 Good morning and welcome to this conference on this very warm Canberra day here at ANU at the National Security College here in the Crawford Building. It's my real pleasure to welcome you. I'm Rory Medcalf. I'm head of the National Security College and you'll hear a bit more from me shortly. I just wanted to say one or two things before I introduce the Vice-Chancellor of the University, Professor Brian Schmidt, to officially open proceedings. Just a reminder that the conference today on strengthening Australia, Japan, US security cooperation challenges and prospects in the Indo-Pacific is very much on the record. So please bear that in mind as you make comments throughout the day. Please also now put your mobile phones on silent. Don't turn them off if you feel like tweeting because we are on the public record and we would like to generate debate with the event today. I'll say a little bit more shortly but to begin with I'd like to welcome and introduce Professor Brian Schmidt, the Vice-Chancellor of ANU. Now Professor Schmidt needs little introduction to most of you. He's the 12th Vice-Chancellor of ANU and it's I think 12 months precisely since you've taken the helm. Among other things driving I think a very engaged approach by ANU to policy and to challenges out there in the world and there are plenty of those at the moment. I suspect we'll reflect on as the day goes on. Regarding Professor Schmidt's academic career, not a lot I need to say. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physics in 2011. I probably won't say more but I think that speaks for itself. Professor Schmidt please over to you. Ladies and gentlemen welcome to the ANU. Before we start I'd like to acknowledge and celebrate the first Australians on whose traditional lands we meet today. Hey my respects to the elders of the Ngunnawal people past and present. Welcome to this conference on trilateral security cooperation between Australia, Japan and the United States. Hosted here at the ANU and this is exactly the type of event we like to do at ANU and I cannot think of a more important time to be doing things like this as the normal political channels at least from my observation post are a little clog compared to what they normally are. It's obviously most timely for us to be meeting to discuss the future strategic environment here in the Indo-Pacific region and especially the role that the United States and its allies can play in maintaining security and stability. It almost goes without saying that U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan will be watching very closely the decisions, declarations coming out of Washington in the months, days, weeks ahead. In this world of complex change and apparent unpredictability the intersection of what happens inside nations, what happens in the wider world of geopolitics is increasingly evident and important. That nexus of domestic and international security is where the National Security College or NSC seeks to make a special contribution to policy teaching and research. It's a unique institution here in Australia in the world and a joint initiative between the Australian government and this university. From my point of view it's one of those parts of ANU where we can simultaneously be a great university and make policy impact. In doing so it leverages its links with other parts of the university such as for example our College of Engineering and Computer Science on cyber security working with the College of Asian Pacific Studies and the ANU Strategic and Defense Study Center in teaching, research and outreach. The National Security College pursues its mission to improve the quality of policy and policy thinking in three ways. First, through executive professional education almost 3,000 Australian officials have been trained since 2010 and I also note that we're working with other institutions. Earlier this month we signed an MOU on behalf of the university with the leading Japanese institution, the Graduate Institute of Policy Studies which will enable us to have joint activities such as joint delivery and executive training courses in Japan, Australia or third countries. Secondly the NSC has achieved significant growth in academic education and research including masters and PhDs programs. It may be unfortunately signed at the times but the Masters of National Security registered one of ANU's fastest growing enrollments in 2016. It is indeed interesting times. And third through policy engagement such as trustable roundtable discussions and publications with practical recommendations such as a paper released last week on how Australia should respond to the Trump administration. Another way that the NSC makes seeks to make an impact on policy in the international debate is through public events like today's conference. Last year the NSC convened four international conferences including one on Indo-Pacific maritime security that had speakers such as Admiral Scott Swift, the commander of the US 7th Fleet, who I had a good chance to meet. Today I'm pleased once again to see the NSC working with the support of the Japanese embassy and I note the ambassador and Japanese ambassador welcome again to the ANU to foster policy discussions around regional security challenges and opportunities. I welcome our distinguished international speakers including former Japanese minister for defense Professor Satoshi Morimoto, Dr. Amy Searight the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense will be hearing from you in just a second and I wish you well with your discussions today. I thank you all for bringing your work and being willing to work with here us at ANU and the National Security College and creating a tangible bridge between academia and policy. Now is the time for this to occur. We need to have discussions they do have the opportunity to have big impact so I wish you well with your discussions. I look forward to seeing the outcomes of today and understanding better how you all think the experts things are going to go because I have to admit it's of intense interest not just for me as a physicist but I think the entirety of Australia and this part of the world. So good luck today and my best of luck in your discussions. I think the candor and frankness in the conversation that we're going to have today will reinforce the value of allies and partners talking to one another and frankly helping one another help themselves and also help allies and partners from harming their own interests in some circumstances too. So with that note I'm going to segue straight into our our first session our first formal session for the conference we have three I think really excellent speakers for this session who represent through their own careers not only the trilateral relationship among Australia the United States and Japan but also that intersection of practical policy and policy leadership security practice and also deep academic and policy thinking about the issues of concern. So for this first session I'm going to introduce our speakers I'll begin with the Honourable Satoshi Morimoto former Minister of Defense from Japan who I think joined us only yesterday I hope you had a restful journey Professor. We welcome Professor Morimoto because his own experience as Minister of Defense for Japan but also more recently as senior advisor or special advisor to the Japanese Foreign Minister and a number of other roles in really helping to inform relationships in the region has really I think had an impact on the security partnership between Australia and Japan and with the United States. I note also that Professor Morimoto is no stranger to academia as well and among other roles at the moment serves as I believe the the Chancellor of Takushoku University in Japan but has also worked in very other distinguished roles in policy and academia throughout his career. So Professor Morimoto I'll invite you to give some opening remarks. This session just before just to remind you is on the record and is very much about setting the scene so that we can take stock of the quality, the strength and the challenges for the key relationships Australia, Japan but also US, Japan, US, Australia lives is. Please Professor Morimoto the floor is yours. First of all on behalf of our people I would like to great thanks to the Australian side especially Prime Minister Turnbull, who received Mr Abe very warmly and now the Japan-Australia relationship is coming to the new stage of a very close security partnership and cooperative relationship between both countries. I have some experience when I was the Defense Minister I joined the two-plus meeting in 2012 in Sydney not here but after we arrived to the Sydney I have received a message from Prime Minister. Okay two ministers should be back as soon as possible to Tokyo because the Chinese ships are coming to Senkaku. Then we have a quick quick discussion with Australian side and it took five minutes shower in Otero lobe and so our trip was a three-day trip north state and so I have a very bad impression to the Sydney but this is a camera and I'm very comfortable especially we have a very excellent new Defense Minister Tokyo if North Korea launch new type of ICBM against us I think a new Defense Minister can deal with very well but anyway we had many a change in the confusion on the last 10 days since the inauguration day of new U.S. President Trump in Washington. We have sought many perspective and a huge prospect which we might not have if Hillary won the election so in this context I think we have to say a great thanks to Mr. Trump but Japanese media relatively critical to Mr. Trump's behavior and policy guideline however we have to think about how the devote enjoyed by United States for its war in especially Afghanistan and Iraq and other place in Middle East was growing un-ch American is and financial deficit and popular war fatigue then many Americans people are satisfied frustrated discontent to the contribution and making a sacrifice for outcome of U.S. overseas military innovation we have to think about the serious division among American society due to the increasing negative side effect of globalization very efficiency very efficiently or minority so that the inequality kept increasing and the problem kept dipping it has all been carried out in the name of international security peace but in the end was not the price paid by only a small portion of the free land would it not be better to focus on one's own national interest domestic security and the lives of its own people this kind of feeling is widespread is not only a United States but also European society alike it was a eruption of this sentiment that gave a birth to the Trump administration seeing from this viewpoint the appearance of Trump administration itself may be a historical inevitable it is my feeling so it is expected that this trend will be pronounced also in a european election of this year this may be a beginning of historical turning point that reject the democratic internationalism the even alliance orientation and free trade and economic cooperation maintained by international community throughout the post or to war or to error if we think about it in this way the nature of Trump administration become somewhat understandable it is not a traditional republican administration it does contain the some element from Reagan and Nixon administration but there is no sign of pronounced convictions or national strategy unfortunately so far impending issues of immigration policy including construction of war between us and Mexico and cooperative tax cut infrastructure spending repeating obama care and withdrawing from tpp not the national strategy but nothing more than symptomatic treatment measure for the time being new administration will make new policy team and they will be debating what the strategy to devise the coming age to us allies this present opportunity for policy recommendation to washington even so there are several north was the point among those that us present address during his campaign first as you know there is a notion of american first more than shared values this prioritize the us national interest which probably imply that allies should shoulder more of responsibility previously carried by us if so it become imperative for all allies the nation to ask the americans to clear clearly point out what shared interests they pursue what significance the alliance holds for them what law they expect they arise to fulfill the second trump administration especially although the us will restore and strengthen its military forces it will not police the world it may maintain the rebalance but yet when it's come to vital national interest the united state is sure to act decisively through hard hitting type of limited military intervention to share the national interest especially a middle east us may turn a blind eye to russian ukraine conflict over Crimea lifting russia strike is against is it will give up the supporting anti-government level forces in Syria instead of the a third or control of their country it's may push to scrap nuclear freeze agreement programs deal with Iran as a result of this sympathetic treatment there will a lift and the us european relations antagonism between ira and the south arabia the fear of nuclear proliferation and russia advancement in the middle east i think this is a serious my serious concern russia will be seeing a partner that can be negotiated with compromise with the united state it will seem the president trump likes to make a deal with the major power but it is very risky business on the other hands it be a it will be a mistake to view the asia in the same way the chinese ambition is hegemony over the india indoe asian pacific region it seems that us think it can be a make a deal with china but that is a mistake and since trump administration has not many asian specialists so far it is a us allies role to warn them the thirdly the trump administration a protectionist economic policy will lead growing inequality and disappointment of the supporter it is fine if they can dissolve the federal deficit through industrial structuring and income redistribution but the post cold war international community has decided has developed thanks to economic cooperation pointing out the problem of protectionism is also arisenation law new defense secretary mr mattis is is is visit to japan next week as you know japan intend to reaffirm and emphasize the importance of u.s japan alliance and discuss with mr mattis how to reinforce alliance cooperation and management between both country i personally don't think mr mattis will raise japan host nation support issue mainly because new defense secretary probably understood how much our country has a significant financial contribution to the host nation support which is almost five billion us that has almost one tenth of defense budget over the 70 percent of total operational cost of us force in japan however he may raise additional defense effort including increasing a defense budget president trump as you know very well as emphasize u.s alliance has to share the cost as a nation for the peace and stability in the international community the five country among a 28 NATO country reach the defense budget uh to lower to two percent of gdp japan defense budget is is uh is going to uh uh under the midterm defense programs uh by the year of 2018 is expected to increase just only a 0.8 percent in average compared to previous year for example next year fiscal year 2017 defense budget request is five trillion 125 uh billion yen it's almost five uh almost 50 uh billion us that has one point five one to four percent increase compared to previous year 0.926 of gdp i don't think mr trump satisfied this three year but large scale over defense budget is a very important political decision government uh uh uh bureaucrat cannot deal with such kind of very important decision by ourselves but even we increase the defense budget and to purchase american defense equipment uh almost 70 percent of our procurement budget of defense equipment is uh is almost a whole or fms if we increase this money our defense industry cannot enjoy the profit and we cannot expect the rehabilitation or development of uh technology of our defense industry so uh if uh this is my thought that if we increase the defense budget we would like to uh make a joint uh development production programs among nation for such as uh u.s. japan australia and uh i think with that will be also profitable to japan defense industry uh we have to uh speculate something like a regional conflict mess up between us and neighbor neighboring country therefore uh what uh japan need to do is strengthen reinforce is our defense forces while making effort to change the quality of allied cooperation and increase the supplement of function and roles of us forces in india passive region i think this is uh most important to rather than increase and defense budget figure itself risk are much faced and there is a need to deal with cyberspace and technological and economic criminal activities to contribute the u.s. third offset strategy scientific and technological cooperation is indispensable moreover there is a need for major that expand us japan uh joint using a base and facility and improve risk support capacity and operational support capability in the surrounding area to us forces uh the most important agenda for our alliance is how us and its allies nation will support and cooperate in order to deal with china especially as their maritime advancement it is imperative that the us and japan on the same page when it's come to china strategy as regards the japanese relations with trump administration seeing that they presently lack of a fixed comprehensive strategy instead pursue the itemized approach setting up a close-knit consultative body at the highest level to deal with chinese strategy is a major of utmost by importance i uh have to uh stop my remarks too long i uh quite frankly i would like to uh uh more uh on a trilateral security relationship in uh in a context of india passive region but i skip my uh points that we have to watch very carefully which direction the new uh u.s. administration going to uh it is premature to conclude the nature of trump administration and uh we have to wait the policy maker team not only white house but also a state and pentagon and the some other ministry uh to make a more comprehensive uh us strategy and then uh we uh would like to react how to cooperate uh us government in in the future so uh so far our term our task is watching very carefully not to move fast and uh also uh we uh believe that uh alliance is still very important deterrence capability to maintain the peace and stability in the world i think this is uh very simple conclusion but i think this is most important element of our security cooperation among three nations thanks so much thank you very much professor morimoto and i think your remarks have captured not only uh the depth and the richness of these relationships particularly uh the u.s. japan alliance but also the gravity of the the issues at stake in getting these relationships right and getting the consultative frameworks right in a changing strategic environment so uh thank you for those remarks i'll um you mentioned uh the question of whether we should give the trump administration time as we see who begins to fill key positions uh not only in the white house but pentagon and state as well so that's kind of a useful a useful note for me uh with which to introduce our next speaker uh dr amy c right uh and amy thank you for making the journey over here uh from the united states and what i know is a is a busy busy busy schedule so dr c right uh was uh until recently the deputy assistant secretary of defense for south and southeast asia from 2014 to 2016 so in the pentagon in the barma administration uh and she's had a really exceptional career across a range of agencies in u.s. government including uh working in agency for international development other positions senior positions at dod uh elsewhere in state and of course positions in the policy and think tank community outside of government as well council on foreign relations and elsewhere uh presently she's the director of the southeast asia program at csis the center for strategic and international studies in washington dc and amy i think we're all waiting to hear what you have to say about an american perspective on the issues for consideration here today please thank you for inviting me here it's a pleasure to take part in these discussions um during my time in the pentagon i worked on directly on all five of our treaty allies in the asia pacific and since we're on the record i won't talk about favorite allies but uh it is a really great opportunity to talk about um these two alliances you know what a world uh we're living in right now very interesting times i think we would be having a very different conversation if we were holding this uh six months ago when certain kinds of continuity i think would be assumed but now of course the elephant in the room that's already been mentioned many times so perhaps it's not really an elephant in the room um but it's uh you know it is the new president of the united states president trump and the turmoil he is injecting into the geostrategic markets so to speak um and i'll say a few more words about him in the end but but getting back uh stepping back a bit and looking at the u.s. japan alliance and the us australia alliance um you know i think it's fair to say they are are at real historic high points the alliances have been modernized and updated according to each ally's strategic outlook it's changing strategic outlook and in particular it's changing perceptions of china um there's been a great amount of effort put into building alliance maritime cyber and space capabilities and expanding joint exercises and training starting with the u.s. japan alliance um this alliance was deepened significantly with the 2015 defense guidelines which are intended to make alliance cooperation and operations more seamless flexible and effective including in gray zone conflicts such as the rising tensions that japan is facing with china in the east china sea but um also importantly um the guidelines build new uh areas of cooperation in the alliance in cyber and in space and ballistic missile defense um and the guidelines also envision a regional and global role um for the u.s japan alliance in areas like maritime security and peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations um and also notable was the new alliance coordination mechanism the a c m that was created in the in the in the guidelines so that the alliance will have more seamless and integrated coordination even in peacetime in addition to the guidelines there's also been a real effort to improve defense trade and technology sharing in the u.s japan relationship and um and the united states uh department of defense has been stationing its most advanced systems in japan including global hawks um cv-22 ospreys and now the first deployments of the f-35 joint strike fighters um to japan the first deployment in asia the u.s australia alliance has long been strong australia is perhaps uh the most reliable ally that the united states has and the cooperation that we've had in iraq syria and afghanistan over the past decade and a half has really strengthened our interoperability uh in many ways in dealing with these kinds of conflicts but the alliance took a significant step forward in uh with the 2014 force posture agreement and the recent cost sharing agreement that was just recently signed the force posture agreement provides a long-term framework for rotational marine presence in darwin and us aircraft rotations at tindall as well as expanding uh expanded joint training and exercises while these rotational forces and assets are here in australia the recent cost sharing agreement provides the way forward for burden sharing to develop the infrastructure to support the full rotations of marines and aircraft and these force posture initiatives really open a new chapter in the alliance one that shifts the primary focus from discrete operational cooperation into the middle in the middle east to a new focus on alliance cooperation designed to shape a benign security environment in the into a pacific region uh and deal with a rising peer competitor namely china uh which which carries out it's a very different kind of challenge a much broader set of challenges as richard fontaine uh put it in a recent article that he wrote on the us australia alliance it is in asia where the alliance is greater importance and most difficult tests will likely arise it's also important to note that us australia alliance cooperation um has taken great strides in recent years in maritime security space and cyber um and we've had very deep levels of intel sharing which remains a real critical pillar of the alliance and extremely valuable to both countries stepping back from these two alliances and looking more broadly at the us alliance system it's important to note that in many ways this alliance system has been transforming away from the hub and spoke kind of model to a more network system of alliances and emerging partnerships secretary carter described this emerging architecture as a principled security network one that ties together our most capable allies like japan and australia along with a broad network of security partners in the region um but at its core these high-end most most capable allies japan and australia are key to maintaining deterrence and continuing to shape the regional security order by maintaining an inclusive architecture open economies and adherence to long-lasting rules and norms including things like freedom of navigation that have served us all so well over the past seven decades but a few features of this new emerging more networked approach to alliances and partnerships um include the following first there's been a shift away from the traditional focused on northeast asia to include south and southeast asia and here australia becomes even more important as a node in this network given its geographic position and its strong relationships with many countries in the region but notably the philippines singapore and indonesia um second uh this new network really seeks to include emerging partners in exercises and training and in strategic dialogue on key challenges and threats and potential collective responses so a couple of examples here that i think are particularly noteworthy um involve india first uh convincing india to include japan as a permanent participant in our buy in our in our flagship naval exercise malabar and hopefully we will manage to get australia included um in the coming years um and also engaging uh the in a u.s. japan india trilateral strategic dialogue uh where there's a lot of focus in that dialogue on long term maritime security challenges in the indoe pacific and how we can work together to address them and third there's been a real attempt to try to encourage the spokes in the old hub and spokes uh alliance network um to encourage the spokes to connect more with each other to build stronger defense ties and strategic partnerships and here the growing strategic partnership between japan and australia uh is a case in point in point it's one that um you know has been really applauded um by the united states and some of the recent accomplishments have already been mentioned the recent axa agreement and information sharing agreement and hopefully uh conclusion soon on a reciprocal status of forces agreement um but you know building uh more spoke to spoke cooperation at the bilateral trilateral and multilateral level um i think is really key to this sort of new approach going forward and trilateral cooperation between the united states japan and australia um is really important here and i know we're going to have time to talk about specific trilateral cooperation later this afternoon but let me just go through a few opportunities that face both alliances and separately but also our trilateral relationship first i think there's opportunities especially in the maritime domain when it comes to building interoperability and capabilities in undersea warfare amphibious capabilities and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance also in technological cooperation uh the third offset strategy that was announced by the pentagon two years ago aims to offset growing chinese and and and russian military capability by investing in game changing technologies such as artificial intelligence unmanned systems and hypersonics and i think the real opportunities to partner with both australia and japan as these technologies are being developed third building partner capacity i think there i think that the the recent us southeast asia maritime security initiative which aims to build partner capabilities in southeast asia in areas like maritime domain awareness and build up other maritime capability maritime security capabilities that provides a real opportunity to work bilaterally or trilaterally with australia and japan to coordinate efforts to build up those kinds of capabilities and finally there are huge opportunities to work with key emerging partners like india in particular if true quadrilateral coordination in the maritime domain in the india pacific could be achieved that would be a real strategic game changer but of course there are many challenges so what are the challenges well first there are strategic challenges um china's tactics in the south china sea which have included massive land reclamation and building up military infrastructure on these reclaimed outposts and pointedly rejecting international law like the recent orbital tribunal ruling um creates real strategic and tactical challenges in how to effectively counter growing chinese coercion and how to reassure allies and partners that we've got their back the combination of china's assertiveness in the south china sea and its economic overtures has changed the calculations of some countries the philippines comes to mind but many others as well which really complicates the task of coalition building and building strong resilient building a strong resilient security network another potential strategic challenge could be a divergence in the strategic objectives especially between the united states and australia since australia itself has some degree of divergence or perceived divergence between its economic and security interests when it comes to china's rise and china's willingness to use economic coercion in the face of a conflict there are also political challenges what happens if the underlying political support of these alliances go wobbly um looking at japan prime minister abe looks to be in a very strong domestic political situation and the securities choices that he has made including much stronger commitments to cooperation in the alliance framework seems to have pretty solid domestic support so i think the political concerns here are not are less immediate but of course domestic politics in japan could always shift and the realignment of forces in okinawa remain stymied by local political opposition which could give rise to some bilateral friction that needs to be managed um what about australia well the the u.s alliance is very popular in australia it's very popular in the abstract but support falls off when australians are asked about concrete policy choices such as joining the united states and defending japan or pushing china from militarized outposts in the south china sea so the gap between public opinion and the views of national security elites here in australia could create you know create some degree of risk that in a contingency australian leaders will find their hands uh somewhat tied and this risk may be growing if overall public support for the alliance begins to decline in australia in response to the unpopularity here of donald trump and his policies so this brings me to the new administration under donald trump um it's been quite a week it's hard to believe it's been only one week that he has been in office um you know the big question is how the big questions we had when he was coming on board is how would he translate his campaign promises into actual policy and the two campaign promises or rhetoric that i think most are most important for asia were his discussions his his um uh you know what he said about tpp the trans-pacific partnership and what he said about alliances and burden sharing well on tpp on day one he did what he said he would do he withdrew the united states from tpp this is a huge strategic setback for the united states as well as all of the tpp partners there's very little sign as of yet that trump and his team will reconsider coming on board tpp although the logic of us participation in tpp on both economic and strategic grounds remains incredibly strong and and by the way remains pop remains you know public polling in the united states continue to show that the tpp has majority support and some of trump's supporters that come from rural areas uh for example that are heavily dependent on agricultural exports um that would have expanded under tpp and maybe hurt in a tit for tat kind of trade war or retaliatory um episode with china so you know there is still some hope that the logic of tpp will prevail in the end and we'll get back to figuring out a way to move forward on that um certainly we at csis are advocating that we just put out a a big report the asia economic strategy commission uh the commission was chaired by john huntsman charlene barshowski and evan greenberg and it makes a very strong case to move forward on tpp and you can find it on our website um what about alliances well trump talked a lot about burden sharing and and you know seemed to question the relevance of alliances um he does appear in this case to be backing off from that campaign rhetoric um so you know we can be somewhat reassured after his meeting with british prime minister charisa may this week uh because apparently he made very favorable comments about nato um and of course prior to that when he was still president elect he had uh his first meeting with a foreign leader uh president prime minister abay um and now abay it's been announced he's coming to uh dc for his first official visit february the 10th and it's quite possible that trump and abay will will hit it off rather well um they may share a view they may have a shared view of key security threats in the region um and so i think that these are all um good signs about where trump seems to be going on alliances in asia um president trump is talking about building up the military in particular building up the navy going from a 270 ship navy to a to 350 ships this is a massive undertaking that would take two or three decades to achieve um but there also is likely to be um given republican interest in this in capitol hill um there's likely to be greater a focus on greater readiness of us military forces um and perhaps bringing more assets to the indopacific theater so all of these could create more opportunities for alliance collaboration in the indopacific i also think there's reason to expect that we will see more frequent and consistent freedom of navigation operations and presence activities in the south china sea and the region more broadly which could be useful in my view especially if they are done relatively quietly and let actions speak for themselves rather than tough words but it's still a big question how confrontational president trump and his team want to get with china and how china will respond there was some confusion over uh the statement that the that rex tillerson nominee for secretary of state made at his confirmation hearings over the south china sea um and the presidential spokesperson i think muddy the waters even further when he made more comments i think it added to the um ambiguity i i would say that this is more likely stray voltage of an early administration rather than strategy so i think we would be i think we probably should reserve judgment until the administration really gets its feet on the ground gets fully up to speed on the issues and carefully thinks through their options um but it's worth noting that the trump team on asia i think he's actually shaping up pretty well with general mattis at the pentagon and his first announced trip as secretary defense to asia is a very good sign and i i believe that uh rex tillerson despite the gaff what i would call probably a gaff at his confirmation hearings i think he could be very good very strong on asia and we are also hearing a lot of names of some very good people on asia who may be headed to do d and state so the working level could be quite good which is always really important for alliance management um but there remain a whole lot of unknowns about how this administration will function and what its strategic priorities will be so for example will the trump administration put a lot of investment into continuing to build strategic ties with india and with countries in southeast asia like vietnam and indonesia and malaysia um this takes a lot of high level engagement and a lot of strategic patience in order to make any progress um also will the secretary of state and secretary of defense be given wide latitude to formulate and implement policies for asia with the full backing of the president or will pronouncements and treat and tweets from the white house undermine their authority i think this kind of uncertainty is going to keep us all on our toes in the coming months but it is worse i will end on an optimistic note um similar to my my colleague at the embassy here um the logic of the rebalance to asia remains very strong it's based on the enduring national interests of the united states and it has strong bipartisan support so i think we can expect the commitment and focus on the india pacific region to continue thank you very much thank you thank you very much dr c right and that's uh i think uh framing for the discussion for the rest of the day you've identified uh the state of play with the alliances you've identified some of the challenges not only relating to i guess chinese power and assertiveness but also to the uncertainties that we're seeing within the united states you've pointed out the political context but you've also talked about the the structural opportunities really to keep building these relationships and really keep maybe with a bit of patience from allies and partners getting through a challenging phase i'm going to um for our final remarks of this session invite james goldrick the australian speaker uh rear admiral james goldrick now our professor uh with adjunct roles there are a number of institutions including an u strategic defense studies center has had a very distinguished career in the royal australian navy including as uh in command of the maritime interception force in the persian gulf the australian defense force academy australia's border protection command and the australian defense college and we were colleagues on the defense white paper panel last year uh james the floor is yours thank you thank you rory and uh i'm honored to have been invited to speak as the australian in the first session um what i would say is that much of uh what i've already been thinking about and saying has already been said uh and indeed not only have some of the things i was thinking about being said by the earlier speakers but uh the paper the trump presidency and australian security don't panic don't relax by rory marina and the other members of the team um says a lot of what i'm going to say and therefore i'll try and say it more quickly i'd only make one point about rory marina's paper um seeing that it has the theme of don't panic and having grown up as a teenager with hitchhiker's guide given the current strategic situation i think the paper should have had a towel issued with it as well because the curse that may you live in interesting times hit with a vengeance in 2016 now i was in america for a previous presidential election between a clinton and a george hw bush in what i can only be uh describe as a very very strong republican environment and in that republic environment i seem to be the only person watching the inevitable train smash happen of a clinton victory and a bush defeat as far as the republicans are concerned and the line that struck me about mr clinton that was going to get it was it's the economy stupid well i would say the theme for what is going to happen over the next few years and indeed for the trump presidency is it's the domestic electorate stupid and actually that applies i think for all three countries in this situation so much of what is going to happen is going to be driven by domestic politics and how it will play domestically more so i think in terms of international relations that has been the case for quite a few years now we've talked about the potential unpredictability and i think this will be a very serious question for america's allies and partners and it's not simply an unpredictability of what is done it is going to be a constant unpredictability of what is said we are going to have to find ways of effectively understanding what is the significance and what is meant by tweets interviews and speeches indeed i suspect the whole industry is going to be set up uh akin to the old kremlinologists who would work out exactly what the russians were saying in the cold war i would say that however uh it's true that um the obama administration in regards to china for instance may be in a little too predictable and a little too cautious in its treatment of china and perhaps a little unpredictability might not always be a bad thing furthermore although our government has had a setback over the ttp the indication that the recent executive order on limiting entry to the united states was modified at australia's request to protect the agreement reached in relation to offshore camps must be encouraging for the australian government and i suspect we'll be encouraging for other governments who are watching how these things work so a deal with mr trump may indeed be a deal but i think that's another problem for the future of the alliances because i think the greatest long-term concern for australia and morimoto san has i think touched it from a japan uh viewpoint is the possibility that the trump administration might well do deals with powers like china and russia it has to be accepted as a possibility these might suit the united states government short-term goals but could fundamentally alter the nature of the strategic framework in asia we need to find ways of ensuring that it is understood by those who matter in washington that the longer-term interests of the united states not simply justify but demand a continued leadership role in this region now successive australian governments have had a much more robust relationship with the united states counterparts in private than has sometimes been apparent to the australian public or to indeed other nations and it's actually been a tension in our relationships i think with asian it's been particularly so since 9 11 with constant and increasingly close exchanges allowing common policy to be worked through behind the scenes on many questions and the limits of australian support made very clear to the united states if the trump administration pursues a less consultative approach australia will need to become more public in expressing its opinion on an american initiatives that it does not wholly support i think this is going to be vital but given that this is a problem faced by all america's allies and long-term partners at the moment as we now see playing out in the north american neighborhood and canada i think is having to watch things very carefully just at the moment i think it's unlikely to be the subject of particular tension between australia and the united states but it will add a dimension to the relationship which it has not had for many years japan is in a very similar situation or rather a parallel situation because i think the points of tension won't always be the same but i want to get back to this domestic element and it's been touched on by dr c right it is mentioned in the the paper in relation to domestic opinion the domestic element for both australia and japan in managing their relationship with united states will not and cannot be ignored particularly in australia there's no doubt there are substantial elements of the population who have strong sympathy with the populist approach endorsed by the trump administration the sort of things that are being said but there are equally large groups who are either ill at ease or very strongly opposed to many elements of what seems to be the president's platform certain decisions and certain rhetoric and i get back to it's the uncertainty about what is said is as much of a problem in many ways as the uncertainty of what is done social media has now become a reality of its own could very easily increase the levels of anti-american feeling or at least i would i would actually specify not anti-american feeling but anti-us administration feeling and anti-us alliance feeling i think there are different different aspects to the australian relationship with america which is always a complex one but they could increase the levels of anti-american feeling and i think 45 percent in the pre in the poll that's quoted by the loy poll that's quoted 45 percent of australians said they would have concerns with a trump administration this could influence both decision making and electoral platforms the triggers will not be the same for japan but i think the same situation could develop now we can hope and you know there is this hope for business as usual that a conspiracy of selective moderation to use my own phrase may well have to develop between the governments of america's partners and elements of the trump administration and i would agree with dr c right not only general matters who i think is greatly admired in australia and is a man whose us marine corps facade should never be confused with an intellect that's really remarkable um it's not it's worthwhile not just saying who's appointed but go and look at who's been going to see president trump not always with much publicity there are some seriously seriously serious players talking to him but the moderation will necessarily be extremely selective because mr trump's domestic credibility is largely based on it's not necessarily accepting the status quo at any situation so the trick is going to be to manage the second and third order consequences personal relationships will obviously matter a great deal in the years ahead and if australia and japan have been spending a lot of time in washington in the last decade they're going to have to spend a great deal more because the pressure points are changing but there are people being brought into the cabinet and the upper levels of the administration who have a great deal of substance within their public form as to opportunities however good its intent we've got to accept that australia is going to be constrained by its own economic situation and even though we're a big country we're not that big we face the need to reshape the national economy whether that's going to work depends as much on external developments as internal effort but i think we need to be much more active in managing our strategic environment in a way that has the relationship with the united states as a key element but the rhetoric the theme the public image is much more of our recognition of complexity our uncertain future calls for a much more active or in fact it's not so much that we need to actually be more active but we've got to be seen to be a great deal more active than i think we have been in the last 10 years in multilateral terms dealing with other nations while india speaks of its look east policy evolving to one of act east i think we need to act outwards japan's situation has certain similarities it has political and economic constraints that require both attention to the domestic situation and a willingness to adopt a much more active approach to regional problems it also needs to be seen to act outwards so we may need to take the administer the trump administration at its word and both do more ourselves and to encourage others to burden share both in a military sense and indeed in wider efforts to contribute to regional and national security instability and arguably the development of closer links in the management of many international challenges and i would speak for japan and australia that i think we need to do much more together in the southwest pacific than we have in the past even though we've done a lot maybe much more straightforward and should be given much more publicity than the measures for a deeper military relationship focused on improving shared capability for high intensity operations and dr searight touched on the the areas where i think we not only need to be working with united states but japan and australia need to be working to have much closer relationships and much closer operation and i would say one mechanical problem we need to talk to the united states about information release restrictions so we're not caught in bilateral arrangements with united states which means we can't talk to japan and vice versa let me just finish with touching on the south china sea i know it's going to be the next session but i think it's so important that we do need to talk about it now we do need to work out mutual understandings as to what are the real issues in the south china sea acquiescence to amber chinese claims would only be highly undesirable in their immediate strategic consequences particularly for asian and unclos but also in the longer term implications of what has been termed learn bad behavior might encourage coerciveness in other matters on the micro scale managing the south china sea problem may include giving the new white house press secretary a crash course in the terminology of international law but there are wider aspects the real problem is not the possession of individual rocks or reefs and i think we need to get away from focusing on a paradigm of freedom of navigation exercises which deal with a particular aspect of unclos the real problem is whether the sea might become a sea closed to all but the chinese and to those who accept whatever rules china may set although we've heard much less of the term from china since the international tribunals decision the ambiguous nine-dash line contains at least the implication that this is china's long-term intent for this reason our key response should be not only and not so much the simple assertion of rights of passage within territorial waters but repeated and substantial naval deployments and joint exercises involving the other literal states and their extra regional partners now australia has been doing these since world war two we have been operating with malaysia and singapore since those two countries independence indeed we have been conducting exercises within the nine-dash line for that period and continue to do so and i think we need both to make more of that and to do more of it and i think japan and the united states need to seek opportunities to be seen to be doing that sort of thing as well but let me just conclude with saying again that it's about the domestic electorate and i think the points that are made about needing to explain what we're doing and why we're doing and create much more confidence in the public eye in all three countries is actually a vital task for governments and indeed for all the sort of people who are sitting here today thank you james i think that was a really powerful and illuminating view of the problems the problem set and i certainly take your your caveat about our don't panic our don't panic advice i think don't relax is the certainly the the counter to that look we've got only a couple of minutes and i know morning tea is waiting but i did also promise the opportunity for a little bit of a chance to at least put a question to our speakers so i'm going to take just three questions from the group i'll take them just as a sequence of three questions and give the speakers an opportunity to respond to to those questions but but very briefly please so please if you have a question please raise your hand get a microphone introduce yourself and just a nice succinct question not a statement please any questions or are we all stunned in the silence please neena silo of strategic and defence studies centre here at annu i have a quick question for amy i'm always curious when the obama administration described this network model that they didn't use any adjectives to describe what the role of the united states in that model is i wonder if you would be willing to offer us some okay thank you uh thank you neena we'll come back to that for amy and i think michael shubridge from department of defence i've called you out there thank you and we'll take one more question i think that's richard yeah richard there in from philippines uh maybe to a rear admiral and professor galdry you said that uh given the strategic restraint and predictability of the obama administration perhaps a little bit of unpredictability under trump administration could sometimes be good could you elaborate on that in what sense could unpredictability be a good thing because i think that was the most interesting okay um i might start with uh with amy yeah dr siri thanks for the question i'm not sure i have a great answer uh or maybe i don't fully understand the question but um you know we did talk uh under the obama administration um there was a lot of talk about the principle of security network and um networking alliances and partnerships um and if you look at the way the united states role was was characterized in speeches that secretaries of defense made at shangri la over the over recent years there still was a lot of talk about american leadership um i don't know if they used the word indispensable nation but that's bandied about a lot as well so i think implicit at least in in um the characterization of the united states in the rebalance and in attempting to encourage the formation of this broad um security network um is the idea that the united states should continue to play a key role in leading and bringing some of this together but i think there's also some attempt to move away from the idea that this is all about hubbard spokes or that this is all about the united states um organizing the region because you know first of all you want to counter the narrative out there pushed by some that the united states is really trying to militarize the south china sea or militarize the region and we really want to emphasize the collective benefits that come to all of us in the region including china in terms of adherence to long-standing rules and norms like the ones i mentioned you know open economies freedom and navigation um open inclusive architecture uh these are these are collective benefits for everyone and so we kind of wanted to move away a little bit from making it sound as this this is all american led or you know american values or leadership you know because it's really it's really joint first of the uncertainty question i actually spent the um day the election results are coming in at lunch with the chancellor and the former chinese foreign minister and here in his entourage it was very interesting their reaction i haven't talked with any chinese in the last week but i have talked with a number uh in the last couple of months it is quite clear that there is an uncertainty um and a desire in china just to work out how this is all going to go because china does fear doing something which might create catastrophic consequences that uncertainty and caution is not a theme i was seeing 12 months ago though this the confidence has gone now there are dangers in it i fully acknowledge that um michael i think i get back to uh this issue of explanation um and i suppose the the subtext your question and the answer is it's actually fundamentally a political problem i think our politicians have to get all of our politicians have to get a lot better at explaining to our peoples what we're doing and why i think there has been a failure of language um i will say that this is a i think a realisation uh rory and i and the other team came to there's also fundamentally an ethnic diversity problem here um i think all of our um security establishments have got themselves within something of an echo chamber in which a lot of people in our fast in the demographics changing a very fast changing very fast in australia and america a lot of people are totally outside that echo chamber um and it's we've seen one aspect in how trump's gone but there's a lot of people who have very different views who are also outside that chamber who are not committed and will take a lot of persuasion so before we include uh professor morimoto i'm not sure if you have any responses to the questions that have been put but i might also put one additional question to you so which is um how worried do you think uh the japanese uh officials and japanese government is about this question of unpredictability uh in the trump administration and what can japan do about it well uh i quite frankly i don't know exactly what kind of anxiety or concern our government has but my personal concern on the unpredictability of uncertainty uh to the trend of uh trump administration is the future prospect of us-china relationship especially i worry about the president trump may uh make a deal and compromise between both countries at the secret base in a small room uh by tetate uh meeting without any information uh out of room especially uh us-china trade imbalance they exchange rate some sort from china on the other hand uh i think uh if the us uh uh it will be we're going to uh deal with uh g's uh concern i think uh they may china may raise such china's issue or is china's issue or taiwan relations or uh support to uh north korea so what what kind of of deal between both uh top leader under the small room like a kishinja type of compromise without any notification to uh us allies i think this is my personal concern i may be i may not be uh wrong but uh i don't know this is my my personal well thank you i think uh prophecy you've left us with something i think quite significant to think about there we're going to conclude the session now uh you've all been patient because i know morning tea is waiting outside but i think these were three uh really really important presentations worth listening to so please join me in thanking our students