 Hello and welcome to this Institute of International and European Affairs event, which is part of the IA's global project, global Europe project supported by the Department of Foreign Affairs. My name is David O'Sullivan. I'm the Director General of the Institute and I'm particularly delighted today to be joined by my good friend and colleague, Stefano Sanino, Secretary General of the European External Action Service, who has been generous to take time out from his busy schedule on a lightning visit to Dublin today to speak with us. He will speak to us for about 15 or 20 minutes or so, and we will then go to a question and answer with your audience. You'll be able to join the discussion using the, by now, very familiar Q&A function on Zoom, which you should see on your screen. And please feel free to send in your questions throughout the session, as they occur to you, and we'll come to them once Secretary General Sanino has finished his presentation. I should remind you that both today's presentation and the question and answer are both on the record. And please feel free, as always, to join our discussion on Twitter using the handle at IIEA. We're also live streaming today's discussion. So a very warm welcome to all of you tuning in via YouTube. Let me just formally now say a few words about Secretary General Sanino before I hand him the floor. He has served as the Secretary General of the European External Action Service since January 19, 2021, and was Deputy Secretary for Economic and Global Issues at the External Action Service from April 2020 to December 2020. He has a very distinguished career in the Italian Diplomatic Service, also in the European Commission. We worked together when he was Diplomatic Advisor to President Prodi as President of the Commission. He then was also his Diplomatic Advisor when he was Prime Minister and he has served as Italian Ambassador to Spain to the permanent representative of Italy to the EU. And he's also been a Director General in the Commission. So he has wide experience of national diplomacy, European diplomacy, and could not be better qualified to take on the role he has today. So please, Stefano, the floor is yours. David, thank you very much. Thank you very much for the warm welcome. And it's a pleasure to share the screen with you. For those who don't know, David has been my first boss when I joined the European Commission. So he was my Secretary General at the time. And so it's an enormous pleasure to share this screen with him. And thanks to the IIEA for hosting me. Maybe I know that it's a little bit intuitive, but I cannot start this meeting and this chat without mentioning what is the biggest challenge that maybe European Union is facing in his recent, in the last few years. And that's the aggression that we are facing in the last few years. And that's the aggression, the war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine. It has been, from many points of view, a sort of watershed because the European Union had to decide between accepting what could be a scene and it is a blatant violation of all the principles for which we have been fighting for decades following the Second World War or close ranks and confront this challenge. And this is exactly what happened there. I still remember very well the European Council that followed the invasion of Ukraine and the sense of unity and determination that all leaders expressed in the context of the of the Council, which really paved the way then for a number of not easy decisions that have been all underpinned by this very strong will. And I would say that since that moment, I can identify two main features that have marked our approach to this crisis. And that is unity and partnership. Unity, as I was saying, we have been since the very beginning very clear that we had to act in a unified way and that it would have been our major asset in order to confront the threat that was coming from them from China. Maybe I start with saying about the one point that is also very sensitive for you in here in Ireland that there's the fact that the European Union has hosted more than seven million Ukrainian refugees. And from that point of view, also Ireland has done an important part of the job since more than one percent of its population of refugees is coming from Ukraine. And this is a solidarity, which I think it's extremely important. But we have been able also to support Ukraine from the economic, financial, political and military point of view in a way which has been unprecedented. I will come back in a moment about the use, for example, of the European Peace facility for supporting militarily Ukraine, especially the beginning of the conflict, but also the larger amounts of financial resources that we provide Ukraine, almost eight billion in these six months, without considering the political decision to grant the candidate status to Ukraine and so paving the way for a possible future membership of the country to the European Union. At the same time, we have also imposed an unprecedented set of sanctions against Russia. And we have substantially worked on isolating Russia on the world scene. We are working also very closely together on the global implications of this conflict, especially when it comes to the triple crisis, the energy, food and financial crisis that we are going through as a European Union, but also all the other countries of the world. And we are at the same time pursuing the accountability of Russia because we think that this part of the possible definition of the conflict and working for the reconstruction effort that we need to shoulder at the moment when the war will be over. I am unfortunately convinced that we will see more things ahead of us. The phone call that has taken place between the Defense Minister of Russia with some of his Western colleagues in France, UK, US is worrying not only about the allegations of use of the dirty bomb, but also because we have seen that many times Russia has started accusing Ukraine of doing the things they did themselves, then would do. So certainly an element of preoccupation. The second point that I think I want to stress in this context is the fact that we have managed to enhance substantially our partnership and this has been also another element of strength. Starting with US, I would say, but also with a number of other key allies in Europe and outside Europe and in close contact with the Ukrainian authorities. We have been able to create the conditions for, let's say this, the policy that I was trying to define before of isolation of Russia and of sanctions. And I think that the work on sanctions is particularly noticeable. We started early enough, we in the sense to European Union together with United States, UK and other partners, early enough at the beginning of December, we were not sure whether Russia would have invaded Ukraine. They were denying it, but we thought it was important to prepare the ground and work. And as a matter of fact, this has allowed us to impose sanctions and to agree on sanctions very rapidly after the start of the conflict. The other thing which I think is important to stress is the fact that we have managed to strengthen our resilience and our role on the global stage. And we have done this in three key areas. The first one is the work that we have developed on security and defence. This is a work that we started already before with the idea of reinforcing our security and defence capacities. You may remember that we have launched already some months ago the strategic compass, which is the new doctrine for the security and defence of the European Union. And that could pave the way of the work that we should do in the coming years within the European Union. Following the war, a number of decisions have been taken by our member states. First and foremost, I would say the decision of Finland and Sweden to apply to join NATO, but also the decision of Denmark to join the EU defence cooperation and the decision which is taken by many countries in Europe to increase the defence spending because we have all realised that unfortunately the security should have been strengthened on our continent. And it is in this context that I would like to remind the commitment to use the European peace facility to finance the military equipment for the Ukrainian army. That was an absolute premiere up until February when the decision was taken. The European Union had never financed the acquisition of lethal weapons and that was the case. And we have done in a quite substantial way. So far we have committed 3.1 billion euro to support the for military assistance to the Ukrainians. But I would say that more than this it's even more relevant to the political signal that was given. It's not only the money that was important, but also the fact that the European Union collectively had undertaken and taken the decision to support military Ukraine. We are continuing to do so. Now we are establishing also a military assistance mission to coordinate and support the training needs of the Ukrainian armed forces and all this on the top of the bilateral assistance given by our member states. The second element that I would like to stress is the capacity of projecting here what I would say our economic strength. Because the sanctions that we have adopted are definitely unprecedented in terms of size and impact. And there is one decision that is part of this process that we have taken. And that's the decision to end our dependency on Russian energy, which is a real game changer from many points of view. Sanctions and the coupling in the energy sector do represent a significant impact on the Russian economy and will have a significant impact on the Russian economy over time. The third element that I would like to stress is the point of the enhancement of the European Union impact, geopolitical impact in the landscape, in the world landscape that is changing very rapidly. Certainly this war has accelerated a number of geopolitical trends in world politics. And the result is that we are all living now in a much more confrontational and fragmented system. And I would say even a more polarized system, a much more polarized world. Last month we have tried to reach out to a number of countries bilaterally and also multilateral partners in order to try to take care of a number of preoccupations that these countries were expressing. It is true that this war has had a number of consequences on a third country, not only on the European Union, but also on countries in Africa or in Asia or in Latin America. And we are trying to denounce the Russia's instrumentalization of food, energy, hunger, and we will continue to encounter these narratives that we think diverts the attention for which are the real causes and responsibilities of Russia in this war. But we need also to make it clear to all these countries that this is not only a question of the way Russia is telling the story. It's also a question of how we are able to respond to the preoccupations that these countries are expressing, how we can better focus our work. And I'm thinking in particular to a number of instruments that we have developed in these last few months. And more than everything else to global gateway, which is our interconnectivity strategy, that may be an important factor in changing the perception of the way we work with them with third countries. Maybe one few words on China, because I think that we are, this is the other big challenge that we have in front of us. You may remember that back in 2019, we have developed a strategic outlook on China, where we're defining this country as a partner, a competitor in the systemic rival. But it is also true that the war in Ukraine and the new political situation in China has made China emerge as much more assertive political actor. There is a termination on the China side to continue challenging the leadership presented by the United States. And they are signaling clearly that they will become strong competitors, especially on the technological and economic point of view. But also we need to look at the vision that China is bringing to the development of the world when it comes to the security initiative or the development initiative or the way they are dealing with the rules of multilateralism or the vision about human rights. So a number of elements which are making China a real global competitor from the economic but also from the political point of view. And without considering the challenges that the issue of the relationship with Taiwan is posing. So we will need to manage this complex relationship. We will need to be able to work with that and trade and keep on developing links with the country that is essential for dealing with our big challenges from climate change to health, the restructuring with the country with which we have a very substantial exchange. It's more than 1.8 billion euro per day. But the country at the same time is also representing, as it was saying, an alternative model for the world. And we need to be able to make sure that the dependencies that we have developed over time with China cannot become vulnerabilities for our systems. So we will need to continue working in areas that David, you know very well. I mean, where you are of your areas of specialization, the screening of foreign direct investment, the anti-economic coercion measures, but also measures that are increasing our capacity to stand on our feet in the future. And that's, for example, the CHIPS Act or the EU batteries regulations or the work that we are doing on critical raw materials. So we need to make sure that again, the interdependence does not become an element of vulnerability and of weakness for us in the future. One final consideration from what I tried to define, the challenges that we are facing in Russia, between Russia and Ukraine, the ramification that these have in all continents from Africa to Latin America to Asia, the problems that we have in managing the relationship with China. All this gives us a sense of the fact that the security theater is one. We cannot no longer speak about alternative security scenarios. You may remember at a certain point, we were more on the transatlantic agenda. Other times we were more pivoting to Asia. The truth is that we have now one single security zone and the link between the different agendas are much stronger than they used to be in the past. And it is also in this context the work that we will keep on doing on multilateralism continues to be of key importance. And I'm speaking here in a country which is a champion of multilateralism. It has done great work during these two years sitting in the Security Council and where the effort that we all need to make is to have held the principles of the United Nations. This is not only a romantic willingness. It's not only the idea of the fact of having a world which is at peace with itself, that is on the contrary the United Nations do represent the place where the use of force, the strength of each country finds limits and counter balances in a context which is based on rules and not on the law of the strongest. That's where we need collectively to keep on working to preserve this space, which is a space of freedom for the whole of us, not only for the West but also for the rest of the world. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Stefano. That's quite a tour d'horizon there of immense, immense challenges. And by and large, I personally would share your sort of positive assessment of the way the EU has reacted. But let me just play devil's advocate for a moment and push you on a couple of those points. I mean, yes, we have maintained unity, but is it not also true that we have seen fairly clear disagreements about how to react to this situation, particularly between, I would say, East and West with the Baltics and Poland and other countries taking a much tougher line and indeed openly, fairly critical of the position taken by countries traditionally in the lead, for example, Germany. It's true that this has given a boost to our defence activities, but has it not also reinforced the primacy of NATO and the transatlantic role in defence rather than an autonomous or an independent European defence capability? And finally, on the global, I mean, yes, I think we have managed to rally a fairly impressive number of countries in the United Nations in support of our general position. On the other hand, we have seen some fairly important countries outside of Europe and the transatlantic space take a rather more distant view. I mean, China, obviously, but we'll come back to China in a moment. But India, South Africa, even Brazil, countries not really taking, wanting to get involved or take too many sides, which is perhaps discouraging for us. So sorry to be, but just to put the counterfactual there maybe that, you know, things are more complicated than it seems. Yeah, I mean, I'm not trying to describe a sort of ideal world, but the European Union is certainly made of different interests and different positions. And what is important is that at the end of the day, you have a recomposition of this interest in a sort of unitary line. And that's what it has happened. I think that it's also normal. The perception of the threat of Russia is different if you are living in a country bordering Russia or if you're living in a country which is not bordering Russia and as always said, a very constructive and positive trade relationship with this country. So I would say that this is part of the story and I've been witnessing very, in the European Council, very interesting questions on this. But again, the point is that even if maybe one could start from different positions, what is important that you get into a middle ground, which is shared by everybody and that everybody's ready to defend. And that's what has happened as a matter of fact. On defence, there too I would be a little bit more nuanced. I mean, first of all, I think that there has never been on the EU side any idea or intention to replace NATO as the military alliance or as the main provider of security in the European continent. We have always said that NATO is and will remain the basis on which the security of the continent is based. But at the same time, I think that we have shown and I was trying to stress this point that the European Union is able to do things in specific circumstances. When we decide to use the European peace facility and so to finance essentially in the armed, the supply of armaments to Ukraine and to take collective responsibility as European Union for that, that was not the right decision. We were not sure about the consequences of this choice. If Russia would have reacted in a certain way, if they've been considered as part of the conflict, so there were a number of elements. And it was a situation where, for different reasons, there was no other security structure in Ukraine. Remember that it's both NATO and United States had, let's say, moved on the eastern flank of NATO and made very clear that that would have been the sort of line that could not be trespassed. And we did it and we took our responsibility. So I think that also from that point of view, there has been a positive and constructive interlocking element, a mutually enforcing dimension, because it is also true that the European Union could be so bold in this stand, because all the members or at least a large number of members of the European Union were also members of NATO. There was a sort of protection that was coming from there. But again, I don't think that the European Union will never become military alliance. And I don't think that we need to, again, to start the competition with NATO. I keep on insisting on the fact that we need to be clear that the enemy, if I can call it so, or at least the warring part of the story, it's not the EU for NATO or NATO for you, but it's for both these organizations, EU and NATO, third countries that are trying to challenge the order in which that we collectively have created after the Second World War. On your third point, concerning the, let's say, third countries, it is true. I mean, even if the last voting was in general assembly was extremely positive, 143, that had voted in favor of, sorry, against the illegal annexation of the regions to Russia. It is also true that there are some important countries, and you have mentioned some, that have abstained and that have preferred not to take a more clear stand. I think that if you analyze the reasons behind this position, you can find a number of elements which are, again, understandable from the political point of view. My reading is that, first of all, we should avoid dividing the world between those who are in favor and those who are against. Again, we have to take into account the complexity. And if you see also the different patterns in different kind of resolutions that have been passed in the General Assembly, you can see that according to the topic, there are different configurations. So we need to be more granular, maybe, in the analysis. But we need also to take into account the complexity of the relations with them with third country. We will continue, and that was I was saying, we will continue, let's say, trying to debunk the false narrative that Russia is trying to impose. But we will also try to show and prove the goodwill and determination of the European Union to work constructively with them, with countries that we believe have any interest in working more closely with us. Thank you. Thank you very much. I must not abuse my position as a moderator. All the questions. So I'll turn to some questions from the audience. Bridget Laffen, Professor Bridget Laffen, asked the following question. You have stressed that developments have been unprecedented with EU unity. How have the EU institutions worked collectively to achieve this in a crowded arena, the European Council, the General Affairs Council, the EES, the Commission, etc. Who takes the lead on what, how is unity and action secured? Look, I have to say that the, especially in, in developing sanctions, the work among the institutions has been almost exemplary. We have been able to sit around the same table, to share the work, to do each on each side what needed to be done. I think that the expertise of the, I mean, the political, if you want the political crowd, the political landscape that we have tried to provide for all the institutions, the expertise of the Commission in defining the sanctions packages, both in the trade component, as in the financial components, or in the energy, I mean, in all these areas, where the experience of the Commission is invaluable and necessary. And the determination of the Council, the rapidity with which the decisions have been taken, and the generosity, if I may say, called this way in terms of time that we have devoted and dedicated to this fight. So I think that for me, it has been a very positive test case that when there is a real important issue to be decided, the institutions are able to put on the side their, let's say, usual dynamic, I would say, dialectics that is characterizing the work of the institutions and try to produce results, concrete results for the interest of the European citizens. So that for me has been a very, very, very positive surprise. I, based on my experience, I would agree with you. Stepano, obviously, one of the concerns is, you know, where is all this war in Ukraine leading? How long is it going to last? And obviously, the fear of escalation at you mentioned the recent phone call by the Russian Defence Minister, clearly setting up a potential accusation, doubtless faults against Ukraine of using nuclear weapons, but perhaps revealing that thought might be in the mind of Russia. And we have a question from one of our researchers here, Kian Fitzgerald, with Russia threatening the use of a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, how might the EU respond to the detonation of a nuclear device and are there preparations in place for such a possibility? I know there's a limit to how much you can answer that question, but still, your boss, the high representative was fairly outspoken on the issue last week. My boss was outspoken, that's the privilege of the politicians. But now joking apart, I think that the, especially when it comes to nuclear, the main point of nuclear is the deterrence effect. I mean, we all are aware and I hope that also in Russia aware of the devastating consequences that this may entail for the whole population, by the way, because then, I mean, where would you use the, if in case, the weapons? I think that there is an element of threat and there is an element of deterrence. And that's where I see what has been expressed by a number of different political quarters on this side and on the other side of the Atlantic about the fact that this would entail, as I said, devastating consequences for Russia. So I hope that there is still an element of rationality in all this process. I mean, as much as we can call it this way, and that this is not the risk or the escalation, as you were mentioning, is more limited than one could fear. Clearly, one cannot exclude. I mean, the fact that this may happen may take place. But again, I mean, it's a question of what you want to achieve and which are the, which is the price that you are paying for achieving the result. It is true that the war, which was supposed to last only a few days now, we are eight months into it. And I'm afraid that we'll see more in the months to come. Maybe during the winter time, it will be a little bit more less visible. But the situation on the ground is still unclear. And so both sides are not ready to go for a settlement. I would like to stress one thing, because this could honestly, while I was speaking, it sounds a little bit like putting Ukrainian Russia on the same plane. And this is not the case. I mean, there is one aggressor and there is a country that has been aggressed. And so I like very much the definition that was used by the Finnish Foreign Minister when she was asked when this war would end. And she replied when Russia will leave Ukraine. And I think it was a very wise way of putting things in the right perspective. Indeed. And we have a question here from former Brigadier General Gerald Ahern, and he says, when I served with the EU training mission in Somalia in 2013-14, I often heard observations from non-military colleagues that the EAS was staffed predominantly by those from development and humanitarian backgrounds and experience. Was that a fair observation he asks? I mean, if there is someone who knows well the story of the origin of the EAS, it's you, David. You have been intimately involved in it. So certainly at the beginning, the external action service was staffed essentially with colleagues coming from the institutions. That said, I think that many of those colleagues had a very open vision of things, and they were not just coming with a sort of development mentality. But in the meantime, the EAS has evolved significantly. Let's say almost half of the staff now is made up of national diplomat. But more than the origin of the staff, I think that what has changed is the approach and the mentality of the EAS as such. It has moved very much into a crisis management, into a crisis response, and there are an important and a very important component of the house, which is dealing with this dimension. So I would say that by now we have a clear sense of the work that the EAS could do both in Brussels and in our embassies on the ground, that also the evolution has been particularly significant. And there again, you are a good witness of this having in yourself leading, if not the most important, certainly one of the most important embassies in the European Union and the world in Washington. So the work has changed a lot with the nature of and the characteristics that the EAS has taken over time. We need also to be aware that the EAS is still a relatively young body, because it has been created less than 12 years ago. And let's say the complexity of the structure is such that you need some time to solidify and cement number of elements, including the culture of the house, of the place, the political culture. But I think that we are, honestly, we are on a very good track. We're getting lots of questions in, Stefano. I'm not sure I'm going to get around to them all because I know we must stop at 120. Just pursuing that issue of development aid, pouring Murphy, former Irish ambassador says, you mentioned development aid policy, would you agree that at a global level, our classic development aid policy has shown certain gaps in coverage, which are now being exploited by China? Do we need to have a more comprehensive view of our policy in this area? You touched also on the global gateway, of course, which is hard. And I would say that even the change in the name of the Director General who is dealing with development is interesting, because now what used to be a development cooperation has become international partnerships. She is, how to say, a quite important shift in terms of approach. It's not only how to, let's say, to support the development of the countries, but how to make it sure that we are creating conditions in the countries of sustainable growth, but also the link that this work can create between those countries in the European Union. So we just don't want to be, let's say, bringing our support, but we want also to create a political connection, which is stronger. I mean, from that point of view, it is very interesting to recall the recent EU African Union summit in Brussels. They tried to have to create a new way of defining the relationship, the partnership between the European Union and Africa, very much based also on what you were mentioning, David, about the global gateway. So our interconnectivity strategy and the idea of creating, again, projects that for their relevance impact may have a significant impact on the economic development of the country and also, as I was saying, generating a stronger political link with the European Union. Thank you. We have exactly four minutes left. I'm going to throw you three questions, Stephanie. Not all of them easy, but you can then choose how much time you spend on each of them. The first one is from Peter McLoone, who is a board member of the IEA, and he's just saying, it's just been announced that we have a new prime minister in the UK, most likely, Rishi Shunak. Do you have any immediate thoughts on how that future relationship will develop? So that's one question. The second relates to the country that you know best in our best European speak, Bobby McDonough, distinguished Irish diplomat, but also former ambassador to Rome. The new Italian prime minister, despite divisions in her coalition has promised solidarity with the EU and the Ukraine. How confident are you of Italy's position? I don't know. That's a tough question there from Bobby. And to what extent is populism in the EU being constrained by the reality of national interests and public opinion? And then finally, an Irish question. You touched on the defence role of the EU, the fact that Finland and Sweden have now joined NATO. Ireland remains something of an outlier. The debate here is not really showing any enthusiasm for NATO, perhaps more openness to the European, to cooperating on European defence activities, but just your thoughts on how Ireland is perceived, how the Irish position is perceived by the other member states. Thank you. So you've got three minutes to come. No pressure. 50 seconds each. New prime minister in the UK. I think that we all hope that the UK will get out of this very complex political situation where they are and can go back to the whole habits of predictability being a reliable partner for all of us. They've had difficult moments. I have to say that in the area that I'm more involved in, the security and defence, we've had a very good cooperation with the UK in all these months in spite of the problems and the difficulties. But I think that for the first of all for the UK citizens and then for the rest of the European and for the rest of the world, we are certainly willing to have a more stable political situation in the UK. On the point of the country and no best, I mean there is a very good golden rule of not commenting on the countries of members of the European Union. But I have to say that from what I'm seeing in terms of choices and in terms of concrete acts that have been taken by the new government, I think that there is at least a good basis on which one could work on. And I won't say more about this. About the point of the role of the Ireland and I think that Ireland has been and continues to be an extremely reliable partner. And I'm not saying this only because I'm sitting in Dublin, but because the I've seen concretely even in areas which were difficult in decisions that were difficult to be made by Ireland, then the instinct has been that of supporting the European Union. I'm thinking particularly now in this moment to the European peace facility, which could have been a difficult decision to be taken and where Ireland could have been difficult in joining the consensus and they have done so. They've done a very constructive spirit and they continue to work in a very constructive spirit in this area. I think that it is important for me to have in mind that when we speak about security, not only in Europe, but the new concept of security goes well beyond the military aspect and the military element. There is also a many other components that come into the picture, be it on misinformation or cyber on hybrid space, you name it. And in all these areas, we need a strong European Union. That's where also the point that I'm constantly making with the colleagues in NATO, if they are strong when it comes to hard security, I think that we are strong as European Union when it comes to this other aspect of security. And that includes energy or the work on the instrumentalization of many policies that is being done by Russia in, for example, during this war. So in all this, I think that we can all contribute and the European Union can give a huge contribution and Ireland can give a huge contribution for the security of all our continent and of the Irish people. Thank you very much. We've run slightly over time, so I apologize for that. But thank you so much, Stefano Zanino, Secretary General of the European External Action Service for joining us today. And good luck with the many challenges that your role faces in the future. Thank you so much.