 day's discussion would be on l oùnwix isn't the world since we are discussing one who is mind concept of mind we need to see how mind is related with the world. And this relation is possible through language human beings are not only conces beings but arrangements for human beings are not only conscious beings but they are linguistic beings. We need to analyse and understand how these linguistic beings relate themselves to the world. This is one of the important questions regarding, the mind-languages, world relationship. where we explore this, referring to the notion of meaning, particularly meaning guided by human intention, meaning guided by human intentionality. So let us try to explain how the psychological Splash mind yarn language on the webі Now we understand following the discussion on the world of mind and logic and the world in conjunction with, . Could closer to the world, the main works and Julie coz, condom on LANGUAGE, industry and thought, we have discuss areast Kanintellig nursery solving our children from school, languation with Rav 1997💛 Today I will also focus a bit on the representational features of language.  değiş  değiş  us                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ḣ consequently ḣ ḅ, extra ɣ Standing the ̑s p r h i n ʻy Through them, the way in the system that we have tried to show us that post years only the sound significant but linguistic presentations are connected with human experiences . There are connected withversen of mind and in general. about the notion of meaning, without taking into account the notion of experience and other psychological features, so therefore, the use theory of meaning must relate to the representational theory of meaning which was advocated the representational theory of meaning which was advocated earlier. Now if somebody emphasizes that it is only through linguistic representation that meaning can be analyzed, then the question would be is there a kind of a symmetry between the linguistic representation on the one hand and the mental representation on the other hand. Sal has clearly shown us that so far the content is concerned, so far the structure of representations are concerned, the quantities is static meaning thereby the content of thought and the content of an expression of that particular thought are identical. So, so in that sense Sal is trying to draw our attention to this fact that mental representation are connected with linguistic representations. And so in that sense Sal is trying to draw our attention to this fact that mental representation are connected whenever we try to understand meaning with reference to mind we cannot rule out this fact that how meaning is construed from the perspective of language, language as well as experience. So, the experiential component that is embedded in our linguistic activities is very much part of the whole analysis of meaning and the mind-world relationship or mind-language world relationship. So, that is that is the background of this particular talk, I would like to emphasize here with reference to this linguistic representation of the world. Whenever we talk about the language and one relationship, we need to also bring in how language represents the world. And in other words how the world is articulated by language that is very important. So, within the semantic structure of all the sentences the language world relationship is not fully settled. If you only a person who is talking about the language and one relationship, you need to also bring in how language represents the world and in other words how the world is articulated by language that is very important. So, within the semantic structure of all the sentences, the language world relationship is not fully settled. If you only emphasize on language or language use, there is a possibility that we would commit to some form of reductionism or we will commit to some kind of a eliminativism as if mind is not a necessary or as if certain mental features are not essential for the analysis of meaning. Our focus would be how certain mental states are involved in in the linguistic expressions and thereby elucidating the the content. So, we would like to discuss that. Now, so far the meaning is concerned, meaning is a common element between language and the world. There is essentially a kind of a gap, a gap which is seen with reference to language on the one hand and the world on the other. The representational theory of meaning advocates that the world is a linguistic representation is intentionally connected to the world. In other words, expressions are directed towards the world. If there is an expression, then expression is directed towards the world. So, this directedness shows a kind of a intentional connection between the world on the one hand and the language on the other hand. Now, the language user or what I call the linguistic, the linguistic beings are connected to the world. There are very much part of the world and their connection is established through intentionality and as Searle points out, intentionality is a pre-linguistic phenomenon. Intentionality is being defined as a pre-linguistic phenomenon. Precisely keeping this in the background that language has evolved as an institutional fact, whereas intentionality is an intrinsic feature of human beings. In other words, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of all biological beings. There are many biological beings who do not probably use language as we use, who probably do not create any kind of sound. In other words, intentionality is an intrinsic feature of all biological beings. So, thereby the mode of communication for them is not through language, but may be through something else, but so far the human beings are concerned. Since they leave a linguistic form of life, it is very important for us to show how language helps us explaining this intentional relationship. Without language, the intentional link with the world is possible, but with language, how this intentionality gets a surplus feature to talk about the world. To theorize about the very existence of the reality is something very significant to the whole epistemic discourses that human beings are involved with. Therefore, how meaning of a sentence is fixed? Is it fixed because of intentionality because of this consciousness or the conscious attitudes, intentional attitude of consciousness? Or it is fixed through certain other linguistic categories, which are non-intentional in nature. We would like to see this, that meaning is something clothing the world as Pradhan advocates it. Meaning is the semantic clothing of the world and for that reason it is not a contingent product of our sense experiences. So, here is an impression given to us that there is no naturalistic theorization of meaning possible in order to dissolve all kinds of problems that is there within the framework of semantics in general. The naturalistic account does not resolve the problem of truth, which is very much part of the discourse of meaning. Hence, the non-naturalist account of meaning emphasizes that the naturalistic account does not resolve the problem of truth, which is very much part of the discourse of meaning. So, here it is that the world language relationship is not a contingent phenomenon, rather it is necessarily, rather the relationship is intrinsic and we would like to see how this relationship is conceptualized as an intrinsic relationship. It is intrinsic precisely because the non-naturalists have tried to show us that there is a kind of a fitting relationship, what Searle calls the direction of fit. The direction of fit suggests that there is a kind of a fitting relationship. There is a language to world relationship. Say for example, when the linguistic beings express something, then this expression represents something about the world. This directedness is not only one directional, rather but also self-referential in nature. Searle, while explaining the nature of meaning, tries to show us this double level of intentionality that is working between the language and the world. So, therefore we need to talk about this notion of direction of fit, as if there is a kind of a fitness, fitting relationship. I should not call it fitness, rather it is a fitting relationship between language and the world. And this is construed looking at the notion of representation in particular, how human beings express something, how human beings express something, how human beings express something. So, therefore we need to talk about this notion of direction of fit, as if there is a kind of a fitness, fitting relationship. I should not call it fitness, rather it is a fitting relationship between language and the world. And this is construed looking at the notion of representation in particular, how human beings represent the world, because whether it is thought or an expression, both are directed, both exhibit this intentionality. One can understand it with reference to any kind of language used, particularly when we talk about the formative utterances, whether it is indicative, request or command, they also this directedness, a kind of an intentional link between language and the world. The language user on the one hand and the world or the other audiences on another side. So, that is how we need to see how the speaker is connected to the world or how the speaker is connected to the audience and how the audience is connected to the speaker. And this connection, this exchange, the linguistic exchange between the speaker and the audience is a kind of an intentional connection. It is intentional precisely because the intentionality is grounded in language. So, the later Wittgensteinian will emphasize on this fact that intentionality is grounded in language. They never question the ontology of language, whereas Searle is questioning the very ontology of language. Hence, he considers that intentionality is a pre-linguistic activity. But for me, intentionality though is pre-linguistic. So, for the human linguistic creatures as concerned, it is through language that Searle is questioning the very ontology of language. So, in that sense, we need to further proceed to this questions. Is meaning a mental entity? Because meaning is not only discussed with reference to the very ontology of language. So, what we say, rather we also give importance to this fact that what we mean, saying and meaning are necessarily connected in the sense that if I request you to bring a glass of water, I must have at least this assumption that you would go to the world and bring a glass of water. Now, if I do not mean that, then my request is nothing but a misfire. My request will not bring the kind of satisfaction which I would derive seeing that you are going to fetch a glass of water for me. In that sense, linguistic actions are actions which carries the content in them, actions which communicate things to the audience or to the world. So, let us look at the context of these actions. Language use is basically about communication, basically about the exchange of ideas and thoughts to generate understanding. Now, understanding is again a kind of a mental activity. Now, let us do not go into that part. Try to see how the mental is connected with the linguistic. The association of meaning with the psychological property of language needs to be discussed when we talk about meaning is a mental entity, but some of the philosophers, particularly those who argue for a representational semantics, they try to distance themselves from psychologicalism as if to say that meaning is related to mind, they would commit to some kind of psychologicalism which is a dangerous trend in philosophy of mind, which is a dangerous trend in philosophy of language, particularly when we try to theorize the concept of meaning. So, without committing to the problem of psychologicalism, we try to understand the concept of psychologicalism. How can we construe this fact that meaning is associated with mind? By saying that meaning is associated with mind, I do not commit that meaning exists in the mind. So, rather I would accept this position that meaning or the content is very much a part of this notion of experience, the kind of intentional field it creates. It is neither wholly there in our mind, it is only there in our mind. Nor it is there in the world which probably the externalist would try to suggest, I would suggest that it is very part of experience, it is part of that intentional linguistic field that has been created by human beings, created by these human linguistic beings. So, from that point of view, we need to comprehend this notion of meaning. The need for a comprehensible theory of meaning includes the need of taking into account the mental attitudes, beliefs and the intention of the speaker who matters to language so much. So, when we talk about language use, the intention based semantics has emphasized basically on this mental attitudes of the speaker. What the speaker intends to speak, what he intends to communicate to the hearer is more important. What does he believe? When I say I need a glass of water, so this request of mind assumes the fact that I believe water can quench my thrust or I believe this fact that passing this request to you, you would go and fetch a glass of water for me. So, the expression, the intentional expression is connected with belief, it is connected with so many other desires that I have. So, intention is one of the mental states, one of the varieties of mental states and when we talk about linguistic communication or communication intention, we do not say it in isolation from the other mental states, rather they are all connected, they are all intentionally connected, they are connected through intentionality. Hence, we need to understand this intentional link between the language and the world, between the human beings and the world, because human beings are not only conscious beings, they are also linguistic beings. So, therefore, it is essential for us to talk about this. The speaker's intention has a basic feature of meaning, because the psychological states are linguistic states. So, when we talk about say for example, p as a psychological state, p has some kind of content, because it is about something. So, being a psychological state, it has some content, which when it is expressed in the form of expression, it refers to a particular fact or an object in the world. So, that is, that is very much important. So, what is the psychological state? It is expressed there, but when it is expressed, it is expressed through a kind of a psychological mode, the mode in which a particular expression is being articulated is also important and we all know about it when we talked about the performative utterances with reference to the speech act theory. It is only when we talk about the intentional expressions, only when we talk about expression of this utterances or this very idea of talking about statement making, then we have that we make the intention explicit. I am very clear when I am making you a suggestion, please read this material on speech act. So, this is where I am making my intention explicit in my suggestions. So, the intentions are explicit, when I say get me a glass of water please, here my intention is explicit, you feel the urgency of getting a glass of water for me. Hence, we need to show that is a high quality speech act theory, how these expressions are being articulated. Antony Matty writes and I am quoting Matty here that the expression of psychological life which is the exclusive and a primary aim of intentional speech, what is rather intended is to influence or to control the unknown inner life. So, we need to talk about the inner life of the speaker as well as the hearer, the unknown inner life of the hearer, because when I make this statement or a request, I must also making this attempt to know what is the inner life, going on in your mind whether you would listen to my request. So, in that sense the intentional speech is a kind of action which is essentially and at evoking certain psychological phenomena in the person. So, the speech is intentionally directed towards the hearer and it evokes some kind of expected thought. In the mind of the hearer and the speaker must put it in that form, so that he succeeds in evoking that mental fact in the mind of the hearer. So, there is an attempt on the part of the speaker to articulate the expression, in fact in the mind of the hearer. So, the speech must articulate intentionally enough to cause certain action. Hence, the speech is equivalent of any kind of action as I will say, it is a special action. Now, as I said, there are naturalist understanding of intention by semantics or the meaning in general, there are non-naturalist theorization of meaning. The naturalists have tried to explain the notion of meaning and the language world relationship with reference to causality. According to them, the naturalists briefly, this relationship that we talk about between the language and the world are causally bound. It is a natural in that sense. It can be causally explainable. The non-naturalist try to go beyond this causal dependency argument. They try to show what are the non-causal phenomena are responsible for constring meaning. So, therefore, when we talk about intention based semantics in particular, we have a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker, a speaker. Let us say, utter statement, the proposition is a P knowing well that the hearer Y would mean K. P is intentionally produced so that Y listens to P and means K. Now, this intentional relationship that I was talking about, referring to this idea of evoking some kind of mental state in the mind of the hearer is something very significant. The non-naturalist account emphasizes that the non-naturalist is a non-naturalist. The non-naturalist account emphasizes that meaning is an informative act. They are also descriptive rather than being explanatory about the notion of meaning. They also argue that speaker's intention or speaker's intentional expression of certain things tries to induce meaning in the hearer's mind. So, this idea of inducing the content is something very special to Paul Grice who talk about intention based semantics in the beginning. Now, Grice's theory also adheres to the notion of representation in this sense that the speaker's not simply utters to induce rather makes a deliberate attempt, quote-unquote, it is a deliberate attempt in the sense that one is thinking rationally about it in telling and making the hearer to think over it in order to fulfill his intention. So, when we talk about speech act, we try to conceptualize or in fact there is a need to conceptualize the course of action, what I am saying, what do I mean when I say this and what the hearer would mean if I say this. All this is to design a kind of a or a pre-conceptualize a kind of course of action before saying something, because you are not just expressing whatever comes to your mind, rather you are deliberately or rationally trying to suggest the hearer that this is what he is trying to do and that is the reason. So, you are not just expressing whatever comes to your mind, whether you are deliberately or rationally trying to suggest the hearer that this is what he is trying to do. So, what is being expected from you when you hear this statement of mind? So, in that sense there is a necessity to talk about reason, there is a necessity to talk about how a particular course is rationally being formed. So, in that sense there is you know fixity of reason in the domain of communication, your reason can change, you can make shift. So, the course that you form, the field that you are creating, through intentionality, through rationality, I mean for all intentionality and rationality are necessarily connected, to be intentional is to be you know rational, it is that kind of thing he is arguing for. Intentional actions are not just merely desired actions, there could be desired independent actions as I mentioned. In one of my lectures earlier, now we need to see how the speaker deliberately putting an expression and also wants this ability to manipulate in a sense the very course of action, hence there is no fixity of reason. So, that is, so that is a possibility to talk about how fixity of reason in the domain of communication. And what does Gray says? Gray says this points to the fact for acts to have meaning in the domain of communication. The intended effect must be something which in some sense of reason, the recognition of intention behind acts is for the audience a reason not merely a cause, reason for believing and reason for doing. So, that very fact that the guys is talking about a non-naturalist theory of meaning, shows that when I am saying acts, then this very saying is not a cause, whether it is a reason or reason, that enforces on the audience to act as I am expected to act. Sal will call it a kind of a mental causation. So, Sal has a different vocabulary altogether when he talks about how mental states are expressed and this ability to express or the ability to cause intense election. Sal says, this is all mental causation. Let us do not go into that here. Let us try to understand that Grays makes this distinction very clear to us that reason for believing and reason for doing is the reason for doing. The reason for believing are different from the kind of causal explanation is expected in the case of a naturalist theory of meaning. Stephen Schieffer also critiques Grays intention-based semantics. Schieffer has two things to suggest. One, that this linguistic course of action that we are talking about in the case of Grays following letter of Einstein is construed within the context of a naturalist theory of meaning. Within a kind of a conventional framework of language use where convention is important to explain meaning. Schieffer in the beginning of his discussion intention-based semantics does emphasize that the conventional model is important but in due course he also talks about the psychological model. Now, what is the significance of accepting a psychological model vis-a-vis the conventional model which intention-based semantics holds on to. We need to see that. We need to see what Schieffer advocates in details. Schieffer does talks about the psychological model. Now, what is the significance of accepting a psychological model vis-a-vis the conventional model which intention-based semantics holds on to. We need to see that. We need to see what Schieffer advocates in details. Schieffer does talks about intention of the speaker. A speech is produced by the intention of the speaker. He also emphasizes that the speech is being recognized by the hearer or the audience. So, this saying. So, when we talk about speech, intention of the speaker and the intention of the speaker, he also emphasizes that the speech is being recognized by the hearer or the audience. And the recognition of the speech. We also need to bring in the mutual knowledge that both speaker and the hearer possess. The speaker and the hearer must possess mutual knowledge within a kind of a conventional framework. So, if they do not share that mutuality, then the hearer may not recognize, may not able to recognize what is being said to him. So, therefore, if the speaker and the hearer possess mutual knowledge within a kind of a conventional framework, then the hearer may not recognize what is being said to him. It is important for Schieffer to talk about the concept of a mutual knowledge. The common knowledge within a kind of a framework of convention in which both speaker and the hearer participate while exchanging ideas, thoughts or having a conversation, a meaningful conversation. Schieffer gives a functional analysis to this fact. He says, X intends to produce a reason R in the audience A. It means, X knows about the responses in A. And that is what the common knowledge he talks about. That is what the sharing he talks about. The sharing of the mutual knowledge X knows about the responses. What kind of response a speech would generate is being conceptualized or being conceived minimally by the speaker. So, in that sense, there is a need to talk about the mutual knowledge. Communication intention activates the process of knowing and recognizing each other's intention. So, both hearer and the hearer have a mutual understanding of what is being said to him. And the speaker must know each other's intention. So, the convention, therefore, is bound by some kind of a norms. In other words, both speaker and the hearer, when they participate in the framework of convention, we must also see that how conventions are guided by certain norms. Our conventions are regulated by certain norms. In a classroom atmosphere, both student and the teacher are governed by certain norms. In other words, the activities of the teacher and the activities of the teacher are governed by certain norms. The activities of the student are regulated by certain normative principles of institution. Hence, these norms, in a sense, facilitate the hearer or the student to recognize what kind of things or actions are taken. In other words, it is possible what kind of actions are expected from a teacher or what kind of actions are expected from a student. So, therefore, the reason of these expectations are truth-supporting reasons. Sipar says, the reason of these expectations are very much truth-supporting in this sense. I will conclude reading out this sentence from Sipar. Let us call reason which are held in this way, truth-supporting reasons. Once reason for believing P did not be truth-supporting, one might have moral or prudential grounds of thinking that P. Look at Sipar. Now, Sipar is bringing the notion of morality and prudentiality in order to talk about an authentic intentional action that is being produced by the speaker. Or produced by any agent who is participating in this framework of linguistic field. I would talk about this and elaborate how linguistic communications takes place or must take place within a normative framework. It is through norms we need to have access to truth or truth-supporting reasons. Hence, value is important.