 Thank you very much and good afternoon to you all. As you know, we have just finished the first part of the session, the special session of the Board of Governors on the safety, security and safeguards situation in Ukraine. I've been already working for some days on this issue, but as always I'd like to focus my comments and information on your particular interest on the matter, so I'd rather take your questions and address the issues accordingly. So I'm at your disposal. Hi DG, Jonathan Tyrone with Bloomberg News. On Ukraine, have you verified that all material is within safeguards, perhaps with the exception of the regions in Donbass and Crimea, which are a little bit different? Yes, yeah indeed. We have in operation a number of remote monitoring devices which are operating normally, checking seals and other aspects. So in this regard we can continue our safeguards activities. We also have scheduled physical inspections, not now. I say this because there were some information going around in indicating that we have withdrawn inspectors from Ukraine. It's not correct, which doesn't mean that safeguards, continuity of safeguards activity has been compromised. So we continue for now and as you say, you know that there is a special situation when it comes to Ukraine preceding the current situation. And with the exception of that safeguards, continuity continues. I mean, yes. And just very briefly a follow-up. And I'm sorry, this has to do with another issue. What would it take for you to be able to draw a rapid conclusion on the outstanding 153 issue with Iran? What would it take for me to do that? Yeah. Iran to cooperate with me. Okay. If they do, we'll be able to do that. Hi DG. Hello. Yes. As you know, the focus in the broader nuclear context right now is more on the talks across town on Iran. And so it seems one of the main sticking points in those discussions is the issue of the outstanding safeguards questions you have with Iran. And so for weeks now we've been hearing basically exactly the same thing, that Iran would like some kind of 2015 style final assessment worked into the JCPOA discussions. And that you've said no, or that you're opposed to that at least, and that you have the support of major powers on that. So where do things stand now on that? And is there any kind of creative solution that can be found on that if things simply haven't budged in such a long time? Well, I would say it's work in progress right now, as we speak. It's no secret that these negotiations, which are not my negotiations, we are participating and being consulted that these negotiations are coming to a decisive point. And of course, this issue has been brought to the fore. Our position on this has always been the same. These are distinct processes, although there is obviously mutual influence. But for us to be able to solve these issues, what we need is an integral and very substantive process. And I'm optimistic that we will be able to do that without any politicization of the issue or making it contingent or depending of the closing, hopefully, of the JCPOA negotiations. So we have to continue our own work. So you're optimistic that what can be achieved exactly? A process, a full process to clarify this, which would not be influenced or affected by the current negotiations or any agreement that the JCPOA partners may be reaching or not. It's not my call. Hi, this is Jordy from FIDG. I have a coming back to Ukraine. Yes. You said in your statement that you received a letter from the Ukraine authorities requesting immediate assistance. Yes. What does this mean? Is it somebody has to go there? Or is it remote? Or what kind of assistance? Yeah, indeed. The situation in Ukraine is, as I described in my statement, is, of course, complex and difficult to grasp, because on the one hand, as I indicated, there is normal operation of the nuclear power plants and also other sites, including Chernobyl. This does not mean that everything is well and there is full comfort in the discharge of these very sensitive activities. Of course, there is an ongoing conflict there with all the dangers and the constraints coming with it. The head of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency of Ukraine, I've been in contact with him, I must say, apart from letters, has sent a letter requesting formal assistance. Of course, Ukraine is a member state of the IAEA and they are entitled and expect to get assistance when there is a problem. In this case, related to the safety of their facilities. Obviously, in the present circumstances, delivering assistance is not a straightforward or easy process. This is why I am in contact with all sites to ascertain in which effective way we could be providing this assistance. Since these consultations are ongoing, I would not be in a position to tell you right now what kind or when this assistance is going to be delivered. But I can confirm to you that active consultations are ongoing between myself and all the relevant partners in this process. It could include that, of course. Hello, DG, this is Albert Ottiti, PAHM and Price Agency. I know I understand that you're saying it's all very much in flux. This question of help. But can you at least tell us sort of what in what areas or to understand what type of help the IAEA could conceivably provide? There are many areas. In my statement, I identified a number of them having to do first with the physical integrity of the facilities having to do with the efficient operation of the safety and security mechanisms there, having to do with staffing issues and the way in which the activities of the staff is being carried out, having to do with the insurance of power, outside power to the facilities, having to do with the transportation and supply chain that any industrial facility needs to and in particular, in this case, may need to have. I also referred to the communications side. So there are a number, I would say, a pretty long and big number of issues where we detect that there could be a need for some assistance. I must say that I am encouraged by the fact that in the discussions, in the ongoing discussions, there has been a widespread support for the agency's readiness to engage with with Ukraine and also with Russia naturally to facilitate this much needed assistance. Of course, as in many cases in life, the devil is in the details because of the ongoing situation, including the military operations that are ongoing, but for us, safety and security are primordial and paramount. So I personally am going to exhaust all every possibility to try to be there present and give the concrete assistance that they need. I hope that we'll be able to tell you more in the coming days, but I beg you to bear with me if at this point I cannot get too much into detail because this is a matter of a very sensitive negotiation, which is ongoing. But certainly there are many, many things that we can do, including remotely, including from here through our teams in the Nuclear Safety and Security Department and our Emergency Centre. Thank you. This is Stephanie Lichtenstein. I'm a freelance journalist. If I may ask two questions, the first one on Ukraine, could you maybe describe for us a bit the risks? What is it exactly that you are worried about in the current circumstances with Ukraine's power plants? And the second question just briefly again on Iran. So you say it's not your negotiation, but the safeguards probe is your negotiation. So I was wondering what can we expect? Are you conducting these talks here in Vienna in parallel? Or you're referring to Ukraine always? No, this is the safeguards probe with Iran. Yes, my second question. OK, well, there are two big questions. So the first was on the Ukraine. And what are the risks? The risk. I explained the risks and the risks you're worried about. Well, you have to then look at the nuclear facilities spread all over the Ukraine. One of the unique features of this situation we are all seeing is that this is an ongoing military conflict taking place in a country that has a vast nuclear program. Fifteen nuclear reactors for big nuclear power site plant sites and all the facilities associated with it. So there is a lot of nuclear material physically present and also the factor that these facilities provide more than half, more than half of the electricity of the country. So that already in and by itself, itself says a lot. The important matter here is that when there is a conflict ongoing, there is, of course, a risk of attack or a the possibility of an accidental heat. In terms of attack, we do not expect this to happen. I believe that all countries without exception are going to be respecting the decisions of the IAEA and the General Conference many years ago, where all of us agreed not to ever attack or threat to attack a nuclear facility. And I think that the Russian Federation itself has indicated that they are not aiming at this kind of thing. But, but, and this is a big but, and I have addressed this in my regular updates, which you may have seen. We have had cases where places, facilities, the vicinity of facilities have been hit accidentally or not by shelling or, or even in one case, a missile. So there you have a distinct possibility that something may happen that could affect the containment of a place where you can have, for example, there were two situations in places where Ukraine has nuclear waste, low level waste from hospitals and other activities. So what you could have is a release of radioactive material if, if that happens. So what we must make sure is that these these things do not happen. In terms of an active external kinetic activity and also that there are no problems related to to your question just before that because of problems related to the lack of external power or the lack of staffing or spare parts, some safety essential activities could not be performed in the way they should be performed. So the really the work is, is, is vast. And I would like to recognize I think it's we all owe it a huge debt of gratitude to people, the nuclear safety people and nuclear security regulators in the Ukraine, which are who are working almost without interruption and without breaks and rest for the past 10 days or so. So that was the first part of your question. And the second was on the issue again, on the issue of the ongoing negotiations. Of course, we do have permanent consultations with Iran, Stephanie, in many, in many ways, in person, virtual, and otherwise, and we are working very hard to try to come to an agreement. I don't know if that is what you wanted to know or there is something else. You're not planning to to travel again to Iran. Or everything is possible. Everything is possible. Yes, everything is possible. Hello, Setsuko Inaki from Nippon TV. I have also one question for Ukraine and one for Iran. And for the Ukraine is that I want to hear a little bit about the communication from the Russian side. What is the Russian rationale of doing this? And how have they communicated to you? That's number one regarding the Ukraine and on Iran. In the last, when the agreement was made, you know, back then, the it was the nuclear probe, you know, of the history, the historical, military dimension was like almost like the last piece, which really didn't. And then, I mean, the IAEA had to make an inconclusive report and it left the judgment to the BOG to decide how they judge on that one. Do you foresee that same thing would ultimately may happen? And my question also is how do you think are you at that point or yet or what's the time feeding for this? Well, on the first part, you were asking me about the rationale of the Russian federation to do exactly what this is what I don't understand. For them to guard or to to have the nuclear Ukraine and nuclear facility under their control. What are how are they explaining to you? They are not explaining motivations. This is a military operation. And they are not explaining to me what is the motivation to move their forces around the country. No, they don't they don't explain that. They they give information about the location of these forces when it comes to nuclear facilities. So about the motivations and the rationale, unfortunately, maybe you should ask them on the source so that the only information that you're getting from Russian is the position of the forces and the from their side of report about facilities operating in a normal status. Is it in terms of the operation? No, the all the information we get, we should never forget that my partner is the Ukrainian regulator and they are the ones we are interacting with. But Russia has been informing about movement of troops and in the particular case of Chernobyl, confirming that they that their forces took over the site, which doesn't mean that they are operating it. It is the Ukrainian operators that are that are there. Then on your second question, it is a bit of a speculation. You know, I don't know it is it is clear that the although, as I said, answering to Mr. Murphy's question before the these issues are, of course, separated. One thing is the JCPOA or the return, the possible return to JCPOA. And the other is the issues that they have to explain to us. Obviously, there is an interrelation. But getting into too much of a interpretation of how one thing would be influencing the other. I don't think it helps, honestly. I think that what we need now is to have sound, good agreements on both and then any interrelationship would always be positive. This is what I would say. Sandra Tomman, Yomer Shinron. Hi, Digi. Digi, you said in your update from today that Russian forces took over the surrounding areas from an NPP in the southern part of Ukraine. Indeed. So does it mean it's just a surrounding area or is it the site itself? And do you have the feeling that they will take over the site itself too, if not until now? Well, I think they are in control of the of the surrounding area and of the site as well, which, again, does not mean that they have taken over the plant itself or the operation of the reactor and etc. So they have the physical control of the perimeter and and the surrounding area, including the village, where most of the employees live. Hi, Digi. Thanks a lot. Good to see you. A couple of questions on each issue, if I may. If the IEA were to send people to Ukraine for assistance, what are we talking about here? How many people potentially could you send? And have you discussed that with Russia and have Russia said that they would be open to that and would provide the security that would be needed? I just want to come back on Ukraine. Also, Russia and Vladimir Putin have made very specific allegations about Ukraine working on nuclear. I elicit even producing nuclear weapons. Can you just state very clearly for us, is there any evidence of that? And then I have two on Iran. Do you want me to wait and then come back to them? Oh, let's. Yep. You talked about a full process in terms of the safeguard probe. And I've heard some talk that there could be another kind of road map with Iran on how you deal with these these issues. I wonder if that's right. But I presume the key point for you is that there is no pre-fixed end date on that process. Is that correct? And I'm just curious as to why you think Iran is so keen to have this probe closed and when are the reports coming? Thank you. Well, thank you. How much time do you have? You have a couple of hours. As you'd like to bring the coffee. And anyway, so the first was about about the assistance, as I said, please be patient with me. It's very difficult. It's a very, very difficult conversation, as you can imagine, because having access to to a zone which is basically, you know, a zone of military conflict, the war zone, what could define it is would be extremely delicate. And we have to consult, of course, those in control and also Ukraine. So on this, maybe we can give you more information on this a bit, a bit later. On the on the process of the clarification of all these outstanding issues with the with Iran, all I can say is that we have made sure that this process is not affected by any other external process, that this process has its own merits. If I can use the word merit has its own reason to be there, and it has to be clarified. The idea of road maps or calendars, et cetera, I would say this is I am not so I would say fixated on that. It is obvious that being a long process and being a process that will concern and be applied to different issues related to different places. There will be a sequencing. We cannot do everything at the same time on the same day and in the same week. So there will be some sequencing. Of course, we have to do that. And in terms of timings, one thing without getting into specific dates or things like that, which I tend not to like too much. I think it's fair to say that we do not expect this to be an open ended thing. We need to come to a point, hopefully the sooner, the better, the sooner, the better, where we will be able, I will be able to draw a conclusion, be it in either sense. OK. Sorry, sorry. Councilor Nozhi from the BBC Persian television. Two questions on Ukraine. I just wondered whether you can simply tell us how worried the world should be today looking at what is going on in Ukraine. On the nuclear front, Iran, of course, as you know, demanding as part of this deal here in the in the nuclear talks that the IAEA stops this investigation in the foreign declared sites. Can you envisage a scenario in which the IAEA as part of the broader interest in a bigger deal might do that, might just drop the investigations. Thank you. I understand. First, the first question, how worried? I think in a in a in a general sense, we must always be very worried, very concerned about war and about the use of force. So we are very good in terms of the specific mandate that I have. I think everything that we have been discussing is my answer. We are trying to make sure that we will not have again added suffering because of any radioactive release or anything having to do with nuclear facilities, which is which is my mandate. I'm not in the international law or territorial integrity or security council domain. That is not my thing. But where I am responsible for, we will do our most. And second on on on your question, of course, the IAEA will never abandon a process that it launched because of the necessity of clarification of certain situations in Iran because of a political reason. This is not how the IAEA works. And I as director general would never do that. So what we need to do with Iran is to sit around the table and try to clarify these issues. These issues, the only way these issues go away is if they are clarified to the full satisfaction of the IAEA. This is the way just very briefly. Digi, can you please give some detail on why the 30 kilometer safety zone may be particularly challenging for you to help to enforce? Well, what you refer to is an idea that the chief executive officer of NRGO Atom mentioned in a conversation with me a few days ago. This is one idea that that he has. Of course, the IAEA has no power to enforce an exclusion zone or any measure with a territoriality aspect in that regard. So it's an initiative that he has been talking about. But frankly speaking, is at the moment, it's not something I am considering. What I am trying to do is to see what I can do in these consultations to ensure the safety of these places. These other things would spill into other competencies and jurisdictions, and I would never be able to help there in this way. But yes, on the safety. Hi there, just in the car from AFP. Also one on each, if that's OK. I just noticed in your statement on Ukraine. You said it's imperative to ensure the brave people who operate, regulate, inspect and assess the facilities. Are able to do their jobs safely, unimpeded and without undue pressure. Yeah. Why did you say that? Well, I say this. Thank you for the question. I say this because you know that in any as in any other work, and in particular in industrial or this type of facility, you have shifts. So people have to go home and rest. And in it has been challenging to ensure that there is a full change of shifts. Some people, this doesn't mean that they are working nonstop without sleeping or eating or things like that. But in some cases, we know that people have to stay the plant and then continue working the next day and not take the necessary time off and things like this. And in this, in any activity, but in particular here, where you have to be really very, very focused and and and not make mistakes, this can lead to mistakes. So what we are trying in our discussions with with Ukraine and also with Russia is to facilitate this, to make sure that things like this do not happen. And I praise them because even if they had all the rest in the world, they could go back home and back to the plant. The whole situation of that country is extremely dramatic. So I think they deserve a lot of you have to understand, for example, our emergency center is 24 seven. They are working all the time and they are in contact with these operators all the time. And they are answering our questions. They are giving us the readings of the different systems that they have. They are checking on things and all of these in the circumstances that they are having. So go figure how difficult, how stressing this may be when their families could be in danger, where they may have lost people they love and when their own country is in this situation. So I think they they really deserve our praise. And the reason I am mentioning this is because the issue of having stuff which is well rested, competent and present there is very, very important. It's not only it is a humanitarian issue, but not only. It's also a technical issue. And sorry, I just want to ask one on Iran if that's OK. Can you just give us a general idea of, you know, since we last spoke to you in the last few weeks, couple of months, what have your interactions been like with the Iranian side? Have things visibly improved? Have you seen any progress? We are working hard. We are working very hard. How would you characterize their cooperation? We are working very hard. OK. Hi, and to be again, coming back to the Ukraine. I mean, if you remember the Fukushima, that the trigger was out of power. Sorry, there was no power. And then I guess, yes, yes, yes, yes, that you also mentioned about the concern about electricity feeding into that. And of course, that there is, of course, a generator, whatever. But how safe is it? And then also, like with the fuel, probably power generator, how long can an Ukrainian power plant can operate without electricity? It's good that you mentioned Fukushima, because as a result, I would never say thanks to Fukushima. But as a result of what happened in Fukushima, as we always say here at the agency, there have been vast improvements in terms of nuclear safety. And one of these improvements that we have is that, of course, the first thing is that external power is not interrupted. But even in that case, the availability of stationed power generating units like diesel, for example, has been vastly improved and their autonomy has also been extended in some cases between seven days and even 10 days and beyond. And this is the case in Ukraine. So, of course, God forbid that such an event happens. But if that was the case, the availability of secondary sources and alternative sources of power would be much easier and less traumatic than it was the case in 2011. Yeah, but the question is that if it's for 10 days, the power station electricity connection is cut off because of the war, then there's no way to supply the electricity. So it would have to solely rely on the diesel. And then you said 10 days and it could be more. And please, I think we should stop speculating like this, because first of all, there is no interruption of power. And secondly, if that happened, the point I'm trying to make is that you have time, which was what we didn't have in Fukushima. You have time to restore it within that period of time. There is ample time to while you are continuing the cooling process, which is indispensable, you have a lot of time for everybody, all concerned to work on that. But starting to say 10, 12, 11 is not an area that I would really like to. And I don't think it adds anything. Frankly, thank you. Thank you. Excuse me. I just want to come back to a question from Lawrence. You didn't answer after the Russian allegations of a possible nuclear idea program after any indications or any. Thank you for thank you. And I'm sorry for for having omitted that. But the question was so vast that I got lost in my in my answer. So the this issue, I mean, for us is very clear. We do not have any information that would question the nonproliferation credentials of the Ukraine. It's important to say, as I indicated earlier in the press conference, that we have we continue our safeguards operation and we do not have any information that there is any deviation of material, any anti-clare material or activities leading to the development of nuclear weapons. This is our answer to that. Short follow up. Maybe a couple of short ones and can you explain why you have not can you explain why you have not issued your quarterly Iran reports to member states and when you're expecting to do so? We're working hard, as I told them. Sorry, Digi. Also a bit of a follow up. You. Digi, sorry. Yeah, sorry. Just a follow up because you've mentioned in your in your daily updates on Ukraine, you know, you keep appealing for no one to do anything that would jeopardize the security and safety of Ukraine's nuclear facilities. Just wondering, has Russia offered you any assurances at all on that? I think Russia has been repeating that they do they do not a, you know, have any plans to attack facilities. Right. But you're talking about their public their public pronouncements. Generally, yeah, to you, though, they made any said anything to you about this? Well, as I was saying, I'm in contact with with my Russian counterparts. And of course, this is an issue that is essential and central to the to the conversation. And I'm convinced that nothing like this could ever happen. Of course, we need to be active on this. We need to make sure that there is no unintended or accidental problem. And this is a possibility for as long as you have a conflict. So we are discussing these things. We are discussing on specific sites. But but on that, I would ask you to bear with me, as I was saying, since it may involve sensitive information about plants and activities. And I cannot get too much into the detail, but we are really covering everything. Yeah. So I think you're much for your attention. And we will keep in touch. Thank you very much.