 It has been one month since the coup took place in Niger on July 26. President Mohammad Bazoum was removed by the country's military. Niger has now become the fourth country in the Sahel to witness a coup stemming from anti-Western sentiment after Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Each of these was led by military officers angered by the presence of French and U.S. troops and by economic crises inflicted on their countries apart from the military. The people of Niger have also expressed support for this coup. Tired by years of presence of foreign militaries and exploitation of their minerals, the people of Niger are hopeful of being able to have sovereign control over their land and resources. Meanwhile, the regional bloc Iqours has been outspokenly against these developments. It has imposed sanctions against Niger and it has said that it can even consider a military intervention in the country. However, the neighboring governments of Burkina Faso and Mali have sent troops to Niger in its support. The countries have said that any military intervention against the government of Niger will be taken as an invasion of their own countries. We look at all these developments in Niger and the response by different actors in today's show. We are joined by Prashant here in the studio and we get inputs from Quasiprat Jr., the General Secretary of the Socialist Movement of Ghana. So Prashant, thanks for joining us today. Can you start by giving us an update on what is happening on the ground in Niger right now? So Rangia, as you can see, this is a map of Niger and already we have the bases, the US bases marked out over here, quite an interesting site, US bases in the north, US bases in the south everywhere. And important to mark out this specific base is the Agadez base, which is the second largest drone base in the world. And it's important to note that it's located in Niger. So what has been happening since July 26? A couple of things in the sense that we know that there was a military coup. President Mohammed Bazoum was overthrown. Initially, there was a bit of uncertainty about the people who had overthrown Bazoum itself. In the sense that there were some reports that it was one section of the military, maybe not the whole of the military, et cetera, et cetera. But it turns out that the entire military is in support of the coup and they have basically taken over, they have given themselves a name, it's called a CNSP. And also, they are now talked about, they've also put a civilian in the forefront as well. And they've also talked about the possibility of a transition period as well. So we need to see this coup. I think it's something we'll talk about later as well. But coups have taken parts in many countries in that region. We'll go to some of that. But important to note that this is wrong to sort of consign it as just yet another military coup, because it's part of a larger process that is taking place in the Sahel region as well. And what has been happening in Niger since the 26th of July actually indicates a lot of this process. On the one hand, for instance, we have seen a number of rallies, popular mobilizations taking place. Now, usually, if you read your history, the coups are followed by a complete clampdown. There's very little that takes place immediately after the coup. But in this case, you've seen a lot of mobilizations taking place with very specific demands. Now, what are some of the demands that people are making in these demonstrations? One is, of course, there is a very clear pushback against France. So there is, you know, we're not marked the French bases here or the French presence. There are about, I think, 1500 French troops in Niger as well in addition and the US also as soldiers. So one is a very clear, you know, wave of opposition to France is very, very perceptible in all these rallies that have taken place. Secondly, many of the demands have also moved onto the economic zone. So it's not just purely about the presence of French soldiers who are present in Niger, by the way, it's important to know that French soldiers are present in Niger because they withdrew from other countries who kick them out. So one demand has been the removal of French soldiers. Another key demand has been, you know, France divesting in some senses from the kind of economic stranglehold it has imposed on countries like Niger, many other countries in Africa. That has been a very key part of it. Interesting to know that some of the protesters have been waving Russian flags as well, which also maybe indicates that people see, some people perhaps see Russia as an alternative. But I think the important demand that is being made is that people are saying that we want security and that's really very important for us. And they are very unhappy with basically what France and the US have been saying for the longest time that our soldiers are necessary. You have to have our soldiers in your countries in order to give you security, in order to protect yourself from the Islamist militants. So this narrative is not holding water anymore among the people in the Sahel. That is very clear. It is clear from the earlier coups that took place. It is clear from the coup that took place in Niger. It is clear from the mobilizations that took place after that coup. So these have been some of the demands that have come out, you know, a rejection of French, you know, French dominance over the region. They have also been protests against the US base, by the way, much lesser maybe, because the US has actually played a slightly behind the scenes role since the coup. But they have also been protests demanding the withdrawal of US soldiers as well. Again, very interesting. Now on the other hand, what has happened also is that for the leaders of the CNSP, these mobilizations, I think, have given them a particular amount of backing to take a far more radical position or in the sense or you can interpret it in the sense that they are forced to take a far more radical position because of some of these mobilizations as well. So for instance, you know, I think yesterday or day before, there were reports that the government has asked the French ambassador to leave the country because they did not follow the kind of diplomatic rules that were there. And you know, immediately after there were restrictions on export of uranium, for instance, which is also a big issue as far as they're concerned. So the coup leader here, the coup leaders here definitely riding a wave, riding that wave of mass sentiment. So I think we have to definitely see it in that context, which is that like the coups in Mali in Burkina Faso, this one is also very much driven by, very much centered in what is definitely a mass sentiment among the people. So and that is how I think we analyze it. And you know, if you want to sort of go a bit deeper into it, I think there are also larger questions of colonialism itself, which really have, you know, which has continued for 500 years. And in some sense, this is also in that this moment is also a response to that. Now to understand more about the historical context in which these developments have emerged, we go to Kuwaiti Pratt Jr., the Secretary General of the Socialist Movement of Ghana. Well, West Africa is undoubtedly in turmoil. And the turmoil can be traced to 600 years of history. The 600 years of history would include the period for the transatlantic slave trade, and then subsequently classical colonialism and today's colonialism. You do know that we were captured at a beast of bedding and were the plantations in North America and Europe for the profit of the new capitalist class in those places. Now, under the transatlantic slave trade, we were simply beast of bedding. We had no rights. We had no, you know, there's no space for discussions or constitutions. And so we're just simply beast of bedding. And then under Kraska colonialism, we did not own the resources that were embedded in our souls. And these resources were not exploited for our own benefit. They were exploited for the benefit of the colonial metropolis. Now we are in a new era of new colonialism. In which colonialism is disguised, in which we no longer own our resources. But it must be emphasized that friend colonialism and new colonialism has been much more vicious. And I explain. Now, for example, all friends picking West African countries are compelled to place their foreign reserves in the central bank of France. And therefore, they borrow their own monies and they pay interest on their own money that they have borrowed. Even in some situations, presidential policies did not belong to the people of West Africa. They belong to France and these countries have to pay, you know, rent for their own presidential policies and so on. There has been some resistance over the period. But this resistance is now getting to a crescendo and more and more friends picking people are pouring onto the streets and demanding an end to the exploitation. With specific reference to what is happening in the Sahel, after the murder of Muamua Gaddafi and in the overthrow of his government, many, many, many people who were serving in some forces from West Africa, many, many groups then came down south with their weapons. That led to the emergence of the Azawad liberation movement, which is seeking to create, you know, an independent state of the Azawad in the Sahel. This also was followed by the incursions by the Islamic state, which hopes to establish an Islamic caliphate, you know, across the Sahel. And then of course, we also have the particular problems of Nigeria. Nigeria has half the population of West Africa. Indeed, all of West Africa is just a little over 500 million. And of those, Nigeria has a population of 213 million. So Nigeria largely is behalf the population of West Africa. But in the northeast of Nigeria, you have the Boko Haram insurgency, which has become linked to the Islamic state. And then to the east of Nigeria, you also have the Biafra Secessionist movement. And the Niger Delta area, you have the low intensity civil war. So that broadly is the architecture of West Africa. Ghanaian intelligence tells us that the Islamic insurgents are moving down south and has come beyond Tamali, which is the northern Vietnam capital, and have also established, you know, sleeping cells, you know, across the country. In the last couple of months, these insurgents have attacked Northern Togu. They have also attacked Northern Benin, and they've been active generally in the region. Now, the French and Western militaries have been pretending to be helping these states to fight against the Islamic insurgents. In fact, the French are in Burkina Faso, they are in Mali, they were in Guinea, and they were in Chad as well. As a matter of fact, the United States of America has its second largest drone base in Nigeria. But in spite of the presence of these Western militaries, the fight against the Islamic insurgents was not making any headway at all. Indeed, sometime last year, the Islamic insurgents controlled 60% of the land territory of Burkina Faso, and so on. So people became very alarmed at the growth of Islamic insurgency, the spread of Islamic insurgency, coupled with the poverty of the peoples of these countries, and then also the growing insecurity in the whole of West Africa. And as a result, people in Burkina Faso took the law into their own hands, there was a coup in Burkina Faso, there's been a coup in Mali, there has been a coup in Guinea, and now there's a coup also in Niger. Now, it is significant for us to note that even though Nigeria is said to be the second poorest country in the world, it is home to the largest, second largest drone base of the United States armed forces. It is also the supplier of uranium to France, and indeed if you go to France, every one out of three light bulbs is powered by uranium from Niger. It's important also to note that Niger produces gas and oil, and it's also a major producer of gold. And in spite of all of this, it continues to remain four. So generally this is the background. There's a background towards what is happening in West Africa. Coming back to Prashant, we see one of the demands on the ground being expressed by the people are for the troops from France and the US to leave. We saw some videos circulating that people have surrounded the French military base in the army, the capital city, and they're threatening that they're going to storm the base if the troops don't leave. So do you see that happening? What is the sort of response that France and US have given to these developments? Right. I think we need to analyze the response in two ways. One is of course that France, for instance, I think has been a driving force behind ECOWAS. We'll come to that maybe in the next question or a future question in terms of pushing ECOWAS to give a very strong response. Right. Now, whereas I think the United States has been a bit more cautious in the way they're responding, they of course sent Victoria Nuland, the infamous Victoria Nuland of multiple coups and regime changes to talk to. It's definitely not the best messaging you can get. And now they've also sent another ambassador who also has a background in intelligence. I think her name is Catherine Fitzgibbon if I'm not mistaken. So she's also been sent to Niger as a representative. So whereas France, on the other hand, has been taking a far more aggressive stance, definitely backing ECOWAS. You've seen a lot of French authorities make very inflammatory statements. And in some senses it's understandable because France can actually see its grip kind of slipping out in that sense. And like we said, if you look for instance the ECOWAS countries, so France can actually in some senses see its grips slipping off. So for instance, you see Mali over here, you see Burkina Faso, Guinea, and now we have Niger. And like I said earlier, when Mali says expelled its troops, the French troops, they were actually moved to Niger. And now you have a situation where Niger itself is saying that we don't want these soldiers anymore. And I think this is a legacy of a particular failed approach that France has taken over many, over decades definitely, but also especially since 2013 when it launched, what is called Operation Barkhane. And Operation Barkhane was meant to provide security, was meant supposedly meant to target the Islamist forces. But that has not really happened. In fact, there have been incidents of French troops indulging in violence itself. They have become extremely unpopular. We have reports earlier of say French convoys moving between many of these countries actually facing mass resistance by people, including attacks as well. So it's absolutely not a surprise that France is on the one hand responding very desperately. On the other hand, I think it's writ in many ways is getting limited by the year. I mean, we'll say this is just 10 years ago or nine years ago that you had Operation Barkhane where France was spread all over this region. And now suddenly you have country after country kicking out France and saying that we don't want your soldiers. So I think so despite all the verbal theatrics, the kind of rhetoric that French leaders are indulging in, the fact is that they have very little ability to intervene on the ground. And really their main source of intervention or their main hope in terms of intervention is ECOWAS. So do you think that is going to happen? What kind of response are the ECOWAS given? Will they act on the behalf of France in the US? Right. So I think their politics of ECOWAS is truly fascinating. And I mean, I think we could also go into it a bit later in more detail. But to look at the facts, I think one important thing is that ECOWAS initially made very threatening noises. We need to sort of keep that in mind in the sense that initially it seemed like we were just days away from an ECOWAS intervention. But then after the first set of meetings happened, it turned out that many countries, actually the mood for intervention was not that significant. And I think Nigeria is a very important player over here because the Senate itself apparently said that they were not in favor and they told the president that you should look at your own security issues rather than thinking of sending soldiers over here. Of course, also important to note that Mali and Burkina Faso were very quick in saying that they would see an attack on Niger as an attack on themselves. So that also kind of, I think, made people think a bit. And while countries, for instance, like I think Benin or for that matter, even I think Kodi war as well, promised various levels of engagement or military intervention. There was a lot of deep, deep seated opposition inside these countries. Also very important to note that Ghana also, there's been a considerable amount of internal opposition. And in many cases, I think this internal opposition forced ECOWAS leaders to sort of slightly, you know, take the slightly step on the brakes. And that is what you see in terms of the nature of pronouncements changed. The chiefs of staff of ECOWAS said, of course, that there is still scope for military intervention. They said that we've even decided a D-day. But they also said there's space for diplomacy. And ECOWAS delegation did end up visiting Niger. They met the leaders of the CNSP. They also met Bazum. And so now we are in this realm of negotiations, the stock of transition, et cetera, et cetera. So I think it's quite possible that many of the ECOWAS leaders are, you know, while presenting a very aggressive front are in some senses also hoping that they will not have to, you know, engage in this kind of a military intervention, which is definitely bound to be deeply unpopular in their own in their own countries. And and as many have pointed out, this is this is quite a disastrous scenario. You have basically, you know, the ECOWAS almost split. If you look at it geographically, definitely split vertically. But, you know, even in terms of population, Mali and Burkina Faso and Guinea and all are substantial countries. So it's very difficult for, you know, for an all out war to be launched. And obviously none of this addresses the core issue of security, which is what the big argument is in order. This is for security of the people, right? So in fact, it is likely to make many of these Islamist insurgencies even worse. So I think in terms of when you look at what the flow of news, so to speak, the kind of comments that are coming out, if you're definitely seeing a pause, but definitely, but still very much too early to declare outright that there is no chance of an intervention, because it does seem like the arrangements have been made. But I think it's possible that many of the leaders are looking for a way out. Right. And to understand further the nature of ECOWAS and its member countries, we go back to Quasie Pratt Jr. First of all, there's a pretension that the states in ECOWAS are democratic. That is very, very far away from the truth. As a matter of fact, when ECOWAS met in Abuja and took the decision to restore former president of Nigeria, at the meeting was Alassan Wotara, who was president of La Cuevue Givoire. Now, it's important to recognize that Alassan Wotara himself is the beneficiary of a coup d'etat, which was organized by the French military against Lorraine Baguio. Alassan Wotara was basically installed by the French as president of La Cuevue Givoire. It's important also to recognize that if you take a country like Senegal, Senegal now is in turmoil, with many percent leaders having been arrested, with the police firing tear gas and rubber bullets against protesters in the streets, it's a very serious turmoil. You take a country like Sierra Leone, and Sierra Leone is also in turmoil. Only a couple of weeks ago, the Sierra Leone government had to arrest and detain several military officers on suspicion of plotting to overthrow it and so on. Now you have the president of Nigeria, who is the chairperson of ECOWAS, and the president of Nigeria himself. I mean, the elections that brought him to power is still being disputed. As a matter of fact, the matter is still before the court. And questions have been raised about why, in spite of the fact that his legitimacy is being still questioned, the legal base of his election is still being questioned. His peers in ECOWAS found it necessary to elect him as chairperson of ECOWAS. That matter has still not been resolved. Now, if you look at elections generally in West Africa, I mean, they are questionable. There have been many questions raised about the legitimacy of those elections. I mean, vote buying is normal in West Africa. Politicians discipline loads and loads of money in order to be able to win elections. Direct rigging of elections is also very common in West Africa. Indeed, in the last elections in Ghana, nine people died. Nine people died in the last elections in Ghana. There has been no investigation. There has been no punishment. Nothing is taking for normal and so on. So, when you have a situation where elections results are procured through bribery of the electorate, through the influence of money, through violence and so on, the legitimacy of those elections themselves raised substantial questions about the quality of the elections and so on. Now, then it's important also to recognize that if you take La Côte d'Ivoire, for example, Alassan Wataral really amended the constitution, the national constitution, to give himself a third term when the national constitution limited him to only two terms. That raises questions about the quality of the so-called democratic practice in La Côte d'Ivoire, you understand. So, all over West Africa, these legitimate questions are being raised about the quality of elections and to go to war, to restore democracy, which is so defective, it's itself very, very problematic. So, Prashan, coming back to you again, there are reports, there are rumors emerging that, you know, a new bloc could emerge in the Sahel region. Is that, do you see that happening? Well, that's a, you know, talking about blocs is a bit, it's a bit complicated always. We just saw Finnish bricks. We saw, you know, how many years it took for bricks to emerge as a bloc. And even now it is not a full-fledged bloc maybe in terms of demands. But so, I think, you know, let's, keeping the word bloc aside, I think definitely that there are certain key demands that are very much, you know, on very much front and center for a lot of these movements. And so, we're not talking just about these countries where coups have taken place, but across this entire region. I mean, I think all of these regions, there are definitely certain key questions. And I think one, of course, like we said, is the question of security, is the question of foreign military intervention, there is a question of financial, you know, autonomy as well, which France has long denied many of these countries. So, all of these are, I think, very much questions which are in the minds of people. Important to also know another very significant country, Senegal, which is kind of, which might be a small country. But, you know, a very important one is President Maki Saal has been long one of the, considered one of the leaders of the region. Maki Saal also facing a lot of protest within his country as well, which are on very similar lines. So, what we're definitely seeing is, I think, there is this wave of protests, this wave of movements against what are called the Stooges of the West or the Stooges of the French. And there's a lot of resentment against the local leadership, which has in fact failed to address the aspirations of the people, which has failed to provide security to these people. And it is in this context that many of these schools have taken place. And interesting, I think, last time, last month or so, we saw the leader of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Thauri. He had gone to St. Petersburg for that Africa-Russia conference. And the way he spoke, you know, there were definitely echoes of Thomas Sankara. And that's also he kind of presents himself in his beret and the kind of rhetoric he's used. Definitely echoes of Thomas Sankara. So it's interesting that someone like Sankara is coming back to the politics of the region as years after he was assassinated. But not just Sankara, we're talking about the legacy of liberation movements as well, the legacy of various movements which are very strong in this region, but which over time were destroyed with the aid and the assistance of the Western powers. So, you know, we have Sekotore, Modibo, Keta, all these important leaders of this region, many of whose legacies are basically pretty much torn apart. And now there is an attempt in some senses to sort of revive those legacies and to pose those fundamental questions. And I think the other important question is of resources as well. And many of these countries are willing to see that if they can get a better deal for their resources, if they can get a better deal where, you know, they're not just exporters of resources and or just spaces for being exploited by companies from abroad, but if there are, if they can be countries which have a say in how these resources are being used. And if the money that comes from these resources can be used in a more equitable way, in a more, you know, in a way that is better suited for the development of people as a whole. And I think that's really the challenge for many of these authorities as well, that on the one hand, they need to guarantee security for the people. But on the other hand, they also need to address these aspirations. We know that Africa is a very young population. And you know, many of the countries in this region are expected to grow both economically and in terms of population considerably in the coming years, which means that in some senses, it's not wrong to say that the future of humanity itself will largely depend on these regions, many of these countries. So even the leaders of these schools who have taken over, they have a very difficult challenge in the sense that they need to address those aspirations as well. So very interesting moment, I think, for the region as a whole and also for the entire world. Right Prashant. And going back to Niger, what are the demands of the people? What do they want? What are their ambitions? And what do they want from a new government? Let's go back to Kuwaiti. Well, basically, the people of West Africa expect that they'll be able to own their own resources and exploit these resources for their own benefit. I mean, if you take the case of Niger, there is the case of Ariba, who is responsible for mining uranium in Niger. Ariba is made up of two subsidiaries, one in Niger and one in France. The one in Niger actually mines the uranium and the one in France buys the uranium, two subsidiaries of the same company. Ariba was paying Niger 5% royalties and the people of Niger were so angry and they demanded 12.5%. The negotiations took years to complete because Ariba was not interested in acceding to the demands of the people of Niger. Now, when Ariba finally acceded to the demands of the people of Niger and promised to pay 12.5%, what it actually paid was less than the 5% it had been paying much earlier. Now, how did this happen? It simply lowered the prices of uranium in Niger and managed to pay through smart accounting far less, you know, royalty than it was paying before. This is annoying. Only about 20, 23% of the people of Niger have access to electricity. If you go to France, one out of every three bulbs is powered by uranium from Niger. This is an unfair situation. This is what the peoples of West Africa are kicking against. The peoples of West Africa want to have their own currency because their dependent on the CFA front compels them to deposit their foreign reserves in the central bank of France. And I would have thought that the way out is for the West African states to make good their promise of establishing the West African currency, you understand. Unfortunately, that has not happened and the people of Niger continue to be exploited because West Africa has not been able to create a monetary zone and to develop a currency for trading in West Africa and so on. So the people are kicking against their exploitation, but also they are kicking against the visible manifestation of French power. That is the presence of French troops. I mean, I saw a video of French soldiers searching cars, you know, in Niaming, the capital of Niger. How come after 60, 70 years of independence, you still have French troops on the streets, you know, conducting patrols, searching cars and so on. And this visible manifestation is so annoying to the peoples, French-speaking peoples of West Africa and has helped to fuel the resistance. So that was Crazy Pride Junior giving us the latest from Niger. And this is all we have in this episode. And for more such stories, visit our website, peoplesespass.org and all our social media handles on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. Thank you for watching.