary. And with very limited airfields, hangars, hotel space, when we've sent people up there recently, the only hotel space we can find is the old due line barracks. For maybe about a dozen people or so, very primitive, but built back in the 50s. There's very limited hotel space available. So if you had a big event like a Deepwater Horizon up there, where would you even house all the response workers? It would have to almost be at sea. So there's risk here and now, as well as emerging risks in the future. So my third point, and this will build on something Heather said, we are in many ways an Arctic nation without an Arctic strategy. And I don't mean that to suggest that nobody is thinking strategically, because I can point to a lot of examples where there's a lot of strategic thought going into how we approach the Arctic. I think it really begins with the presidential decision document, PD-66, which articulates the national interest in the Arctic. And there's really six areas of interest and involves protecting the environment, national security, scientific interests, cooperation with the international community, and the involvement of indigenous peoples, all of that included in that strategy. It's a good document that articulates our national interests, but it's a policy document, it's not a strategy. It does require the departments and agencies of government to begin planning. And I think to their credit, most of the departments and agencies that have a role have done so. Coast Guard clearly has an Arctic strategy moving forward. The Navy has been very active and they have a roadmap for the Arctic looking at the national defense role and the Arctic has an emerging operating area. NOAA has a plan for the Arctic. Just think of what the challenges we face in maritime domain awareness and such simple things as predicting the weather. We don't have satellite coverage, significant satellite coverage for the Arctic, so even predicting the weather is a challenge. So the agencies are looking at all of this. Interior, of course, is deeply involved in the permitting aspect of this, but we don't have a strategy around which all of these efforts coalesce, and which signifies national will and a willingness to commit resources to put forward national or to advance national needs. That is something I think we'll get to at some point, but it's a hole right now. One of the key strategic decisions we have to make as a country is do we ratify the law of the Sea Treaty and think of what that means in terms of the Arctic. It's important in a lot of areas of the world, but as the Arctic emerges, the oil and gas resources there are considerable, and all nations are looking at this. We assert a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. That is an artifact of the Law of the Sea Treaty, by the way. What we would also like to assert is the extended continental shelf, which will go beyond 200 miles out to 350 or more miles if we can demonstrate that there is a geological extension of the continental shelf out that far. And we can make that claim before an international committee. All the Arctic nations are doing that, by the way. And in fact, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy, one of our few ice breakers right now, is outfitted for science missions, works predominantly with the National Science Foundation and with NOAA, was in the process of mapping, of last several years, of mapping our extended continental shelf, looking towards the day when we can perfect or put forward a claim before the international committee on that. And incidentally, when we talked about cooperation, Cutter Healy was operating in company with the Canadian Coast Guard ice breaker, the Louise Saint Laurent. So they were supporting each other, providing an operational capability for mutual safety, and also sharing information, which I think is an excellent example of cooperation between our two countries. The Law of the Sea Treaty, of course, has been somewhat controversial. I think early on there were concerns about loss of sovereignty. Most, if not all of those concerns were addressed in the 90s, but that is something that for policymakers in our country to really consider as the Arctic opens up, because it is really critical to moving forward and perfecting a claim on resources that really lie right off our coast. Incidentally, it's not only Arctic nations that are interested in the Arctic. There are some areas that would lie outside of any national claims. So you see ships from other countries operating up there also doing scientific research. China, for example, has sent an ice breaker up there on a number of trips doing scientific research. So within that Law of the Sea Treaty, in areas that are considered common heritage of mankind, if you will, other countries are also looking at their possibilities of extracting resources. So I will stop there and look forward to your questions. Thank you. Are you okay? You got it. Thank you, Admiral Slater. That was a great overview of the challenges. What we'd like to do now is bring you into the conversation. I just want to remind everyone we are on the record. And if you raise your hand and state your name and affiliation, that would be great. But I'm going to take the moderator's prerogative here and start with the first question to you both. And I was struck the last several months with what sort of came home on this critical need, obviously the search and rescue, the safety, the security, the stewardship. We had last summer Operation Nanook, a great tragedy happened. And had it not been, though, for the military capabilities that had been in place at that time, that operation, the rescue and obviously the recovery would have been much more difficult. Don't know if you could help us understand some of the logistical operational concerns. The Admiral had mentioned it. Often in any type of military operation, the operations inform the logistics. I think in the Arctic it's reversed. The logistics in some way inform the operation and how to respond. And Admiral, we saw just very few months ago at the end of last year with the refueling of Nome, Alaska, had the Healy, the only medium-strengthened icebreaker operating right now in the Coast Guard fleet, had it made an earlier decision to do a mission to Antarctica would not have been available to help lead the way for the Russian fuel tanker into Nome. But these choices because of the limitations of capabilities are going to define how we respond to future operations. If you could both in those two situations or potentially future situations help us understand the constraints that you're going to have to provide to policy leaders who want to have immediate response. The capabilities simply aren't there. General, I'll start with you and then Admiral. Sure, thank you very much. If I can come back to a number of the more strategic comments that I made and kind of drill down to try to operationalize them as Heather has asked. First, we understand, appreciate that the North is all about sustainment. So it is right. It's about logistics. In a lot of cases the military mind kind of figures out to do the pointy end stuff and logisticians catch up with it. It's not the way it is in the Arctic. Clearly in the Arctic what you need to be able to do is clearly understand the logistics demands, constraints, restraints, and from that perhaps to find what you can and can't do. So we do accept that. But it does tie into a comment made here by Heather that we also know that public-private partnership is the way to go in our North. Speaking on behalf of Canada here in our North. So we can tell you right now from our studies and work that there are 17 airfields that can take a C-17 across Canada's North already into the high North. We're working to establish and we'll use with those private companies to say, could we use those? Why I come back to the comment made that it is so expensive to build, so expensive to maintain. Second is in Canada's North there are many private companies contractors who are prepared to provide you with the sustainment that you need. Now there are companies there that if you have the money can put a camp anywhere in the North, even on the North Pole if you want it. If you have the amount of money that is needed be it either accommodations, be it food, messing, be it command and control facilities. They can do that. From the Canadian perspective where we're at today if I could take you there and show you we have built Resolute. Resolute is the second most Northern. I believe it is town, village in the world. Greece Fjords the first in Canada's North. We have just completed or in the throes of completing our Arctic Training Centre, modern state-of-the-art accommodations. We conducted a look out of there last year both from a command and control point of view housing and the like. Resolute can take any aircraft in the Canadian Inventory C-17 all the way down to be at fighter aircraft. So we already have that in place because our work concluded that if you want to control our North domestically you have to do it out of Resolute Bay. So we have invested heavily. This government has in developing Resolute Bay. It'll be up and running complete by next summer and it'll help greatly to be able to deploy folks in. Very much our approach is moving people from the South to the North by having C-17s in the inventory. We can fly from Ottawa into Resolute in five hours. I've done it a couple of times. Put whatever you need be it a company's worth of soldiers, be it aircraft, be it helicopters to get tactical ability. So we can do it right now. But the question is when? We define our operational season when most of the stuff happens between March and September. So that's when people come out to do the stuff, to do the fishing, to do the tourism. So that's when our interest and the risk actually goes up and our interest and focus. So Heather said, well you were up there when it happened. So we actually plan our exercises and our training during the higher risk periods to ensure that we are there. So it has helped that we're on the ground already. There was a case here before where because we were in the nook, we rescued a gentleman from I believe Australia, New Zealand. It was in the very high North. But Heather is right, you know, in that distant, distant future. How are you going to ensure that you can get to where you need to go in a timely fashion? And that we are looking at by expanding resolute, by looking at other areas that we right now, the Canadian military and the government of Canada, and I throw this out in a strong way, can address all the threats and hazards that we're going to meet in the next number of years with the infrastructure we have, with the capabilities we have. So as much as we say it's a challenge, I would come back and tell you it's not a challenge for us. And we've stated that publicly in our parliament that we can do what we need to do in our North. Well, I'd say it is a challenge for us. But we don't have any Coast Guard infrastructure on the northern side of Alaska. So anything we do up there is either going to be using other facilities, cooperation either with private sector or with Alaska State National Guard or some other infrastructure, or base it at sea. Now for this summer, we will deploy one of our newest cutters, a national security cutter, to provide that sovereign presence in Alaska. It's not an ice breaker, it's not even ice strengthened. So we have to be very careful about where they operate and we'll have to avoid ice. But we'll have that capability up there and we'll provide a command and control platform as well as a helicopter deck. The new cutters can support two helicopters. So that will be our primary capability there. We'll supplement that with a buoy tender which has some minimal ice strengthening so they can operate in that area as well. We will work closely with Royal Dutch Shell because they will be running aircraft back and forth from the beach and we expect that we'll be able to use some of their infrastructure for our aircraft. But it's minimal. I think looking long term as activity increases in the Arctic we will probably need some longer term solution and there's potentially a number of ways we can go along those lines. It could be something we do jointly with DOD. There's currently an ongoing capabilities assessment between DHS and DOD, mostly brokered by Northcom and the Coast Guard looking at needs in the Arctic, but also potentially with Alaska State authorities including the Guard. There's a wonderful comment out of Coast Guard. It talks about the DO line and sort of that national imperative and my bumper sticker for the United States is make the DO brand new. Use some of that infrastructure that's up there and try to revitalize it if we can and use some of that infrastructure. I'll have to further that thought a little bit more, but there's the bumper sticker. Yes, so we have some questions here. Tell them in the back if you could have a microphone. Thank you. Yes, Steve Benson from CSIS. I'd like to ask a question of the general and the admiral. You look at down the road 30 years as significant changes anticipated for the environment up in the Arctic. You have some significant building programs or naval platforms on your horizons. Is that change informing the structures, the key performance parameters, the capabilities that are being built into these platforms? Beyond sensing. Why don't we take a couple of questions and then we'll let you, why don't we bundle a couple of questions. Yes, there, come on in the front, coming to you. Bundling questions, I wouldn't wish that on anyone. I can choose which one they want to hit. I'm John Farrell from the US Arctic Research Commission. I have a question for the general. And it's about your emphasis on sovereignty and what I perceived and maybe it's struggling with what I heard as a paradox in your presentation. And in that on the one hand, I heard that from what you presented that security and safety threats and hazards were really the primary emphasis. And that defense wise, the threat from incursions on marine sea, air, cyber were not as, didn't seem as imminent or as as high a priority. Yet on the other hand, you opened your presentation with a slide from Prime Minister. It said, gee, you know, our number one priority in the Northern strategy is promotion and protection of sovereignty in the Arctic. So I'm struggling with that paradox and I was wondering if you could speak to that. Thanks, John. Do you have a question right there? Thank you. Pete Amps from Reuters. I wonder if you could give some thoughts to what a, how a different geopolitical world looks where the Arctic is melting. I mean, functionally speaking, for the last, as long as anyone can remember to go around the world, you've had to go around the middle, basically a bit of a cylinder. Once you can go over the top, how does it change the world? And I'd also like your thoughts on whether non-arctic nations, so nations without an Arctic seaboard like China and European nations can really operate up there at all or whether it's just impossible without at least a significant land presence. Wonderful questions on naval platforms, sovereignty and the geopolitics. And are we going to see the Northern Sea route as the new Suez Canal? Admiral, walk away. Well, I think that question really gets to the heart of the whole Law of the Sea debate. There are differences in what nations can assert in terms of rights regarding mineral resources and control over living marine resources in their exclusive economic zone. I think those are pretty well-defined. As far as the ability of other nations to operate in the area, I think there is provision for that as well in the Law of the Sea treaty, particularly as it relates to transit rights and, you know, innocent passage. So if, for example, there was a, you know, across the Northern Sea route, would that be available to all nations? I think the Law of the Sea is probably the right construct, you know, that you would use to answer that question. Now, I'm not a lawyer. I'm not going to try to answer it. But I think that's the kinds of things the Law of the Sea is meant to address. So when you look at movement of vessels, you know, you know, through NEEZ as one thing, actually extracting resources or conducting operations on it might be something else. I don't know if that answers your question. If I can come, I'll take the tougher one first. I'll go back to the easiest one here. Is that from all of the projections I've seen, be it 20, 30, 40 years out, the opening of or the melting of the ice is less in the Canadian territory, more in the Russian side. So I think that becomes, let's say, assume that's a fact. Secondly, when will the Northwest Passage, you know, as I'm sure we all know, Northwest Passage speaks to five or six different routes. You know, one that's the most viable, when will it be open? I think the coin is still in the air and hasn't landed when that's going to happen. But again, from what I've seen, it is mostly the Russian route and across the North that will be open from all of the projections I've seen. So what does that mean? Perhaps it speaks to the need for more of an international dialogue, dimension, discussion on where and what's going to happen. We're already seeing that with a number of states, be it Russia. The Saudi building has the largest nuclear ice-breaking fleet in the world. It helps many countries move goods and services from one end to the other. That number is rising, perhaps not exponentially this year, but it is rising. We'll see more of that in the future along that northern route. If it's sort of from polar view, a vice of the Northwest Passage. So we're still waiting to see what will happen in the Northwest Passage. We have heard those have said in the next 20, 30, 40 years, it'll be ice-free. It's back to the comment, does ice-free mean it's navigable? But two do not mean yes-yes. So we've got to figure that out. Are there charts and the like? And then we have to figure out what's international and what's not international. And we can have had that question posed. Friends agree to disagree on many things, but we're still friends. And we'll sort it out. It'll be resolved in different rooms and different environments. The easy question. Don't see it as a paradox at all. Coming from a military guy, I throw back to folks down here. Sovereignty is not the purview, it's not only exercised by the military. By the government of Canada supporting the territory of Nunavut in setting up its governance is exercising sovereignty. That's the message here. The question then becomes, within that pillar of sovereignty, what is ours? We have a part to play. But the part is it's not about sovereignty, therefore someone's going to come at us, therefore we need to be prepared to defend today. It speaks to that that sovereignty pillar is the most important, which is why the government has invested a number of different ways. Good governance, ensuring that there's health care to a much better degree in the north, bringing the military up and doing the nook and exercise as such. Some would see that as kind of trying to project military, militarization of the north. How I view it is very, it's not about militarization of the north, it's about the military in the north. I need to be in the north to be able to support Canadians that live in the north to give them the same support that they get. And there are boundless stories of things going on in Canada's north that no one ever hears. We're out with our Rangers, which is a very unique Canadian-like capability. 5,000 Rangers across Canada's north. These are folks who live in local communities. We provide them with pay, we provide them with a weapon, and they go out and they're our eyes and the ears and kind of support us. So I come back to it. Sovereignty is, I think, very multifaceted in this view, which I think is clearly clear to us that we have a role to play, but that role does come back to, I think, the fundamental question of what will the world look like in 40, 50 years? I throw this back. But we as a Department of National Defense, with the leadership, are ready to respond to any requests from any government at that time to be able to do what we need to do when it comes to Canada's sovereign territory. And what was the third? I think it was on capabilities, yeah. I'll launch in. Yeah, what are we looking at for future capability as conditions change? That's an excellent question. It's one we're really starting to grapple with ourselves. We're facing a situation where our two polar icebreakers, the heavy ones, they're 30 years old. They're really close to the end of their serviceable life. So if we need new icebreakers, we have to start thinking about what should they look like. We have a bridging strategy right now. We're refurbishing one of our breakers, the Polar Star. That'll buy us another seven to 10 years. Healy's only 11 years old. She's a medium icebreaker, outfitted predominantly for science missions, working with the National Science Foundation. But what are the capabilities we'll need for the future? We're currently engaged in a pretty in-depth study of that right now. We know what the missions will require. The actual capabilities we feel quite strongly is not just purely a Coast Guard decision. Because this is a national issue, it requires a national solution. We really need to engage other departments and agencies to determine what their needs are. This is going to be a platform that serves many departments. We need to build those capabilities in. So that process is really beginning right now. There is actually some funding provided in the budget that will get that process started. It's not money to build an icebreaker. It's money to really begin the design and process and really evaluate what the capabilities need to be. So yes, very much on our minds, but I don't have the final answer for you yet because there's still a lot of work that needs to take place before we know what the answer is. The common I throw when it comes to icebreakers is icebreakers, from our perspective, are a national treasure. That if you want to do the business in the North from a maritime perspective, you need icebreakers. It comes back to what the Admiral had said. We were up on a nook last year. And remember it's not about new ice, it's about old ice. And I throw this out to that, those that haven't looked at that kind of dimension to it is what we are starting to see with the melting is old ice coming for their self. That's bad, it's not good. Because it's the old ice, it's the hard ice. So this idea of having ice-capable ships is going to be a challenge. But clearly icebreakers, we're going to build an icebreaker. We've announced it as part of our ship building strategy. We're moving ahead with what we call our Arctic Offshore Patrol ships. And our Coast Guard is very active. It is clearly the unsung and quiet hero. When it comes to our North, they've been there for many years. I've been on our Coast Guard ships across the North and done great work. We are working our Navy with our Canadian Coast Guard very closely and with U.S. Coast Guard, 17th District with Admiral Ostebo to ensure that we kind of fill the seams because I think we all know that not only the enemy, whatever that might be, whether or the like always finds the seams and finds the boundaries and finds a separation of legal jurisdiction. So clearly how do we do that? And I agree with Heather that given the cost and the price of all this countries may have to come together at some time to say what can we do, collaboratively from a capability point of view because the stuff is expensive. It is. Just to build on that point, the work that was done through the Arctic Council on the agreement for search and rescue I think is very much built on that framework of cooperation. Recognizing that Arctic nations may really have to help each other out because the distances are vast, the environment is so harsh and our capabilities are so limited. And working right now even on a pollution response agreement much along the same lines. We had agreements with Canada long before the Arctic Council dealt with this issue. It just broadened the nature of it. But that level of cooperation has been existing for years with Canada and also with the Russian Federation. The challenge on the border is Canada command their organization I'm responsible for is responsible for search and rescue. Very different for Canada. So I work to my minister. That's where the buck stops for search and rescue, maritime and air. I'm sure it's coordinated and integrated and synchronized and all that good type of stuff. But as the Admiral said, we are very much connected on the search and rescue piece. But to give a little bit of detail here to dig down into the tactical level is that what we are finding in search and rescue, the S is coming out of a lot of it as we have better beacons. And the gentleman who we found in the far north, from Australia and New Zealand, went out before he went into the north. In fact, what Heather said, if you go, you better be ready to bring some of your own stuff. He flipped it on and we found him. So the S is coming out of it. It is more rescue that has happened. It is a lot less searching. Given surveillance, we have satellites across our north that we use. We have programs to upgrade those satellites. That right now very openly are focused on the Northwest Passage. So as the person responsible, I can tell you who's up there and what they're kind of trying to do. But it speaks to much deeper pieces. I'll throw this out to start stimulating your thoughts. The need for satellites, be it satellites at the top, the need for UAVs, be it hails or males, the need for surveillance aircraft, the need for jets to move around, whatever those might be one day, going all the way down to people on the ground, being some type of system so we know who's up there and the like. So it is a complete or a complex framework that needs to be put into place to be able to really know the details in the future. Today we've got what we need in the future of who's up there and what are they doing in our sovereign space. Can I just ask a follow-up question? If the Arctic Council Search and Rescue Agreement was needed to be used today, would you know how that agreement would be implemented? Is there enough, now that we have the agreement, is there enough knowledge for implementation? Do you know how it would work? Yeah, what we did in Whitehorse, we had all the heads of delegation. So there were teams that broke off, we came back and lessons learned and talked about the challenges. So I would say we know who to phone if it were be a seams or a boundary issue. So we know where right now we have a maritime center on our east coast and our west coast, works with him on the west and the east coast with the district commanders as well. And they are connected to Greenland Command. We've already had a number of rescues through Greenland Command working with the Danes. So the picture is much, much better than it's painted in some articles that you read. I would agree. The connectivity between our rescue coordination centers in the different countries is actually very, very good. And you can point to cases that occur almost on a daily basis where those connections are exercised. We had a case within the last few days of a vessel off the east coast of the United States was being tracked by a Canadian rescue coordination center and there was coordination with US assets as well. So it works, it works in a lot of areas and that same system would work in the Arctic. Which speaks to the strength of the perimeter security approach of working together, bringing our militaries together, having a combined defense plan, assistance plan with we all working as one team to ensure that North America is safe and free for our citizens. Terrific. Okay, we've got lots of hands. I'll hit these four questions. They're all clustered here. So Alex, I'm going to start in the front row. We'll just pass it down the row and then we'll go to the woman in the back down. All right, wait, wait for the next one. There you go. Thank you. Yeah. Well, with respect to climate, which I think is very key to this, how are the indications of cavitation? Is it stronger or less? And how does that affect, get affected by international problems and issues? Thank you. You can just pass that microphone right down the line. Thank you. Yeah, just a couple of comments and a question about the reference to sea routes opening in the Arctic. I think it's important to point out that the climate models are very consistent in predicting that we'll have a near loss, not a total loss, but a near loss of summer sea ice, but not of winter sea ice. And so one of the things that sets up is sort of a repeat of the incident in 1871 when we lost 30 whale ships on Point Barrow. And I guess the question would be, how would we be able to respond to ships getting caught coming around that point? It doesn't seem like, you know, a ship from what you've said, a ship-based presence would work for that, the way we're planning for the Chukchi. Thank you. Thank you. I'm Jeanine Nguyen from Voice of Vietnamese Americans. Admiral and Lieutenant General, you both talk about the law of the sea and the sovereignty issues. So I understand that the unclaw has been on the table at our Congress for more than 20 years. When do you think we should have Congress ratified it? And to what extent the timing would have the effect to the United States' national interests and to the global security and peace? Thank you. General, you have my permission to be very direct on the answer to that question. We'll just grab that microphone. Alex and the woman right in the back. Great. Thank you. And right in the back. Oh, Alex right there. Sorry. I'm going to jump on the satellite's comment. I was wondering where you see collaborative opportunities for the U.S. and Canada on tackling some of the difficult problems of communications, space-based MDA, as well as UAVs and the unique difficulties in the climate of the climate. That's a brilliant question. Great. Okay. Climate change, sea routes, unclose and satellite and the challenges of communication. We would like to start. Okay. The first question, cavitation. I just want to make sure I understand the question. I think of cavitation as vibrations and problems associated with propellers. Is that what you were referring to? No, I experienced cavitation. I'm not sure I understand. Right. Oh, okay. I'm sorry. Well, I'm not an expert in that area, but one of the concerns we have is, again, that the ice-free Arctic, not really being free of ice, as ice breaks off and it's floating, there are obviously navigational hazards associated with that. So it becomes a very complicated navigational area. So I think that's a good question. I think that's a good question. I think that's a good question. Navigational area when you're talking about ice that's floating and breaking off of glaciers and so forth. The effects on tribal communities, very much a part of the presidential document that they are included in the decision-making. And as we've seen just in the run-up to the drilling by Shell, there have been hundreds of interactions with the tribal communities in Alaska to involve them in the process and to obtain their input. That's taken place not only from a federal perspective, but also by Shell directly, so that they're included in that. And from an environmental protection standpoint, very much a part of our environmental planning to make sure that we have the tribal elders input into what would need to be protected and to include them in any decision process should there be an environmental emergency. Before we conduct an exercise or an operation on the North, we actually go and ask first, get their permission. Before we went into Resolute to Doonanook and back to this issue, we actually met with the mayor of the town and asked him, sat with him, do you want us here if he would have said no? We would not have showed up and he then wanted us back the second year which is a good sign. Which clearly for us speaks to that. We've appreciated it, understood perhaps many of the important dynamics of how things work there. And back to a change, there is a change. I never get into the why. All I can tell you is I see a change. I've talked to many, many folks who live in the North when I was there and they would tell you they've actually seen the change. Places in previous years where they could go out with a ski due to go out and do fishing, they now go out with a boat. I'm not trying to say that's everywhere but enough for me to hear that from them they also see the change and changing migration of animals. So you hear it from those that are living there. They're just scientific, sitting down and mapping it out. People on the ground who live it and see it every day are seeing the change. On satellites, a great, great brilliant question and I think it is an area perhaps where the communities can all come together be it either with satellites or maybe you need satellites that are going to give you weather communications, give you imagery, so there's a number of different areas and perhaps we can work collaboratively. Perhaps not to share the images but to do that. Perhaps with UAVs but again as a reminder, UAVs on domestic soil are very different legal construct than another place. So it can be done. We're thinking about it. We actually, last year, took a tactical level UAV and tested it and trialed it up in operation in Resolute. So we had it up, it did some Coast Guard iceberg spotting for us. It gave it some requirements, here's 10. Go out and have this thing, find it, the analysts sat down. So it is possible and those are all areas being out of UAVs, satellites, all different satellites, communications, weather and imagery that we could come together and cooperate on given in some cases a prohibitive cost to have that. If you agree, which I think most of our work shows, the sense function or sensing if I gave you a dollar, where would you put it? I put it in the sense function to ensure you have that sense of what's going on to be able to get people where they need to be. I would agree with that. I think there's tremendous opportunities there for collaboration on sensors and for information sharing, improving our domain awareness. Given the shared interest and safety for the region and environmental protection and the question on law to see, I'm not going to answer the political aspect of that because as far as when should it be, I think that is an issue before political leadership. I will tell you from a Coast Guard perspective we've gone on record as supporting ratification. The U.S. Navy has done the same Chief of Naval Operations in the past has done that. There's widespread support among the commercial maritime industry. So there are benefits that we recognize as operating agencies and as vessel operators to ratification. But ultimately will we and when is a political issue? From a Canadian perspective we're working very hard to put our submission together and there's a lot of focus and effort to get it done. For us it's important for the same reasons. It's about rule of law, rule of the seas, rights of passage and the like. So we understand the need to work with the government right now has worked very hard. High priority is the Arctic is the north with its strategies and the like and its focus. And I throw this out, our Prime Minister comes to every one of our operation in the nooks in the month of August. Gets on a plane, forgets everything else, comes up and visits it to ensure and goes across the north to ensure that the message is out there to show that this is important for the government and for Canadians and is part of the government's platform. There's a question about seasonality too which I think is important to address because in many ways the gnome experience is a good example of that. Yes, this is very seasonal. The human activity up there will peak in the summer months and will then taper off as you get closer to winter but how precise is that tapering off? What we saw with gnome is some coastal storms precluded the delivery of fuel on its regular schedule at the tail end of the shipping season making it impossible for the normal supply vessel to get in there and that precipitated a need for an ice capable tanker which did not exist in the U.S. inventory commercial inventory so the company signed a contract with a Russian tanker the Renda to go in there but Renda couldn't go in unaided so Healy on its way back from its science mission was diverted to escort Renda into gnome and was able to get within about a mile of the pier then they had to run a line across the ice to actually deliver the fuel and then break Renda out when that was over and that overall took just about a month to break in and break out how quickly conditions can change and why operators up there have to be extremely careful that same rationale is being applied to Shell they will operate only in the summer season they are expected to basically close up shop about a month prior to the expected end of the actual workable season just to provide that fudge factor so that they will be out of there if there is any real risk of them being locked in by ice what gnome reminded us in Canada and the situation watching it every issue in the Arctic becomes strategic within 24-48 hours so you might think it's small that it's insignificant it all becomes immediately very quickly a strategic issue well thank you both so much John Sumionoff, Admiral Slanart you've helped I think focus an important light on the issues highlighting collaboration, cooperation and I'd like to highlight the need for American leadership in the Arctic whether that's the development of a national economic strategy ratifying on close this is such an important opportunity and I know we will rise to the challenge and we will look forward to a very important drilling season this summer so thank you all so much thank you for joining us