 Part 3, Section 4 of the Freedom of the Will by Jonathan Edwards, this Leibovach's recording is in the public domain, Command and Obligation to Obedience Consistent with Moral in Ability to Obey. It being so much insisted on by Armenian writers that necessity is inconsistent with law or command, and particularly that it is absurd to suppose God by His command should require that men which they are unable to do. Not allowing in this case for any difference between natural and moral inability, I would therefore now particularly consider this matter and for greater clearness I would distinctly lay down the following things. 1. The will itself and not only those actions which are the effects of the will is the proper object of precept or command. That is, such as state or acts of men's wills are in many cases properly required of them by commands and not only those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest for it is the soul only that is properly and directly the subject of precepts or commands, that only being capable of receiving or perceiving commands. The motions or state of the body are matter of command only as they are subject to the soul and connected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can in the most direct and proper sense consent yield to or comply with any command but the faculty of the will and it is by this faculty only that the soul can directly disobey or refuse compliance. For the very notions of consenting, yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, etc. are according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts of the will. Obedience in the primary nature of it is the submitting and yielding of the will of one to the will of another. This obedience is the not consenting, not complying of the will of the commanded to the manifested will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the will as certain motions of the body and alterations in the soul are obedience or disobedience only indirectly as they are connected with the state or actions of the will according to an established law of nature. So that it is manifest the will itself may be required and the being of a good will is the most proper direct and immediate subject of command and if this cannot be prescribed or required by command or precept nothing can for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon and are the fruits of a good will. Corollary one if there be several acts of the will or a series of acts one following another and one the effect of another the first and determining act is properly the subject of command and not only the consequent acts which are dependent upon it. Yay this more especially is that to which command or precept has a proper respect because it is this act that determines the whole affair in this act the obedience or disobedience lies in a peculiar manner the consequent acts being all governed and determined by it this governing act must be the proper object of precept or none. Corollary two it also follows from what has been observed that if there be any act or exertion of the soul prior to all three acts of choice in the case directing and determining what the acts of the will shall be that act of the soul cannot properly be subject to any command or precept in any respect whatsoever either directly or indirectly immediately or remotely such acts cannot be subject to commands directly because they are no acts of the will being by the supposition prior to all acts of the will determining and giving rise to all its acts they not being acts of the will there can be in them no consent to or compliance with any command neither can they be subject to command or precept indirectly or remotely for they are not so much as the effects or consequences of the will being prior to all its acts so that if there be any obedience in that original act of the soul determining all volitions it is an act of obedience wherein the will has no concerned at all it preceding every act of will and therefore if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act it is wholly involuntarily there is no willing obedience or rebellion no compliance or opposition of the will in the affair and what sort of obedience or rebellion is this and thus the Armenian notion of the freedom of the will consisting in the souls determining its own acts of will instead of being essential to moral agency and to men being the subjects of moral government is utterly inconsistent with it for if the soul determines all its acts of will it is there in subject to no command or moral government as has been now observed because its original determining act is no act of will or choice it being prior by the supposition to every act of will and the soul cannot be the subject of command in the act of the will itself which depends on the foregoing determining act and is determined by it in as much as this is necessary being the necessary consequence and effective that prior determining act which is not voluntary nor can the man be the subject of command or government in his external actions because these are all necessary being the necessary effects of the acts of the will themselves so that mankind according to this scheme are subjects of command or moral government in nothing at all in all their moral agency is entirely excluded and no room is left for virtue or vice in the world so that the Armenian scheme and not that of the Calvinist is utterly inconsistent with moral government and with all use of laws precepts prohibitions promises or threatenings neither is there any way whatsoever to make their principles consist with these things for if it be said that there is no prior determining act of the soul preceding the acts of the will but that volitions are events that come to pass by pure accident without any determining cause this is most palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts where nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate perfect accident which by the supposition of its being pure accident is in no case regulated by anything preceding but happens this where that perfectly by chance without any cause or rule the perfect uselessness of laws and precepts also follows from the Armenian notion of indifference as essential to that liberty which is requisite to virtue or vice for the end of laws is to bind to one side and the end of commands is to turn the will one way and therefore they are of no use unless they turn or bias the will that way but if liberty consists in indifference then they're biasing the will one way only destroys liberty as it puts the will out of equilibrium so that the will having a bias through the influence of binding law laid upon it is not wholly left to itself to determine itself which way it will without influence from without to having shown that the will itself especially in those acts which are original leading and determining in any case is the proper subject of precept and command and not only those alterations in the body etc. which are the effects of the will I now proceed in the second place to observe that the very opposition or defect of the will itself in its original and determining act in the case to a thing proposed or commanded or its failing of compliance implies a moral inability to that thing or in other words whenever a command requires a certain state or act of the will and the person commanded not withstanding the command and the circumstances under which it is exhibited still finds his will opposite or wanting in that belonging to its state or acts which is original and determining in the affair that man is morally unable to obey that command this is manifest from what was observed in the first part concerning the nature of moral inability as distinguished from natural where was observed that a man may then be said to be morally unable to do a thing when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination or has a want of inclination under such circumstances and views it is also evident from what has been before proved that the will is always and in every individual act necessarily determined by the strongest motive and so is always unable to go against the motive which all things considered has now the greatest strength and advantage to move the will but not further to insist on these things the truth of the position now laid down these that when the will is opposite to or failing of a compliance with a thing in its original determination or act it is not able to comply appears by the consideration of these two things one the will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination and when actually under its influence is not able to exert itself to the contrary to make an alteration in order to compliance the inclination is unable to change itself and that for this plain reason that it is unable to incline to change itself present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise for that would be at present to choose something diverse from what is at present chosen if the will all things now considered inclines or chooses to go that way then it cannot choose all things now considered to go the other way and so cannot choose to be made to go the other way to suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise and it is now inclined the will may oppose some future remote act that it is exposed to but not its own present act to as it is impossible that the will should comply with the thing commanded with respect to its leading act by any act of its own in the time of that diverse or opposite leading and original act or after it has actually come under the influence of that determining choice or inclination so it is impossible it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing act for by the very supposition there is no foregoing act the opposite or non-compliant act being that act which is original and determining in the case therefore it must be so that if this first determining act be found non- complying on the proposal of the command the mind is morally unable to obey for it to suppose it to be able to obey is to suppose it to be able to determine and cause its first determining act to be otherwise and that it has power better to govern and regulate its first governing and regulating act which is absurd for it is to suppose a prior act of the will determining its first determining act that is an act prior to the first and leading and governing the original and governing act of all which is a contradiction here if it should be said that although the mind has not any ability to will contrary to what it does will in the original and leading act of the will because there is supposed to be no prior act to determine and order it otherwise and the will cannot immediately change itself because it cannot at present inclined to change yet the mind has an ability for the present to forbear to proceed to action and taking time for deliberation which may be an occasion of the change of the inclination answer one in this objection that seems to be forgotten which was observed before these that the determining to take the matter into consideration is itself an act of the will and if this be all the act where in the mind exercises ability and freedom then this by the supposition must be all that can be commanded or required by precept and if this act be the commanding act then all that has been observed concerning the commanding act of the will remains true that the very want of it is a moral inability to exert etc. to we are speaking concerning the first and leading act of the will about the affair and if determining to deliberate or on the contrary to proceed immediately without deliberating be the first and leading act or whether it be or know if there be another act before it which determines that or whatever be the original and leading act still the foregoing proof stands good that the non-compliance of the leading act implies moral inability to comply if it should be objected that these things make all moral inability equal and suppose men morally unable to will otherwise than they actually do will in all cases and equally so in every instance in answer to this objection I desire to things may be observed first but if by being equally unable be meant as really unable then so far as the inability is merely moral it is true the will in every instance acts by moral necessity and is morally unable to act otherwise as truly and properly in one case as another as I humbly conceived has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding part this essay but yet in some respect the inability may be said to be greater in some instances than others though the man may be truly unable if moral inability can truly be called inability yet he may be further from being able to do some things than others as it is in things which men are naturally unable to do a person who strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of one hundred pounds is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds as ten thousand pounds but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the former and so according to the common use of speech as a greater inability for it so it is in moral inability a man is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present inclination which in the least degree prevails or contrary to that motive which all things considered has strength and advantage now to move the will in the least degree superior to all other motives in view but yet he is further from ability to resist a very strong habit and a violent and deeply rooted inclination or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength and again the inability may in some respects be called greater in some instances than others as it may be more general and extensive to all acts of that kind so men may be said to be unable in a different sense and to be further from moral ability who have that moral inability which is general and habitual than they who have only that inability which is occasional and particular thus in cases of natural inability he that is born blind may be said to be unable to see in a different manner and is in some respects further from being able to see and he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud or mist and besides that which was observed in the first part of this discourse concerning the inability which attends a strong and subtle habit should be here remembered these that a fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral inability by which it is distinguished from occasional volition namely that endeavors to avoid future volitions of that kind which are agreeable to such a habit much more frequently and commonly proved vain and insufficient for though it is impossible there should be any sincere endeavors against the present choice yet there may be against volitions of that kind when viewed at a distance a person may desire and use means to prevent future exercises of a certain inclination and in order to it may wish the habit might be removed but his desires and endeavors may be ineffectual the man may be said in some sense to be unable yet even as the word unable is a relative term and has relation to ineffectual endeavors yet not with regard to present but remote endeavors secondly it must be born in mind according to what was observed before that indeed no inability whatsoever which is merely moral is properly called by the name of inability and that in the strictest propriety of speech a man may be said to have a thing in his power if he has it at his election and he cannot be said to be unable to do a thing when he can if he now pleases or whenever he has a proper direct and immediate desire for it as to those desires and endeavors that may be against the exercises of a strong habit with regard to which men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises they are remote desires and endeavors into respects first as to time they are never against present volitions but only against volitions of such a kind when viewed at a distance secondly as to their nature these opposite desires are not directly and properly against the habit and inclination itself or the volitions in which it is exercised for these and themselves considered are agreeable but against something else that attends them or is their consequence the opposition of the mind is leveled entirely against this the volitions themselves are not at all opposed directly and for their own sake but only indirectly and remotely on the account of something foreign three though the opposition of the will itself or the very want of will to a thing commanded implies a moral inability to that thing yet if it be as has been already shown that the being of a good state or active will is a thing most properly required by command then in some cases such as state or active will may properly be required which at present is not in which may also be wanting after it is commanded and therefore those things may properly be commanded for which men have a moral inability such as state or active the will may be required by command as does not already exist for if that volition only may be commanded to be which already is there could be no use of preset commands in all cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent and not only may such a will be required as is wanting before the command is given but also such as may possibly be wanting afterwards such as the exhibition of the command may not be effectual to produce or excite otherwise no such thing as disobedience to a proper and rightful command is possible in any case and there is no case possible wherein there can be a faulty disobedience which Armenians cannot affirm consistently with their principle for this makes obedience to just and proper commands always necessary and disobedience impossible and so the Armenian would overthrow himself yielding the very point we are upon which he so strenuously denies these that law and command are consistent with necessity if merely that inability will excuse disobedience which is implied in the opposition or defective inclination remaining after the command is exhibited then wickedness always carries about in it which excuses it by how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart by so much is his inclination to evil the stronger and by so much the more therefore has he of moral inability to the good required his moral inability consisting in the strength of his evil inclination is the very thing wherein his wickedness consists and yet according to Armenian principles it must be a thing inconsistent with wickedness and by how much the more he has of it by so much is he the further from wickedness therefore in the whole it is manifest that moral inability alone which consists in disinclination never renders anything improperly the subject matter of preceptor command and never can excuse any person in disobedience or want of conformity to a command natural inability arising from the want of natural capacity or external hindrance which alone is properly called inability without doubt wholly excuses or makes the thing improperly the matter of command if men are excused from doing or acting any good thing supposed to be commanded it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the will itself but either in the capacity of understanding or body or outward circumstances here two or three things may be observed one as to spiritual acts or any good thing in the state or imminent acts of the will itself or of the affections which are only certain modes of the exercise of the will if persons are just the excuse that must be through want of capacity in the natural faculty of understanding thus the same spiritual duties or holy affections and exercises of art cannot be required of men as may be of angels the capacity of understanding being so much inferior so men cannot be required to love those amiable persons whom they have had no opportunity to see or hear of or know in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the human understanding but the insufficiency of motives will not excuse unless there being insufficient arises not from the moral state of the will or inclination itself but from the state of the natural understanding the great kindness and generosity of another may be a motive insufficient to excite gratitude in the person that receives the kindness through his vile and ungrateful temper in this case the insufficiency of the motive arises from the state of the will or inclination of heart and does not at all excuse but if this generosity is not sufficient to excite gratitude being unknown there being no means of information adequate to the state and measure of the person's faculties this insufficiency is attended with a natural inability which entirely excuses it to as to such motions of body or exercises and alterations of mind which do not consist in the imminent acts or state of the will itself but are supposed to be required as effects of the will in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding that inability and that only excuses which consists in wanted connection between them and the will if the will fully complies and the proposed effect is not proved according to the loss of nature to be connected with his volition the man is perfectly excused he has a natural inability to the thing required for the will itself as has been observed is all that can be directly and immediately required by command and other things only indirectly as connected with the will if therefore there be a full compliance of will the person has done his duty and if other things do not prove to be connected with his volition that is not criminally owing to him three both these kinds of natural inability and all inability that excuses may be resolved into one thing namely want of natural capacity or strength either capacity of understanding or external strength for when there are external defects and obstacles they would be no obstacles were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and strength corollary if things for which men have a moral inability may properly be the matter of preceptor command then they may also have invitation and counsel commands and invitations come very much to the same thing the difference is only circumstantial commands are as much a manifestation of the will of him that speaks as invitations and as much testimonies of expectation of compliance the difference between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand the main difference between command and invitation consists in the enforcement of the will of him who commands or invites in the latter it is his kindness the goodness from which his will arises in the former it is his authority but whatever be the ground of will in him that speaks or the enforcement of what he says yet seeing neither his will nor his expectation is any more testified in the one case than the other therefore a person being directed by invitation is no more an evidence of insincerity in him that directs in manifesting either a will or expectation which he has not then a person being known to be morally unable to do what he is directed by command is an evidence of insincerity so that all this grand objection of Armenians against the inability of fallen men to exert faith in Christ or to perform other spiritual duties from the sincerity of God's counsels and invitations must be without force in the part three section four part three section five of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain that sincerity of desires and endeavors which is supposed to excuse in the non performance of things in themselves good particularly considered it is much insisted on by many that some men though they are not able to perform spiritual duties such as repentance of sin love to God a cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel etc yet may sincerely desire and endeavor after these things and therefore must be excused it being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things which they sincerely desire and endeavor to do but cannot concerning this matter the following things may be observed one what is here supposed is a great mistake and gross absurdity even that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love acceptance choice rejection etc consisting in the exercise of the will itself or in the disposition and inclination of the heart and yet not able to perform or exert them this is absurd because it is absurd to suppose that a man should directly properly and sincerely incline to have an inclination which at the same time is contrary to his inclination for that is to suppose him not to be inclined to that which he is inclined to if a man in the state and acts of his will and inclination properly and directly falls in with those duties he therein performs them for the duties themselves consist in that very thing they consist in the state and acts of the will being so formed and directed if the soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of will or choice the soul therein makes that choice its own even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direction of its motion that is the same thing as to move in that direction to that which is called a desire and willingness for those inward duties in such as do not perform them has respect to these duties only indirectly and remotely and is improperly so called not only because as was observed before it respects those good volitions only in a distant view and with respect to future time but also because evermore not these things themselves but something else that is form is the object that terminates these volitions and desires a drunkard who continues in his drunkenness being under the power of a violent appetite to strong drink and without any love to virtue but being also extremely covetous and close and very much exercised and grieved at the diminution of his estate and prospect of poverty may in a sort desire the virtue of temperance and though his present will is to gratify his extravagant appetite yet he may wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperance and forsake his excesses through and unwillingness to part with his money but still he goes on with his drunkenness his wishes and endeavors are insufficient and ineffectual such a man has no proper direct sincere willingness to forsake this vice and the vicious deeds which belong to it for he acts voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess his desire is very improperly called a willingness to be temperate it is no true desire of that virtue for it is not that virtue that terminates his wishes nor have they any direct respect at all to it it is only the saving of his money or the avoiding of poverty that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his desire the virtue of temperance is regarded only very indirectly and improperly even as a necessary means of gratifying the vice of covetousness so a man of an exceeding the corrupt and wicked heart who has no love to god and jesus christ but on the contrary being very profanely incarnally inclined has the greatest distaste of the things of religion and enmity against them yet being of a family that from one generation to another have most of them died in youth of an hereditary consumption and so having little hope of living long and having been instructed in the necessity of a supreme love to christ and gratitude for his death and sufferings in order to his salvation from eternal misery if under these circumstances he should through fear of eternal torments wish he had such a disposition but his profane and carnal heart remaining he continues still in his habitual distaste of and enmity to god and religion and holy without any exercise of that love and gratitude as doubtless the very devils themselves not withstanding all the devilishness of their temper would wish for a holy heart if by that means they could get out of hell in this case there is no sincere willingness to love christ and choose him as his chief good these holy dispositions and exercises are not at all the direct object of the will they truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul but all is terminated on deliverance from torment and these graces and pious volitions not withstanding this forced consent are looked upon as in themselves undesirable as when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors in order to save his life from these things it appears three that this indirect willingness is not that exercise of the will which the command requires but is entirely a different one being a volition of a different nature and terminated altogether on different objects wholly falling short of that virtue of will to which the command has respect for this other volition which has only some indirect concern with the duty required cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself which is commanded being not the thing which answers and fulfills the command and being holy destitute of the virtue which the command seeks further to illustrate this matter if a child has a most excellent father that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness and has every way in the highest degree merited his love and dutiful regard and as with all very wealthy but the son is of so vile a disposition that he inveterately hates his father and yet apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin by bringing him finally to those abject circumstances which are exceedingly adverse to his avarice and ambition he therefore wishes it were otherwise but yet remaining under the invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition he continues still in his subtle hatred of his father nor if such as sons indirect willingness to love and honor his father at all acquits or excuses before god for his feeling of actually exercising these dispositions towards him which god requires it must be on one of these accounts one either that it answers and fulfills the command but this it does not buy the supposition because the thing commanded his love and honor to his worthy parent if the command be proper and just as is supposed then it obliges to the thing commanded and so nothing else but that can answer the obligation or to it must be at least because there is that virtue or goodness in his indirect willingness that is equivalent to the virtue required and so balances or counter veils it and makes up for the want of it but that also is contrary to the supposition the willingness the son has merely from a regard to money and honor has no goodness in it to counter veil the want of the pious filial respect required sincerity in reality in that indirect willingness which has been spoken of does not make it the better that which is real and hearty is often called sincere whether it be in virtue or vice some persons are sincerely bad others are sincerely good and others may be sincere and hearty in things which are in their own nature indifferent as a man may be sincerely desirous of eating when he is hungry but being sincere hearty and in good earnest is no virtue unless it be in a thing that is virtuous a man may be sincere and hearty and joining a crew of pirates or a gang of robbers when the devils cried out and besought christ not to torment them it was no mere pretense they were very hearty in their desires not to be tormented but this did not make their will or desire virtuous and if men have sincere desires which are in their kind and nature no better it can be no excuse for the want of any required virtue and as a man's sincerity in such an indirect desire or willingness to do his duty as has been mentioned cannot excuse for the want to perform it so it is with endeavors arising from such a willingness the endeavors can have no more goodness in them than the will of which they are the effect and expression and therefore however sincere and real and however great a persons endeavors are yay though they should be to the utmost of visibility unless the will from which they proceed be truly good and virtuous they can be of no avail or wait whatsoever in a moral respect that which is not truly virtuous is in God's sight good for nothing and so can be of no value or influence in his account to make up for any moral defect for nothing can counterbalance evil but good if evil be in one scale and we put a great deal into the other of sincere and earnest desires and many and great endeavors yet if there be no real goodness in all there is no weight in it and so it does nothing towards balancing the real weight which is in the opposite scale it is only like subtracting a thousand knots from before real number which leaves the sum just as it was indeed such endeavors may have a negatively good influence those things which have no positive virtue have no positive moral influence yet they may be an occasion of persons avoiding some positive evils as if a man were in the water with a neighbor to whom he had ill will and who could not swim holding him by his hand this neighbor was much in debt to him the man is tempted to let him sink and drown but refuses to comply with the temptation not from love to his neighbor but from the love of money and because by his drowning he should lose his debt that which he does in preserving his neighbor from drowning is nothing good in the sight of god yet hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would have been contracted if he had designedly let his neighbor sink and perish but when Armenians in their disputes with Calvinists insist so much on sincere desires and endeavors as what must excuse men must be accepted of god etc it is manifest that they have respect to some positive moral weight or influence of those desires and endeavors accepting justifying or excusing on the account of sincere endeavors as they are called and men doing what they can etc has relation to some moral value something that is accepted as good and as such countervailing some defect but there is a great and unknown deceit arising from the ambiguity of the phrase sincere endeavors indeed there is a vast indistinctness and unfixedness in most or at least very many of the terms used to express things pertaining to moral and spiritual matters whence arise innumerable mistakes strong prejudices inextricable confusion and endless controversy the word sincere is most commonly used to signify something that is good men are habituated to understand by it the same as honest and upright which terms excite an idea of something good in the strictest and highest sense good in the sight of him who sees not only the outward appearance but the heart and therefore men think that if a person be sincere he will certainly be accepted if it be said that anyone is sincere in his endeavors this suggests that his heart is good that there is no defective duty as to virtuous inclination he honestly and uprightly desires and endeavors to do as he is required and this leads them to suppose that it would be very hard and unreasonable to punish him only because he is unsuccessful in his endeavors the thing endeavored after being beyond his power whereas it ought to be observed that the word sincere has these different significations one sincerity as the word is sometimes used signifies no more than reality of will and endeavor with respect to anything that is professed or pretended without any consideration of the nature of the principle or aim whence this real will and true endeavor arises if a man has some real desire either direct or indirect to obtain a thing or does really endeavor after it he is said sincerely to desire or endeavor without any consideration of the goodness of the principle from which he acts or any excellency or worthiness of the in for which he acts thus a man who is kind to his neighbor's wife who is sick and languishing and very helpful in her case makes a show of desiring and endeavoring her restoration to health and bigger and not only makes such a show but there is a reality in his pretense he does hardly and earnestly desire to have her health restored and uses his true and utmost endeavors for it he is said sincerely to desire and endeavor after it because he does so truly or really though perhaps the principle he acts from is no other than a vile and scandalous passion having lived in adultery with her he earnestly desires to have her health and vigor restored that he may return to his criminal pleasures or to by sincerity is meant not merely a reality of will and endeavor of some sort and from some consideration or other but a virtuous sincerity that is that in the performance of those particular acts that are the matter of virtue or duty there be not only the matter but the form and essence of virtue consisting in the aim that governs the act and the principle exercised in it there is not only the reality of the act that is as it were the body of the duty but also the soul which should properly belong to such a body in this sense a man is said to be sincere when he acts with a pure intention not from sinister views he not only in reality desires and seeks the thing to be done or a qualification to be obtained for some and or other but he wills the thing directly and properly as neither forced nor bribed the virtue of the thing is properly the object of the will in the former sense a man is said to be sincere in opposition to a mere pretense and show of the particular thing to be done or exhibited without any real desire or endeavor at all in the latter sense a man is said to be sincere in opposition to that show of virtue there is in merely doing the matter of duty without the reality of the virtue itself in the soul a man may be sincere in the former sense and yet in the latter be in the sight of God who searches the heart a vile hypocrite in the latter kind of sincerity only is there anything truly valuable or acceptable in the sight of God and this is what in scriptures calls sincerity uprightness integrity truth in the inward parts and being of the perfect heart and if there be such a sincerity and such a degree of it as there ought to be and there be anything further that the man is not able to perform or which does not prove to be connected with his sincere desires and endeavors the man is wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God his will shall surely be accepted for his deed and such a sincere will and endeavor is all that in strictness is required of him by any command of God but as to the other kind of sincerity of desires and endeavors having no virtue in it as was observed before it can be of no avail before God in any case to recommend satisfy or excuse and has no positive moral weight or influence whatsoever corollary one hence it may be inferred that nothing in the reason and nature of things appears from the consideration of any moral weight in the former kind of sincerity leading us to suppose that God has made any positive promises of salvation or grace or any saving assistance or any spiritual benefit whatsoever to any desires prayers endeavors striving or obedience of those who hitherto have no true virtue or holiness in their hearts though we should suppose all the sincerity and the utmost degree of endeavor that is possible to be in a person without holiness some object against God requiring as the condition of salvation those holy exercises which are the result of a supernatural renovation such as a supreme respect to Christ love to God loving holding us for its own sake etc that these inward dispositions and exercises are above men's power as they are by nature and therefore that we may conclude that when men are brought to be sincere in their endeavors and do as well as they can they are accepted and that this must be all that God requires in order to they're being received as the objects of his favor and must be what God has appointed as the condition of salvation concerning this i would observe that in such manner of speaking as men being accepted because they are sincere and do as well as they can there is evidently a supposition of some virtue some degree of that which is truly good though it does not go so far as were to be wished for if men do what they can unless they're so doing be from some good principle disposition or exercise of heart some virtuous inclination or act of the will they're so doing what they can is in some respect not a bit better than if they did nothing at all in such a case there is no more positive moral goodness in a man doing what he can than in a windmill doing what he can because the action does no more proceed from virtue and there's nothing in such sincerity of endeavor or doing what we can that should render it any more a fit recommendation to positive favor and acceptance or the condition of any reward or actual benefit than doing nothing for both the one and the other are alike nothing as to any true moral weight or value corollary to hence also it follows there is nothing that appears in the reason and nature of things which can justly lead us to determine that God will certainly give the necessary means of salvation or some way or other bestowed true holiness and eternal life on those heathens who are sincere in the sense above explained in their endeavors to find out the will of the deity and to please him according to their light that they may escape his future displeasure and wrath and obtain happiness in the future of state through his favor end of part three section five part three section six of the freedom of the will by jonathan edwards this leverbox recording is in the public domain liberty of indifference not only not necessary to virtue but utterly inconsistent with it and all either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations inconsistent with Armenian notions of liberty and moral agency to suppose such a freedom of will as Armenians talk of to be requisite to virtue and vice is many ways contrary to common sense if indifference belong to liberty of will as Armenians suppose and it be essential to a virtuous action that it be performed in a state of liberty as they also suppose it will follow that it is essential to a virtuous action that it be performed in a state of indifference and if it be performed in a state of indifference then doubtless it must be performed in the time of indifference and so it will follow that in order to the virtue of an act the heart must be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act and the more indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act performed so much the better because the act is performed with so much the greater liberty but is this agreeable to the light of nature is it agreeable to the notions which mankind in all ages have of virtue that it lies in what is contrary to indifference even in the tendency and inclination of the heart to virtuous action and that the stronger the inclination and so the further from indifference the more virtuous the heart and so much the more praiseworthy the act which proceeds from it if we should suppose contrary to what has been before demonstrated that there may be an act of will in a state of indifference for instance this act these the will determining to put itself out of a state of indifference and to give itself a preponderation one way then it would follow on Armenian principles that this act or determination of the will is that alone where in virtue consists because this only is performed while the mind remains in a state of indifference and so in a state of liberty for when once the mind is put out of its equilibrium it is no longer in such a state and therefore all the acts which follow afterwards proceeding from bias can have the nature neither of virtue nor vice or if the thing which the will can do while yet in a state of indifference and so of liberty be only to suspend acting and determine to take the matter into consideration then this determination is that alone wherein virtue consists and not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by consideration so that it will follow from these principles that whatever is done after the mind by any means is once out of its equilibrium and arises from an inclination has nothing of the nature of virtue or vice and is worthy of neither blame nor praise but how plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind into the notion they have of sincerely virtuous actions which is that they proceed from a heart well disposed and well inclined and the stronger the more fixed and determined the good disposition of the heart the greater the sincerity of virtue and so the more of its truth and reality but if there be any acts which are done in a state of equilibrium or spring immediately from perfect indifference and coldness of heart they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in the heart and consequently according to common sense have no sincere goodness in them having no virtue of heart in them to have a virtuous heart is to have a heart that favors virtue and is friendly to it and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it and besides the actions that are done in a state of indifference or that arise immediately out of such a state cannot be virtuous because by the supposition they are not determined by any preceding choice where if there be preceding choice then choice intervenes between the act and the state of indifference which is contrary to the supposition of the act arising immediately out of indifference but those acts which are not determined by preceding choice cannot be virtuous or vicious by Armenian principles because they are not determined by the will so that neither one way nor the other can any actions be virtuous or vicious according to those principles if the action be determined by a preceding act of choice it cannot be virtuous because the action is not done in a state of indifference nor does immediately arise from such a state and so is not done in a state of liberty if the action be not determined by a preceding act of choice then it cannot be virtuous because then the will is not self determined in it so that it is made certain that neither virtue nor vice can ever find any place in the universe moreover that it is necessary to a virtuous action that it be performed in a state of indifference under a notion of that being a state of liberty is contrary to common sense as it is a dictate of common sense that indifference itself in many cases is vicious and so to a high degree as if when I see my neighbor or near friend and one who has in the highest degree merited of me in extreme distress and ready to perish I find an indifference in my heart with respect to anything proposed to be done which I can easily do for his relief so if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God or kill my father or do numberless other things which might be mentioned the being indifferent for a moment would be highly vicious and vile and it may be further observed that to suppose this liberty of indifference is essential to virtue and vice destroys the great difference of degrees of the guilt of different crimes and takes away the heinousness of the most legidus horrid inequities such as adultery bestiality murder perjury blasphemy etc for according to these principles there is no harm at all in having the mind in a state of perfect indifference with respect to these crimes nay it is absolutely necessary in order to any virtue in avoiding them or vice in doing them but for the mind to be in a state of indifference with respect to them is to be next door to doing them it is then infinitely near to choosing and so committing the fact for equilibrium is the next step to a degree of preponderation and one even the least degree of preponderation all things considered is choice and not only so but for the will to be in a state of perfect equilibrium with respect to such crimes is for the mind to be in such a state as to be full as likely to choose them as to refuse them to do them as to omit them and if our minds must be in such a state wherein it is as near to choosing as refusing and wherein it must of necessity according to the nature of things be as likely to commit them as to refrain from them where is the exceeding heinousness of choosing and committing them if there be no harm in often being in such a state wherein the probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal there being an equilibrium and no more tendency to one than the other then according to the nature and laws of such a contingence it may be expected as an inevitable consequence of such a disposition of things that we should choose them as often as reject them that it should generally so fall out is necessary as equality in the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the cause or of the antecedent state of things from which the effect arises why then should we be so exceedingly to blame if it does so fall out it is many ways apparent that the Armenian scheme of liberty is utterly inconsistent with the being of any such things as either virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions if liberty of indifference be essential to moral agency then there can be no virtue in any habitual inclinations of the heart which are contrary to indifference and imply in their nature the very destruction and exclusion of it they suppose nothing can be virtuous in which no liberty is exercised but how absurd is it to talk of exercising indifference under bias and preponderation and if self-determining power in the will be necessary to moral agency praise blame etc then nothing done by the will can be any further praise worthy or blame worthy then so far as the will is moved swayed and determined by itself and the scales turned by the sovereign power the will has over itself and therefore the will must not be out of its balance preponderation must not be determined and affected beforehand and so the self-determining act anticipated thus it appears another way that habitual bias is inconsistent with that liberty which Armenians supposed to be necessary to virtue or vice and so it follows that habitual bias itself cannot be either virtuous or vicious the same thing follows from their doctrine concerning the inconsistence of necessity with liberty praise dispraise etc none will deny that bias and inclination may be so strong as to be invincible and leave no possibility of the will determining contrary to it and so be attended with necessity this dr. Whitby allows concerning the will of god angels and glorified saints with respect to good and the will of devils with respect to evil therefore if necessity be inconsistent with liberty then when fixed inclination is to such a degree of strength it utterly excludes all virtue vice praise or blame and if so then the nearer habits are to this strength the more do they impede liberty and so diminish praise and blame if very strong habits destroy liberty the lesser ones proportionably hinder it according to their degree of strength and therefore you will follow that then is the act most virtuous or vicious when performed without any inclination or habitual bias at all because it is then performed with most liberty every prepossessing fixed bias on the mind brings a degree of moral inability for the contrary because so far as the mind is biased and prepossessed so much hindrance is there of the contrary and therefore if moral inability be inconsistent with moral agency or the nature of virtue and vice then so far as there is any such thing as evil disposition of heart or habitual depravity of inclination whether covetousness pride malice cruelty or whatever else so much the more excusable persons are so much the less have their evil acts of this kind the nature of vice and on the contrary whatever excellent dispositions and inclinations they have so much are they the less virtuous it is evident that no habitual disposition of heart can be in any degree virtuous or vicious or the actions which proceed from them at all praise worthy or blame worthy because though we should suppose the habit not to be of such strength as holy to take away all moral ability and self determining power or may be partly from bias and in part from self-determination yet in this case all that is from antecedent bias must be set aside as of no consideration and in estimating the degree of virtue of vice no more must be considered than what arises from self-determining power without any influence of that bias because liberty is exercised in no more so that all that is the exercise of habitual inclination is thrown away as not belonging to the morality of the action by which it appears that no exercise of these habits let them be stronger or weaker can ever have anything of the nature of either virtue or vice here if anyone should say that notwithstanding all these things there may be the nature of virtue and vice in the habits of the mind because these habits may be the effects of those acts we're in the mind exercise liberty that however the forementioned reasons will prove that no habits which are natural or that are born or created with us can be either virtuous or vice-vicious yet they will not prove this of habits which have been acquired and established by repeated free acts to such an objector I would say that this evasion will not at all help the matter for if the freedom of will be essential to the very nature of virtue and vice then there is no virtue or vice but only in that very thing wherein this liberty is exercised if a man in one or more things that he does exercises liberty and then by those acts is brought into such circumstances that his liberty ceases and there follows a long series of acts or events that come to pass necessarily those consequent acts are not virtuous or vicious rewardable or punishable but only the free acts that establish this necessity for in them alone was the man free the following effects that are necessary have no more of the nature of virtue of vice than health or sickness of body have properly the nature of virtue of vice being the effects of a course of free acts of temperance or in temperance or then the good qualities of a clock are of the nature of virtue which are the effects of free acts of the artificer or the goodness and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral virtues being the effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener if liberty be absolutely requisite to the morality of actions and necessity wholly inconsistent with it as armenians greatly insist then no necessary effects whatsoever let the cause be never so good or bad can be virtuous or vicious but the virtue or vice must be only in the free cause agreeably to this dr. Whitby supposes the necessity that attends the good and evil habits of the saints in heaven and damned in hell which are the consequence of their free acts in their state of probation are not rewardable or punishable on the whole it appears that if the notions of armenians concerning liberty and moral agency be true it will follow that there is no virtue in any such habits or qualities as humility weakness patience mercy gratitude generosity heavenly mindedness nothing at all praiseworthy in loving christ above father mother wife and children or our own lives or in delight in holiness hungering and thirsting after righteousness love to enemies universal benevolence to mankind and on the other hand there is nothing at all vicious or worthy of disgrace in the most selfish beastly malignant devilish dispositions in being ungrateful profane habitually hating god and things sacred and holy or in being most treacherous envious and cruel towards men for all these things are dispositions and inclinations of the heart and in short there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious quality of mind no such thing as inherent virtue and holiness or vice and sin and the stronger those habits or dispositions are which used to be called virtuous and vicious the further they are from being so indeed the more violent men's lusts are the more fixed their pride and be in gratitude and maliciousness still the further are they from being blame worthy if there be a man that by his own repeated alex or by any other means is come to be of the most hellish disposition desperately inclined to treat his neighbors with injuriousness contempt and malignity the further they should be from any disposition to be angry with him or in the least to blame him though on the other hand if there be a person who is of most excellent spirit strongly inclining him to the most amiable actions admirably meek benevolent etc so much as he further from anything rewardable or commendable on which principles the man Jesus Christ was very far from being praised worthy for those acts of holiness and kindness which he performed these propensities being strong in his heart and above all the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from anything commendable his good inclinations being infinitely strong and he therefore at the utmost possible distance from being at liberty and in all cases the stronger the inclinations of any are to virtue and the more they love it the less virtuous and the more they love wickedness the less vicious they are whether these things are agreeable to scripture that every christian and every man who has read the bible judge and whether they are agreeable to common sense that every one judge that has human understanding in exercise and if we pursue these principles we shall find that virtue and vice are wholly excluded out of the world and that there never was nor ever can be any such thing as one or the other either in god angels or men no propensity disposition or habit can be virtuous or vicious as has been shown because they so far as they take place destroy the freedom of the will the foundation of all moral agency and exclude all capacity of either virtue or vice and if habits and dispositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious neither can the exercise of these dispositions be so for the exercise of bias is not the exercise of free self-determining will and so there is no exercise of liberty in it consequently no man is virtuous or vicious either in being well or ill-disposed nor in acting from a good or bad disposition and whether this bias or disposition be habitual or not if it exists but a moment before the act of will which is the effect of it it alters not the case as to the necessity of the effect or if there be no previous disposition at all either habitual or occasional that determines the act then it is not choice that determines it it is therefore a contingence that happens to the man arising from nothing in him and is necessary as to any inclination or choice of his and therefore cannot make him either the better or worse any more than a tree is better than other trees because it often happens to be lighted upon by a nightingale or a rock more vicious than other rocks because rattlesnakes have happened often are to crawl over it so that there is no virtue nor vice in good or bad dispositions either fixed or transient nor any virtue or vice in acting from any good or bad previous inclination nor yet any virtue or vice in acting wholly without any previous inclination where then shall we find room for virtue or vice end of part three section six part three section seven of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain Armenian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and inducement in either virtuous or vicious actions as Armenian notions of that liberty which is essential to virtue or vice are inconsistent with common sense and they're being inconsistent with all virtuous or vicious habits and dispositions so they are no less inconsistent with all influence of motives in moral actions such influence equally against those notions of liberty whether there be previous to the active choice a preponderance see of the inclination or preponderance see of those circumstances which have a tendency to move the inclination and indeed it comes to just the same thing to say the circumstances of the mind or such as tend to sway and turn its inclination one way is the same thing as to say the inclination of the mind as under such circumstances tends that way or if any think it most proper to say that motives do alter the inclination and give a new bias to the mind it will not alter the case as to the present argument for if motives operate by giving the mind an inclination then they operate by destroying the mind's indifference and laying it under a bias but to do this is to destroy the Armenian freedom it is not to leave the will to its own self-determination but to bring it into subjection to the power of something extrinsic which operates upon it sways and determines it previous to its own determination so that what is done from motive cannot be either virtuous or vicious besides if the acts of the will are excited by motives those motives are the causes of those acts of the will which makes the acts of the will necessary as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause and if the influence and power of the motive causes the volition then the influence of the motive determines volition and volition does not determine itself and so is not free in the sense of Armenians as has been largely shown already and consequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious the supposition which has already been taken notice of as an insufficient evasion in other cases would be in like manner impertinently alleged in this case namely the supposition that liberty consists in a power of suspending action for the present in order to deliberation if it should be said though it be true that the will is under a necessity of finally following the strongest motive yet it may for the present forbear to act upon the motive presented till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it and compare its real weight with the merit of other motives i answer as follows here again it must be remembered that if determining thus to suspend and consider be that act of the will wherein alone liberty is exercised then in this all virtue and vice must consist and the acts that follow this consideration and are the effects of it being necessary are no more virtuous or vicious than some good or bad events which happen when they are fast asleep and are the consequences of what they did when they were awake therefore i would hear observed two things one to suppose that all virtue and vice in every case consists in determining whether to take time for consideration or not is not agreeable to common sense for according to such a supposition the most horrid crimes adultery murder sodomy blasphemy etc do not at all consist in the horrid nature of the things themselves but only in the neglect of thorough consideration before they were perpetrated which brings their viciousness to a small matter and makes all crimes equal if it be said that neglect of consideration when such heinous evils are proposed to choice is worse than in other cases i answered this is inconsistent as it supposes the very thing to be which at the same time is supposed not to be it supposes all moral evil all viciousness and heinousness does not consist merely in the want of consideration it supposes some crimes in themselves in their own nature to be more heinous than others antecedent to consideration or in consideration which lays the person under a previous obligation to consider in some cases more than others to if it were so that all virtue and vice in every case consisted only in the act of the will whereby it determines whether to consider or know it would not alter the case in the least as to the present argument for still in this act of the will on this determination it is induced by some motive and necessarily follows the strongest motive and so is necessarily even in that act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious one thing more i would observe concerning the inconsistence of Armenian notions of moral agency with the influence of motives i suppose none will deny that it is possible for such powerful motives to be said before the mind exhibited in so strong a light and under such advantageous circumstances as to be invincible and such as the mind cannot but yield to in this case Armenians will doubtless say liberty is destroyed and if so then if motives are exhibited with half so much power they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength and go halfway towards destroying it if a thousand degrees of motive abolish all liberty then 500 take it half away if one degree of the influence of motive does not at all infringe or diminish liberty then no more do two degrees for nothing doubled is still nothing and if two degrees do not diminish the will's liberty no more do four eight sixteen or six thousand for nothing however multiplied comes to but nothing if there be nothing in the nature motive or moral suasion that is at all opposite to liberty then the greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty but if there be somewhat in the nature of the thing against liberty then the least degree of it hurts in some degree and consequently diminishes virtue if invincible motives to that action which is good take away all the freedom of the act and so all the virtue of it then the more forcible the motives are so much the worse so much the less virtue and the weaker the motives are the better for the cause of virtue and none is best of all now let it be considered whether these things are agreeable to common sense if it should be allowed that there are some instances where in the soul chooses without any motive what virtue can there be in such a choice i am sure there is no prudence or wisdom in it such a choice is made for no good end being made for no end at all if it were for any end the view of the end would be the motive exciting to the act and if the act be for no good end and so from no good aim then there is no good intention in it and therefore according to all our natural notions of virtue no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke which is driven to and fro by the wind without any aim or end in the thing moved and which knows not whether nor wherefore it is moved corollary one by these things it appears that the argument against the Calvinists taken from the use of councils exhortations invitations expostulations etc so much insisted on by Armenians is truly against themselves for these things can operate no other way to any good effect than as in them is exhibited motive and inducement tending to excite and determine the acts of the will but it follows on their principles that the acts of will excited by such causes cannot be virtuous because so far as they are from these they are not from the will's self-determining power hence it will follow that it is not worthwhile to offer any arguments to persuade men to any virtuous volition or voluntary action it is in vain to set before them the wisdom and amiableness of ways of virtue or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice this notion of liberty and moral agency frustrates all endeavors to draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion precept or example for though these things may induce them to what is materially virtuous yet at the same time they take away the form of virtue because they destroy liberty as they by their own power put the will out of its equilibrium determine and turn the scale and take the work of self-determining power out of its hands and the clearer the instructions given the more powerful the arguments used and the more moving the persuasions or examples the more likely they are to frustrate their own design because they have so much the greater tendency to put the will out of its balance to hinder its freedom of self-determination and so to exclude the very form of virtue and the essence of what so ever is praiseworthy so it clearly follows from these principles that god has no hand in any man's virtue nor does it all promote it either by a physical or moral influence that none of the moral methods he uses with men to promote virtue in the world have any tendency to the attainment of that end that all the instructions he has given men from the beginning of the world to this day by prophets or apostles or by his son jesus christ that all his councils invitations promises threatenings warnings and expostulations that all means he is used with men in ordinances or providences ye all influences of his spirit ordinary and extraordinary have had no tendency at all to excite any one virtuous act of the mind or to promote anything morally good and commendable in any respect for there is no way that these or any other means can promote virtue but one of these three either one by physical operation on the heart but all effects that are wrought in men in this way have no virtue in them by the concurring voice of all armenians or to morally by exhibiting motives to the understanding to excite good acts in the will but it has been demonstrated that volitions excited by motives are necessary and not excited by a self-moving power and therefore by their principles there is no virtue in them or three by merely giving the will and opportunity to determine itself concerning the objects proposed either to choose or reject by its own uncaused unmoved uninfluenced self-determination and if this be all then all those means do know more to promote virtue than vice for they do nothing but give the will opportunity to determine itself either way either too good or bad without laying it under any bias to either and so there is really as much of an opportunity given to determine in favor of evil as of good thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will certainly follow from the armenian doctrine which they charge on others namely that god acts an inconsistent part in using so many councils warnings invitations and treaties etc with centers to induce them to forsake sin and turn to the ways of virtue and that all are insincere and fallacious it will follow from their doctrine that god does these things when he knows at the same time that they have no manner of tendency to promote the effect he seems to aim at yea knows that if they have any influence this very influence will be inconsistent with such an effect and will prevent it but what an imputation of insincerity would this fix on him who is infinitely holy and true so that there's is the doctrine which if pursued in its consequences does horribly reflect on the most high and fix on him the charge of hypocrisy and not the doctrine of the Calvinist according to their frequent and vehement exclamations and invectives corollary to from what has been observed in this section it again appears that Armenian principles and notions when fairly examined and pursued in their demonstrable consequences do evidently shut all virtue out of the world and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing in any case or that any such thing should ever be conceived of for by these principles the very notion of virtue or vice implies absurdity and contradiction for it is absurd in itself and contrary to common sense to suppose a virtuous act of mind without any good intention or aim and by their principles it is absurd to suppose a virtuous act with a good intention or aim for to act for an end is to act from a motive so that if we rely on these principles there can be no virtuous act with a good design and end and it is self-evident there can be none without consequently there can be no virtuous act at all corollary three it is manifest that Armenian notions of moral agency and the being of a faculty of will cannot consist together and that if there can be any such thing as either a virtuous or vicious act it cannot be an act of the will no will can be at all concerned in it for that act which is performed without inclination without motive without end must be performed without any concern of the will to suppose an act of the will without these implies a contradiction if the soul in its act has no motive or end then in that act as was observed before it seeks nothing goes after nothing exerts no inclination to anything and this implies that in that act it desires nothing and chooses nothing so that there is no active choice in the case and that is as much as to say there is no active will in the case which very effectively shuts all vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe in as much as according to this there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the will is concerned and according to the plainest dictates of reason and the light of nature and also the principles of armenians themselves there can be no virtuous or vicious act wherein the will is not concerned and therefore there is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts at all corollary four if none of the moral actions of intelligent beings are influenced by either previous inclination or motive another strange thing will follow and this is that God not only cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his creatures but he can make no conjecture can give no probable guests concerning them for all conjecture in things of this nature must depend on some discerning or apprehension of these two things previous disposition and motive which as has been observed Armenian notions of moral agency in their real consequence all together exclude end of part three section seven part four section one of the freedom of the will by Jonathan Edwards this LibriVox recording is in the public domain part four wherein the chief grounds of the reasonings of armenians in support and defense of the four mentioned notions of liberty moral agency etc and against the opposite doctrine are considered section one the essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will lies not in their cause but their nature one main foundation of the reasons which are brought to establish the four mentioned notions of liberty virtue vice etc is a supposition that the virtuousness of the dispositions or acts of the will consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts of the will but wholly in the origin or cause of them so that if the disposition of the mind or acts of the will be never so good yet if the cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue there is nothing virtuous or appraise worthy in it and on the contrary if the will in its inclination or acts be never so bad yet unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault there is nothing vicious or blame worthy in it hence their grand objection and pretended demonstration or self evidence against any virtue and commendableness or vice and blame worthiness of those habits or acts of the will which are not from some virtuous or vicious determination of the will itself now if this matter be well considered it will appear to be altogether a mistake yay a gross absurdity and that it is most certain that if there be any such thing as a virtuous or vicious disposition or volition of mind the virtuousness or viciousness of them consists not in the origin or cause of these things but in the nature of them if the essence of virtuousness or commendableness and of viciousness or fault does not lie in the nature of the dispositions or acts of mind which are said to be our virtue or our fault but in their cause then it is certain it lies nowhere at all thus for instance if the vice of a vicious act of will lies not in the nature of the act but the cause so that its being of a bad nature will not make it at all our fault unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours as its cause or something in us that is our fault then for the same reason neither can the viciousness of that cause lie in the nature of the thing itself but in its cause that evil determination of ours is not our fault merely because it is of a bad nature unless it arises from some cause in us that is our fault and when we are come to this higher cause still the reason of the thing holds good though this cause be of a bad nature yet we are not at all to blame on that account unless it arises from something faulty in us nor yet can blame worthiness lie in the nature of this cause but in the cause of that and thus we must drive faultiness back from step to step from a lower cause to a higher in infinitum and that is thoroughly to banish it from the world and to allow it no possibility of existence anywhere in the universality of things on these principles vice or moral evil cannot consist in anything that is an effect because fault does not consist in the nature of things but in their cause as well as because effects are necessary being unavoidably connected with their cause therefore the cause only is to blame and so it follows that faultiness can lie only in that cause which is a cause only and no effect of anything nor yet can it lie in this for then it must lie in the nature of the thing itself not in its being from any determination of ours nor anything faulty in us which is the cause nor indeed from any cause at all for by this supposition it is no effect and has no cause and thus he that will maintain it is not the nature of habits or acts of will that makes them virtuous or faulty but the cause must immediately run himself out of his own assertion and in maintaining it will insensibly contradict and deny it this is certain that if effects are vicious and faulty not from their nature or from anything inherent in them but because they are from a bad cause it must be on account of the badness of the cause a bad effect in the will must be bad because the cause is bad or of an evil nature or has badness as a quality inherent in it and a good effect in the will must be good by reason of the goodness of the cause or its being of a good kind and nature and if this be what is meant the very supposition of fault and praise lying not in the nature of the thing but the cause contradicts itself and does at least resolve the essence of virtue and vice into the nature of things and supposes it originally to consist in that and if a cavaler has a mind to run from the absurdity by saying no the fault of the thing which is the cause lies not in this that the cause itself is of an evil nature but that the cause is evil in that sense that it is from another bad cause still the absurdity will follow him for if so then the cause before charged is at once acquitted and all the blame must be laid to the higher cause and must consist in that being evil or of an evil nature so now we are come again to lay the blame of the thing blame worthy to the nature of the thing and not to the cause and if any is so foolish as to go higher still and ascend from step to step till he is come to that which is the first cause concerned in the whole affair and will say all the blame lies in that then at last he must be forced to own that the faultiness of the thing which he supposes alone blame worthy lies wholly in the nature of the thing and not in the original or cause of it for the supposition is that it has no original it is determined by no act of ours is caused by nothing faulty in us being absolutely without any cause and so the race is at an end but the evader is taken in his flight it is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind that moral evil with its desert of dislike and abhorrence and all its other ill-deservings consist in a certain deformity in the nature of certain dispositions of the heart and acts of the will and not in the deformity of something else diverse from the very thing itself which deserves abhorrence supposed to be the cause of it which would be absurd because that would be to suppose a thing that is innocent and not evil is truly evil and faulty because another thing is evil it implies a contradiction for it would be to suppose the very thing which is morally evil and blame worthy is innocent and not blame worthy but that's something else which is its cause is only to blame to say that vice does not consist in the thing which is vicious but in its cause is the same as to say that vice does not consist in vice but in that which produces it it is true a cause may be to blame for being the cause of vice it may be wickedness and the cause that it produces wickedness but it would imply a contradiction to suppose that these two are the same individual wickedness the wicked act of the cause and producing wickedness is one wickedness and the wickedness produced if there be any produced is another and therefore the wickedness of the latter does not lie in the former but is distinct from it and the wickedness of both lies in the evil nature of the things which are wicked the thing which makes sin hateful is that by which it deserves punishment which is but the expression of hatred and that which renders virtue lovely is that on account of which it is fit to receive praise and reward which are but the expressions of esteem and love but that which makes vice hateful is its hateful nature and that which renders virtue lovely is its amiable nature it is a certain beauty or deformity that are inherent in that good or evil will which is the soul of virtue and vice and not in the occasion of it which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem praise or dispraise according to the common sense of mankind if the cause or occasion of the rise of an hateful disposition or active will be also hateful suppose another antecedent evil will that is entirely another sin and deserves punishment by itself under a distinct consideration there is worthiness of dispraise in the nature of an evil volition and not holy in some foregoing act which is its cause otherwise the evil volition which is the effect is no moral evil any more than sickness or some other natural calamity which arises from a cause morally evil thus for instance in gratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise according to common sense not because something as bad or worse than in gratitude was the cause that produced it but because it is hateful in itself by its own inherent deformity so the love of virtue is amiable and worthy of praise not merely because something else went before this love of virtue in our minds which caused it to take place there for instance our own choice we chose to love virtue and by some method or other wrought ourselves into the love of it but because of the amuableness and condescency of such a disposition and inclination of heart if that was the case that we did choose to love virtue and so produced that love in ourselves this choice itself could be no otherwise amiable or praise worthy than as love to virtue or some other amiable inclination was exercised and implied in it if that choice was amiable at all it must be so on account of some amiable quality in the nature of the choice if we choose to love virtue not in love to virtue or anything that was good and exercise no sort of good disposition in the choice the choice itself was not virtuous nor worthy of any praise according to common sense because the choice was not of a good nature it may not be improper here to take notice of something said by an author that has lately made a mighty noise in america a necessary holiness says he is no holiness adam could not be originally created in righteousness and true holiness because he must choose to be righteous before he could be righteous and therefore he must exist he must be created yet he must exercise thought and reflection before he was righteous there is much more to the same effect pages 437 438 439 440 if these things are so it will certainly follow that the first choosing to be righteous is no righteous choice there is no righteousness or holiness in it because no choosing to be righteous goes before it for he plainly speaks of choosing to be righteous as what must go before righteousness and that which follows the choice being the effect of the choice cannot be righteousness or holiness for an effect is a thing necessary and cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its cause and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the cause and he says a necessary holiness is no holiness so that neither cannot choice of righteousness be righteousness or holiness nor can anything that is consequent on that choice and the effect of it be righteousness or holiness nor can anything that is without choice be righteousness or holiness so that by his seen all righteousness and holiness is at once shut out of the world and no door left open by which it can ever possibly enter into the world I suppose the way that men came to entertain this absurd notion with respect to internal inclinations and volitions themselves or notions that imply these that the essence of their moral good or evil lies not in their nature but their cause was that it is indeed a very plain dictative common sense that it is so with respect to all outward actions and sensible motions of the body that the moral good or evil of them does not lie at all in the motions themselves which taken by themselves are nothing about moral nature and the essence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them lies in those internal dispositions and volitions which are the cause of them now being always used to determine this without hesitation or dispute concerning external actions which in the common use of language are signified by such phrases as men's actions or their doings hence when they came to speak of volitions and internal exercises of their inclinations under the same denomination of their actions or what they do they unwarily determine the case must also be the same with these as with external actions not considering the vast difference in the nature of the case if any shall still object and say why is it not necessary that the cause should be considered in order to determine whether anything be worthy of blame or praise is it agreeable to reason and common sense that a man is to be praised or blamed for that of which he is not the cause or author i answer such phrases as being the cause being the author and the like are ambiguous they are most verbally understood for being the designing voluntary cause or caused by antecedent choice and it is most certain that men are not in this sense the causes or authors of the first act of their wills in any case as certain as anything is or ever can be for nothing can be more certain than that a thing is not before it is nor a thing of the same kind before the first thing of that kind and so no choice before the first choice as the phrase being the author may be understood not of being the producer by an antecedent act of will but as a person may be said to be the author of the act of will itself by his being the immediate agent or the being that is acting or in exercise in that act if the phrase of being the author is used to signify this then doubtless common sense requires men being the authors of their own acts of will in order to their being esteem worthy of praise or dispraise on account of them and common sense teaches that they must be the authors of external actions in the former sense namely they're being the causes of them by an act of will or choice in order to their being justly blamed or praised but it teaches no such thing with respect to the acts of the will themselves but this may appear more manifest by the things which will be observed in the following section end of part four section one