 Mark Nolan, you have the unenviable task of trying to explain to us the current state and future of American trade policy. Take it away. Thank you. It's an honor to be here. In the interests of time, let me quickly take off four challenges, three of which are interrelated, and I'll focus on trade, as Jeff indicated. The first is exit from unconventional monetary policy and rising interest rates globally are likely to set off financial crises, large and small. Olivier Blanchard and others on the program will address this issue, so I'll just skip through that. The next three are interrelated. The first is the rise of populist governments. Now, these are often described as conservative or right wing, but they're not classically liberal. They tend to be highly interventionist. And these microeconomic interventions create winners and losers. The losers demand compensation. That sets off another set of interventions. And so you get cascading interventions. The net effect will be to reduce long-run productivity and incomes, but the constituencies don't really seem to care about that. The Trump trade policy in this respect is an exemplar. Trump launched a trade war with China. The Chinese retaliated against American grain producers. The response to the U.S. government has been to expand income supports for farmers and is now contemplating increasing the requirement that ethanol in American gasoline rise from 10% to 15% to increase demand for grain. So in effect, a trade policy finds its echo in policies having to do with energy and transportation. And finally, the Trump trade policy can be seen as simply one component of a broader emerging cold war between the United States and China. So now on trade policy, Donald Trump is a protectionist. He has protectionist views going back to the 1980s. He ran on a protectionist platform. And while there's some uncertainty about the administration's goals and how far it's willing to push confrontational tactics in their pursuit, I don't think there can really be an argument about the overall thrust of that policy. The goals are reducing trade deficits, both globally and bilaterally, renegotiating or abrogating disastrous trade agreements and rebuilding the manufacturing base by tearing up global supply chains and bringing production back to the United States. The tools are aggressive use of U.S. anti-dumping, countervailing, unfair trade practice statutes, and particularly concerning the use of national security statutes, Section 232, with a focus on China. The use of 232 is particularly worrisome because the statute is very broadly written and it's used by the United States practically invites emulation from other countries. Renegotiation of existing trade deals, most importantly NAFTA, criticism of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism on sovereignty grounds and a preference for bilateral talks over WTO or regional initiatives. The bottom line is the Trump administration is focused on undoing past deals and instituting border restrictions. It remains unclear whether this protection is a means to an end. That would be sort of the optimistic interpretation that this is an elaborate tactical maneuver that will ultimately generate a more open system or whether the protection is an end of itself. I'll come back to that at the end. Today about 12% of American imports are under special protection. If Trump goes forward with his threat to increase the amount of Chinese imports under protection, that number could double. And if the administration goes through with the threat to introduce a Section 232 case on automobiles, and I'll talk more about this in a moment, that would be another 15% of trade. So all together the administration is contemplating putting 40% of American imports under special protection. I'm not saying they're going to do that, but I want to signal to you the scale that the administration is talking about. 8% of American exports are now under retaliation and that figure will rise Paripassu as the United States goes forward with these other protective mechanisms. The two key drivers have been the renegotiation of NAFTA and concerns over China. The NAFTA renegotiation, like the earlier renegotiation of the U.S.-Korea trade agreement, had a net effect of weakening the agreement and moving the United States away from free trade. Maybe we should call the new U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement NAFTA 0.8. While the renegotiation did yield some useful modernizations of the agreement, these were taken part and parcel from the language of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which the United States pulled the U.S. out of its first week in office. So while supporters can point to some good things in the new NAFTA, they're really a second best to getting those modernizations through TPP. The real innovations of the new NAFTA are twofold. One is the introduction of a convoluted sunset provision, which has the intent of creating uncertainty and deterring investment in Mexico. The second is the introduction of new, highly restrictive rules of origin in the automobile sector. These include higher value-added thresholds and the requirement that production be undertaken at a high minimum wage. The net effect of these new rules of origin is going to greatly increase costs of doing business in Mexico. Now, the tariff on automobiles in the United States is only 2.5 percent, so the companies would simply ignore these, pay the tariff, and go ahead and import the cars. So to prevent the companies from doing that, that is why the administration is introduced or is talking about bringing in a Section 232 case with a tariff of 25 percent. That has set off a scramble by third-country exporters, namely the EU, Japan and Korea, to try to get exemptions from that, and the United States is demanding voluntary export restraints as the price of that exemption. The sad part of all this is modeling suggests that it's quite possible by rising, by increasing costs of production in North America that much, and then by imposing barriers on imports, the effect of this policy will be actually to reduce production and employment in the United States in automobile assembly parts and distribution. With respect to China, the administration has cited eight different justifications for its policy. These include reducing the trade imbalance, increasing exports, reducing Chinese steelmaking capacity, stopping intellectual property rights abuse, ending China's industrial policy, slowing US FDI to China, deterring Chinese investment in US high tech, and terminating Chinese purchases of Iranian oil and gas. The question remains whether the threat and tariffs are a means to an end or a goal in itself, and of course to choose, I would choose the latter. That the point is actually to reduce trade between the United States and China, and indeed this can be seen as the economic component of the broader Cold War with China. So conclusion, Trump is a protectionist. He set the world economy off on a trajectory towards much higher levels of protection, and while there is some possibility that this is all a negotiating tactic to gain leverage and will ultimately generate a more open system, my guess is the odds are what you see is what you get. Thank you. Thank you, Marcus, for that somewhat troubling interpretation of American trade policy, which I happen to agree with.