 So, as we've talked about, Socrates is trying to answer this question. What is the relationship between religion and morality? And to do that, he gives a person in the dialogue, his name is Euthyphro. He gives them two possibilities, the dilemma. Either what is moral is moral, because it's commanded by the divine, or the divine commands what is moral because it's moral. For what it's worth, I'm using the Greek god Ilios. Ilios was the Greek god of the sun, and while Greek classics are not my specialty, as I understand it, he was later considered to be Apollo. And since Socrates' career basically began with the Oracle of Delphi, Apollo's Oracle, I thought it appropriate here. But to be clear, Socrates thinks these are the only two possibilities. And each possibility has a consequence. This is a dilemma, not in the sense that there's some tough moral decision, or he knows what's right and has to do it anyway. It's a dilemma in the sense that there are two possibilities. Each possibility has a consequence, so you must accept at least one of the consequences. So let's look at the first horn of the dilemma. What is moral is moral, because the divine commands it. So the idea is we have the divinity, who, by proclamation, makes what is moral. The consequence here is that if all there is to morality is something that the divine commands, well, the divine could have commanded just about anything. Could have had something really easy going and light-hearted for morality. And a piece of cake to fulfill. It could have been something as simple as, make sure you wave and say hello to your neighbor, and ever once in a while, give somebody a flower. Morality could have been something very dark and disturbing, requiring blood sacrifice of one's favorite pet every three years. If morality really could have been just any of these possibilities, because morality is just what's given by divine command, then there's no reason for whatever moral code we have. Morality is arbitrary. It's worth mentioning that there are people who take this possibility very, very seriously. It's called divine command theory, and it states that what is moral is moral simply because the divine commands it. Well, that's one horn of the dilemma. Let's look at the other horn. The divine commands what is moral because it's moral. The consequence here is that morality exists, and what it is, its nature, is independent of the divinity. It's outside of the divine's command, or it's any kind of proclamation. Indeed, it's an interesting question of what we need the divinity for. In theory, we can learn about morality all on our own. We would need a divinity for this. So this is the standard approach to understanding the utipro dilemma, and indeed, even the standard approach to teaching it. Socrates concluded, and again, most people agree, that if these are the two possibilities, then either morality is arbitrary, or morality is independent of the divine, for what is worth Socrates took the second horn of the dilemma and set about trying to understand morality independent of divine revelation. It's also worth noting that quite a few people have considered this to be some sort of proof against any sort of existence of a divinity. So theists are certainly not happy with the results of the dilemma, and atheists and agnostics seem to be pretty content with the dilemma. But a word of caution. There are more consequences to follow each horn than you might realize. The first horn tells us that what is moral is moral is simply because of divine command, and the consequence of this is that morality could have just been anything, and morality is arbitrary. Well, the further consequence of this is, well, there's a divine. If there's a divine command, there's a divine. The second horn tells us that divine commands what is moral because it's moral, and this does indeed have the consequence that morality is independent of the divine, and we are free to investigate morality on our own, but it also still has the consequence that there is a divine. Whether we choose to investigate morality along with the divinity, there is still a divinity. So this is what we might call the other dilemma. Theists are not pleased with the results of the Euthyphro dilemma. Well, atheists, agnostics are not pleased with the result of the second either. Atheism claims that there is no rational justification for the existence of the divine, and agnosticism claims there's no rational justification whether there is a divinity or not. In contrast, this argument concludes that there is one. Okay, so nobody is really pleased with the consequences of the Euthyphro dilemma. If we're going to reject the consequences, then we have to reject at least one of the premises that resulted in those consequences. If you're a theist, then you want to reject either two or three. If you're an atheist or agnostic, then you want to reject either five or six. Well, that leaves us with a question. Can anybody reject either two or three or five or six? This is what these premises look like rejected. Can we reject any one of these and make sense?